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Abstract 
The Development of Sociomoral Knowledge: 
A Cognitive-Structural Approach 
Hugh .Rosen 
This dissertation organizes in a conceptually and 
historically coherent form the available knowledge on socio-
moral development. The purpose in doing so is to bring the 
information into the mainstream of social work education and 
practice.                   is placed upon the significance and com-
patibility of sociomoral development to the field of social 
work from interventive, psychological, and philosophical 
perspectives. It is viewed as congenial to ego psychology 
and as fitting within the ecosystems orientation being advanced 
by contemporary social work theorists. Its potential as a 
heuristic model for generating new and effective methods of 
intervention across a diverse range of settings and populations 
is elaborated upon. 
The material synthesized in this dissertation is organized 
and presented within the cognitive-structural framework of 
Jean Piaget. At the heart of the synthesis, however, is the 
moral developmental psychology. and                       of Lawrence 
Koh1berg. The six stages of moral development which Kohlberg's 
longitudinal research have led him to identify are elaborated 
upon at length. They are posited as universal stages in light 
- - ------------------------- ----- --- -- ----.------ ---- -1--- -- --- --- --------. 
2 
of the extant cross-cultural validation. Although only a 
relatively small number of people 'pass through all six stages, 
it is necessary that passage through each stage be in an un-
varying sequence. Each stage signifies a particular conception 
of justice that is more differentiated and integrated than the 
previous one and is, hence, said to be more adequate for re-
solving competing claims between individuals or between an 
individual and the general welfare. In order to successfully 
achieve any given stag·a, it is necessary to first arrive at a 
corresponding stage of social perspectivism, which is the ability 
to take another's or a societal point of view. Therefore, the 
relevant work on perspectivism of Mead, Feffer, Flavell, and 
Selman is examined. The relationship between cognition and 
moral development, as well as between moral judgment and be-
havior, is also explored. 
To provide depth and full comprehension of Kohlberg's 
work, the cognitive-structural developmental psychology of 
Piaget is formulated, followed by an extensive presentation of 
Piaget's early and only material on moral judgment, which serves 
as a point of departure for Kohlberg. An analysis is offered 
to differentiate areas of agreement and disagreement between 
Piaget's and Kohlberg's basic findings on moral development, 
the latter position representing a refinement and extension of 
the                
One section of the dissertation is devoted exclupively to 
marshaling criticisms against Kohlberg's methodological practices 
. - ._------_._-------._---_._._._---------_.,,------_._-- -------------- --.--.--- _. __ .. _-- ---- .------------. --. --_. __ . 
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and the theory supporting his psychology and philosophy. A 
related section provides a comparative analysis of alternate 
approaches to moral development, focusing specifically upon 
psychoanalytic and social learning models. ·In effect, the 
presentation of opposing approaches, held to be viable by 
their proponents, also constitutes·critical commentary. 
Methods of intervention are classified into psycho-
dynamic, interpersonal, and organizational categories. 
Assignment of an interventive method is more a matter of 
emphasis, however, than mutually exclusive                        
It is urged that the Piaget-Kohlberg sociomoral model, 
based upon a cognitive-structural developmental psychology, be 
integrated into social work education. It would contribute 
to professional education a relevant, but neglected, body of 
knowledge and wourd also provide a means for facilitating the 
sociomoral advance of students. Most importantly, this 
organismic-erivironmental model of human development would.pro-
vide new strategies of intervention that could be readily 
assimilated to the philosophy of contemporary social work 
practice. 
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Introduction 
Social work is predicated upon a respect for persons. 
It holds a conviction in the individual's self-determination 
and potential for growth. It seeks the psychosocial enhance-
ment of people functioning within a just society. These be-
liefs and ideals will be found reflected in this dissertation. 
They will be treated as psychological realities and philosophical 
values. 
The exposition in this dissertation is upon the develop-
ment of sociomoral knowledge as conceived in the cognitive-
structural tradition. Social work has struggled over the 
            to create an independent body of knowledge based upon 
its experience in serving a diversity of populations across 
a wide range of disparate settings. It has also done a yoe-
man's job of eclectically selecting relevant theory for in-
tegration and application in its practice from an                          
amount of material amidst a perennial knowledge explosion. 
The development of sociomoral knowledge is a significant area 
from the behavioral sciences which has been neglected, however. 
Psychologically it is compatible with ego psychology and phi-
losophically it meshes well with the profession's aspirations. 
Further, it has distinct viability from the standpoint of pro-
viding direction for intervention at the clinical level. 
In this prelude I wish simply to provide an orientation 
I 
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to the organization of the dissertation. All that follows 
is an amplification of these few words. Although each chap-
ter may be read in isolation, the sequence of chapters builds 
a hierarchy of knowledge which reflects the character of the 
very subject of the dissertation. Therefore, maximum compre-
hension and appreciation is likely to follow from reading the 
chapters in order. 
Because of the very nature of this subject area there 
is an inherent logic which strongly urges.a particular ap-
proach. Sociomoral knowledge is embedded in cognitive-
structural development. Its theoretical underpinnings are 
rooted in this field with its emphasis upon stages, inter-
action, adaptation, structure, differentiation, integration, 
hierarchy, and equilibration. Therefore, a general pre-
sentation of the theoretical foundation of cognitive-struc-
tural development is essential. This is also a requirement 
for comprehending sociomoral development because specific 
stages of such development cannot be achieved without the 
presence of the appropriately corresponding cognitive period; 
although the presence of any cognitive period does not assure 
a corresponding level of moral development. 
Although this dissertation is not exclusively on the 
work of a single theorist, the central figure is Lawrence 
Kohlberg, the leading contemporary moral developmentalist. 
His work draws heavily upon Jean Piaget's genetic epistemo-
logy in general, as outlined in the first chapter, and speci-
fically- upon -P-iaget!. s_ .. _only book _on .mor_al                                     I. _ "?ll:tch .. _____ . 
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is discussed in the second chapter. The influences are unmis-
. takable and a scholarly grasp of Kohlberg demands an acquain-· 
tance with the earlier theorist's research and observations 
on moral development, first published in 1932. 
Similarly to what has been stated above in relation to 
cognitive-structural development, the construction of social 
knowledge is also a necessary, but not sufficient condition 
for·moral reasoning. Egocentrism, the inability to take 
another's point       view, is present in varying forms at each 
level of development. As egocentrism       one level declines, 
a step forward is evident in the developing child's ability 
to take another's point of view. This increasing capacity 
for perspectivism undergoes qualitative advances in develop-
ment as each new form of egocentrism is conquered. In order 
to adequately reason morally at any given level of a Kohlberg-
ian stage the corresponding stage of role-taking ability must 
be achieved. ··It follows logically, therefore, that one can-
not fully comprehend moral development without a knowledge of 
the acquisition of social role-taking skills and structures. 
The work of Mead,                 Feffer and Selman will be examined 
in Chapter Three to provide the necessary orientation to this 
area. 
The areas of cognitive development and role-taking 
ability logically dovetail into a full exposition of Kohlberg's 
highly researched position on moral development in Chapter 
Four. The six universal stages are                   in depth. Both 
their philosophical and psychological foundations are explained. 
4 
The developing nature of the "justice structure" is analyzed. 
There are several major themes that dominate the 
literature on Kohlberg's research and these are examined at 
some length in Chapter Five. These themes are as follows: 
the relationship between moral stage and action, the hierar-
chical nature of moral stages, and the relationship between 
moral and cognitive development. 
In Chapter Six a critique is presented on Kohlberg's 
methodology and theoretical position. I have attempted in 
the Chapter to do justice to the serious criticisms that 
have appeared in various quarters. Therefore, I have avoided 
offering point by point rebuttals on Kohlberg's behalf. In 
a very real sense, all of the Chapters preceding the criticism 
constitute a response. 
To broaden the scope of approaches to moral develop-
ment, I have presented in Chapter Seven the psychoanalytic 
and social learning viewpoints. Both of these psychologies 
are extensive and continue to be enlarged upon by contem-
pory figures. An exhaustive treatment of either would be 
beyond the parameters of this dissertation. Therefore, I 
have emphasized the two theorists whom I consider to be the 
major contributors. In the case of psychoanalysis this is 
Freud who founded that school of thought and is now deceased; 
while in the case of social learning theory I have chosen 
Bandura who has built upon a rich tradition of predecessors 
and who, very much alive, continues to e!fectively refine the 
- ---- --.------ model.-- - - - --- -- - - ----- --.-- ----- - ---------- - _______________________    _____ _ 
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The two final chapters take a 'pragmatic turn. Various 
perspectives on intervention are described in the first of these. 
Interventive theories and practices at psychodynamic, inter-
personal, and organizational levels are examined. The next and 
last chapter explores the salience of the Piaget-Kohlberg 
paradigm to social work practice in terms of application to 
diverse settings and problems. Its congruence with a contemporary 
ecosystems orientation is underscored. A closing suggestion is 
made urging that it be integrated into social work curricula 
both as a body of knowledge to be learned and as a process to 
facilitate the student's own sociomoral development. 
It is an underlying premise of this dissertation that the 
sociomoral developmental system of Kohlberg, based upon Piaget's. 
constructivist psychology, is greatly relevant to the lives of 
social workers and the people they are committed to helping •. 
Therefore, the scope of the Piaget-Kohlberg model is presented 
through a conceptual organization that I hope the reader will 
find both personally and professionally meaningful. Comprehension 
of the model has the potential for transforming what we do and 
.how we view. it. 
CHAPTER ONE 
A·COGNITIVE-STRUCTURAL FOUNDATION 
                              and Epistemology 
The heart of this dissertation, the work of Lawrence 
Kohlberg, pulsates within the body of cognitive-structural 
developmental psychology. In order to understand Kohlberg's 
contribution to sociomoral knowledge in depth, it is necessary 
that one be familiar with the historical and theoretical frame-. . 
work which encases it. In this chapter I will present salient 
aspects of the epochal work of Jean Piaget (1896- .), from 
which Kohlberg has drawn so freely in pursuing his own in-
novative findings. The following chapter will concentrate 
exclusively on Piaget's theory of moral development, since it 
has served as the point of departure for Koh1berg's investi-
gations into that field. 
Both Piaget and Kohlberg adopt a theoretical position 
known as structuralism. A structuralist approach cuts across 
disciplines and has been applied to such wide-ranging areas 
as mathematics, biology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, 
and literature. Two major sources on the subject of struc-
turalism, Piaget and Gardner, 1 offer useful expositions which 
lJean Piaget, Structuralism, trans. C. Maschler (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1971): Howard Gardner, The ·Quest for Mind .- .. --------.. --.. --- - (New-York·: Alfred· A.- Knopf, ···1973) • - -. -.-. - . - _. ... .- - --.- ----... -- ---.-
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identify its essentials. Structuralism is a method of 
analyzing and understanding phenomena rather than a dogma 
of content. The structuralist scans the surface manifesta-
tions of things or               and penetrates below these to grasp . 
underlying order and significance which form a meaningful 
pattern. Tbe superficial detail and-d,iversity that appear 
on the surface prove to be less significant than the co-
herent pattern of the deep-structures which give rise to what 
is overtly perceived. The submerged patterned relationships 
of whatever is under consideration are what constitute the 
sources of reality and account for observed regularities 
rather than do the atomized surface details. Emphasis is 
placed upon the self-regulating system of relationships and 
transformations amongst the interdependent elements comprising 
the totality or whole of a phenomenon. 
Prominent amongst modern structuralists are Chomsky, a 
linguist, and Levi-Straus, an anthropologist. Both believe , 
in the existence of deep universal                       within the human 
organism which account for formal patterned regularities in 
language and cultural behaviors, despite the manifest varia-
tion of peoples across the world and through time. However 
congenial this outlook may appear to be to the work of Jean 
Piaget, the Geneva genius breaks sharply from it on one ex-
tremely vital issue. The theories of Chomsky and Levi-Straus 
are agenetic. - They do not deal with the genesis of those 
underlying structures which govern behavior. Piaget, to the 
contrary, sees the emergence of structures deriving from a 
continual process of construction. This process is auto-
regulated and is promoted by the organism's interaction with 
its environment. 
Piaget is a genetic epistemologist before all else. 
Regardless of how valuable his contribution may be to de-
velopmental psychology, his own avowed primary aim has been 
to study the nature of knowledge and its origins. He chose 
to work with children because approaching his goal this way 
seemed to be the best means for achieving it. The work of 
Piaget and that of what has become known as his Geneva school 
is set·apart from that of the famous epistemological philo-
sophers who preceded him in that it rests upon extensive re-
search. This is true despite the sometimes intimidating 
features of its theoretical components. In effect, he intro-
duced a scientific approach to epistemology, with an emphasis 
upon the development of knowledge in each individual from 
birth through adolescence. Piaget has attempted to avoid the 
pitfalls of either empiricism or rationalism which great 
thinkers in the tradition of Western philosophy had previously 
fallen into. Rationalists, such as Plato, Spinoza, and 
Leibnitz formulated theories of knowledge which denied sensory 
experience as a source of reality. Instead they identified 
a priori mental activity divorced from sensory ·data as the 
true mode of acquiring knowledge. In fact, those familiar 
with Plato's illustration of the cave will recall that he 
went so far as to characterize sensorial impressions as 
----.---------.---. - - having -distracting -·and- -distorting··effeccs upon -the -ep-istemic- ______ c 
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subject. Embracing the empiricist tradition in epistemo-
logy are such theorists as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, each 
of whom" stressed the role of sensory                         in the ac-
quisition of knowledge.               rejected the notion of innate 
ideas and likened the mind to a blank slate which receives 
impressions from experience in the environment, the ultimate 
source of ideas. Simple ideas thus" derived from sensory 
data are combined into aggregates of complex ideas. These 
complex ideas do not follow in their formation "any predeter-
mined pattern of organization or sequence. In the work of 
Kant we find an attempt to reconcile these two divergent 
orientations to epistemological theorizing. While acknowledg-
ing a contribution to                     of sensory experience, Kant 
maintained that we do not come to know objective reality as 
it exists independently of the knowing subject. The ex-
planation for this assertion resides in his contention that 
we have certain a priori intuitions and categories of mind 
which restructure and impose meaning upon the incoming data. 
Conceptions of time, space, and causality, for example, are 
innate to the human mind and these assure that experience will 
be ordered and processed in a particular way, exclusive of any 
alternative possibilities. The emphasis upon the knowing sub-
ject actively participating in construing knowledge from his 
experience justifies characterizing Kant as an intellectual 
                    of Piaget. In a later chapter we will see that 
Kant also plays a significant role in Kohlberg's theory of 
moral development. However, as with Chomsky and Levi-Straus, 
10 
Piaget makes a concentrated effort to differentiate his 
epistemological position from that of Kant's in one major 
                  Piaget thoroughly rejects any notion of innate 
ideas or structures. Yet this in no way brings him into the 
empiricist camp. 
Piaget is a radical constructivist who posits the con-
tinuous development of new structures out of old ones, which 
become more complexly organized into increasingly adaptive 
superordinate structures. Emergent cognitive structures 
usher in qualitatively different ways of thinking. Intellec-
tual development is not a simple matter of quantitative in-
crease in intelligence. Young children comprehend reality in 
ways that are qualitatively different from those in middle 
childhood, who in turn comprehend reality differently from 
adolescents. The child's cognitive developmental level, there-
fore, confers meaning upon experience, while at the same time 
limiting the scope and depth of that meaning. What Piaget has 
proposed is quite different from Skinner's radical behaviorism 
with its total exclusion of internal mediating variables and 
emphasis upon operant conditioning. It also differs essentially 
from the variety of stimulus-response learning theory models 
which, along with the work of ·Skinner, have their roots in 
associationistic Lockean epistemology. In recent years social 
learning theory, through the effbrts of Bandura, Mischel and 
other leading psychologists, has expanded the behavioristic 
model to introduce a strong focus upon cognitive mediating 
... ---- -- .--_ .. -.------variables_and_.modeling __ .in_.the __                                                         ._._.                                  _. ___ ._._. ___ _ 
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shift in behaviorism one should be careful to recognize that 
social learning theory lacks completely the developmental per-
spective that is the hallmark of Piaget's psychology. Further, 
while it allows that there occurs an internal processing of 
information, it does not posit the existence of structures. 
Hence, there is nothing to be developed over time. 
What is a structure? Kohlberg explicitly states, 
"Structure refers to the                 characteristic of shape, 
pattern, or organization of response rather than to the rate 
or intensity of response or its pairing with particular 
stimuli"l. ·In elaborating further, he goes on to say, ..... 
• cognitions' are internally organized wholes or systems of 
internal relations, that is,                       Cognitive structures 
are rules of processing information or for connecting ex-
perienced events .. 2 . The developing changes which structures 
undergo comprise the stage theory in Piaget's work, which 
shall now be examined. 
1Lawrence Kohlberg, ".Early Education: A Cognitive 
Developmental View", in Intellectual· Development, ed. 
P.·S. Sears (New York:John Wiley & Sons, 1971), p. 104. 
2Ibid• 
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Developmental Stages and Periods 
Cognitive structural development progresses in an un-
varying sequence. In the passage from one stage to the next, 
lower order structures are integrated into a higher order 
system of structural wholes. The rate of progress will vary 
from individual to individual, as well as from culture to 
culture. The demands of the environment and the nature of 
personal experience undergone by the interacting                  
within it will greatly affect this rate of cognitive deve1op-. 
mente However, according to Piaget there is an inherent 
logic to cognitive-structural development which does not per-
mit deviation from the sequence with which structures are found 
to evolve. Therefore, although general age trends can be 
identified in development, age cannot reliably be utilized as 
a predictive measure of stage in any given individual. To 
know what stage a child is capable of performing at, the in-
vestigator must make a cognitive diagnosis of that particular 
child.. In fact, making an accurate stage diagnosis is an 
incredibly complex matter. The more one becomes familiar with 
the intricacies of the cognitive developmental field, the more 
this becomes apparent. For example, if a child does not per-
form at a given level during an assessment, he may possess the 
structural competence and yet not be exhibiting it for any 
number of reasons. Methodologically, this may be termed a 
false negative. Conversely, there have been established in-
stances in which subjects ostensibly appear to demonstrate a 
-------- ._------ - ------- --------------- _. -------------- ------- ------------------------------ -- -- - -- -----
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cognitive capabillty, which proves to be misleading upon 
further examination. This situation is known as a false 
positive. Smedslund and Flavelll have both provided fruit-
ful explorations of this important area which would lead 
down many byways were it to be pursued further here. 
Piaget's assertion of the universality of stages is          
times misinterpreted to mean that all people will pass through 
all stages. The achievment of arriving at the final stage of 
cognitive development is by no means assured. All that can 
be accurately predicted from the theory is that as far as one 
has progressed, he will have followed the same sequence of 
development as anyone else who has reached the same end" point. 
There are four periods of development formulated in 
Piaget's work, each one marking a major qualitative advance 
over the child's previous way of knowing the world. Piaget 
has concentrated primarily upon the child's construction of 
                                        the physical world. In more recent years, 
"while Piaget's indefatigable efforts continue unabated in the 
.same direction, there has been an intensive surge of activity 
attempting to extend his cognitive-developmental approach to 
social and moral domains. The interrelatedness of all these 
efforts will become increasingly                   in the course of 
.: ... 
this dissert"ation. 
lJan Smedslund, "Psychological Diagnostics",              
logical Bulletin 71 (1969): 237-487 John H. Flavell, Stage 
Related Properties of Cognitive Development", Cognitive 
Psychology 2 (1971): 421-53. 
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In his numerous expositions of developmental periods, 
Piaget is most respectful of whatever stage the child happens 
to be at. He does not view the child as simply being wrong 
when a response does not measure up to the highest level of 
cognitive functioning. Precisely because it is necessary to 
invariably pass through each stage if one is ever to arrive 
at the next, he accepts the child's present state as the 
natural way of knowing for that child at that time in his 
life. In fact, Piaget is somewhat amused at what he calls 
"The American Question" a recurrent theme whenever he finds 
himself lecturing in the united States. The question is about 
whether we can speed up development. It is not one that holds 
much interest for Piaget, himself. Most of Piaget's studies 
have been within what Hartmann would call "the average ex-
pectable environment". Given such an environme·nt, it is 
reasonable to expect that development will progress fairly 
well. It does not follow in comparing two individuals of the 
same age at the same level of cognitive development that if 
one had arrived at that point earlier than the other he would 
necessarily be more intelligent, in a Piagetian sense, than 
the one who moved through the stages more slowly. Despite 
Piaget's serene position on this matter, there have been 
numerous training studies in which attempts have been made 
to accelerate development, conducted in the United States, and 
prominent members of the Geneva School have recently been 
active in such efforts as well . 
. ---.. --.- .. --- - -·-···-·-·----The-developmenta·l-periods·--presented-·--below--have--been..-----.------._._. ____ . 
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-elaborated upon by Piaget in innumerable works throughout 
his professional career extending over sixty years. Often 
he has devoted entire books to an exposition concentrating on 
only one period or cognitive dimension. Fortunately there 
exists a fairly recent and concise summary by Piaget and 
Inhelder and in addition there is now available for the first 
time a comprehensive anthology of his works. l 
The Sensorimotor Period 
The sensorimotor period covers the phases of infancy 
ranging from birth to approximately eighteen months to two 
years. At birth the child exists in a virtual state of 
radical egocentrism. He experiences everything in his small 
universe as an extension of his own body and yet he completely 
lacks any sense of self. Piaget views the early infant as 
being in a state of narcissism, yet without there being any 
Narcissus. There is no distinction made between perceptual 
sensations and the stimuli in the environment from which they 
derive. Entering the world without any innate cognitive 
structures and' equipped only with such primitive reflexes as 
sucking, grasping, and lookiIJg, the infant. _swif.tiy begins to 
explore his world. Gradually he begins to differentiate bet-
ween his own body and that which exists beyond it. Reflexes 
encountering resistance from the material begin to adapt 
lJean Piaget & Barbel Inhelder,' The Psychology of the 
Child, trans. H. Weaver (New York: Basic Books, 1969); ,Howard " Gruber & J. Jacques Voneche, eds. The Essential Piaget (New 
York: Basic Books, 1977). 
16 
to the environment. Interesting and novel chance encounters 
with objects are reproduced to satisfy curiosity and acquire 
greater mastery. These reinstated chance encounters are 
called circular reactions, a term Piaget borrowed from J. M. 
Baldwin, a precursor -to g-enetic epistemolog-y-. Circular -r.e-
actions are body-centered at first, as when. the child attempts 
to reinsert his thumb into his mouth once it has fallen there 
by chance, but gradually they extend outward toward .objects 
existing independently of the body, and eventually include the 
child's deliberate attempts to vary the chance encounter in 
an "experiment to see" what will happen. 
The earliest cognitive structure is referred to as a 
scheme. Use of the term scheme is generally confined to the 
sensorimotor period. It is a construct inferred by observing 
the infant's overt behavior and it represents an abstraction 
of an entire class of similar patterned behaviors. Schemes 
generalize, differentiate, and integrate. For example, a 
grasping scheme is increasingly exercised across an ever-
widening range of objects. In the process of generalizing 
this way it must attend to the unique features of each ob-
ject it grasps. Hence, the basic scheme which is initially 
globular and undifferentiated becomes increasingly more 
differentiated in order to cope more adequately. In time, 
schemes which had been functioning independently become in-
tegrated into one smoothly coordinated scheme. As an illu-
stration, we may observe the infant beginning to grasp an 
----.------.---.. -.object- which_ he __ brings __ before_him                                                                                  __ ·_. ____ _ 
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his vism1 scheme, i. e. looking at the object. In the same 
manner, he may now exercise his visual scheme, looking in-
tently at an object, as he brings to bear a concentrated 
effort to grasp it. Later in development many more complex 
examples of differentiation and integration occur. For 
example, young children may value many things indiscrim-
inate1y in a globular fashion. In time they differentiate 
amongst them and proceed to integrate them into a hierarchy 
of values and preferences. 
Implicit in the above description is 'Piaget's theory 
of the functional invariants. In contrast to structures, 
which undergo qualitative changes throughout development, 
functions remain the same regardless of age or stage. The 
two functional invariants are organization and adaptation. 
Because of his employment of these functions in his theory 
of cqgnitive development, Piaget's conception of human in-
                      is understood to be rooted in a biological model. 
. . In adopting this framework, Piaget avoids the split between 
mind and body to be found in Cartesian dualism. For Piaget, 
human                           is simply a subset of biological functioning • 
. . Organization is essentially an internal affair in which more 
basic elements, schemes or structures, are integrated into 
hierarchical systems of relationships. This occurs with in-
creasing complexity throughout development. Adaptation is 
an external matter in its emphasis upon the organism's inter-
action· with the environment. It is comprised of two aspects, 
assimilation and accommodation, which are both present to 
18 
varying degrees in all mental activity. Assimilation is 
a conservative force which leads to interpreting reality in 
terms of the present level of structural development. Ac-
commodation is progressive in that it forces change upon the 
structure to meet the demands of what is new and novel in the 
environment. Hence, an infant which attempts to grasp every-
thing it can lay its hands on is getting to know things in 
one of the few ways at its command, through assimilation. to 
the grasping scheme. However, when it comes upon objects 
with unaccustomed shapes the scheme must undergo change as 
it accommodates the unyielding resistance of novel properties c.. 
in the unfamiliar object. It should not be overlooked that 
assimilation and accommodation also work in tandem when acting 
upon familiar objects, although the grounds for change are 
less fertile at such times. 
The origins of intelligence as viewed by Piaget.reside 
in the sensorimotor period. 'Although this is a time frame 
that precedes language and conceptual capability, there is a 
progressive logic to the infant's overt action that supports 
his view. Piaget's theorizing. about this period is based upon 
extensive observations, made with                         meticulousness, 
of his own three children during their first two years of life. 
He has do'cumented six stages of development constituting the 
period preceding representational thought. His comments upon 
these stages have been conceptualized into specific areas 
within which the infant is said to construct a knowledge of 
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ality or means-end behavior, object permanence, causality, 
space, and time. Many rich and innovative discoveries are 
detailed· in Piaget's·works covering these areas. However, a 
few summary remarks will suffice here. The infant advances 
from engaging in overt trial and error behaviors in which he 
attempts to reproduce interesting chance happenings to be-
havior in which the goal is set in mind at the outset and is 
efficiently achieved without the necessity of trial and error 
behaviors, as he can finally invent solutions to some pro-
blems through mental activity. Throughout the sensorimotor 
period the infant struggles to develop an adaptive object 
concept, which enables him to know firmly that an object con-
tinues to exist without benefit of his directly perceiving it. 
Although earlier he acts as if an object ceases to exist when 
removed from his vision, the infant fully comprehends. that 
this is not the case by the time he arrives at the sixth stage. 
In the domain of causality, on a behavioral plane, he learns 
that he cannot produce effects at a distance by initiating 
magical actions such as kicking his legs to activate a rattle 
too far away for spatial contact. Ultimately at stage six, 
the infant can infer causes from observed effects and anti-
cipate effects from contemplated causes. Regarding the subject 
of space, the stage six child has achieved much greater ef-
ficiency in his ability to devise alternate routes to attain 
his destination. and return to the starting point. All of the 
preceding in one way or another entails an enhanced concept 
of time. Ranging across each sphere of development in the 
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sixth stage is the emergence of representational thought; the 
cognitive ability to re-present mentally that which is absent 
from perception. Lastly, the child is no longer solipsistic, 
now demonstrating a behavioral comprehension of his position 
as one object relative to a multiplicity of others with none 
being the sole and fixed center around which the others re-
volve. 
The Preoperational Period 
The preoperational period extends roughly from two years 
to six or seven years. It is generally divided into the pre-
conceptual phase (2-4 yrs.) and the intuitive phase (4-7 yrs.). 
Emphasis has been upon the cognitive limitations of this 
period and it is traditionally construed, correctly I think, 
as a preparatory period paving the way to the emergence of 
logical thinking in the concrete operational period. Never-
theless, some of the most appealing aspects of child develop-
ment occur during this period, as reported in the early work 
of Piaget. 
Foremost in significance when chronologically approach-
ing the preoperational period is the development of the 
semiotic function which stands at its threshhold. The advent 
of representational thought undergirds the semiotic function, 
which is divided into signs and symbols. Signs are publicly 
shared meanings such as language, as well as mathematical and 
scientific notations. Symbols are private and personally 
motivated. They include images, play, and dreams. Signs bear 
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no resemblance to that which they stand for. In public 
language, for example, one word may be eliminated and another 
automatically substituted for it, as long as there is con-
sensual agreement. It makes no ·difference. Contrary to this, 
symbols are idiosyncratic and do bear a resemblance to that 
which they stand for. For example, an image is specific to 
the person who maintains it and its material nature imitates 
the sensorial attributes of whatever it represents and has 
mentally reconstructed. 
What Piaget has in mind in referring to the early          
operational period as pre conceptual is the lack of stability 
in the concepts the' young child does entertain. The concepts 
are said to lack true                             and true generality. 
Separate objects which are of the same class and observed at 
different times are often mistaken as identical. The pre-
conceptual child does not yet possess a stable abstract con-
cept of a whole class which subsumes an indefinite number of 
individual objects that are known to be separate from one 
another, but similiar in that they share certain properties 
that accord them membership in a common               At the same 
time the early preoperational child does not conserve identity 
of an individual. Surprising as it may appear to those uninit-
iated in Piagetian psychology, it can be demonstrated that 
very young children believe that individual identity can be 
lost or transformed by a change as superficial as a change of 
clothing in another person. Related to these preconceptual 
limitations is a feature of cognitive reasoning known as 
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transduction and it is quite prevalent in the                 think-
ing during the preconceptual phase. It is a mode .of                    
·which, unlike either induction or deduction, goes from 
                      to particular. One aspect of transductive rea-
soning leads the child to conclude that if two objects are 
alike in some respects, then they are alike in all respects. 
Hence, a dog and a cat are alike in that they both are covered 
with hair and, therefore, a dog and a cat are the same. Pre-
conceptual children reasoning transductively are also prone 
to think that if A causes B, then it necessarily follows that 
B causes A. Piaget tells of one child who has observed re-
peatedly that whenever father wants to shave he draws water. 
Hence the child concludes, without evidence, that drawing 
hot water requires that his father will be shaving. Under-
pinning transductive thinking is the absence of a hierarchical 
classification system and of any general laws to account for 
phenomena. An attempt is maqe to explain each event as an 
isolated one without applying any general rules of logic. 
This results in preoperational thought, especially during the 
early phase, being frought with contradictions which do not 
at all disturb the little thinker. 
During the intuitive phase thinking becomes somewhat 
more logical but there are still serious cognitive deficiencies. 
The ability to properly handle members of a simple class arrives, 
but the child cannot correctly handle the relationship between 
subparts of a whole class or between one subpart and the general 
------.-.- -_. class.' - For--example,-faced-with-a task-involving_ twelve _wP_Q.c;len __ ._. ___ . 
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              ten of which are brown and two of which are white, the 
child is able to identify that all the beads are wooden and 
that they add up. to twelve. However, when asked to compare 
the amount. in the subset of brown beads to the amount in the 
whole class of wooden beads he will respond that there are 
more brown beads than wooden beads. The child is not able to· 
simultaneously coordinate the two· perspectives of class and 
subclass; he is consequently misled by the perceptual saliency 
of the brown beads, which leads him to a false conclusion. 
The intuitive character of preoperational thought is well 
illustrated in the classic example of the rotating beads of dif-
ferent colors; let us say red, blue, and green. They are 
inserted ·into a tube in that order with the green on top while 
the t·ube is being held vertically. The child is asked to 
anticipate the position of the green bead through a series of 
rotations of 180 degrees each. The later preoperational child 
comprehends the question, in contrast to the earlier one who 
does not. He even answers the question correctly for several 
to many rotations, but eventually he falters. The child who 
has gone beyond the preoperational period entirely can con-
sistently answer the question correctly for an indefinite 
period because he derives a rule for doing·so based on the 
distinction between a half versus a total revolution of the 
tube. The intuitive preoperational child answers the question 
as Jongas he can maintain an image supplying information about 
the changing order of the beads. Eventually, however, he be-
comes confused and loses track of the image. Although clearly 
24 
more advanced over the pre conceptual child, the imagistic-
bound thinking of the intuitive child does not provide his 
                with the mobility of the rule-maker he will soon be-
come.-
The concept of egocentrism is central to Piaget's entire 
system. What Piaget means by this rich and varied concept is 
the individual's inability to differentiate between subject 
and object. The egocentric knower does not distinguish bet-
ween self and other. All of development may be seen as a 
series of conquests, at each major period, of the limitations 
imposed by egocentrism. Of particular relevance is the form 
of egocentrism during the preoperational period in which the 
knower is so embedded in his own perspective that he does not 
realize that the other may have an alternate, possibly even 
opposing, perspective. In Chapter three I will elaborate upon 
this aspect of development at considerable length. Egocentrism 
is also prevalent amongst preoperational thinkers in relation 
to the inanimate world. The child does not conceive of events 
occuring by chance and instead he ascribes psychological 
motives to natural events. His turn of mind is artificialistic, 
by which Piaget means that he construes natural events as 
having been created by man. The mountains and lakes, for ex-
ample, were so created. He is also finalistic in his thinking 
so that he may be inclined to believe that the mountains were 
made for climbing and the lakes for swimming. He has a ten-
dency to think animistically in which he ascribes such at-
----------------tributes-as- ,?onsciousnes s.,_wi                                                                  __ tC?.. ________ . _______ _ 
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in"animate objects. He is especially prone to do this with 
objects that exhibit motion or function. Piaget has 
catalogued as many as seventeen egocentric types of causality 
which he           aptly refers to as precausality. Realism is 
still another manifestation of egocentrism, one in which 
psychic content is externalized and viewed as if it truly had 
substantial existence. For example, the preoperational child 
believes that dreams originate from without and may be observed 
by another person in the same room. The ontological ego-
                  described       the preceding comments declines gradually 
through a series of stages, as the child increasingly defines 
his own self in relation to the external world he comes to 
know with ever increasing adaptive prowess. 
The preoperational child tends to absolutize relational 
notions such as left-right, above-below, and heavy-light. He 
thinks of these attributes as absolute entities, failing to 
recognize their relative character. Thus, heavy is an integral 
property of a bucket of water; the bucket of water is not 
something experienced as heavy for him, but light for father. 
In a similar view, the child has difficulty grasping the re-
lativity of kinship                   He may know that he has a brother, 
but not recognize that he is, himself, a brother to that per-
son. The tendency to absolutize relative notions declines 
slowly and is eventually replaced with a genuine comprehension 
of their true nature sometime during the concrete operational 
period. 
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The Concrete Operation·al Period 
A discussion of additional major features of pre-
operational thought has been delayed for this portion of the 
exposition because they will best be illustrated by a com-
parative analysis to the concrete operations. Before entering 
into the comparison, however, some introductory comments on 
the concrete operations are in order. The emergence of con-
crete operational thinking brings the rigor of genuine logic 
to the developing child. Although he is not consciously aware 
of it, his thinking is now governed by a rich interlocking 
network of systematically organized cognitive structures. 
Thought processes no longer occur in isolation from one 
another and this fac.t contributes significantly to the 
elimination of contradictory explanations. Piaget has drawn 
from the fields of logic and mathematics to formulate a set 
of nine models, which he calls groupings that form a cognitive 
unconscious promoting the advances of this period. As with 
each cognitive epoch, however, there is a serious limitation. 
The logical thought of this period can only be carried out 
upon concrete objects either being presently perceived in the 
environment or, in some cases, manipulated through mental 
representation. In either case the operational activity is 
confined to the familiar and known; it cannot be carried out 
on a highly abstract and purely hypothetical plane. 
Piaget's logico-mathematical model is not an etherial 
construction of Piaget's own mind unrelated to the activities 
of .the_child. ___ In.fac_t_,_ he ..                                                                                          ___ .. _______ ._ 
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investigations of children's                     performance and 
through analysis of the explanations proffered by them to 
account for their actions. It is                   contention that the 
mode of information processing exhibited by the children studied 
appeared as if it flowed from the ·model he devised. The most 
significant areas explored in relation to this period in-
volved tasks of conservation, classification, ·seriation, number, 
and transitivity. 
Conservation, the invariance concept, is the ability to 
recognize that certain fundamental properties of an object 
remain the same even though the object is subject to altera-
tion. The invariant properties are of a quantitative nature 
and the changes involve a deformation in shape, which.results 
in a previously observed perceptual equivalence, to a compared 
standard,·being destroyed. F.or example, a child has before 
him three beakers. Two are the same size and contain an equal 
amount of water. They are designated A and B. They are low 
and wide in comparison to a third beaker designated BI, which 
is narrow and high. The liquid from B is poured into BI and 
the child is asked whether there is now the same amount in 
A as there is in Bl or if one beaker contains more than the 
other. A concrete operational child will give a conservation 
response, stating that the amount remains the same. A non-
conserving                               child will fail to do so, pointing 
out that there is more liquid in Bl since the water level is 
higher than that of A. Probing further with the conserving 
child it is discovered that he will advance one or more of 
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three explanations to justify his conclusion. Two of these 
explanations are categorized as reversibility operations. 
One is reciprocity, in which the child explains that although 
the liquid in Bl is taller, it is also narrower. This opera-
tion is alternately called a compens-atory me-chanism by the 
Geneva School, emphasizing that a change in one direction is 
compensated for by a change in another direction. The other 
reversible operation is negation or inversion and is contained 
in the child's statement that since the liquid in BI could be 
poured back into B, at which point there would be the same 
amount in A and B, there must now be an equal amount in A 
and Bl. It can be seen in this supporting argument that the 
child is capable of a mental action which facilitates his 
ability to infer a correct conclusion. It is not necessary 
for him to actually pour BI back into B. The preoperational 
child can handle empirical reversibility, recognizing that an 
equivalence in amount is reestablished between A and B, when 
Bl is actually returned to B, but he cannot perform the 
operation mentally. The third type of supporting argument 
offered by the conserving child is called an identity operation. 
In effect, the child asserts that nothing has been added or 
subtracted from the original quantity and, therefore, the 
amount remains the same. 
An examination of the cognitive features differentiating 
conservers from nonconservers will -assist in recognizing the 
contrast between concrete operational and preoperational thinkers. 
It- snould --be -noted-first -o-f--all -that-the -preoperational -child_-_____ _ 
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is perceptually bound. The                   of the high water level 
in B1 is so distracting that he does not reason beyond it. 
This is in marked contrast to the concrete operational child 
who is not misled by mere perceptual ques. His newly con-
structed operational system enables him to process the in-
formation beyond appearances to a deeper reality. The non-
conserving child centers on one aspect of reality to the 
exclusion of others. Hence, he centers entirely upon height 
in the illustration given, whereas the conserver decenters, 
taking into account both height and width simultaneously. 
Preoperational thought is static as the child takes into 
account only end states, such as water levels before the 
pouring and then again after the pouring. To the contrary, 
concrete operational thinking attends to the intermediary 
change that is taking place during the pouring as well, 
hence recognizing that as the water is getting higher it is 
also getting narrower. For this reason it is said that his 
thinking is transformational rather than static. Finally, 
because the preoperational child cannot mentally grasp the 
effect of pouring Bl back into B, his thought process is 
characterized as irreversible.. In contrast, the older child 
who can perform this operation mentally possesses thought 
processes that are characterized by reversibility. 
There is a decal age in the development of conservation 
which spans several years. , A decalage is literally an un-
wedging or uncoupling. Applied to conservation it means that 
the emerging cognitive structures promoting a comprehension 
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of invariance of amount, which mvebeen under discussion, do 
not automatically facilitate an understanding of quantitative 
relationships being conserved in all content areas. Con-
servation of substance or amount usually appears at about age 
s-ix- --or- os-even. H-owe"ve-r, cons-e-rvati-on-o-f- we-±ght do"e-s -not arrive 
until about eight or nine and of volume not until eleven or 
twelve. Because it deals with an invariant sequence of 
development within the same period of the same cognitive 
capability across different contents it is called a hori-
"" zontal decalage. (Vertical decalages will be taken up in 
the discussion on classification.) Conservation is perhaps 
the most frequently researched of all Piagetian tasks. It 
is impressive that children allover the world, without any 
specific training, acquire the ability to conserve. In 
addition, they all tend to give the same supporting ex-
planations that have been described and to acquire conserva-
tion of substance, weight, and volume in precisely that order. 
Findings such as are to be found in this type of cross-
cultural research tend to strengthen the claim of" the Geneva 
School regarding the universality of cognitive-structural 
development. Dasenl has recently edited a collection of papers 
which amplifies the contemporary state of cross-cultural in-
vestigations and explores the role of culture in cognitive 
development. 
lPierre Dassen, ed. Piagetian Psychology: Cross Cultural 
Contributions (New York: Gardner Press, 1977). 
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An individual without classification competence would 
be highly inefficient in effecting problem solving strategies. 
The ability to classify enables us to impose order upon an 
otherwise bewildering diversity of phenomena and to grasp 
both the similarities and dissimilarities amongst things. 
Although complex systems of classification are constructed 
in the concrete operational period, their roots are observed by 
Piaget in the primitive actions of the infant. For example, 
an infant upon coming across an object which can be shaken, 
such as a rattle, picks it up and shakes it. He has assimi-
lated it to his sensorimotoric scheme of shaking which de-
monstrates an act of recognizing the rattle as a thing to be 
shook. Piaget refers to this as an act of practical classi-
fication, just as more generally he refers to all of sensori-
motor development as an expression of practical intelligence. 
During the early part of the preoperational period children 
between the ages of two and four form graphic collections 
when asked to classify a group of diverse objects. Given a 
collection of toy objects a child is likely to put things 
together in a manner that suggests a functional relationship 
rather than to separate and join objects according to a 
simple defining principle which is utilized clearly and con-
sistently. For example, in a collection of items he is 
found to select a tree and a house to go together because One 
offers shade for the other, rather than to put trees in one 
pile and houses in another, as the older child or adult would 
do. Alternately, as he begins to put certain objects in one 
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pile he may begin to discern the outline of a train and 
will then continue selecting objects from the master group 
that will further the building of a train. As has been 
noted previously, the intuitive child between the ages of 
four and seven can handle single classes. Hence, he can put 
all the circles in one pile or all the blue objects in 
another. However, he does not yet have the cognitive structures 
which enable him. to cross multiply so that he can classify 
the blue circles in one group. The concrete operational child 
does develop the competence to cross multiply and this under-
girds his capacity to handle a four-celled classification. 
In other words, from amongst a heterogeneous collection he can 
separate blue squares, blue circles, red squares, and red 
circles each into a separate section. 
In the late phase of the preoperational period the child 
is capable of classifying a collection of objects in a way 
that suggests an understanding of nesting hierarchies, although 
upon questioning       is revealed that he does not comprehend, 
despite his behavioral accomplishment. For example, confronted 
with a collection of geometric objects he will first assemble 
two groups, putting all the rectilinear objects in one and 
all of the curvilinear in another. He then                                  
the two piles separating squares and triangles from within 
the rectilinear class and separating circles and half-circles 
from within the curvilinear class. In so doing he has de-
monstrated a mastery of intension and extension. Intension 
---------·-·---involves- the -identifi.cat.ion_Qf __ an. attribute which defines an - ... ------ - ---- -- .---- - -. - ------------_._-------
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object as qualifying for membership in a class. Extension 
signifies the full range of objects which possess the 
attribute gaining each of those objects entry into the 
class. The prob.lem is that even though the child at this 
stage can assemble what are flawless classes, he does not 
understand the relationships amongst them until he develops 
a class inclusion structure, which does not occur until the 
concrete operational period. The inclusion structure pro-
motes an understanding of the difference between all and 
some, which confuses the younger child. When asked a series 
of questions along these lines, the younger child will de-
monstrate that he thinks there are more squares than 
rectilinear objects and more rectilinear objects than total 
geometric objects. Since the preoperational child does not 
decenter he cannot simultaneously compare part to whole. 
Because he lacks                             in his thinking he does not 
have the mobility of thought to know that squares added to 
triangles in this illustration result in the rectilinear 
class and that the process can be negated such that squares 
subtracted from rectilinear objects yield triangles. 
Symbolically, A+A 1= Bi B-A = AI. It is .precisely because 
he can decenter and perform the mental operation of negation 
or inversion that the concrete operational youngster does 
understand class inclusion. 
It has been observed that despite the qualitatively 
different ways of knowin9 which characterize each period 
examined thus far, there have been advances made in the 
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construction of ever more complex classification structures. 
This will continue into the formal operational period where 
it is found that the concrete operational child's ability to 
handle a 2x2 or four-way classification structure will ex-
pand into the capability to generate all of the sixteen 
possible combinations of those four variables. The phenomenon 
of classification competence developing across cognitive 
.I' periods is an example of a vertical decalage. Unlike hori-
.. . ' zontal decalages which occurs within periods, vertlcal de-
calages occur across periods. A vertical decalage involves 
qualitatively different structures but there is a similarity 
from one plane to another with regard to the content to which 
they apply. A growing child may classify the same objects 
from. one period to the next, but because of structural changes 
he will do so in qualitatively different ways. On the other 
, hand, in a horizontal decal age the structures remain 
essentially the same, but are applied across different con-
tent in an invariant sequence, as in the case of conservation. 
Competence at seriation is another middle-childhood 
achievement. As with all cognitive advances it also has its 
roots in the sensorimotor period. Basically, it is the 
ability to comprehend the relationships between a series of 
gradations ordered in a systematic progression from smallest 
or least intense to largest or most intense. In his ex-
periments on the subject Piaget asked children to assemble 
a collection: of ten different sized sticks so that there 
-.----.----.--. -·would. -be an _orderly __ array: gping _froIll                               _       _                    __ . __ .. ______________ _ 
35 
The children go through various stages ranging from the 
youngest who do not understand the task to concrete opera-
tional children who perform the activity           the most 
efficient strategy. The late preoperational subjects do 
succeed in arranging the sticks in proper order, but they 
do so only after several trial and error efforts. The hall-
mark of those in middle-childhood is their demonstrated 
ability to select the appropriate stick each time without 
error. This entails a mental operation in which the child 
can scan the remaining sticks to select the one that is larger 
than all those that have already been chosen and yet smaller 
than all others that remain. It involves reciprocal re-
lation in which he decenters recognizing.that B is greater 
than A, but smaller than C, Dr etc. The relations involved 
are known as ordinal signifying that concern is with the 
magnitudes of lesser or greater than. They are not concerned 
with specific or absolute relationships as in cardina.l numbers. 
Reciprocity is also present in that as B is recognized as 
greater than A, reciprocally A is recognized as less than B. 
Lastly, the concrete operational child has mastered empirical 
transitivity. Comparing A to B and then B to C he can con-
clude that A is less than C or, reciprocally, that C is 
greater than A. To do this it is not necessary for him to 
observe A and C together. 
Competence with number is itself an achievement of the 
concrete operational period. Prior to this time the child 
lacks the ability to conserve number. The capacity to do so 
. "     . .. . . 
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generally arrives at about six or seven years. The inability 
to conserve is readily illustrated by a simple experiment 
in which a child arranges two rows of discrete objects, such 
as pennies, in one-to-one correspondence. Hence, directly 
under each penny in the top row is a penny from the bottom 
row. It is then established that there is an equal amount in 
the two rows. Subsequently the bottom row is condensed and 
the child is asked if there is still the same amount. The 
younger child centering upon the greater length of the top 
row and overlooking the compensating density of the bottom 
row will pronounce the longer row as containing more pennies. 
When empirical reversibility is enacted to restore the bottom 
row to its original state, the child automatically shifts 
back to stating that there is now an equal amount in each 
row. It is not until the concrete operational period that the 
child can invoke mental operations to conserve number. What 
is particularly striking and instructive about this illustra-
tion is that the nonconserving child can actually count the 
number of pennies in each row after the bottom one has been 
condensed and still conclude that there is more in the top 
row. Such is the force of perceptual salience in preopera-
tional thought! The mental operations of middle childhood, 
however, perform their information processing task without 
perceptual distraction. 
In Piaget's view the ability to comprehend the nature 
of number is essentially a synthesis of classification and 
.-------.-- --- ser-ia tion -struc.tures_._ -_ He_ agQPJ:JL.i;:Qis __         =i:: tio.n_                      
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logical and empirical grounds. Logical analysis reveals 
that to understand number one must invoke an inclusion 
                      For example, take the number eight. Accidental 
properties such as shape or color of particular things are 
irrelevant to this analysis. A set of any eight units form 
a class of eight. Each Single unit or any combination of 
the subparts of the class will add up to something less than 
the total class of eight. Any union of subparts subtracted 
from the total class will leave the balance of subparts. 
Any addition of all· the subparts in whatever combination 
will             the total class of eight. Further, in under-
standing the number eight one must realize that it is simu-
ltaneously greater than seven and less than nine. Therefore, 
it is a specific case of the general structure operative 'in 
seriation in which B is recognized as greater than A, but 
less than C. The integration of classification and seriation 
in understanding number is a relatively complex example of 
the functional invariant known as organization. The empirical 
argument advanced by Piaget is based on the observation that 
a comprehension of number never precedes the development of 
classification and seriation, seeming always tq emerge only 
as these two other cognitive abilities are becoming relatively 
crystalized. 
It is on the basis of the preceding material and a 
variety of related experiments that Piaget constructed the 
complex logico-matematical model of the concrete operational 
period. Although it will not be elaborated upon here, 
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I Flavell offers a commendable exposition of the model in his 
classic text on Piaget's work. 2 Sigel and Hooper have edited 
an extensive collection of research papers which focus on 
this important period of the child's cognitive development. 
In summary, thinking during this period has become 
freed from the perceptual rootedness of preoperational thought. 
It is now decentered, transformational and reversible. These 
attributes derive from mental operations which are interrelated 
systems of interiorized actions. Cognitive acts no longer 
are carried out in isolation and this fact eliminates the 
tendency toward contradictory statements existing side by 
side. Although capable" of rigorous logical thought the child's 
thinking is egocentric in that it is limited to the familiar 
objects of his everyday world. 
The Formal Operationa"l Period 
The formal operational period represents the fullest 
flowering of cognitive development in the Piagetian system. 
It generally reaches its threshold at about eleven or twelve 
years, but does not become stabilized until fourteen or fif-
teen. Currently it is being suggested that this period may 
be sub-divided into two parts. The scope of the formal 
operational thinker is broadened to encompass the full range 
of the possible, with reality being merely one subset of this. 
IJohn Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget 
(New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1963). 
                                                                                                                           __ Ho_op_er_", __              __                               Thinking ____ " ___ .. 
in Children (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968). 
,.. dO, 
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Mental operations are no longer confined to familiar con-
            objects in the environment, but are free to soar 
throughout the hypothetical universe. Where previously the 
object of thought were those known things in the environment 
it-is now the case that one's own thought becomes the object 
of thought. Instead of using only single propositions to 
make a statement about reality, such"as IIThis ball is red," 
formal operational thought is interpropositional, hence deals 
with the logical relations between two propositions irrespective 
of reality. In elaborating upon this point Flavell states, 
"The less mature mind looks only to the factual relation bet-
ween one proposition and the empirical reality to which it 
refers; the more mature mind looks also or instead to the 
logical relation between one proposition and another ll • l 
Interpropositional reasoning may be completely detached from 
any "content and, hence is purely formal. For example, one 
type of logical relation takes the form that if x is present 
then y is present, but that if y is present then it does not 
follow that x is present. This is a pure case of formal 
reasoning. It makes no difference what x and y refer to. 
The logical relationship involved is one of many possible 
types. It mayor may not prove to be true when tested out 
upon actual objects in the real environment. Confronted with 
IJohn Flavell, Cognitive Development (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977), p. 105 • 
.. - -- ......... OL __ 
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a set of materials and the problem of discovering cause and 
effect relationships, the formal operational thinker can in-
voke hypothetical deductive reasoning to resolve the problem. 
He utilizes the scientific method of developing an hypoth-
esis and then proceeding to test it out by holding all vari-
ables constant except one to observe its effect. He per-
forms this systematically with each variable. In one of the 
many experiments Piaget had                   conduct, the logical 
relation presented above proved to obtain. In this parti-
cular experiment the children had to discover what it was 
that caused the bending of rods which were riveted over a 
basin of water. Several variables came into play such as 
length of rod, material it was made of, whether it was thick 
or thin, and its shape such as round or square. Another 
variable was the fact that a set of differing weights were 
available to place at the end of the horizontal rods. 
Children of varying ages participated in this experiment. 
Their problem solving strategies became                           more 
efficient with age. However, it was only the adolescent 
subjects who evidenced hypothetico-deductive reasoning in 
applying the scientific method. They discovered that a long 
rod would cause bending, but that the presence of bending did 
not necessarily indicate that there was a long rod. This 
was due to the fact that bending could also be caused by a 
heavy weight being placed on a short rod. Such a relation-
ship between length and bending constitutes a sufficient, 
-- ... -- _.but __ not __ ne.ces.sary-__                                  ___                                              __                                   .. ___ ... -.:... __ .. _____ .. _ .... 
_ ..      ............. ;--0:; ......... _ ............ _ .......... """'"-
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referred to quite simply as that of implication. In other 
words, this turns out to be an actual case of the previous 
example involving interpropositional thought, i.e. if x, 
then y; but not if y, then x. A variation of this example 
is reciprocal implication, a causal relationship in which it 
follows that if x, then y and if y, then x. " In a separate 
experiment formal operational thinkers effectively discovered 
precisely this relationship "when attempting to determine the 
cause of rapid oscillation of a pendulum. Amongst the several 
variables only a" short string, on the pendulum, would cause 
rapid movement. Therefore, it followed that" whenever such 
movement would be observed it could logically be inferred 
that there must be a short string, as only that variable 
could cause such an effect. This constitutes a necessary 
and sufficient condition. 
Piaget has designed two powerful models to explain 
formal operational thinking. One is the sixteen binary 
operations model. It is comprised of sixteen possible types 
of causal relationships which can logically be derived bet-
ween two propositions. Reciprocal implication and impli-
cation "are two of those possibilities and there exist four-
teen others. In symbolic terms, let P and Q represent the 
two propositions. The negation or falsity of these proposi-
tions are representented by placing a horizontal sign above 
them, as follows: P and Q. In modern logic the sixteen 
possibilities can be rendered into truth tables. An 
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incomplete truth table looks like this: 
P P :                    
Of the four possibilities in the four-celled truth table 
above there are sixteen possible combinations, ranging from 
all four cells being marked true to all four cells being 
marked false. To illustrate, two truth tables, one repre-
senting reciprocal implication and the other implication, 
will be presented below. 
P P P P 
Q I T F I P=Short I 1 P=Long Q T T Q F T Q=Fast Q F T : Q=bending 
Reciorocal Implication Implication (Pendulum Experiment) (Rod Experiment) 
The way to read the truth table is to note whether the 
combined propositions may logically be verified in reality 
or not. For example, in the pendulum experiment it will 
never be that one will discover a short string and a not 
fast or slow movement. Stated more generally, the causal con-
nection of reciprocal relationship does not ever include an 
instance in which propositions P and Q are true. Hence an 
"F" for false has been placed in the lower left quadrant. 
To cite another example, in the rod experiment it is possible 
to have a not long or short rod and still have bending. In 
formal terms, it is possible in the causal relationship of 
implication to verify an instance of P and Q. Therefore, a 
"T" for true has been placed in the upper right quadrant. ------- -----. ------- --._--- - --- -------_. - ---- - - .- --- - -- - - - ----- - - - - -- -. - .- - -._----- - -- -- - -- .. ------- ._-- -- ------
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Particularly pertinent to the above material is a com-
ment by Gruber and Voneche in which they state, 
The 'point of this combinatorial system is that the 
operations in question form a closely knit system 
in which passage from one element of the structure 
to another is always possible ••• Thanks to this 
closed system of transformations the preadolescent 
becomes capable of inserting real cases in the set 
of all possible cases that can be generated logically. 
Reality has become a special case of possibility. The 
system of all possible combinatiqns forms the logic 
of propositions ••• l 
By "preadolescent", Gruber and Voneche mean the child on the 
                      of formal operations. 
The second great model advanced, by Pia get to explain 
formal operational thought is the INRC structure. It is a 
highly integrated cognitive structuration of what has pre-
ceded in development. Piaget's account of the model is 
extraordinarily complex. I shall attempt here to present a 
simplified version of Piaget's specific application to the 
equilibrium problem. In this structure I = identity, N = 
negation, R = reciprocity, and C = correlation. A balance 
and a set of weights are used in this experiment. The point 
of the problem is to see 'if the child understands the set of 
relationships which ,obtain between the weights on both sides 
of the balance and the distance of the weights on each side 
from the center. Involved in dealing effectively with this 
problem is                                 and the integration of both forms 
of reversibility. These are formal operational structures 
I , Howard Gruber and J. Jacques Voneche, eds. The 
Essential Piaget (New York: Basic Books, 1977) p. 395 
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offering a high range of power. Their conceptual sophistication 
are especially apparent when compared to·the strategy of the 
young preoperational child who attempts to restore an imbalance 
of the scale by pushing down with his hand the end that is 
tipped upward. The identity is affected by adding weight to 
one side of the scale. Since this disrupts the balance, the 
problem is to restore it. The action can be negated by simply 
removing the weight that had been added. This, of course, re-
stores the original balance. ·Reciprocity is an action that 
will restore the balance by compensating for the added weight 
rather than by negating it. Reciprocity neutralizes the 
effect· of adding weight. By definition, the correlation is 
the inverse of the reciprocal. It has the same effect as would 
the adding of weight, but does not involve actually adding 
weight. If weight is added to one side the effect can be 
neutralized by moving the weight on the opposite side outward 
from the center of the balance. The inverse or correlation 
of this reciprocal action would be to move the same weight in-
ward rather than outward. This correlation action has the 
same effect as adding weight on the opposite side would have 
had. An ·alternate way of achieving a reciprocal effect is to 
move the weight that has been added closer to the center. This 
neutralizes the effect of having added the weight. The in-
verse or correlation would be to move the original weight 
outward from the center without adding any more weight. In 
doing so an imbalance will be effected as would have been the 
--.---------. -.- ease -had--weight- been -added.- - Conversely_, __ .the_                                  _____ --.:_ 
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removing weight from the original amount would be to move the 
original weight closer to the center instead of actually re-
moving any weight. A simple reciprocal operation to adding 
              on one side. would 'be to add the same, amount on the 
other side at an equal distance from the center. The in-
version or correlation to that operation would be to remove 
weight from the opposite side from which one might have added 
the weight to create an imbalance. Either adding weight on 
one side or removing it from the other will produce the same' 
type of imbalance. What can be seen from this analysis is 
that I and C will produce the same result. Applied to the 
scale problem, there will be an imbalance created whether one 
adds weight or performs the inverse of the reciprocal. On 
the other hand Nand R will also produce the same effect as 
one another. Whether one removes the added weight or performs 
an operation that neutralizes it, the balance that has been 
disrupted by adding weight would be restored. In the con-
crete operational period the two reversible operations are 
applied separately; negation to the classification task and 
reciprocity to the seriation task. In the formal operational 
period negation and reciprocity are integrated into one 
unified system. For example, the adolescent thinker in re-
solving the equilibrium problem realizes that he can remove 
some of the added weight and move the remaining weight some-
what closer to the center. There is a recognition of the 
proportionate relationship that an increase in weight and 
decrease in distance is equal to a decrease in weight and an 
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increase in distance. In the INRC structure each of the 
operations is defined in relation to the others. It is only 
at the formal operational period that the young person fully 
understands the subtlety and multiplicity of these inter-
related connections and is able to apply this comprehension 
across a wide range of problems. The INRC structure is 
actually a very abstract model of operational thought even 
though its application here has been to a tangible illustration. 
In fact, Piaget construes it as being isomorphic with the si.x-
teen binary operations model. 
Egocentrism during the preoperational period receives 
more attention from cognitive developmentalists than at any 
other period. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked 
that each new period brings with it a variation of egocentrism 
to be conquered. The formal operational period is no ex-
ception. Blessed with a new found capacity to generate a 
multiplicity of possible worlds, including a utopian one, 
the adolescent thinker fails to differentiate between these 
grand ideas and the perspective of others upon whom he wishes 
to· impose his reforms. It is through peer interaction, so 
intensified during adolescence, that the new formal 
operational thinker encounters confrontation and challenge 
as he avidly communicates his ideas. This social process 
has the felicitous effect of forcing the youngster to de-
centrate and move back into the domain of reality where he 
must live his everyday life. Even more significant, howe,\reJ:, 
-·:-------··--·-·---··is-··-the--·wor-k-·role.-.which .-the __ adolesc_en.t ___                               enters. -_. __ ._----- ---------------- .--
Piaget states, 
"The focal point of the decentering process is the 
entrance into the occupational world or the beginning 
of serious professional training. The adolescent be-
comes an adult when he undertakes a real job. It is 
then that he is transformed from an idealistic re-
former into an achiever. In other words, the job 
leads thinking away from the dangers of formalism 
back into reality". 1 . 
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The unfortunate adolescent who fails to make the return and 
becomes lost in a schizophrenic universe is the focus of 
attention in a brief work by Lidz. 2 
In view of the fact that Piaget does not posit the 
existence of any cognitive periods beyond the formal operations, 
it is especially germane to raise the issue of how universally 
they are to be found. First, it should be recognized that 
even those who have arrived at this period do not always 
function with benefit of it. Even a scientist whose every-
day livelihood depends upon employing the essentials of 
formal operational thinking in the laboratory may not utilize 
it in other areas of his life with any great consistency. 
Indeed,           of the demands of everyday life can be met 
adequately with the use of concrete operational thinking. 
1Ibid., p. 441. 
2Theodore Lidz, The Origin and Treatment of Schizo-
phrenic Disorders (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
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Findings suggest that in Western countries approximately 
fifty percent of adults attain the formal operational 
period. There are serious methodological difficulties in 
testing members of non-Western countries. Nevertheless, 
some work carried out in this direction indicate relatively 
slow cognitive development and instances of entire groups 
lacking in formal operations when the population has been 
exposed to neither modern technological advances nor the in-
fl f W d · P' 1 h l' d uences 0 estern e ucat10n. 1aget as recent y ra1se 
the question of the generality of formal operations across 
all contents by those individuals possessing the necessary 
structural development. Theoretically, precisely because 
they deal with form and not content, the operations should 
have wide-ranging applicability across all areas. Piaget 
has acknowledged,                         the individual's aptitudes 
and professional specializations influence the content areas 
to which he will be likely to apply formal operational 
thinking. An excellent current overview of this period is 
found in a presentation by Neimark. 2 
lJean Piaget, "Intellectual Evolution from Adolescence 
to Adulthood", Human Development 15 (1972) :1-12. 
2Edith D. Neimark, "Intellectual Development During 
Adolescence", in Review of Child Development Research, ed. 
F. D. Horowitz, Vol. 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1952), pp. 541-94. 
--------------_.-._-----------------._----._------------ ----_ .. _-----._ .. _.-- _._._. -_._--- _ .. _---_.----------- -" -- ----------------
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The Equllibration Model 
Piaget's conception of intelligence is essentially 
one of adaptation. The human organism interacting with its 
environment strikes a proper balance. between assimilation 
and accommodation to achieve adaptive intelligence. However, 
since structures are not innate, the existing cognitive 
structures at any given time are frequently encountering ex-
periences in the environment which they cannot adequately 
cope with. At the point of such an encounter a disequilibrium 
occurs that results in a structural modification, ultimately 
a reorganization to a higher level of cognitive structuration, 
leading to greater adaptiveness. New encounters with moderately 
novel events in the environment reinitiate the same cycle 
which occurs repeatedly throughout the course of cognitive 
growth. The process of restoring equilibrium at a higher 
level of structural reorganization and greater adaptiveness 
is called equilibration. It is this process which accounts for 
stage transitions and the gradual evolution through 
qualitatively different ways of information processing and 
acquiring knowledge in Piaget's theory. He does not ignore 
the traditionally cited factors in development. These are 
experience with the the physical world, heredity and neurological 
maturation, and social transmission. However, such factors 
are not sufficient in themselves and must rely upon the 
fourth factor of equilibration which serves as a coordinating 
t.' ..•. ! • . " 
-- ------- -- - ." -
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facilitating force. Piagetl discussess the process of equili-
bration in terms of strategies for maximizing gains and 
minimizing losses. Confronted with an experience it cannot 
assimilate, it is costly in the short-range for the organism 
to undergo the effort necessary to invent more adequate 
structures, but the long-range advantage to be attained from 
such an- effort maximizies the overall gains. This is true 
in infancy and throughout all development. Piaget points 
out that it is equally so in the affective and cognitive do-
mains. Although more costly in the short-range for the in-
fant to maintain object relations with those in his environ-
ment, he will mitigate his preoccupation with sucking and 
sphincter activities to achieve the palance of long-range 
gains to be had by doing so. Gains are maximized in the 
long run by giving up the immediate advantage of the more 
primitive developmental stage in favor of accepting the cost 
of development to the next more probable stage. The insertion 
of an example emphasizing the affective domain rather than 
cognitive is somewhat misleading for Piaget does not believe 
in a dichotomous split between the two any more than he would 
posit a split between biology and intelligence. It is his 
strong conviction that every mental act has both 
1Jean Piaget, liThe General Problems of the Psychobio-
logical Development of the Child", Discussions on Child De-
velopment, J.M. Tanner & B. Inhe1der, Eds. -Vol.4 The Pro-
ceedings of the Fourth Meeting of the World Health Organiz-
ation Study Group on the Psychobiological Development of the 
child, (New York: International Universities Press, 1960), 
pp.-                   ------ --- ---------- --------------------- --- ------------------
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a cognitive and affective component which are indissociable 
even though he has emphasized the cognitive aspect throughout 
his professional career. Interest is viewed as an affect 
which serves as an energizer to motivate cognitive activity. 
Cognitive structures serve to channel affect. For example, 
it is not until adolescence that many young people will de-
velop emotional attachments to ideas and ideals. This is 
because the conrete level of middle childhood reasoning does 
not yet open up access to these more abstract realms. The 
reorganization to a more complex cognitive structural system 
of formal operations broadens the field of application and, 
hence, permits affect to be channeled toward ideas and ideals. 
Equilibration is a self-regulating activity. The 
organism acting upon the environment experiences                  
feedback that is incongruent with the present level of 
structural development. The ensuing disequilibrium motivates 
structural change to the point at which the "novel information 
can be assimilated, whereby equilibrium is restored. It should 
be evident that this process of increasingly greater adaptive-
ness is not predicated upon mere conformity or adjustment. 
Each level of cognitive reorganization widens the scope of 
mental activity, frees the organism from earlier constraints, 
and promotes greater mastery of reality. All of this is to 
say that with such development occuring the individual achieves 
greater competence and command over himself and the environ-
ment. The values and morals that will infuse this enhanced 
freedom are, in large                   the subject of this dissertation. 
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Some examples of feedback inducing disequilibrium may 
prove instructive at this point. Illustrations are pervasive -
                      the work of Piaget and others of the Geneva School. 
In one experiment Piaget                     the activity of an infant 
who pulls a support, which holds a desired object, toward 
himself. To test whether the infant truly has the scheme 
which promotes understanding of the relationship between 
object and support, the position of the object is varied. 
If the infant does not possess the scheme, he may still be 
observed pulling the support toward himself even when the 
object has been placed alongside the support rather than upon 
it. A facial expression of surprise reveals that the child 
had an expectation that the object would move toward him when 
he pulled the support. This misexpectation induces dis-
equilibrium and leads to further grappling with the environ-
ment in order to resolve the problem and restore equilibrium. 
The restoration of equilibrium is predicated upon the develop-
ment of a new cognitive structure which enables the infant to 
understand the relationship between support and object. The 
ineffective strategy of pulling the support when the object 
is alongside it will now be eliminated in favor of the 
effective action of pulling it only when the object rests 
upon it. The new structure permits differentiation between 
the two states of the object in relation to the ?upport and 
is clearly more adaptive. Although the state of incongruity 
or discrepency between structure and experience may be viewed 
--- -- ---------- -       --- as -one·· of--tension-,--it. -would-be. a .mi spl ace_d _eroph_a_s.J.                               -:-. ______    __________ _ 
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strue the equilibrating process as having the primary goal 
of tension reduction. The reduction of tension is a secondary 
byproduct of the natural surge toward. greater adaptiveness. 
Proponents of the Geneva School have devised a variety of 
ingenuious experiments to induce cognitive conflict in 
training experiments with the aim of accelerating growth. 
One method is to ask the preoperational child to predict the 
level that liquid will attain when being poured from a short 
and wide beaker to a tall and thin one. The idea is that a 
disconfirmation of the prediction           generate surprise and 
lead to a resolution based upon conserving judgments. Still 
another method is to ask a preoperational child confronted· 
with twelve wooden beads comprised of two different colors to 
place all the beads in the set of one color on one side and 
all the wooden beads of the total set on the 9Pposite side. 
It is anticipated that the logical. impossibility of dividing 
the beads this way will induce a cognitive conflict and lead 
the child to decenter as he is forced to differentiate between 
the whole and its subparts while coordinating the two per-
spectives simultaneously. In general, training experiments 
based upon this kind of strategy have met with greater success 
than alternate approaches. An important qualifier, however, 
must be inserted here. The tendency is for those subjects who 
already proved to beat an intermediary stage during the pre-
test in relation to the experimental task to exhibit the 
most significant gains at the time of the posttest. This is 
interpreted to signify that one's present level of cognitive 
54 
development imposes meaning upon stimuli presented by the 
environment; an interpretation clearly in opposition to 
traditional stimulus-response learning theories. The most 
contemporary position emanating from the Geneva School on 
these training studies are to·· he- found in a work by Inhelder, 
sinclair, and Bovet. l Piaget2 has recently written a book 
in which he offers the most thorough exposition of his 
equilibration theory available thus far. 
Conclusion 
As it interacts with the environment over time from 
birth onward the human organism undergoes a progression of 
decentrations through which the knower becomes increasingly 
less egocentric and more objective. Acting upon the                
ment he invents cognitive structures for more apaptive knowing. 
The practical intelligence of the sensorimotor period is 
interiorized as representational thought emerges. Continuing 
to act upon the environment the growing child constructs com-
plex interrelated mental action systems for processing in-
formation. The external world does not impose meaning upon 
the person, but through assimilation to one's developmental 
lBarbel Inhelder, Hermine Sinclair, & Mogali Bovet, 
Learning and the Development of Cognition, trans. S. Wedgwood 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). 
2Jean Piaget, The Develo 
                                                               of Cognitive Structures, trans. A.            
Press, 1975). 
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level and the process of auto-regulation the person confers 
meaning upon the environment. Hence, acts of knowing in-
volve the process of mental transformations. 
The present chapter of this dissertation is the corner-
stone of all that follows. Though the connections,may not 
be immediately apparent, it'is my conviction that an in-
depth comprehension of sociomoral,knowledge cannot be achieved 
without a sound grasp of this                     An attempt to under-
stand the work of Lawrence Kohlberg and his collaborators' 
without knowing structuralism and the genetic epistemology 
of Piaget is like attempting to go from the                              
period to formal operations without first passing through the 
intermediary period. 
CHAPTER 2 
PIAGETIAN ROOTS IN MORAL JUDGMENT 
Jean Piaget'sfifth book, The Moral Judgment of the 
Chi1d,1 was· written over forty years ago. It constitutes 
the last of what is generally known as his early work and pre-
dates the construction of his complex logico-mathematica1 
models. Nevertheless, although he has by now written approxi-
mately more than fifty books and hundreds of articles, this 
one book alone would have assured him an immortal role as a 
pioneer in the field of sociocognitive moral development. 
Piaget never again devoted a major work to moral development 
and has given only brief treatment to it in the years following 
publication of his fifth work. Yet the book has spawned a 
spate of replicated and modified studies, some of which have 
challenged, but none of which have disconfirmed the essential 
validity of Piaget's contribution. The most ambitious of these 
has been the work of Lawrence Kohlberg and his collaborators, 
which has refined and extended Piaget's earlier work to a 
considerable degree. Their findings and theoretical formulations 
will be examined in detail later in this dissertation, while 
lJean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, trans. 
M. Gabain (New York: The Free Press, 1965), Originally pub-
lished, 1932. 
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the present chapter will focus upon the Piagetian point of 
departure. 
Piaget's investigations on moral development em-
phasized the verbally communicated judgments that children 
from five to thirteen years of age make when stories in-
volving a moral component are posed to them. He did not 
explore the relationship between those judgments and behavior, 
as is being done in current research. However, he does 
comment that children's behavior         reflect a decalage, such 
that they may be carrying out actions in the moral sphere that 
are more sensitively related to others than their conceptualized 
version of" morality would suggest. The paradoxical reciprocal 
to this, however, is the common phenomenon in which adult in-
dividuals                                   advanced moral conception fail to 
act upon it. Piaget, himself, demonstrated a precursor to 
this amongst youngsters who break the rules of marble-playing 
while maintaining that the rules are immutable and sacred. 
In regard to the sequentiality of moral stages, Piaget cautions 
against construing. this in absolute terms. There are definite 
age trends in which earlier and more primitive moral conceptions 
diminish as later and more mature ones emerge to assume an 
increasingly more dominate role. However, there is a con-
siderable mix of primitive and mature moral judgments which 
may characterize the child's thought at the same time in 
development. Even after the               are clearly in greater 
evidence, it may be observed that they will be applied only 
to some areas which are of lesser complexity and not until 
-------- ---- ----. 
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later will they be applied to areas of greater complexity. 
Piaget remarks upon this especially in reference to children's 
developing attitudes toward rules, a point of no minor 
significance since he holds that one's attitudes regarding 
rules constitute the essence of morality. There exists a 
premoral stage which is basically asocial. Following this 
are the two major stages of moral development in the Piagetian 
model. The first is a morality of constraint in which def-
erence to external authority is the primary characteristic. 
It is referred to often as the stage of heteronomy and roughly 
corresponds to the preoperational cognitive period of develop-
ment. The second is a morality of cooperation in which group 
solidarity and               respect are paramount. It is re-
ferred to as the stage of autonomy and corresponds to the 
period of concrete operations. Piaget's pathbreaking book 
is divided into four main sections. It begins with an ex-
position of children's attitudes toward rules and their be-
havior in relation to them. This is followed by a section on 
adult constraint and the correlated concept of moral realism. 
The next section explores the idea of justice and notions 
children have of punishment. The final portion examines the 
two moralities in a social context. The influences of Bovet, 
Baldwin, and Durkheim are cited by Piaget at various points 
throughout the text. 
------._---._-------- ----- - --------- -- --------- --- - -- ----- -- - ---_._- - ---- --- --- - -----------------
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Changing Conceptions and Practices of the Rules 
The stories Piaget designed to test out children's re-
sponses to moral situations were based upon                 familiar 
to them from their everyday lives. In exploring their con-
ceptions of rules, Piaget actually got down on his hands and 
knees and played a familiar game with them. He selected the 
game of marbles because of its universality among them. He 
took the trouble to learn the intricacies of the game, although 
he concealed this fact from his young companions. Piaget, then, 
while playing the game with the children, proceeded to inquire 
what they thought the origin and nature of rules to be. In 
addition, he observed the practices they followed to discover 
the relationship between conception and action. This is the 
one exception, incidentally, to the general statement that 
Piaget studied moral judgment only and not behavior. It is 
emphasized that the game of marbles is by no means a simple 
matter, as it permits numerous legitimate variations and this, 
therefore, enhances its functional capacity for discpvering 
how children relate to rules. The attitudes revealed by the 
participants do. not signify that they had been carefully thought 
out in advance. They do not represent preconceived ideas, 
but instead are the spontaneous responses to the inquires being 
made. This same qualifier obtains as well to Piaget's earlier 
works in which he sought to uncover the child's spontaneous 
thoughts about how the world is made and about the natural 
phenomena wi thin it. 
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There are four stages observed in the child's practice 
of marbles. Motoric habits and desire dictate the manner 
in which the child deals with marbles in the first stage. 
There are no collective rules being followed, as the motor 
rule of this stage is purely individual and is merely 
ritualistic or habitual. There follows an egocentric stage 
which may begin between two to five years and extends to 
seven years. The child during this time becomes aware of the 
existence of external rules governing the game and he plays 
in a manner attempting to initiate them. Nevertheless, the 
spirit of his game-playing remains individualistic in that we 
find him either playing separately from others or if engaged 
with others he does not aim to win. The notion of winning 
has not yet dawned upon him. It is at about seven or eight 
years that the third stage emerges. Piaget refers to it as 
incipient cooperation to reflect the budding of social activity 
in playing the game. Although their is a lack of specifity 
and uniformity regarding the rules amongst players of this 
stage, each one attempts to win. The players attempt to 
unify the rules and may even succeed over the course of a 
single game, but there persists a vagueness about the rules 
which are not generalized from one game to the next. A 
stage'known as the codification of rules becomes manifest at 
about eleven or twelve. At this point the fine details of 
each rule and variation are carefully worked out and con-
sensually'acknowledged. The rules are universally applied 
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across each game and locality where it is played. An earnest 
effort at consistent adherence to the rules is made and 
generally achieved. There has occurred a shift from an 
emphasis upon cooperation to an interest in rules in their 
own right. This last stage coincides with the beginning of 
formal operations. 
The second Qr egocentric stage is viewed as an inter-
mediate one which comes between the purely individualistic 
motoric stage and the socially cooperative third stage. 
Although sincere in his attemptto initiate the rule, the 
egocentric child's activities are not at all coordinated with 
the game playing of other participants in the game. There 
is a desire to be a member of the group at play and particularly 
to emulate the older boys, but the preoperational period of 
cognitive development prohibits the capacity for egocentric 
                to unify their use of rules in game playing. The 
essence of the following stage is the social cooPeration that 
characterizes the game playing. Children in the third stage 
not only play to win, but attempt to do so while adhering to 
consensually agreed upon rules. The cooperative interaction 
demanded by playing the game this way is facilitated by the 
reciprocity of reversible thinking which is present in the 
concrete operational period. Although this aspect of 
development continues, the accent in the fourth stage is 
upon the nature of the rules themselves which, indeed, acquire 
a fascinating hold upon the child's mind. Piaget states, 
"Children of the fourth stage ••• ha"ve thoroughly mastered 
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their code and even take pleasure in juridical discussions, 
whether of principle or merely of procedure, which may at 
times arise out of'the points in dispute".l 
There are only three stages in the development of 
conscious attitudes toward rules and they do not all coin-
cide exactly with the chronological unfolding of actual 
practice in the game. The first stage is one in which there 
is no consciousness of the coercive or obligatory element in 
rules, despite the very young child's tendency toward en-
gaging repetitively in a motoric scheme. At the same time, 
the fact is that the child has been exposed to regularities 
of action imposed by his environment and, thus, upon first 
encountering marbles there may be some dawning awareness that 
rules are involved in their use. The               stage in the 
consciousness of rules begins at about       four or five and 
extends to about eight or nine, that is to the middle of the 
cooperative stage in the actual practice of rules. During 
this period the child decisively experiences the coercive 
element in rules. He views rules as sacred and not subject 
to the possibility of change. There is a misleading appearance 
from four to six of accepting a change in rules, but upon 
analysis it is found that the apparently accepted change had 
not been recognized as an innovation, but itself had been 
mistaken for a perennial rule. By age six even this mis-
leading aspect has disappeared and the conception of rules 
------- .. --.--. __ - ___________________                                                     .. ------------__ 
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as absolutely immutable is unmistakable. Al though the 
egocentric child is found to express a belief that rules may 
never be changed and he even strives to imitate, he will be 
observed departing from rules with both minor and major 
infractions in practice. The rule for such a child remains 
external and has no binding effect upon him for this reason. 
The child believes that even if all children were to agree 
to change a rule they would be wrong to think they could 
                  so great is the reverence the child at this stage 
"has for the sacred nature of a rule. Piaget makes the point 
that the egocentric child is not presocial entirely. To the 
extent that he is not in the                         stage in the practice 
of rules he is                       However, to the extent that he 
embraces the rule "as unchanging and external, he is not. A 
belief in the immutable nature of rules derives from unilateral 
respect, a blind acceptance in parental authority and in God, 
the sources of rules. There is a self-imposed quality of con-
straint here, which has a definite social aspect, nevertheless. 
The egocentric child moves into the cooperative"stage of 
practicing rules while retaining a conscious attitude of their 
eternal nature, even though he is achieving a recognition be-
haviorally that the players may themselves vary the rules. 
There is a lag in development during this phase between the 
behavioral and conceptual                 one in which the former is 
more advanced than the latter. The third stage in the con-
sciousness of rules starts at about age ten, approximately 
the middle of the stage of cooperation in practice, and 
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extends throughout the phase of codification. Piaget 
conunents, "Autonomy follows upon heteronomy: the rule of 
a game appears to the child no longer as an external law, 
sacred in so far as it has been laid down by adults; but 
as the outcome of a free d-e-ci s-ion and worthy o-f- re-spect in 
the measure· that it has enlisted mutual consent."l- The 
emphasis now is upon procedure rather than outcome. Rules 
may certainly be altered as long as the proper procedure 
gaining mutual consent is pursued. The established order 
is no longer revered and if it is the will of the members of 
a group collectively then innovations may be explored and 
tested. The children now come to realize that there is no 
such thing as the eternal origin of rules imposed upon the 
game of marbles, but instead that other children, much like 
themselves, had gathered together around a number of marbles 
and generated a set of rules to facilitate playing the garne. 
It is precisely this awakening recognition of the origin 
and nature of rules that leads to a spontaneous obedience in 
playing the game that characterizes the period of codification. 
Piaget emphasizes the democratic basis of this newly evolved 
moral achievement. Procedure and the will of the collective 
now govern. The children are no longer bound by a false 
notion·of eternal and unerring tradition. An era of genuine 
cooperation replaces the previous period of incipient co-
operation as this new consciousness of rules arises to guide 
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codification. The rational foundation of this genuine co-
operation is a more complete plane of reciprocity than any 
that had preceded. There must be fairness in playing the 
game so that all participants are subject to the same laws 
of chance and opportunities for winning. 
There is a vital point which arises here in relation to 
Kohlberg's writings on stage five. We will see a distinct 
resemblance between that stage and what has just been described 
from Piaget's work. Yet Kohlberg does. not find such a demo-
cratic morality emerging until considerably later in develop-
ment than the youngsters in Piaget's studies would .suggest. 
Perhaps anticipating this dilernrna,Piaget raises the question 
of such a democratic attitude arising so early when it is well 
known that even many adults have not arrived at that level 
in some domains in their life. As one would expect, Piaget's 
observation on the matter is somewhat ingenious. He points 
out that since children generally discontinue playing marbles 
shortly after age thirteen, if not sooner, then it follows 
that there are no Elders· for these young people to look up to 
as far as tradition in marbles is concerned. Those who have 
reached the age of twelve and thirteen are, in fact, the 
seniors upon whom all younger children rely as custom bearers. 
It is this situation which forces upon the senior youngsters 
a recognition of their own potential for autonomy. In the 
event that children .customarily played the game.for a much 
longer period, then the democratic attitude would be a longer 
time in developing. For Piaget, the history of the· chiidren's 
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game of marbles is as illuminating to that populatIon of 
little people as is the history of government and religion 
to the older population of adults. 
Moral Realism and Objective Responsibility 
The concept of realism was first introduced by Piaget 
in dis·cussing the child' s tendency of mind to ascribe ex-
ternal substantial existence to such psychic components as 
dreams and names. lie once again utilizes the same notion in 
presenting his ideas pertaining to the moral realm. He 
succinctly formulates, "We shall therefore call moral realism 
the tendency which the child has to regard duty and the value 
att·aching to it as self-subsistent and independent of the mind, 
as imposing regardless of the circumstances in which the in-
dividual may find himself."l He is explicit in citing the 
three criteria to which moral realism conforms. First, the 
good is defined by obedience to adult rule, hence, moral 
realism is heteronomous. Second, it is the letter of the law 
which must be met. There is no allowance for flexibility 
or deviation. Third, objective responsibility determines 
the measure of culpability when assessing actions. It is 
the actual consequences of an act and not the intention 
motivating it which is taken into consideration. 
Piaget explores objective responsibility specifically 
with stories posed to children in the areas of c.lumsiness 
and stealing in.one section and lying in another. Clumsiness 
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is accurately identified as a fairly common event in- the 
child's life which fairly frequently evokes a negative re-
sponse from adults. The stories constructed by Piaget 
juxtaposed one in which the damaging consequence of an act 
was great, while the child was either well-intentioned or 
merely carrying out an act precipitated by chance, to one 
in             only a slight damaging consequence resulted from 
an intentional violation of a command. An example is a 
story of a little boy who opens a dining room door upon 
being called and in so doing upsets a tray on the other side 
which had been resting on a nearby chair. All fifteen cups 
that had been supported by the tray fall -and break. The 
alternate story is one in which a young boy left alone by 
his mother enters the cupboard and climbs up high to get some 
jam. In the process he knocks over a cup and it_breaks. 
The clear implication is that he knows he was not to go after 
the jam. Upon relaying the stories, the investigator then 
asks whether the two children are equally guilty and, if not, 
which one is guiltier. The respondent must then explain why 
he has answered as he did. The results that Piaget obtained 
indicate that until age ten there will be found two types of 
responses amongst children. The same child may even alternate 
between the two types. One of these responses focuses ex-
clusively on the objective damage and the other on motives. 
However, there is a decisive dimunition of objective responsi-
bility with age and there were no such instances of children 
focusing mainly on material damage rather than intention after 
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age ten. It is Piaget's view that objective responsibility 
has its source in adult constraint. In relation to clumsiness, 
a subtle distinction is made by Piaget. The adult will often 
model objective responsibility for he will scold even when 
the child accidentally breaks something of value, but he 
does not truly believe the child is morally flawed. How-
ever, the child, unlike the adult, makes no such distinction 
and the actor, himself or a peer, is morally at fault. 
Either through repeated acts of scolding or simply as-
serting prohibitions, the adult has fostered a notion of 
absolute obligations and forbidden behaviors. Hence, Piaget 
suggests that deriving from the child's unilateral respect 
and the adult's constraint there is generated moral realism. 
In his discussion in this area, Piaget is most sensitive to 
the parents' potential for promoting subjective responsibility 
in the child by instituting certain ega1atarian procedures. 
In addressing himself to the attempt to facilitate a re-
sponsivity to intentions over objective damage, Piaget 
anticipated the work of Robert Selman by several decades. 
Piagets observations are worth citing in this connection. 
He states, "In this way the child will find himself in the 
presence, not of a system of commands requiring ritualistic 
and external obedience, but of a system of social relations 
such                             does his best to obey the same obligations, 
." : 
and does·· so out of mutual respect ... 1 It is reciprocity, in 
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which individuals in the social system come to take the 
other's point of view and evaluate accordingly, that under-
pins the morality·of this social system and not a rigid 
obedience to external ·rule. 
Piaget finds lying a particularly fertile practice around 
which to explore the child's developing moral conceptions 
because it is so integral to egocentric thought. There is a 
fundamental conflict inherent in lying in the face of adult 
constraint. Analysis of children's protocols reveals that 
the youngest children conceive of a lie as saying naughty 
words. It is the utterance of forbidden expressions. Yet 
the very same child is demonstrated to have an understanding 
that to lie is to speak what is not true. The child's ex-
tension of the definition of a lie to encompass the use of 
naughty words is explained by Piaget's belief that the child 
sees language as the means through which lying as a moral 
fault is committed. Saying naughty words.is also to display 
a fault through                     The child reasons further that lies 
are all those things which one is not supposed to say. 
Although generally children between six and ten years will 
define a lie more simply as something that is untrue, their 
genuine comprehension is limited because they omit the com-
ponent of intention. It is not necessarily that he cannot 
distinguish between intentional and unintentional statements 
that are untrue. The point is that for the             child, if 
the statement is known to be untrue, then it is held to be a 
lie regardless of motivation. A child who is frightened by 
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a large dog in the street is said to be lying when he runs 
to his mother in alarm, announcing that he has seen a dog 
as big as a cow. It is at about ten or eleven years that 
children unambiguously recognize a lie as an intentional 
untruth. Surprising though it may be, Piaget discovered 
that younger children believed a lie to be more naughty 
if, in departing greatly from the truth, it was less likely 
to be believed than a lie that departed only slightly from 
the truth and, therefore, was more likely to be believed. 
In other words, the more successful the deception, the less 
naughty the ,liar. This proved to be the case even where the 
intention was not malevolent, as in the story where the boy 
said he saw a dog as large as a cow. Age progression leads 
to a reversal of this interpretation by the child and we find 
that older children realize that a blatant untruth is more 
an exaggeration than a lie. Piaget is most emphatic in con-
veying that he is not positing two pure stages, one sequentially 
followed the other. Both objective and subjective responsi-
bility can be found in various proportions amongst the younger 
children. The passage of time, however, leads to a significant 
disappearance of the former and a dominance of the latter. 
Gutk!nl views the notion of intentionality as part of the 
broader area of personal responsibility and he offers an en-
riching analysis of the subject. 
1Daniel C. Gutkin, "An Analysis of the Concept of Moral 
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Truth, for the egocentric child, holds no special value. 
He is governed by· his own desires and fantasies. Assimilation 
predominates over accommodation with the aim of supplying 
personal satisfaction. The valuing of truth evolves as the 
child becomes more of a social agent gradually recognizing . 
the moral demand of reciprocity and cooperation in relation-
ships. As long as a relation of unilateral respect is main-
tained the child has no opportunity to hold peer level dis-
cussions of genuine mutual exchange and in the process dis-
cover the destructive aspects of lying. Unilateral                
is bound to generate objective responsibili.ty. As unilateral 
respect declines, the child will interiorize necessary rules 
and make them autonomously his own. Mutual respect replaces 
adult constraint and the need for truthfulness as a con-
structive force in relationships becomes evident. The suc-
cessful lie is now seen for the invidious force that it re-
presents. Trust must be maintained in social relations and 
only truthfulness can be relied upon to achieve this. It is 
between the ages of ten and twelve that a full consciousness 
of what has been discussed here becomes apparent to the child • 
. In Piaget' s words, "Thus truthfulness gradually ceases to 
be a duty imposed by heteronomy and becomes an object en-
visaged as good by c;tn autonpmous personal conscience."l 
For the very young child a lie is considered wrong because 
1 p' Jean 1aget, 
Gabain (New York: 
published, 1932. 
The Moral Judgment of the Child I trans. M. 
The Free Press, 1965), p. 174. Originally 
72 
it is that which gets punished. If punishment were not a 
consequence of lying, 'then the onus of being wrong would be 
removed from the lie. There is a progression with age to a 
realization that even if lying was not something for which 
punishment is received, it would still be wrong in itself. 
However, this realization is still not accompanied by inter-
personal awareness and psychological insight. It is at the 
next stage of development that children characterized by a 
high level of reciprocity awaken to the fact that lying is 
necessarily wrong because it is in stark opposition to main-
taining mutual trust and would sunder the affective bond. 
Justice and Punishment 
There are basically two types of justice. They are 
retributive and distributive. The former is concerned primarily 
with proportionate punishment and the latter with equality 
in distributing resources that are available. Piaget has 
observed in his studies that when the two are in conflict the 
younger child favors retributive action and the older child 
favors distributive justice. The stages of justice involve 
a shift from believing that whatever authority commands as 
punishment is just, to a conviction that a rigid equality 
("A blow for a blow") is just, to a realization that equity, 
which takes into account a variety of factors, is the basis 
for justice. 
Justice, in Piaget's view, is not an implant derived 
from external authority. The only necessary ingredients -----._-----_. -----._----._--._.-._--.-_ .. ----_ ... -._--._--- - .'---.- -.-" .. ----------- ------:---.--- -'- ----.- -_. ----- -------. - .. - -
are mutual respect and solidarity amongst children them-
selves. In fact, the derivation of the justice idea in 
children is not only independent of adults, but is some-
times at the adult's expense. 
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Piaget distinguishes sharply between two kinds of 
punishment. Expiatory punishment is governed by constraint. 
A moral transgressor must be brought back into line. Punish-
ment is coercive and proportionate to the seriousness of the 
violation. It is also unrelated to the content of the violation. 
Reciprocal punishments are not arbitrary and lack the coercive 
element. Hence, one who has ruptured the social bond through 
some transgression should simply be punished in such a way 
that-he experiences the natural consequences of that rupture. 
In order of severity, punishment by reciprocity has been 
classified as follows: 1.") Exclusion from the group per-
manently or temporarily; 2.) Being subjected to the trans-
gression's immediate and material consequences; 3.) Deprivation 
of whatever it is that has been misused; 4.> Performing upon 
the child the exact violation he has committed; 5.) Restitution, 
in which the offender must                 or repay fQr           is 
damaged; 6.) censure, which entails no punishment other than 
communicating to the transgressor -that he has, indeed, broken 
the bond of sOlidarity. In general, non-expiatory punishment 
ultimately seeks the restoration of solidarity and not mere 
conformity. There is an age trend leading away from ex-
piation toward reciprocity in punishment. Kohlberg states 
the following in connection with _Piaget's studies: 
Four year old children do not use reciprocity as 
a reason for consideration of others, whereas 
children of seven and older frequently do. Even 
seven-year-olds show mainly selfish and concrete 
reciprocity concerns, including anticipation of 
retaliation and anticipation of return of favors. 
Most ten-year olds who were asked "What would the 
Golden Rule say to do if a boy came up and hit you?" 
interpreted the golden rule in terms of concrete 
reciprocity and said, "Hit him back. Do unto 
others as they do unto you." By age eleven to 
thirteen most children can clearly judge in terms 
of ideal reciprocity, in terms of putting oneself 
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in the place of someone in a different position, and 1 
in terms of sentiments for past affection and favors. 
Stark reciprocity in which the governing rule is to seek an 
exactly proportionate response to the offense is the stage of 
equality which on the average is from seven to ten years of 
age. It can have an almost brutal effect and it is not 
until beyond age ten that the more just form of reciprocity, 
equity, predominates over equality. Further comments on the 
nature of equity will follow shortly. 
Punishment by expiation is clearly linked to a morality 
of heteronomy in which pure duty and obedience reign. The 
ultimate source of punishment is authority with which the 
child lacks a relationship of reciprocity, which is not possible 
in an non-equalitarian relationship. It is the morality of 
autonomy, grounded in mutual respect, which gives rise to a 
punishment ethos of reciprocity. Expiative punishment has 
roots in primitive vengeance, whereas reciprocity evolves from 
1 . Lawrence Kohlberg, IIDevelopment of Moral Character 
and Moral Ideology,1I in Review of Child Develo ment Re-
search, ed. L.W. Hoffman, Vol. 1 New York: Russell Sage 
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it and through strict equality.to a morality of forgiveness 
and understanding. The essence of punishment by reciprocity 
in its most evolved form is, for Piaget, inducing an aware-
ness in the transgressor that he has broken the bond of 
solidarity. 
Piaget p'oints out that there may exist a conflict bet-
ween retributive and distributive justice. For example, if 
a very young child drops a roll while hiking with a group in 
the mountains and the roll irretreivably falls over the side, 
should he be given another? Younger children responding to 
such     dilemma would choose a retributive response stating 
that he was .wrong to let it fall over the side and should 
not be given more. As children grow older they favor distri-
butive justice indicating that it would be unfair not to re-
distribute what remains in order that the young child may have 
a part of what is still available. As children first begin 
favoring dis'tributive justice they will explain their position 
simply by stating that all should have equal shares. As.they 
move.beyond sheer equality to equity they will support their 
_z::esponses by introducing                                         su']ges,!:ing that 
the child is too young, for example, to understand and could 
not be held responsible for what happened. Equity is 
situational in the sense that the specific conditions obtaining 
are taken into account and coordinated to arrive at a just 
resolution. This is a more subtle and.complex advance over 
advocating pure equality in either distribut;l.ve ,or retributive 
spheres. In commenting upon the shift from authority based 
'. 
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concepts of justice to equalitarian justice, Piaget comments, 
"Equalitarian justice develops with age at the expense of 
submission to adult authority, and in correlation with 
solidarity between children. Equalitarianism would there-
fore seem to come from habits of reciprocity peculiar to 
mutual respect rather than from the mechanisms of duties 
that is founded upon unilateral respect".l Equity, in Piaget's 
view, extends equalitarianism one step further than the pure 
equality which defines it , to encompass the relative aspects 
of a given situation. In summary, Piaget posits three major 
periods in the child's developing conception of justice. 
In the first period justice is subordinated to the authority 
of adults. This generally lasts until seven or eight years. 
Ranging from ages eight to eleven the child's sense of justice 
is observed becoming increasingly more equalitarian. 
Finally there emerges the third major period aot about eleven 
or twelve at which time equalitarianism yields to the re-
lativity of equity. 
Finally, there is a curious tendency of the young mind 
to adhere to what Piaget calls immanent justice. The child 
expects that wrong doing will automatically bring with it a 
corolary punishment. It is in the nature of things that this 
will occur. perhaps it is not really a surprising belief 
if one considers that there is no pure chance operative in the 
world of the the preoperational child. The world is infused 
----------- -- ----- -- -------------lpi"a-g-et-,       -295:------ ------------ -- ------ - ------ ----- ---------- -------------- ---- -----
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with purposiveness and finalism. Although immanent justice 
extends into the school years it diminishes with age and is 
finally abandoned. 
Durkheim, Bovet, and Baldwin· 
The closing section of Piaget's great work on the 
child's moral development expands into the field of sociology 
and social psychology. Three influential theorists, Durkheim, 
Bovet, and Baldwin are treated at length by Piaget and their 
essential relevance to his work will be briefly summarized. 
Durkheim was a French sociologist born in 1858. He 
formulated a theory of morality in which society was seen 
as its ultimate source and conformity to society's rules 
its major aim. He posited three components to morality. 
They are discipline, group attachment, and autonomy. There 
exists a set of socially promulgated commands and discipline 
requires adherence to these. Individual conscience interiorizes 
these commands and respects the authority which is their source. 
The individual is obligated to attach himself to the social 
group and work .towards its welfare. Discipline and group 
attachinent are both seen as "good for the individual and ad-
herence to these two dictates of morality will enrich the 
personality while it is simultaneously subordinate to society. 
By autonomy of the will, Durkheim means to propose a rational 
morality. Each moral agent should understand the rules of 
society and from that understanding should flow a willful 
embracing of the rules. Just as in science physical laws are 
.. --_... . . .,... ''----'-'''---'.'--'-'-..... .... . . .. .......:..-..-.-..-:;.. .. _-----.-
o _. ____ •• _ __ __ 
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discovered and freely accepted, in the same manner social 
rules should be made known and conformed to by the individual • 
. Piaget stresses that a failing in                       view is to ignore 
the fact that children have a society of peers available to 
them, and hence, are ·not exclusively subject t·o adult au·thority. 
The derivation of rules for Durkheim is truly outside of per-
sonal conscience and it is the role of society, in the form 
of the teacher, to transmit these rules to the child. The 
French sociologist has been accused of elevating society to 
the status of a metaphysical entity and Piaget interprets 
this facet of Durkheim's theory as being predicated upon in-
tellectual realism. Piaget stresses that there exists neither 
a substantial being to be called society, nor a series of 
isolated individuals. There exists instead only relations 
and these must be understood from more than one perspective. 
The essential quarrel that Piaget has with Durkheim pivots 
around the latters identification of constraint and co-
operation. There is a fundamental distinction to be made 
between these two and Durkheim does not make it, tending 
to fuse them instead. An autonomous morality cannot be 
truly transmitted by a teacher or any authority. It must 
be constructed by each individual through interaction with 
peers, and those adults who relate to the child with equality, 
in mutual respect. Piaget agrees with Durkheim that morality 
has an essentially social component, but he differs sharply 
in rejecting the coerive element which Durkheim clings to. 
---.-                                                                                                                                                         vital--
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to morality, they do not agree upon the meaning of the 
term •. Succinctly. put, Piaget asserts, "In the moral as in 
the intellectual domain we really possess only what we have 
1 conquered by ourselves". Piaget's formulations lead him to 
advocate the creation. of a democratic society within the 
school system and to stress the student's own initiative. He 
somewhat sharply refers to the type of school that Durkheim 
advocates as being a monarchy acquiring its authority from 
divine right. peterson,2 advancing a position congenial to 
Piaget's critique, suggests that Durkheim had a fear of 
liberating the aspirations and fantasies of people and, there-
            overreacted with an excessive penchant for maintaining 
order, from which his theory of morality and moral education 
developed. 
Bovet and Durkheim both discount the individual con-
struction of moral law and the Kantian notion that respect 
is the product of a priori rational law. Bovet's emphasis, 
in fact, amounts to an attempt to account for rational law 
itself through the evocation of respect as the product of 
social interaction. A sense of obligation, it is held by 
Bovet, arises from being issued commands by those whom one 
respects. The compelling quality of the rules stems from 
the respect the receiver has for the bearer. It is this 
respect which generates a sense of duty in the subject. 
1piaget, p. 366. 
2 Howard L. Peterson, "The Quest for Moral Order," 
Journal of Moral Education 4 (1974): 39-46. 
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For Bovet, there is nothing intrinsic to the law itself to 
which the mind yields. The child                         both fear and 
affection in relation to his parents and these emotions 
generate the respect for them which becomes the source of 
accepting law. -The parents are seen by the child as the 
proto·l:.ype of perfection and are held to be godlike,; However, 
in time, commands conflicting in their nature and implications 
will be put forth by various individuals who are respected. 
This will initiate personal activity as the subject will 
necessarily seek to reinstate consistency and his own reason 
will set up a hierarchy from amongst the diversified commands. 
Piaget believes that Bovet's explanation of the origin of 
child morality is essentially correct and that the latter 
has left his theoretical system sufficiently open-ended to 
permit further elaboration, which Piaget attempts. A difficulty 
inherent in Bovet's formulation is that since assent is com-
pelled by unilateral respect, the rule promulgated by an authority 
mayor may not be intrinsically good. However,with the em-
phasis on respect this allows a shift from unilateral to 
mutual respect. The shift to mutuality eliminates coercion 
and invokes reciprocity, which assures the formation of 
rational rules subject to mutual regulation. This avoids the 
potential pitfall in Bovet's system through which duty would 
by definition remain the good. As has been observed previously, 
Piaget believes it is essential to maintain a distinction bet-
ween the heteronomous orientation of unilateral respect and 
tne -- autonomous' orientation -of mutual --respect       --Bovet' s . system . 
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blurs the distinction for it views mutual                 as 
essentially rooted in unilateral respect. Piaget's in-
sistence on this point is a. forerunner of his own cognitive 
system's strong emphasis upon qualitatively different 
stages of development. 
Baldwin is also se"en to emphasize the interconnection 
between individual and social. The apparent pure individuality 
of consciousness of self is analyzed by him and observed to 
be an illusion. This is because at birth there exists no 
sense of self whatsoever and it is only by interacting with 
other individuals and especially by imitation that it can 
be acquired. In development the child first imitates the 
behavior of others which gives rise to a subjective sense of 
self that is ·the same as others. This process is also re-
versed in that the child begins to realize that others have 
internal feelings which may mirror his. The initial pr.ocess 
of imitation, hence, has a converse called ejection. There 
follows a sense of obedience which, being neither imitation 
nor ejection, induces friction. Out of this, in Baldwin's 
view, is created an                             which is a moral agent 
subject to adult constraint. It is in a sense an internalized 
command, imitating the authQrity from whence it sprung, that 
serves to convey what one ought to become. An inner sense of 
the morality of law and the good evolves to a point where it 
is seen as superior to individuals, beyond the dictates of 
authority figures, and ultimately elevated to a stage of 
absolute moral law. 
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Piaget does not believe that Baldwin, even though he 
posits an adualism between inner consciousness and outer 
reality, sufficiently appreciates the child's                          
The child's egocentrism specifically places his own view-
point at an absolute position. Hence, although the child 
appears to respect commands, his egocentrism leads to dis-
tortion and misapplication of them. Piaget insists that 
while imitation will illuminate for us what we have in 
common with others, it does not promote a particularized 
self. In an illuminating passage he states the following: 
In order to discover oneself as a particular in-
dividual, what is needed is a continuous comparison, 
the outcome of opposition, of discussion, and of 
mutual control; and indeed consciousness of the 
individual self appears far later than consciousness 
of the more general features in our psychological 
make-up. This is why a child can remain egocentric 
for a very long time (through lack of consciousness 
of self), while participating on all points in the 
minds of others. It is only by knowing our individual 
nature with its limitations as well as its resources 
that we grow capable of .coming out of ourselves and 
collaborating with other individual natures. Con-
sciousness of self is therefore both a product and a 
condition of cooperation. l 
The work of Baldwin has held significance for both 
Piaget and Kohlberg. Kohlberg2 decries the relative neglect 
of Baldwin's work by researchers today and has offered a 
rather extensive treatment of his theories. It is worth 
lpiaget, p. 394. 
2Laurence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization," in Handbook of 
Socialization, ed. G. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 
',- .. -. -. ---.. -.. --- .. pp ." .. 34 7    480. _ _ . 
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noting, in passing, that although Piaget is justifiably 
credited with having' created the new interdisciplinary 
science of genetic epistemology, the genetic psychology of 
Baldwin stands as an unquestioned 'precursor to that growing 
body'of knowledge. 
Summary of Piagetian Based Research 
A voluminous amount of replication research has flowed 
from Piaget's pioneering work, The Moral Judgment of the 
Child. A good deal of it.is sector research in the sense 
of being designed to test a specific hypothesis such as 'one 
involving objective. responsibility versus intentional judgment. 
On the other hand, some of it is addressed to broader issues 
such as the universality of stage sequences. An exhaustive 
survey will not be attempted, but instead I shall identify 
the major findings that previously conducted surveys have re-
vealed to date. 
Kohlbergl cites eleven areas in which age changes are 
said to occur in Piaget's moral developmental Theory. He 
divides these into two groups; those areas in which age trends 
have been confirmed and those in which they have not been. 
The six dimensions supported' by the research at the time of 
Kohlberg's survey are as follows: 1.) Intentionality judgments 
ascend in frequency over time as objective responsibility de-
clines; 2 .. ) Older children show a greater recognition that 
1 Kohlberg, Moral Character, p. 397-98. 
84 
different perspectives may be adopted regarding the same 
situation, whereas younger children center' on only one 
                        as the right one; 3.) Independence of sanctions. 
For an older child a bad act is so because of its in-
trinsic nature, but a younger child will construe an act as 
bad solely on the basis of someone being punished for per-
forming it; 4.) There is an increase in the use of re-
ciprocity from four years through thirteen, as predicted by 
Piaget; 5.) The administration of harsh punishment is ad-
vocated during the younger years with a gradual dimunition 
of such practices being advocated and an ascending frequency 
with age in favor of restitution and reform occuring; 6.) 
There is a tendency on the part of younger children to think 
that harmful events will automatically and naturally follow 
bad actions, but older children do not anticipate such 
teleological events. 
Age trends in the above area have been supported by 
the research at least in Western cultures. These developmental 
trends have been observed to occur irrespective of religion, 
social class, and story content when being questioned. Child 
rearing practices regarding punishment may vary without 
eliminating the observed early characteristics in young children 
      absolutism, objective responsibility, and orientation to 
punishment. Kohlberg suggests that the cultural variations 
are not causal to these features of moral development, but 
that some of them may lead to deceleration or stage arrest. 
- The -cognitive developmental basis-of-rnoicil-development---is-
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indicated in the positive correlation found between the 
areas confirmed and I.Q. scores. Lastly, each of the six 
aspects demonstrates a fundamental shift in orientation 
from emphasizing objective material consequences to sub-
jective psychological components. 
Kohlberg reports that the areas of Piagetian re-
search which have been disconfirmed are not those with 
cognitive bases, but those that are rooted in what he calls 
socio-emotional elements. In these areas, he asserts, 
there may be found an increase with age of the anticipated 
developments followed by a decline in their presence. A 
clear cut emergence of a democratic spirit preceded by an 
authoritarian ethic is not observed. Kohlberg also con-
cludes that the research does not support the premise that 
peer interaction amongst young children promotes either 
reciprocity or intentionality, even though he acknowledges 
that it plays a significant role in general moral development. 
He does contend, however, that social participation amongst 
preadolescents. will facilitate the acquistion of more mature 
moral conceptions with respect to.his own                                      
development. The shift from unilateral to mutual respect is 
not fully supported and, in any event, we will see that Kohl-
berg places a different interpretation upon the non-egalitarian 
relationship between child and adult than does Piaget. There 
is greater variance to be found in these areas of socio-
emotional aspects as influenced by religion, social class and 
culture, and content of stories utilized. This is in marked 
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contrast to those dimensions with a cognitive foundation, 
which are resistant to these variables. Lickona, in what 
appears to be the most current survey available on piagetian 
based research, has reached a conclusion similar to Kohlberg's. 
He states the following: 
The findings ••. suggest that while Piaget's 
analysis of the cognitive basis of moral judg-
ment is well formed, his speculations about its 
affective side are on shaky grounds. Young 
children do not ••• stand in awe of the authority 
of adults or the rules they repeatedly set forth 
The research ••• indicates that loyalty to and 
genuine respect for personal authority, like re-
spect for rules, is something that children must 
develop during the early school years (ages 4-7) 
and something that accompanies advance, not im-
maturity, on moral dimensions such as judging· 
the rightness of an action apart from its ex-
ternal consequences. The child's early obedience 
orientation in moral thinking appears to be based 
less on respect for the moral status of              
than on simple recognition of their superior 
power. I 
In view of its extreme salience to the subject at hand, 
it will be fruitful to examine Lickona's report at greater 
length. He is emphatic in asserting that the evidence is 
ample to unequivocally accept Piaget's position of develop-
mental changes in the area of moral judgments, reflecting 
qualitatively different moral modes of thought that change 
with age and experience. Nevertheless, the data pertaining to 
specific areas is mixed, some of it lending support and some not 
doing so. As with all research, it should be kept in mind 
IThomas Lickona, "Research on Piaget's Theory of Moral 
Development," in Moral Development and Behavior:Theory, Re-
search, and Social Issues, ed. L. Lickona (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & WinS1:on,--1976)., p. 240.;-· .............. . 
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that disconfirming evidence may at times be explained by 
flawed conceptual analysis or methodology. Even so, when 
faced with such deficiencies in a given piece of research, 
the most one can conclude is "Not proven". Lickona,l in 
an article predating the research survey presently under 
consideration, has provided an excellent critique of mis-
conceptions about Piaget's theory of moral development, 
which have led to false or irrelevant conclusions in the re-
search literature. 
A major disclosure is that moral developmental advances 
appear at a much slower rate than originally proposed. We 
are more likely to find youngsters achieving Piaget's morality 
of autonomy between the ages of twelve to seventeen rather 
than at age twelve. Furthermore, Piaget's highest stage of 
autonomy would seem to be coincident with Kohlberg's third 
stage, signifying three additional major stages which orie 
could possibly pass through. Clearly, the autonomous 
morality uncovered in the prototypical study by Piaget will 
be seen to fall far short of the highest level of moral 
reasoning on the Kohlbergian scale, to be                   in Chapter 
Four of this dissertation. 
With only minor deviation, all .of the six areas Kohlberg 
reported as being confirmed by the literature were reaffirmed 
lThomas Lickona, "Piaget Misunderstood: A Critique of 
the Criticisms of Theory of Moral Development," Merrill· Palmer 
Quarterly 16 (1969): 337-50. 
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by Lickona's assessment of Piagetian replication and modified 
studies. 
In general, although it is not the only                        
variable, there is a positive correlation between mental age 
and Piagetian moral development. However, an individual 1 s 
I.Q. does not reflect intellectual level in the manner that 
Piaget, himself, has conceived of it. Therefore, it is note-
worthy that Lickona is able to cite several projects validating 
a positive correlation between moral judgment measures of 
the Piagetian variety and competence at performing Piagetian 
tasks of a logical nature. These findings lend support to 
the cognitive foundation of moral development. A detailed 
study of the connection between cognitive level of develop-
ment and the Kohlbergian stages of morality will appear in 
a later Chapter. 
Lickona has further inquired into the role of both peer 
interaction and .absence of adult constraint to ascertain their 
impact upon progress. toward a morality of cooperation. In 
a summary statement, Lickona reflects the following: 
For all three hypothesized causes of moral 
change-cognitive development, experience of 
social equality, and increased independence 
of adult constraint-the research reviewed 
thus far has been correlational rather than 
experimental. The most that can be said on 
the basis of these naturalistic data is that 
the factors identified by Piaget as sources 
of moral growth have typically been found to 
correlate with mature judgment on one or 
another of his dimensions. The evidence is 
strongest for the role of cognitive develop-
ment, mixed but generally supportive regarding 
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the contribution of peer experience, and 
weakest with respect to the role of freedom 
from the constraining influence of adult 
authority. 1 
Lickona goes on to review experimental studies designed 
to foster moral growth in Piagetian areas. His overall con-
clusion is that it does not appear plausible to expect 
accelerated growth from the types of causes involved, such 
as cognitive development and peer-interaction, in so short a 
period of time as a laboratory experiment utilizes. He con-
cludes with a recommendation of longitudinal studies with 
careful follow-up as the most appropriate approach to ex-
perimental research of a developmental theory. 
Hoffman2 has                     a balanced and even-handed dis-
course ranging widely across many approaches to moral develop-
ment. Attention here shall focus upon his comments on con-
sistency across moral attributes in Piagetian theory. The 
purpose in concentrating on these remarks is not to cite 
definitive conclusions, but to highlight some issues involved 
when dealing with Piaget's complex moral system. Hoffman '. 
begins with the premise that it is reasonable, given the 
nature of cognitive developmEm'tal theory, to expect to find 
, lLickona, "Research on.Piaget's Theory of Moral De-
velopment ," p. 235. 
2Martin Hoffman, "Moral Development," in Carmichael's 
Manual of Child Psychology, ed. P. Mussen, Vol. 1 (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1970), pp. 261-359. 
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considerable consistency across attributes. One may search 
. for consistency of a single attribute across different content 
areas. He cites the example of objective responsibility 
being applied to the two spheres of lying and stealing. 
There is also a type of consistency which deals with the in-
terrelatedness of two distinct attributes. For example, one 
may search for a correlation in development between objective 
responsibility and immanent justice, both early modes of moral 
judgment in Piaget's theory. Hoffman concluded from a review 
of the literature that despite some mixed findings, in general, 
the evidence did not support a view of stages as structured 
wholes which consistently cut across all areas. It is his 
conceptual analysis of this conclusion that I am interested 
in pinpointing. 
Peer-level experience is an important facilitator of 
moral development in Piaget's view, but it obviously does 
not occur at the same time in children's lives in all areas. 
Specifically, social interaction with peers in the game of 
marbles may very well promote autonomous attitudes toward 
rules in this area, yet the children may, for the time being, 
remain heteronomous in relation to rules applied to other 
areas in their lives. Piaget, himself, had made the identical 
point in his book on the subject. Similarly, intentional 
judgments may emerge in situations entailing behavior 
resulting in physical damage before it is observed in " 
situations involving lying, since the latter is less palpable 
-. .. . - .-.-------and more subtle     " - -In" other words ,"" -"researcn must take" into 
:           ,;-.-
"" ... , .... 
account decalages in development, a phenomenon which is 
integral to a cognitive structural approach and does not 
run counter to it. 
Another consideration is that of the complexity of 
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,situation and variables. As the child's cognitive capacities 
increase, he is more likely to take into account additional 
variables, especially more complex ones. Hoffman suggests 
that while it ,is an advance, making a judgment based on 
intentions over physical consequences when inanimate' objects 
are involved ,is relatively simple in comparison to continuing 
to hold a well-intentioned person responsible for harm his 
actions have caused another person, when the unfavorable 
consequences could have been anticipated and, hence, avoided. 
In the case of the latter judgment, "'good intentions are re-
cognized and yet the actor is not absolved from responsibility 
for his behavior. 
Hoffman's observation is that research designed to test 
out consistency across               in Piagetian moral theory has 
not instituted the proper controls needed to take into account 
the complexity of the system. It is through continual 
rigorous conceptual and methodological analysis such as Hoff-
man has demonstrated that progress in researching all facets 
of cognitive developmental psychology will occur. As for the 
absence of stage consistency                           in Piagetian moral 
theory specifically, a different picture will 'be presented in 
the modified and expanded work of Lawrence Kohlberq. 
CHAPTER THREE 
EGOCENTRISM AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVISM 
As long as the child remains embedded in his own per-
spective he will be unable to progress in his capacity for 
moral reasoning. The very young child is not aware that 
others possess a point of view which may be different from his 
own. Hence, in his interpersonal relations he acts as if 
peers and adults share his limited outlook. He has no basis 
for even attempting to anticipate the needs, feelings, and 
motives of others. The concept of egocentrism, which re-
presents this condition is a rich and central one in the field 
of cognitive-developmental psychology. It essentially signifies 
an incapacity for differentiating between internal and ex-
ternal. In its profoundest form the epistemic subject ex-
periences a state in which knower and known are fused together 
as one. All of cognitive development may be           as a series 
of progressions in which there is continual disengagement 
between subject and object leading to increased objectivity. 
However, objectivity is characterized by a relativism which 
takes into account the many perspectives that must be coordinated 
to provide knowledge of reality in a situation. Inhelder and 
Piaget characterize it in the following manner: 
Essentially, the process, which at anyone of the developmental stages moves from egocentrism toward 
decentering, constantly subjects increases in know-
• .._- ._,_ •• - -- -- ._, ••••• _.- - •• ". _ •• _ •••••• 0 ••• _ ••• _ '" __ , ._._ _ ••• _ _ _ ,,_ ••• 
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ledge to a refocusing of perspective •••• 
Objectivity presupposes a decentering-i.e •. , 
a continual refocusing of perspective. Ego-
.centrism, on the other hand, is the undif-
ferentiated state prior to mUltiple per-
spectives,                 objectivity implies both 
differentiation and coordination of the I 
points of view which have been                                
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The term egocentrism as it is used by the Geneva School is 
applied to logical, ontological, and social realms. Although 
there are noteable exceptions, the bulk of Piaget's work 
utilizes it in relation to the child's construction of know-
ledge about the physical world. The meaning of the word in 
this discussion, however, will be restricted to its signi-
ficance in a social context." This is in keeping with Piaget's 
use of the concept in his book on the language and thought of 
the· child and the one on moral judgment, as well as his treat-
ment of adolescence in the final chapter of his work on that 
development period. The egocentric child,. then, will be 
viewed simply as one who centers upon his own point of view 
and is unaware that others hold a viewpoint of their own. 
Decentration refers to the ability to see things from per-
spectives other than one's own. It may be either sequential, 
in which case one shifts through time from his own to another's 
viewpoint, or it may be simultaneous, in which case one's own 
perspective· and another's are coordinated at the same time. 
I " Barbel Inhelder and Jean piaget, The Growth of Logical 
Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence, trans. A.                 and 
S. Milgram (New York: Basic Books, 1958), p. 345. Originally 
published, 1955. 
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The ability to see things from another person's perspective 
is called role-taking. Both Piaget and Kohlberg consider 
role-taking to be a pivotal concept in their respective 
theories of moral development. It serves as a connecting 
or intermediary link between the necessary cognitive-structural 
development and the attainment of moral maturity. Because of 
its essential function and integral relationship to contem-
porary moral stage theory role-taking, or perspectivism as 
it is alternately called, will be examined in depth. The 
leading figures in this field are Piaget, Feffer, Flavell, 
and Selman. The theorist who coined the term role-taking and 
is the forerunner of much of the work in the area, Mead, war-
rants attention in his own right. As the discussion procedes 
it will be observed that an examination of role-taking may 
emphasize either the individual, an interpersonal frame-
work, or a societal perspective. In any case, egocentrism 
and perspectivism are complex concepts which develop in in-
verse proportion. As egocentrism declines, perspectivism 
increases. The concepts are subject to influence by such 
variables as· familiarity of situation, task complexity, and 
social class. The nature of both at varying levels of 
cognitive development is qualitatively different from its 
expression in preceding stages. Some contemporary re-
search on         subject has. been criticized for testing role-
taking with tasks that invoke cognitive skills that are 
unrelated to role-taking itself. The problem is that the 
--subject may actually have the ability to deal-·with per spec·tiV'i sm- --
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at some level, but the fact will be masked if the child lacks 
the contingent 'cognitive skill, which is not really essential 
to the main hypothesis. A false negative will then result. 
The corolary is that the age at which role-taking is then 
said to first appear is set higher than is truly the case. 
Kohlberg's Perspective on Role-Taking 
Since it is primarily because of the strong emphasis 
placed upon role-taking by Kohlberg in'his moral stage theory 
that this material is being introduced, it may be useful to 
highlight the essential features of his use of the term, 
which he adopted from Mead. Kohlberg is quite explicit in 
citing the following characteristics of role-taking. 
1.) it emphasizes the cognitive as well as the 
affective side. 
2.) it involves an organized structural relation-
ship between self and others. 
3.) it emphasizes that the process involves 
understanding and relating to all the roles in 
the society of which one is a part. 
4.) it emphasizes that role taking goes on in all 
social interactions and communication situations, 
not merely in ones that arouse emotions of 
sympathy or empathy.l 
Kohlberg is insistent that the emotional aspect of role-
taking not be emphasized exclusively, with its implicatiqn of 
empathy and sympathy. The dual emphasis by Kohlberg          
course, quite consistent with Piaget's position, promulgated 
many years prior, on the indissociable nature of affect and 
ILaurence                     "Moral Stages and Moralization: The . 
Cogni ti ve-Developmental Approach ,.11 in Moral Development and 
Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues, ed. L. Lickona 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976), p. 49. 
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cognition. There exists no pure cognition without affect, 
just as affect cannot arise in a vacuum without being chanelled 
by                           structuration. The structural base of affect and 
cognition is a shared one and, for both Piaget and Kohlberg, 
neither component of mental life solely determines the other. 
The purest act of cognition relies upon interest from the 
affective side to energize it. An emotion generated from 
within the moral sphere will derive its                 to the in-
dividual from the sociocognitive stage of moral development 
that he is at. For example, anxiety precipitated by the 
transgression of a moral precept will be experienced very 
differently on a symbolic plane by the Stage 1 person than by 
the Stage 4 person. The meaning conferred upon the anxiety 
has its source in the sociocognitive moral stage from which it 
arose. According to Kohlberg, the Stage 1 person may be 
anxious in relation to the possibility of going to jailor 
suffering some bad consequence to himself, whereas this would 
be preempted for the Stage 4 person by a sense of guilt over 
having broken the law, which he felt obliged to preserve. 
Kohlberglpresents his views on role-taking in a lengthy 
tract in which he formulates the cognitive-developmental 
position on socialization. His theoretical predecessors in 
this regard are Baldwin, Mead, and Piaget. He is also the 
lLaurence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization," in Handbook of 
Socialization Theory and Research, ed. D. Gaskin (Chicago: 
Rand McNally, 1969), p. 347-80. 
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intellectual heir of Kant and Dewey, whose influences will 
be commented upon in the next chapter. 
'Role-taking                   enables one to respond to his 
own behavior as' seen through the eyes of another, as well 
to react to the other person as if he were like one's own 
self. This is a reciprocal activity that structures the 
thinking and behavior of the subject. The social matrix 
as 
is comprised of a number of selves that are like the own self 
of the subject, but which are not identical with that self. 
The essence of a moral conflict pivots around competing and 
oppositional claims amongst two or more selves and the key 
to a just resolution resides in the moral agent's role-' 
taking ability which will be invoked variously depending upon 
his stage of development. Commenting that                         has a 
wide field of applicability beyond the moral sphere, Kohlberg 
goes on to state, "Basically, however, all these forms imply 
a common structure of equality and reciprocity between selves 
with expectations about one another. Our moral stages repre-
sent successive forms of reciprocity, each more differentiated 
and universalized than the preceeding form."l 
Since role-taking competence evolves progressively 
through an ongoing structuration process of increasing dif-
ferentiation and integration, Kohlberg is especiallY,con-
cerned with social institutions that promote role-taking 
IIbid., p. 39B. 
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opportunities. It is the direct participation in the life of 
a group or institution. that affords the growing child an 
opportunity for development and enhancement of role-taking. 
Leadership roles in particular call upon role-taking skills 
as decision-making requires taking the roles of those who 
will be affected by the leader's actions. This is especially 
true of democratic leadership. Similarly, the non-leaders 
in a democratic group or institution will have greater 
opportunities ·for developing their role-taking skills for 
they will be called upon to engage in the decision making 
process. Clearly, the first group a child belongs to is the 
family. Although a good family offers role-taking 
opportunities and a bad family, in Kohlbergian terms, may 
foster moral arrest and pathology, children who have not 
grown up in a traditional family matrix at all may still 
reach moral maturity. Kohlberg constrasts children from an 
orphanage to children raised in a kibbutz. Interaction with 
family members is far less than ordinarily for the kibbutz 
child and, of course, the child in the orphanage will have 
no parents. While the institutionalized child is found to be 
morally behind in development, the kibbutz child is on a par . 
with the· child raised in an urban family, from a moral stand-
point. What Kohlberg is seeking to establish is that it is 
the role-taking opportunities which is critical to moral 
development in child rearing and these may be lacking in 
certain families, on the one hand, while they may be present 
in the environment of some children reared outside· the familY·-
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unit, on the other hand. Although one would "not expect the 
child to be a leader in his family, the parents of a familY 
high in role-taking activities are those who invite the child 
to participate in decisions, permit him to assume responsi-
bili ty", encourage discussion, and point out to him his part 
in his own actions which affect other people., a!; well as their 
consequences to them. 
Peer group interaction is another major avenue providing 
role-taking opportunities for children. Kohlberg, like Piaget, 
stresses the importance of this social activity for general 
moral development, but he denies that it promotes growth "in 
specific Piagetian identified moral dimensions, such as 
intentionality in making judgments. 
Kohlberg takes a position which is in opposition to a 
prevailing notion in traditional sociology. The convention 
has been to see the growing child as beset by conflicting 
moral values derived from multiple commitments to family, 
peer group, and the broader societal institutions on a 
politico-economic level. Each sphere is said to generate its 
own values which then place the growing young person in a 
quandary because of the conflict amongst them. Kohlberg's 
theory leads to a different formulation. He states, "Instead 
of participation in various groups causing conflicting de-
velopmental trends in morality, it appears that participation 
in various groups converges in stimulating the development of 
basic moral values, which are not transmitted by one parti-
cular group to another •••• While various people and groups 
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make conflicting immediate demands, upon the child, they do 
not seem to present the child with basically conflicting or 
different stimulation for general moral development."l 
It is precisely because Kohlberg's theory is founded upon a 
structuralist base that he may logically and consistently 
adopt this viewpoint. There evolves a meaningful pattern of ' 
organization through the development of moral role-taking 
structures which may be brought to bear in the resolution of 
conflict amidst competing claims within any social system re-
gardless of its scale. 
The roots of role-taking are to be found in early 
imitative behavior which serves a major function in the 
socialization process, according to Kohlberg. He cites both 
Baldwin and Piaget as early theorists addressing imitation in 
the sociocognitive development of the human organism. 
Imitation is not only a source of social knowledge, in that it 
is a reconstruction by the child of what others are observed 
doing, but in Baldwin's view it helps the child to build both 
a' self-concept and a concept of others. We have already seen 
in the preceding chapter that imitation is followed by a pro-
cess of "ejection" in which the child ascribes to the other the 
feelings he, himself, has experienced upon imitating the other. 
The new activity taken on by the imitating child modifies his 
self-concept, as one competent to perform the action involved, 
and at the same time provides him with a phenomenological basis 
. 1 . ... . "" .. Ibid., p. 402. 
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for inferring something about the other's subjective state 
when the other is carrying out the action. Thus, Kohlberg 
emphasizes that social knowledge and knowledge of the self 
are constructed from acts of sharing, by taking another's 
perspective. The development of a self is a social act 
motivated by a thrust toward competence. When the child at 
first imitates the observed behavior of the adult, he is 
submissive in that he is merely copying the valued action of 
another. However, when he initiates such action subsequently 
he is seeking to reverse the roles. He is manifesting a bid 
for status as having moved toward the competence and mastery· 
of the model and he intends·that the model will now accord 
him the admiration that he had previously accorded the model. 
This role reversal activity appears as early as the second 
year. It continues as the child at three and four years of 
age, having imitated a model, can be seen assuming the role 
of being a model for others as he. exhibits his budding com-
petence in performing the activity. 
Having traced the origin of role-taking behavior to 
imitation in early childhood, a view                                  
primarily from Baldwin, we will proceed to an examination of 
related work by other major theorists, some of whom have had 
a significant influence on Kohlberg. 
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The Symbolic-Interaction Theory of Mead 
Mead (1862-l931) was a social psychologist who adopted 
an interactional perspective, stressing that mind develops 
as a result of the organism interacting with its environment. 
He he ld that· evo-lut-ronary d-irection could be a-l tered by the 
exercise of the intellect of human beings. He wedded his 
social psychology to philosophy and shares a place alongside 
of James and Dewey, as one of the great American pragmatists. 
Mind and consciousness are developed through a social process 
which each growing individual participates in. Mead believed 
himself to be a social behaviorist. Although he held that 
the starting point of theorizing should be observed behavior, 
he was perfectly willing to construct a theory to explain be-
havior, which was complex and not itself observable, relying 
as it does upon inner experience. l Mead's frame of reference 
is distinctly related to role-taking. He emphasizes that 
through social activity a person develops the capacity to 
take the role of another and in so doing observe himself 
symbolically as he would be seen by others. In this manner 
he can shift from being a subject who observes others to being 
an object observed by another. Out of the process of social 
interaction we develop a notion of a generalized other which 
is a composite of how we think others view and respond to us. 
In reflecting upon the generalized other we will sometimes 
lMorton Deutsch and Robert M. Kraus, Theories in Social 
Psychology (New                                       1965). 
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modify our own anticipated behavior on the basis of how we 
think others may respond to us: The generalized other is 
moulded out of many experiences in which we have taken note 
of how people actually have reacted to us. 
Meadl takes as the unit of analysis the specific inter-
action between two people in a social matrix. In an 
illuminating comparison he juxtaposes a man running through 
the forest to a man who is directly confronted with a number 
of combatants. The running man perceives the environment, 
its contours and obstacles, and will respond by adjusting his 
own behavior in an adaptive manner. He does not expect his 
adjusted movements, however, to exert a modifying force upon 
the environment. In the social 'situation the reality is dif-
ferent. One's own responses to the encountered stimuli can 
shape the course of things to come. The man who recognizes 
a stimulus from another which signifies he is about to be 
attacked may avert the attack by altering his own behavior •. 
In observing an assaultive approach from an enemy, a man may 
place himself in' the shoes of the other to see that if he 
acts boldly the enemy will back down, whereas if he assumes 
a submissive position, the attack will most certainly be 
carried out. Taking the role of the other then influences 
his own behavior, which in turn becomes a stimulus that 
modifies the intended behavior of the attacker. The man 
lGeorge H. Mead, "Social Consciousness and the Con-
sciousness of Meaning," in Pragmatism: The Classic Writings, 
ed •. H. S. Thayer (New York: New American Library, 1970), 
pp. 341-50. 
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                himself boldly and his enemy turns to run. The 
course of events in a social reality has been shaped by 
role-taking. I have elaborated upon this illustration 
slightly beyond the original in order to fully capture Mead's 
meaning. 
Although it is out of a number of specific experiences 
that the generalized other is forged, it takes on a trans-
cendent character reflective of the generalized attitudes in-
herent in the group or community within which one holds member-
ship. Just as in a specific situation a person may respond 
to the other's anticipated actions to his intended behavior, 
he may also respond to the anticipated reactions of the 
Community, in the form of his generalized other, to his in-
tended behavior. There occurs a symbolic conversation or 
communication within himself which, for Mead, is the thinking 
process. Through this. symbolic activity it becomes possible 
for humans to engage in rational behavior. This is quite 
different from the limited concrete activity of animals. 
A dog will respond automatically and inevitably with a hostile 
gesture to an aggressive act from another. His response then 
becomes the stimulus which elicits an automatic reaction from 
the aggressor. Mead's point in his illustration of the 
animal fight is that neither can take the role of the other 
to either anticipate what the other will do next or how the 
other might respond to his own intended behavior. The fight 
unfolds in a linear fashion without benefit of symbolic 
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activity which might have altered the possible course of the 
action and, thereby, modifying the outcome. 
Piaget and Perspectivism 
Two major foci of Piaget's work which are of concern 
here are visual perspective taking and communication. Piaget 
and Inhelderl have made some interesting discoveries regarding 
the growing young child's capacity to literally see things from 
another's point of view. In a classic experiment they placed 
a configuration of three three-dimensional simulated card-
board mountains on a table. A doll is rotated by the ex-
perimenter from one position to another. The child has ten 
photographs before him and his task is to select the one ' 
showing the scene the doll would see from its perspective. 
In a variation of the task, the child is to place the doll 
at a position which would give him a view corresponding to 
a particular picture. Lastly, he is given a set of flat 
cardboard pieces which he is to reconstruct to show what 
would appear on a snapshot if the doll were to take a picture 
from a specific viewpoint. The child is permitted to walk 
around the table after which he is to return to his seat. 
The youngest children did not understand the assignment. 
Once the child does understand the task, however, he exhibits 
a totally uniperspective'stance. In effect, he indicates that 
lJean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder, The Child's Conception 
of Space, trans. J. F. Langden and       L. Lunzer (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 1967), Originally published, 1948. 
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he thinks the scenes observed by the doll are identical with 
his own. It does not appear merely to be a matter of not 
having the ability to recreate what the other is viewing. 
Rather, the evidence indicates that the child simply has no 
awareness that the doll has a viewpoint other than the child's 
own. This egocentric stage lasts from four to seven years of 
age. Between seven and eight years the child becomes aware 
that there is a point of view other than his own, but his 
version regarding the doll's perspective at various positions 
is incorrect. Finally, the child at nine or ten years can 
also formulate the correct version, indicating that he can take 
the other's 'visual role and accurately coordinate perspectives. 
A variety of experiments of this type have been conducted by 
subsequent researchers. Some of them have involved more com-
plex arrangements and others more simple ones. The variable 
of task complexity does seem to have an affect on the results. 
Thus we find that children perform better at a younger age when 
the task is more simple, but when the demands of the task are 
more stringept, the age for successful coordination of per-
spectives is pushed upward. It should not be overlooked that 
this experiment involves both egocentrism and cognitive skills 
bearing on spatial relations, which is a confounding factor. 
Piagetl studied the process of verbal communication very 
early in his career. In fact, he devoted his first book to 
lJean Piaget, The Language and Throught of the Child, 
trans. M. ·Gabain (Cleveland:Meridian Books, 1955), Originally 
published, 1923. 
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this subject. Language as it exists amongst humans is un-
doubtedly one of our most fascinating and cherished attri-
butes. Yet its first appearance in the second year is of 
limited scope as it continues to manifest its sensorimotor 
roots. It remains so action-laden in the beginning that many 
children in· the early acquisition phase can actually be ob-
served carrying out the action when using a verb. Hence, a 
toddler saying "jump" may be seen jumping as he speaks the word. 
Early language is also largely lacking in public meaning as 
words often carry private meanings, perhaps shared only with 
the mother. There occurs a dimun!tion of these features of 
language as the sensorimotor imprint disappears and words be-
come public increasingly in that they accommodate a consensual 
meaning. Yet there persists a· serious deficiency in the 
child's communication pattern up to the age of six or seven. 
In·brief, the child's speech until that time tends to be ego-
centric and it is not until about seven years of age that his 
speech shifts from egocentric to sociocentric. . 
Piaget's procedure was that of conducting naturalistic 
studies of children' s                             utterances,                 tl_e re-
corded and analyzed. The first portion of this work involved 
only two children, six years old, who were observed for one 
month. There followed a further study with twenty children 
between the ages of four and seven. The essential theme of 
The Language and Thought of the Child, Piaget's first book, 
is that the child's language is limited by and an expression 
of his cognitive level of development. Hence, the preoperational 
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child's language is egocentric in that he centers on his own 
viewpoint and makes no attempt to take the viewpoint of his 
listener •. Therefore, his speech is not constructed to de-
monstrate the validity of his statements or to compel assent 
to them. Thoughts that are not logically related are 
juxtaposed without explanation. Causal connectives such 
as "therefore" and "because" are omitted. The referents to 
pronouns are omitted, 1eaving the listener uninformed about 
who "he," "she," "they," and "them," are. It is as if the 
child were speaking only to himself and did not realize that 
the listener had certain informational needs which must be 
conformed to if genuine communication were to take place. 
Piaget concluded from his study that, in fact, egocentric 
speech does not truly have the aim of communication.            
are three subclasses of egocentric speech. There is re-
petition, which has nothing more than the intrinsic pleasure 
of talking as its aim. It bears the stamp of babbling and is 
not at all social. A second class is monologue which addresses 
no one. The child talks aloud in a manner suggesting that he 
is simply speaking his thoughts. It, too, has no social 
function. The third type is the collective monologue. This 
form of egocentric speech has a quasi-social character to it, 
but remains non-communicative speech. The child speaks aloud 
in the presence of others. He is still centered on his own 
actions and thoughts. 
of others to himself. 
At best, he seeks to draw the interest 
Although aware of the audience he is 
not really addressing it. The situation is compounded by the 
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fact that peer level" listener's at this stage are equally 
egocentric. Therefore, they are equally centered upon them-
selves and the observer may witness a scene of preoperational 
children soliloquizing amidst one another without any dialogue 
occurring. Also, the listener who appears to be paying at-
tention is more than likely assimilating what he hears to his . 
own viewpoint without attempting to accommodate what is novel 
to him in the message. The result is that he believes he has 
understood when he has not. In the process of interpreting 
the message he has distorted it. Of course, the message was 
never a genuine" communication in the first place. 
Adaptive or sociocentric communication appears between 
the ages of seven and eight. It is not that children talking 
to one another suddenly understand everything they say to each 
other. However, at this time there is manifest a serious at-
tempt to communicate effectively to one another. Children by 
this time have decentered from their uniperspective and take 
the point of view of the other while attempting to transmit 
information. The emphasis that Piaget has placed on peer in-
teraction throughout his professional career has been evident 
from the time of his first book length work. He states 
succinctly: 
What then gives rise to the need for verification? 
Surely it must be the shock of our thought coming 
into contact with that of others, which produces 
doubt and the desire to prove •••• We are constantly 
hatching an enormous "number of false ideas, conceits, 
utopias, mystical explanations, suspicions and megalo-
maniacal fantasies, which disappear when brought into 
contact with other people. The social need to share 
the thought of others and to communicate our 
own with success is the root of our need for 
verification. Proof is the outcome of agru-
ment. l 
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The conquest of egocentrism during the preoperational period 
and the increasing competence to take the role of another are 
largely the outcome of dialectical confrontation in the social 
arena. 
The egocentrism of adolescence, manifesting itself as 
the youngster first enters the formal operational period, has 
been introduced in the opening chapter. The young person is 
capable now of thinking about his own thought. His own . 
thought, therefore, may be an object of his thinking process, 
which is no longer confined to known objects from the environ-
ment, as in the concrete operational period. Similarly, the 
thoughts of other people also become the object of his newly 
expanded thinking prowess. However, he does not properly dis-
tinguish between what has become the primary object of his 
concern and what is of focal interest to others. For the 
adolescent, both his own and the interests of others are 
channelled toward himself. He labors under the false impres-
sion that his actions and appearance are of paramount concern 
to others. This formulation has led Elkind, elaborating upon 
Piaget, to the following assertion: 
One consequence of adolescent egocentrism is that, 
in actual or impending social situations, the young 
lHoward Gruber and J. Jacques Voneche, eds. The Essential 
Piaget (New York:Basic Books, 1977),. p. 92. 
person anticipates the reactions of other people 
to himself. These anticipations, however, are 
based on the premise that others are as admiring 
or as critical of him as he is of himself. In.a 
sense, then, the adolescent is continually con-
structing, or react,ing to, an imaginary audience. 1 
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Elkind invokes this notion to explain much       the                        
and narcissistic behaviors of the adolescent and regards it 
as an hypothesis which gradually yields to repeated encounters 
with reality. This facilitates a differentiation in the 
adolescent's mind between his own primary interests and 
those of others, which he eventually comes to realize do not 
coincide. Thus, in early adolescence we have the paradoxical 
situation in which the young person is role-taking, but be-
cause of the particular form that egocentrism takes at this 
time his inference leads tp the construction of a highly dis-
torted perspective which he attributes to the other. 
                  Role-Taking Paradigm 
Feffer has sought to concentrate upon expanding the social 
implications inherent in Piaget's fertile concept of decentration. 
The infant gradually decentrates from his solipsistic union 
with the objects in hi-senvironment. The preoperationa-l child· 
progressi vely differentiates between his own psychic pro·perties 
and natural objects. He also decentrates in such areas as con-
servatipn, classification, and seriation, all of which allows 
lOavid Elkind,                           in Children and Adolescents," 
Children and Adolescents: Interpretive Essays on Jean Piaget, 
2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 91. 
112 
him to take into account and coordinate more than one aspect 
qf reality at a time, which in turn fosters more adaptive 
knowledge of the physical world. Feffer accentuates the 
fact that an analogous decentering process occurs in the social 
realm, bringing with_it enhanced in-terpersonal knowledge that 
is more adaptive than preceding cognitive limitations allowed. 
He developed a projective technique which is by now well 
known as the Role Taking Test (RTT). It is a method. applied 
to Schneiderman's Make a Picture Story. The latter consists 
of a series of domestic and community scenes accompanied by a 
set of cardboard human figures. The subject is required to 
place three figures in three different scenes and then make 
up a story for each arrangement. He is further expected to 
retell the basic story in each instance by shifting from the 
various perspectives of each of the characters in the stories. 
The test involves an attempt at ascertaining the extent to 
which a subject will decenter from the content of his own 
initial perspective as reflected in the basic story he had 
made up and from the immediate perceptual stimuli of the 
scene. The assignment becomes increasingly more complex as 
the subject shifts from perspective to perspective for he 
must simultaneously maintain the continuity of the theme while 
at the same time embracing the limitation imposed by each new 
decentrationor refocusing. Successfully accomplished this 
results in balanced decentering. 
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In a series of papers, Feffer and his collaboratorsl 
applied the RTT to explore several hypotheses. In         1959 
paper he concludes that the RTT is a valid means for evaluating 
level of cognitive maturity, having found an association bet-
ween a formal analysis of role-taking ability and an inde-
pendent measure of cognitive development derived from the 
Rorschach Composite Index. The essence of. the latter pertains 
to the subject's cognitive ability at differentiation and in-
tegration in organizing perceptual stimuli. In the 1960 
paper, Feffer shifts from having used an adult population 
to utilizing children of various ages. Further, he compared 
their RTT scores to independent scores on exclusively Piagetian 
tasks such as conservation. In so doing he is dealing with 
the unitary construct of decentration as it cuts across both 
personal and impersonal realms. Feffer again concludes that 
the decentering concept as revealed. in the RTT may validly 
serve as a criterion for inferring cognitive maturity. He 
bases this on tbe findings that there was a positive associa-
tion between decentration in the RTT and the various Piagetian 
tasks utilized. Also, both                                 decentration were 
positively associated with advances in age. In general, as 
1Melvin Feffer, liThe Cognitive Implications of Role-
Taking Behavior," Journal of Personality 27 (1959): 152-68; 
Melvin Feffer and Vivian Gourevitch, "Cognitive Aspects of 
Role-Taking in Children," Journal of Personality 28 (1960): 
384-96: Melvin Feffer and Leonard Suchotliff, "Decentering 
Implications of Social Interactions," Personality and Social 
Psychology 4 (1966): 415-22; Melvin Feffer, "Developmental An-
alysis of Interpersonal Behavior," Psychological Review 77 
(1970): 197-214. 
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children grow older their role-taking capacities increase 
with especially marked advances noted between eight to nine 
                            to eleven. 
It is in the 1966 paper that Feffer begins to direct 
his re.s:earch- toward demonstrating that a high level of per-
spective taking, facilitated by decentration, has significant 
implications for social adaptiveness, a belief he intimated 
in his early work. Prominent in the present discussion is the 
manner in which single centrations produce distortions, as 
opposed to balanced decentrations which ·correct for dis-
tortions. A balanced decentration is one in which two or 
more perspectives are taken into account simultaneously and 
this allows the individual to modify his intended behavior· 
in relation to how he anticipates the other would react to it 
were it to be carried out. This notion strikes a chord of 
recognition resonating from the work of Mead, with which 
Feffer was certainly· familiar. For Feffer, optional social 
interaction between two people proceeds when both are utilizing 
simultaneous decentering. Subjects who shift perspectives in 
the RTT but do not maintain continuity and consistency amongst 
the characters· are said to be engaging in sequential decentering. 
Those who go from character to character in the story, alter-
nating perspectives, while maintaining continuity and con-
sistency are engaged in simultaneous decentering. Feffer 
paired thirty six subjects into eighteen dyads, each matched 
for role-taking capacity as measured by the RTT. The subjects 
---.-.-- ·---were-undergraduate· college-students-enrolled ill· a-psychology-- --- -------
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course. A separate measure pertaining to the effectiveness 
of social interaction characterizing each dyad was then made. 
The task involved the indirect communication of a key word 
from one member of the dyad to the other by use o·f one·-word 
association clues. The partner receiving the message was 
permitted to respond aloud by guessing at the one word which 
he thought was the correct response. Feffer stresses that 
optional effectiveness involves soc"ial cooperation as each 
participant attempts to anticipate the other and dovetail 
his responses to meet the requirements of the activity. Each 
takes into account several perspectives simultaneously. For 
example, the receiver must alter his future responses in re-
lation to both his own former responses and the clues that 
have been offered to him already. The donor, of course, 
must consider his knowledge of the correct word, past responses 
from the receiver, and thoughts of how the receiver might 
respond to the next association.clue. This· in turn might 
alter what word he will select to· .convey. Results of the re-
search indicated that the dyads rated with higher RTT scores 
completed the password                 th fewer             _a..!ld ___ !_n ___ less time 
than was required by those with lower RTT scores. The im-
·portance of this increases when compared to a variation of the 
task which eliminated the variable of social interaction, so 
that reciprocal adjustments as described above could nQt 
occur. In this variation there did not appear any signi-
ficant correlation between RTT scores and successful com-
pletion of the task. 
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In the 1970 paper, Feffer presents a summary state-
ment of the developmental stages in role-taking which his 
research uncovered. He states the following: 
Essen"tially three main patterns of response have 
emerged from the analysis of such role-taking 
productions. The first, typically evidenced at 
about six years of age, is characterized by un-
corrected decentering, that is, by obvious dis-
continuity between all versions of the story •••• 
A second pattern becomes predominant between 
seven and eight years of age and is characterized 
by a limited, fluctuating form of coordination 
between perspectives. Although each of "the 
perspectives may be relatively consistent with 
the initial story, they are sequentially focused 
on with respect to one another •.•• The third 
pattern, which only becomes clearly evident at 
about nine years of age is characterized by a 
synthesis of the different perspectives and hence 
is considered as showing the simultaneous co- 1 
ordination indicative of the cognitive operation. 
An example of the first pattern would be an instance in which 
the child originally tells a story that has the father 
eagerly prepared to give his wife a birthday gift. Then, 
when specifically shifting £rom the general story to the 
perspective of the father, he is described as preoccupied with 
what will be served for dinner. In the second pattern, there 
may be a consistent shift from a father who is suggesting 
that the familY go out for a walk to the son who ex-
citedly inquires where they will go. The third pattern is 
relatively complex, entailing a dual shifting between in-
ternal and external orientations. A teacher may be described 
as feelingly badly because he had to flunk a student, but he 
lMelvin Feffer, "Developmental Analysis of Interpersonal 
__ " _____ " ______                           _ Psychological Review 77              __                        ___________________ _ 
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observes tha-t the student did deserve it. Alternately I 
assuming the student's perspective, the student is described 
as feeling guilty because he did not do his assignments 
properly, but understanding that the teacher did what he had 
to do. There is a fine coordination of multiple perspectives 
in this final version. of role-taking achievement. 
Feffer's contribution is a substantial one and it is 
apparent that those who are highest in the type of perspective 
taking reflected in the RTT would be most likely to have 'the 
potential for resolving conflicts of competing claims amongst 
individuals in a just manner. 
Flavell's Instrumental Model of Perspectivism 
In a major work on the subject, Flavell et ale provide 
an especially explicit definition of role-taking, as follows: 
"The basic and essential ingredient of any sort of skill 
sequence in this area appears to be that process in which the 
individual somehow cognizes .•• certain attributes of another 
individual. The attributes in question are primarily of the 
type that 90uld be described as inferential rather than 
directly perceptible, for example, the other-' s -needs, --his 
intentions, his opinions and beliefs, and his emotional, per-
ceptual or intellectual capacities and limitations."l Flavell 
did not set out to uncover causal antecedents, believing that 
·1 John Flavell et al., The Development of RO'le-Taking and 
Communication Skills in Children (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1968), p. 5. 
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given the state of the field that should be a task for 
future research. He sought, instead, to provide a develop-
mental-descriptive account of perspectivism, which would 
                the ontogenetic qualitative changes which occur as 
the child moves through the early and middle years, as well 
as adolescence. Flavell conceives of role-taking activity as 
serving the function of promoting understanding of the other 
as an end in itself or of fostering communication and per-
suasion. It could be utilized on behalf of either cooperative 
·or competitive behaviors. Since he emphasizes an instrumental 
function, he has carried his analysis a step beyond what is 
ordinarily encountered in the literature, to include the 
sub-skills employed in attaining the end goal of role-taking. 
The model that Flavell generated from his studies contains 
the following components: Existence, Need, Prediction, 
Maintenance, and Application. By Existence, he means to 
signify the subjects' fundamental recognition that one's own 
thoughts, feelings, and perceptions may not be the same as 
those another person experiences. It extends to an awareness 
that the knowledge two or more people may have of an identical 
object could differ with respect to thoughts, feelings, and 
perceptions depending upon their perspective. Acquiring this 
level of knowing represents the basic shift from egocentric 
to nonegocentric. It is not inclusive, however, of the req-
uisite skills to make the correct inferences about taking 
other people's perspective, which successful role-taking de-
________ .. _ mands. _ . The_Need. _component_highlights_ the. fac_t _that_one may ___ . __ .. ________ _ 
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have the knowledge that other people's perspective could 
differ from his own,                 having the awareness that a 
particular situation may call for invoking the role-taking 
capabilities at his command. An awareness of this need in 
appropriate situations facilitates calling into play the 
relevant skills. Prediction is the exercise of the actual 
role-taking skills necessary to making accurate inferences 
about another's role attributes. The exact nature of these 
skills is not well understood. What has been firmly 
established, however, is that there are definite differences 
of a qualitative nature                                           skills accompanying 
age progression. Flavell has emphasized that there is a strong 
tendency for one's own point of view to preempt consciousness 
even if                 inferences are made about another's role at-
tributes. Therefore, this tendency must be countered so that 
inferential knowledge about another may be retained suf-
ficiently to accomplish the role-taking goal in any giyen 
situation. This is precisely what Flavell intends to high-
light by including maintenance as an element of the model. 
Assuming that one has successfully undergone the preceding 
aspects of role-taking activity, he must still possess a 
capacity for knowing how to apply his inferred and stably 
held knowledge       achieving the situational goal. For example, 
a subject may call forth the first four elements of the model 
in a communication task, but fail in the area of application 
because he lacks the skill required in         specific situation 
to verbally construct the exact message necessary for success 
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at the task. Skills involved in the field of application 
will also develop qualitatively with age. A point that 
Flavell seeks to accent is that a subject who fails in a 
role-taking task may be deficient in anyone of the identified 
elements. of the model. The researcher should, therefore, not 
simply make the globular assessment that the subject lacks 
role-taking capability, but should carry out an analysis 
to discover where in         total process, suggested by the model, 
the subject is lacking. Familiarity with Flavell's con-
ceptualization of the full range of role-taking activities 
guided toward the instrumental aCQievement of specified goals 
should protect one against naive and overly simplistic views 
on perspectivism. 
Once having formulated his model from the research 
conducted by him and his                               Flavell then reflexively 
utilizes it to comment on their findings. The preschool child 
seems to lack a solid concept imparting knowledge of the 
existence of alternate perspectives held by others. Upon 
entering school, a knowledge of perspectivism seems evident 
amongst most children, but it is not as yet well developed. 
The neophyte in school does possess some abilities contingent 
upon the aspects of Need, Prediction, Maintenance, and appli-
cation, but these are minimal and tenuous at this early stage. 
It is during middle childhood and adolescence that the 
most extensive and deepest changes are observed in role-
taking, as well as in communication skills. The Existence 
component is .on firm ground by_ this time and_ the _changes ______ . ______ _ 
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appear mostly in the subsequent categories. 
The 1968 work of Flavell et al. has been broadly 
described and the major theoretical model derived from it 
presented. It is a rich treasure of meticulously detailed 
research which bears reading by the motivated scholar. The 
remaining material on Flavell in the present                       will 
cite one study from his book because of its intrinsic value 
per" se and also because of its comparative relevance to an 
earlier procedure instituted by Feffer, which has been ex-
amined. Following this, a later research project will be 
introduced to highlight its contribution to the gains made 
in adolescent role-taking ability. 
One incisive method utilized in the study of role-
taking was to present a series of seven cards, each depicting 
a scene, in a predetermined sequence to the subject. The 
ordered sequence clearly manifests a particular story line, 
which the child is asked by an experimenter to state. 
Then three of the cards are removed"and those remaining 
clearly reflect a quite different story. A second experimenter 
enters the room and it becomes the task of the child to anti-
cipate the story that this experimenter, "never having seen all 
seven cards together, will tell on the basis of the four re-
maining cards. Unlike Feffer's Role-Taking Test the materials 
are not ambiguious and, hence, do not require a projective 
response. Of course, the possibility of projecting onto a 
situation always exists no matter how well defined a situation 
may be. The point is that the structure of this task does not 
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by its nature call forth a projective response as in the case 
of the RTT. There is no way that the second experimenter, 
who has seen only the four cards, could logically know about 
the story contained in the seven cards, within the limits of 
the experiment. The responses of the subjects were divided 
into four categories. Basically, however, these could be 
dichotomized into subjects who persisted in providing a 
story founded upon their original perspective from the seven 
cards, which they ascribed to the second experimenter, and 
subjects who recognized that this experimenter, of necessity, 
had a different perspective based on the four cards and which 
could not logically coincide with the child's original per-
spective. The population studied consisted of 160 students, 
in 8 groups of 20 each. The groups represented grades 2 
through 8 plus grade 11. There occurred a significant age 
trend in which more children increasingly acquired the ability 
to exclude the story version represented in their initial 
observation and to take the role of the second experimenter, 
hence, correctly predicting that he would tell the story re-
flected in the four cards before him. The most significant 
quantitative shift amongst those acquiring this capability 
took place between the ages of eight and nine. 
A conceptual analysis is revealing, for in the second 
part of the experiment both the child and the second experi-
menter are facing the four cards only. What prevents the 
child from immediately identifying the experimenter's per-
spective since at the moment it appears to be his own as well? 
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Flavell advances tbe notion that there is a force or pres-
sure exerted upon the child who does not shift perspectives 
in this context to interpret his original story as an . 
absolute               than relative reality. His thinking            
flexibility as his conception of the story line is ir-
reversibly fused to the initial version of the seven cards 
and he cannot decentrate from that. The persistence ·of the 
former story now imposing itself upon the present situation 
is akin to intellectual realism, in which psychic properties 
are absolutized and externalized. In effect, Flavell is 
saying that the general limitations of preoperational 
thought constrict the child's role-taking ability and pre-
clude the capacity to shift perspectives. Briefly, role-
taking ability is integrally related to overall cognitive 
functioning and development. 
Miller, Kessel, and Flavell l have conducted a study 
on social cognitive development which is particularly in-
structive regarding the significant advances brought with age 
through adolescence. The major theoretical observation made 
here is that representational acts can be recursive based on 
a nesting hierarchy of structures. This is in contrast to 
motor and perceptual acts. For example, a person may observe 
another person who is looking at him, but he cannot proceed 
lpatricia H. Miller, Frank s. Kessel, and John H. 
Flavell, "Thinking About Thinking About People Thinking 
About ••• : A Study of Social Cognitive Development," Child 
Development 41 (1970): 613-23. 
124 
to observe the undergirding perceptual action which is part 
of that other person who is looking at           In contrast, 
on a plane of mental representation, there may exist a 
recursive structuring such as, "I think that you think 
that we think that they think ••• " Conceivably this could go 
on indefinitely. Now, it is essential to understand that the 
foregoing does not signify mere mental gymnastics. Rather, 
it seems to be the case that attainment of recursive thinking 
of this sort is found only amongst adolescents and adults, 
carrying with it                   implications for role-taking com-
petence and action strategies based upon it. 
The study by Miller et al. did, in fact, demonstrate 
that recursive thought develops in an invariant sequence. 
The subjects utilized in their study were 72 in number ranging 
from grades one through six. There were four basic steps in 
development observed and even the youngest children in the 
study seemed to grasp the first. The four invariant steps 
were referred to as contiguous, action, one-loop recursion, 
and two-loop recursion. The procedure entailed showing to 
the subjects drawings which were designed to reflect various 
states from amongst the four possibilities, thereby permitting 
those subjects who could conceive of them to identify them 
from           test material stimuli. The contiguous category 
depicts one person thinking about another. The action category 
involves one person thinking about another person, who is 
carrying out a social interaction such as talking •. This is 
structurally more __ complex as_ one person is c9n,c:;.e:i:.ved as 
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carrying out an action within an action. That is, the 
thinker is said to be thinking about someone who is in turn 
carrying out the action of talking to someone. One aspect 
is nested hierarchically within the other. In the third 
category, one-loop recursion, the scenes depict a nesting of 
thinking itself. That is, one person is thinking of another 
person who is also thinking of someone. This constitutes a 
.... 
mental act of thinking about thinking. In this case one 
person may be the object of two others who are said to be 
thinking about him. The third person is embedded in'the 
thought processes of the second and the first, whereas the 
second and the third persons are embedded in the thought pro-
cess of the first. Hence, a teacher may be thinking about a 
student who is thinking about his mother. In this illustration 
the mother is embedded in the thought process of both the 
student and the teacher in a nesting hierarchy. Similiarly, 
the mother and the student are embedded in the thought process 
of the teacher. Miller et al. suggest that this capacity for 
one-loop recursive activity may be distinctly facilitated by 
the development of the Piagetian grouping 1, which is the 
I 
composition of classes. This category of one-loop recursive 
skill does emerge in middle childhood and a conceptual analysis 
seems to reveal a structural similarity to classification com-
petence. The final category in this developmental sequence 
of social cognition, a two-loop recursion, takes us one step 
further. Here we have a situation in which, ,for example, the 
teacher is thinking that the student is thinking of his mother 
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thinking of his father. In brief, there occQrs thinking 
about thinking about thinking. Miller et a1. point out that 
while this is structurally more complex than the developments 
of previous stages, its occurence in everyday life is likely 
to- be foun-d much less frequently. As the fourth category is 
the last of an invariant sequence and the oldest children in 
the study were approximately twelve years, it is probable that 
it owes its presence to the emergence of formal operations. 
In closing, Miller et ale relate their work specifically to 
role-taking as follows: 
It is not surprising to find that the understanding 
of recursive thought is not nearly complete by the 
sixth grade. This finding is roughly in accord with 
a previous study of role-taking activity ••• ,in which 
game strategies requiring complex inferences about 
recursive interpersonal thought did not become com-
mon until adolescence. Understanding that thinking 
possesses a recursive, "wheel within wheels" pro-
perty may well be a prerequisite for these complex 
role-taking-type inferences found in adolescence. 1 
Miller et ale in the above statement are referring to 
complex guessing games that have been utilized in the research 
on role-taking which involve invoking anticipatory strategies 
(i.e. I am anticipating, that he is anticipating, that I am 
anticipating that ••• ) leading to the modification of one's 
behavior as it would otherwise have occurred. The relation 
of this current research to Mead's early theory of symbolic 
interaction is unmistakable-. 
IIbid., p. 622. 
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Selman's Social ·Perspecti vism and Mora·l· Development 
The extensive contribution of Selman to the field of 
social perspectivism is creative and powerful. He has drawn 
freely from Baldwin, Mead, Piaget, Feffer and Flavell. 
Of greatest relevance is the intrinsic connection between his 
work and that of Koh1berg's theory of sociomoral knowledge. 
Selman, like Kohlberg, built his work upon the Piagetian 
structural-developmental foundation. Therefore, it will not 
be surprising to learn that Selman conceives of role-taking 
as developing through an increasingly more complex hierarchy 
of invariant stages involving a process through which each 
succeeding stage becomes more adequate and inclusive as it 
represents a reorganization of concepts from the preceding 
stage. The underlying structural development of social 
perspective-taking, which constitutes the central motif to 
Selman's work, has been purs.ued in two distinct but related 
directions. It has been applied to the domains of moral 
.1 d't 1 2 reason1ng an 1n erpersona concepts. Selman's view is 
1Robert L. Selman, "The Relation of Social Perspective-
Taking to Morai                                                       .. ancl Empirical Approaches, II 
(Unpublished paper, Harvard Graduate School ·of Education; 1975); 
Robert L. Selman and William Damon, liThe Necessity (but insuf-
ficiency) of Social Perspective Taking for                         of 
                at Three Early Leve1s,1I in Moral Development: Current 
Theory and Research, ed. D. J. DePalma and J. M. Foley (Hills-
dale, N. J.: Erlbaum Associates, 1975), pp. 57-73;               L. 
Selman, 'Social Cognitive Understanding: A Guide to Educational 
and Clinical Practice,1I in Moral Development: Theory, Re-
search, and Social Issues, ed. L. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart & winston, 1976), pp. 299-316. 
2Robert L. Selman, "Toward a Structural Analysis of 
Developing Interpersonal Relations Concepts: Research with 
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that perspective taking is more fundamental than either of 
those two areas and exists as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition in relation to them. Because of its more immediate 
relevance to the subject of this dissertation, emphasis will 
be given to Selman's theoretical position and empirical 
findings regarding the nature of perspective taking and its 
correspondence with stages of moral reasoning. 
Crucial to appreciating Selman's and Kohlberg's work 
is grasping the phenomenological aspect inherent in both 
positions. Whether it is social or moral "reasoning that is 
the focus of attention, the essential point in relation to 
any particular child is how he views the world in these two 
domains. It is only by eliciting from the child, or even 
the adult, his specific conceptions and underlying reasons 
for holding them, that light will be cast upon the manner 
in which he organizes and comprehends his sociomoral matrix. 
Selman is clear in his contention that role-taking is 
not a single skill which one either possesses or does not. 
The adoption of such a static conception by some researchers 
may account for the discrepant reports in the literature re-
garding the age at which it appears. By assuming the view 
that perspective taking is a process of progressive structural 
development, the important question becomes what form it takes 
Normal and Disturbed Preadolescent Boys," Minnesota Symposia 
on Child Psychology, ed. A. D. Pick, Vol. 10                            
University of Minnesota Press, 1976), pp. 156-93. 
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at different levels. Although it may be true that the pre-
sence of a primitive role-taking sensitivity may be observed 
as early as age two or three, as maintained by some, there 
is no way that this can be held to even remotely approximate 
the qualitative level of perspective taking found in 
adolescence. Further, the view that perspectivism is chara-
cterized by qualitative changes runs counter to conceiving of 
it as a quantitative phenomenon based on additive pieces of 
social information. The critical function involved in the 
process is the promotion of comprehending the relations that 
obtain between one's own perspective and those of' others. 
Of special interest at each level of development is how 
the child differentiates between hi's own and other's pers-
pectives, as well as the manner in whi·ch ·the·se are coordinated 
by him. Also of concern is knowing how any. given level 
signifies an advance in differentiation and coordination over 
the previous level and how it remains limited compared to 
the structural organization that may succeed it. Acquiring' 
this dual perspective of past and future will deepen under-
standing of         present level. 
A brief description of the ·levels through which per-
spective taking evolves is in order. They make this appearance 
in an invariant sequence as follows: 
Level 0: Egocentric social perspective-taking (ages 
3-6). An ability to recognize simple affect in others is 
manifest. Nevertheless, a child during this period confuses 
his own subjectivity with other's. He is likely to believe 
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that when in the same situation another person will feel as 
he does. Hence, there is no differentiation between his own 
perspective and that of other people. 
Levell: Subjective social perspective-taking (ages 6-
8). At this time there is an awareness of the distinct sub-
jectivity of each person's own viewpoint. The child recognizes 
that even when in the same situation as another person, the 
other may construe it differently than he does. He recognizes 
further that access to varying information will result in 
different subjective interpretations. However, he cannot 
simultaneously entertain both his own and another person's 
viewpoint. He also lacks the ability to see himself from the 
perspective of another person. 
Level 2: Self-reflective perspective-taking (ages 8-
10). There now develops a reciprocal understanding that just 
as the child, himself, can view the other as a subject, it is 
also true that the other can view the child as a subject. This 
awareness that the other can view him as a subject will in-
fluence his actions toward the other. The child can also now 
view himself through the perspective of another. The advance 
encompassed· at this level is l:imited by the fact that the re-
flections involved take place sequentially and, therefore, 
the child is still locked into a dyadic situation. 
Level 3: Third person perspective-taking (ages 10-12). 
There occurs a mutuality of role-taking. The child becomes 
aware that each person in a dyadic situation has the capability 
__ .. _________ of __ a_simultaneous_knowledge_of_his_.own and_                            ________ .. ______ .. 
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subjectivity. He can transcend the immediate dyadic 
situation to adopt an abstract third person perspective 
which permits observation of his own interaction with the 
other and their mutual subjectivity. 
Level 4: Qualitative systems level of                        
taking Cages 12-15). The young person by now has generated 
a generalized other perspective which he knows he shares with 
others. It is a perspective that others in the community may 
also hold regardless of their social position. It is com-
prised of an integration of communally shared values, 
attitudes and beliefs. There is now an idea of a social 
system perspective which goes beyond the abstract third per-
son perspective of level 3 that observes only a specific 
dyadic interaction. Social conceptions now include knowledge 
that relationships can exist at varying levels such as in a 
state of being lovers, best friends, friends, or simply 
acquaintances. 
Level 5: 
(ages 15 +). 
Symbolic interactionperspective-takihg 
The relativity of socially rooted perspectives 
is discerned. A perspective which goes beyond the confines 
of any given society which one happens to find himself in can 
be adopted. 
Selman reJects· the notion that moral judgment is merely 
a special case of these perspective taking levels applied to 
the moral realm. Although the former is necessary.to moral 
reasoning, the latter calls into play components that are 
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distinctive to it. A recent report by Selmanl attempts to 
offer longitudinally based data to support the fundamental 
hypothesis that perspectivism is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to moral development. The report is 
based upon a massive collection and analysis of material from 
longitudinal interviews with ten of the original subjects in 
the Kohlberg study. The subjects were ten years old when the 
study by Kohlberg began and Selman utilized the same material 
that was accumulated by Kohlberg over the years as the young 
people continued in the study. Mate+ial from five interviews 
with each of the ten subjects was examined and scored for 
perspective taking level. There were a total of 47 inter-
views (3 had been missed) spanning 5 different ages that the 
subject passed through during the course of the study. A 
significant age progression was documented in regard to l"evels 
of perspective taking. For example, only 10 percent of the 
children at age ten demonstrated level 3 as their predominant 
level of perspective taking. By age thirteen, this figure had 
risen to 70 percent. At age nineteen one subject remained 
at level 3, while the remaining subjects hac all passed beyond 
it. At age 22 all subjects had gone beyond the third level. 
Furthermore, the data confirmed the invariant hypothesis. 
There was not a single instance in which":- a subject went from 
lRobert L. Selman, "The Relation of Social Perspective-
Taking to Moral Development: Analytic and Empirical Approaches," 
Unpublished paper, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1975. 
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being scored at one level to a lower level after the passage 
of time. The direction of change evidenced was invariably 
from a lower· level to a higher level and there were no signs 
of any subject having skipped over a level. Finally, each of 
47 interviews was analyzed and scored from the standpoint of 
correspondence between perspective level and moral stage. There 
was not a single case in which moral stage was higher than per-
spective level. In 54 percent (N=25) of the cases a parallel 
correspondence between stages in the two areas was noted. The 
perspective taking level was found to be one higher than stage 
of moral reasoning in 46 percent (N=22) of the cases. If.there 
were not a necessary but not sufficient relation obtaining, then 
one would expect to find at least· some instances in which moral 
stage would be more advanced than perspective taking •. 
Selman, citing the work of Byrne,l in the same report pre-
sents an additional study testing once again the necessary but 
not sufficient condition hypothesis. This cross sectional study 
utilized a population of 56 males evenly divided amongst ages 
ten, thirteen, sixteen, and adulthood. Unlike the previous study 
Byrne employed two independent sources of measurement, whereas 
Selman had derived his scores from the same data basew Special 
means were devised by Byrne to test perspective taking with a 
view toward assessing the levels specific to                         and 
beyond. Moral stages, as in Selman's study, 
lOiane Byrne, "Role-Taking in                           (Unpublished 
Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1973). -
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were defined in terms of Kohlberg's theory. Results,l 
once correlations were tabulated, revealed that 24 cases 
were parallel in development, in 25 cases perspective taking 
was one level higher than moral stage and in 5 cases it was 
two higher. In one case moral stag.e appea.red to be one 
stage higher than perspective taking. The last statement 
would seem to be a logical impossibility if the theory is 
correct. However, in the light of Selman's evidence and the 
balance of Byrne's own findings, the greater likelihood is 
that it signifies an error in measurement. 
Attempting to formulate a position statement in the 
relation between the dimensions under consideration, Selman 
suggests, "The structural core of the moral stages refers to 
the way in which the subject orients to the conflicting claims 
.of all participants in the moral dilemma. The form by which 
one considers the claims of oneself and others presupposes 
the prior form of understanding the relationship of the per-
2 spectives of oneself and other." Hence, perspective taking 
is always necessary but never sufficient for parallel moral 
reasoning. 
IThe figures reported by Selman in the text of his paper 
do not coincide with those appearing in Tab.le 8, p. 33 of the 
paper. I have cited the figures in the table, which leaves one 
case unaccounted for. 
2Robert L. Selman, "The Relation of Social Perspective-
Taking to Moral Development: Analytic and Empirical Approaches," 
(Unpublished paper, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1975). 
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Concluding Remarks 
The twin concepts of egocentrism and                           be-
cause of the prominent contribution they make to an under-
standing of moral development, have been examined at length. 
Some of Kohlberg's own comments OIl the nature and origins of 
role-taking have been introduced and the early relevant work 
'of Baldwin, Mead, and Piaget has been presented. The con-
temporary work of Feffer,                   and Selman has been for-
mulated with a special emphasis upon Selman's social per-
spective taking levels and their relationship to moral stages. 
Although everything that has been covered in this chapter 
may be subsumed under the broad category of social cognition, 
that field is too                     to have justifiably included here 
all that goes under that classification. There do exist, 
however, two recent comprehensive and                     literature 
reviaws on social cognition. l Finally, Kurdek has made an 
exhaustive review of the literature which                           covers 
the relationship between perspective taking and moral develop-
-.-mente He has emerged from his search with a modest but forward 
looking thrust, as he states, "There are enough conceptual and 
lcarol V. Shantz, "The Development of Social Cognition," 
in Review of Child Development Research, ed. E. M.                          
Vol. 5 (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1975) pp. 257-324; 
Michael Chandler, "Social Cognition, Ii Knowledge and Development, 
ed. W. F. Overton and J. Gallagher, Vol. 1 (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1977), pp. 93-147. 
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methodological problems in the existing body of literature 
••• to conclude that the relationship between perspective 
-taking and moral development has not been adequately 
assessed. The venture of searching for the cognitive com-
ponents of various "f"ace"ts-""o-f children's mora-l development ••• 
remains defensible and perspective taking ability is the 
front-running candidate for the position."l 
lLawrence A Kurdek, "Perspective Taking As the 
Cognitive Basis of Children's Moral Development: A Review 




KOHLBERG'S STAGE THEORY OF l-10RAL DEVELOPMENT 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1927- ) is the leading                          
figure in the field of sociocognitive moral development.        
work represents a profound extension and refinement of piaget's 
early book on moral judgment. Research currently being con-
ducted in the field today is largely a derivative of his com-
plex system. Literally scores of critical articles have appeared 
in the literature and this phenomenon in itself is suggestive 
of the monumental impact of his work. Kohlberg has not been 
insensitive to these criticisms and it is known that he has been 
engaged in an ongoing process of revising his methods and 
formulations when encountering valid critical commentary or new 
findings that demand reconciliation with a prior position. 
The first portion of this chapter will be organized around 
a general characterization of Kohlberg's moral psychology and 
philosophy. It will be followed by an in-depth examination of 
the six stages of moral development based upon his major 
longitudinal study and confirmed by ,cross-cultural research. 
In the following chapter         discussion will be carried forth 
by focusing upon several major questions which inevitably arise 
in the context of Kohlberg's work. Serious criticism will be 




To avoid misunderstanding, it is essential from the out-
set to be clear on what is implied by Koh1berg's use of the 
term IImora1 stage." It does not refer simply to an application 
of cognitive reasoning to the moral realm. Moral reasoning 
involves structural development which is specific to its own 
domain even though, ,as we shall see in the next chapter, 
cognitive operations constitute a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for moral development. Further, a moral stage does 
not automatically signify anything about behavior. The re-
lationship between stage and action is a separate issue and 
it, too, will be explored subsequently. The stage concept is 
utilized by Kohlberg to denote a moral judgment. It is pre-
criptive or normative in that it deals with what a subject 
thinks is right and, therefore, concerns what ought to be. 
Stages are derived by posing anecdotal conflict situations to 
subjects and asking them not how they would behave in that 
situation, but about the behavior of the characters in the 
situation. Conceptions pertaining to rights and duties, 
implying values in these areas, are then elicited. The dilemmas 
presented to the subjects are designed to place in opposition 
obedience to authority and law with individual rights and human 
welfare. Once a subject has made a moral judgment, the under-
lying reasoning that brought it forth is explored in the inter-
view. It is not the content of the judgment that determines 
what stage a subject is at, but the form of covert moral rea-
soning that had led him to the position he adopted. It is 
theoretically possible for each of six subjects to- make the- s-arne---'---------
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overt judgment about a moral dilemma while at the same time 
each being at a different stage from the others. Similarly 
two different subjects may make opposing.moral judgments and 
yet be at the same stage. This is because a structural analysis 
of the underlying reasoning is the stage determinant and not 
the content of the judgment.· An elaboration of the actual 
stages, appearing'later in this chapter will clarify this 
essential point further. 
In a very significant way, Kohlberg's stage theory bears 
a                 resemblance to Piaget's cognitive stage theory than 
it does to the moral theory of Piaget. Kohlberg's stages are 
held to be universal and to follow an invariant sequence of 
development in all cultures. Each subsequent stage represents 
a reorganization and synthesis of the elements in the preceding 
stage and is generative of a qualitatively different mode of 
structural moral reasoning. Piaget did not make the claim that 
the stages in his moral theory meet formal stage criteria, 
whereas he has decisively made that claim for the deve+opment 
of logical operations. In passing through Kohlberg's stages, 
one person may move through them. more slowly than another, but 
it would not be predicted that anyone could move through them 
by reversing the order of any of the stages nor could any of 
the stages be skipped. Also, a person would not be expected 
to regress to a previous stage. Passage through all six stages 
is not likely, however, and in the United States amongst urban' 
middle class people the dominant mode of moral reasoning is at 
Stage 4. Stating that a person is at a particular stage indicates 
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that approximately half or more of his moral reasoning is 
grounded in the defining nature of that stage. It also 
implies that the balance of his moral conceptions is likely 
to be divided between one stage higher and one stage lower. 
Therefore, it should be obvious that a person will not always 
exercise moral reasoning at his basic stage and certainly not 
at the highest stage he is capable of reasoning at. 
Kohlberg rejects the notion that moral judgment is 
founded upon an internalization by the growing child of cul-
tural rules inculcated through verbal transmission, the ad-
ministration of punishment, or identification with a model. 
The cultural moral relativism implied in internalization 
theories runs counter to his quite fundamental assertion that 
stage development is universal. The content of a particular 
culture will, of course, become grist for the structural mill, 
but will ·not alter essentially the development of modes of 
moral reasoning. The cultural environment will have a signi-
ficant impact upon the rate of development as a function of 
the role-taking opportunities it provides, but this will have 
no effect on the universality and invariance of the sequence. 
Cross cultural research supporting Kohlberg's position has been 
conducted in Canada, Turkey, India, Martinique, Tawain, Mexico, 
Yucatan, and Israel. Studies have been made with both middle-
class and lower-class groups., as .well as with children from 
preliterate and semiliterate cultures. Kohlberg has also 
found that regardless of the particular religious faith a 
__________ person_may_pel_ong_                      ..                                            ___                            ____ ._· ____ ._ 
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bearing upon the invariant sequence. This has been in-
vestigated not only with Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, 
but with Buddhists and Moslems as well. 
There are two central concepts which function throughout 
the developing process and which warrant citation prior to 
progressing to an exploration of the actual stages. One is 
the concept of equilibration which                   has borrowed from 
Piaget and which has been discussed in Chapter One. It is the 
dynamic mechanism utilized to explain stage transitions and 
will recur with still further elaboration in later portions of 
this dissertation. The other is the concept of differentiation 
and integration, which has been adopted from the                      
theory of Werner. 1 It posits that in the earliest phase of 
development there exists a globular and undifferentiated state 
which in time becomes differentiated, with the elements forming 
a hierarchic integration. The, common biological example of,ten 
cited is the one cell dividing into many cells which begin to 
interrelate functionally, while going on to organize into 
hierarchical structures. An example from cognitive development, 
which also has a biological foundation, is the development of 
-classification. Early classification schemes are globular 
and undifferentiated. All furry animals may be classified by 
the very young child as IIdoggie ll • The perception of furry 
1 . h' f lD Heinz Werner, Comparat1ve Psyc ology 0 Menta e-
velopment (Chicago: Follet, 1948). 
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animals is globular and undifferentiated. In time dif-
ferentiation occurs and the child has classification structures 
to distinguish amongst dogs, cows, foxes and other animals. 
These are organized into a hierarchy under the generic class 
of animals. In fact, the taxonomy of primates, including 
humans, which anthropologists have devised constitutes an ex-
traordinarily complex hierarchy of finely differentiated 
elements. It is also the case in moral judgment that each 
stage represents greater differentiation and integration than 
the previous stage. The value of life, for example, is not 
differentiated from material wealth at Stage 1. The differ-
entiation occurs by Stage 2, at· which time there is a lack of 
differentiation between personal desire and the value of life, 
which does not become differentiated until Stage 3. The pro-
cess continues throughout development. Not only is property 
differentiated from life in value terms, but a later develop-
ment is the differentiation between human life and animal 
life. Implicit in the value differentiations is a hierarchy, 
with human life valued over animal life and animal life valued 
over property. 
The Moral Developmental Sequences 
Kohlberg commenced a longitudinal study on .rnoral develop-
, h h' dId' ,1 ment               octora                           The dissertation was 
lLawrence Kohlberg, liThe Development of Modes of Moral 
Thinking and Choice in the Years Ten to Sixteen" (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958). 
- ----- ---- ---------------- --._------ ._._. --- - ---- ----.--
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completed in 1958; the study is still in progress. The re-
sults were first reported       the literature 1 in 1963. The 
monumental'scope of this study imparts "a degree of credence 
that is simply unattainable in non-longitudinal studies. I 
will first present a characterization of Kohlberg's comments 
on the original work and then proceed to discuss the stages , 
in order of their ontogenetic appearance. In discussing the 
stages, however, the material brought to bear will not be con-
fined to Kohlberg's earliest statements, but will range qcross 
the years that have followed as well. 
The population of the study originally resided in the 
suburbs of Chicago. There were seventy two boys divided into 
three age groups of ten, thirteen, and sixteen. In each group 
one half was from the upper-middle class and the other half 
from lower to lower-middle class. Each age group had comparable 
I.O. s • Ten moral dilemmas were discussed on a hypothetical, 
plane with each subject during a two hour tape-recorded clinical 
interview. The idea for conducting the research, it is acknow-
ledged, was derived from Piaget's fifth book, The Moral Judg-
ment of the Child. It was the task in the case of each 
dilemma to resolve the inherent conflict. The choice was 
always between an act that would comply with sociolegal rules 
or an act that would violate the rules but se'rve human needs 
1 " Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's 
Orientation Toward a Moral             1. Sequence in the Develop-
ment of Moral Thought," Vita Humana 6 (1963): 11-33. 
--------
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or the welfare of others, which would be neglected by 
obedience. Analyzing the content of the responses, i.e. the 
choice of which act should be carried out, proved unfruitful. 
The analysis of the underlying reason for the choice is what 
turned out to be revealing. 
Analysis of the raw data from the interviews produced 
a pattern of 6 stages of moral development, reflected in 
30 general aspects of morality inherent in the verbal responses 
of the subjects. Together these led to the construction of a 
typology with 180 cells (i.e. 30x6). The aspects included such 
categories as punishment, rights, and motivation. Each aspect 
could be considered from the standpoint of which stage it 
corresponded to. For example, in assessing a statement that 
had a motivational aspect, if the motivation for a particular 
choice of action pivoted around the theme of "disapproval by 
others" then it would be scored in a specific column for 
motivation in the cell reserved for stage 3, because that stage 
is defined by its emphasis upon good relations and approval. 
If the motivational aspect had been "punishment by another," 
then it would have been entered in the cell reserved for stage 
1, which is defined by its emphasis upon physical consequences 
and avoiding punishment. All of the moral ideas conveyed during 
the interview were thus analyzed according to aspect and stage. 
It was then possible to ascertain what percentage of all state-
ments by each subject was at a certain stage. Although dealing 
with 30 aspects, a rather heterogeneous array, there was an 
impressi ve--degree-- of stage consistency-, -which _ Kohlberg _has ______________ _ 
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viewed as a strong supporting argument for. his position that 
moral stage theory constitutes structured wholes and not 
isolated skills. The· typology provided a profile on each boy 
and the computation of percentages yielded information. on 
which stage of moral development he was at. The original 
results indicated that stages land 2 decline with age, whereas 
there occurs an increase in the appearance of stages 3 and 4 
until thirteen years. Stages 4 and 5 increase until age six-
teen. Koh1berg was to discover later that moral development 
continues for considerably longer than he originally concluded. 
His instructors in this vital lesson were to be these same boys 
as they grew older over the years, many of them going to college 
and subsequently graduating. (In this longitudinal study, N=53.) 
Kohlberg believed that he had found a basis in his data 
for dividing the six stages into three natural levels, each 
one comprised of two stages. Hence, level 1 was comprised of 
stages land 2, level 2 of stages 3 and 4, and level 3 of 
stages 5 and 6. There appeared to be a higher correlation 
between the two stages grouped within anyone level than bet-
ween any stage within one level and a stage in another level. 
The three               and six stages will be presented, following 
this summary statement by Kohlberg from his first published 
work. 
From the internalization view of the moralization 
process,             age changes in modes of moral thought 
would be interpreted as successive acquisitions or 
internalizations of cultural moral concepts. Our 
six types of thought would represent six patterns 
of verbal morality in the adult culture which are 
successively absorbed as the child grows 
more verbally sophisticated. 
In contrast, we have advocated the develop-
mental interpretation that these types of 
thought represent structures emerging from 
the interaction of the child with his social 
environment, rather than directly reflecting 
external structures given by the child's 
culture •••• While these successive bases of a 
moral order do spring from the child's aware-
ness of the external world, they also represent 
activelprocesses of organizing or ordering his 
world. 
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It is clear that Kohlberg embraces an active organism 
model, which holds that the growing person constructs and 
reconstructs his own moral knowledge out of exchanges with 
social beings in the environment. 
Three "Level"s of Moral Deve"lopment 
In a recent overview and update of his own work, Kohl-
berg2 has presented the three levels in relation to social 
perspectives, which I believe is in itself a commentary on the 
significance he accords the latter. However, he distinguishes 
what he refers to as a sociomoral perspective from the role-
taking stages of Selman, believing it is a broader concept 
underlying both role-taking and moral                    
The preconventional level (stages 1 and 2) is one at 
which the individual does not yet understand society's rules 
lIbid. i p. 30 
2Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Moralization: The 
Cognitive Developmental Approach," in Moral Development and 
Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues, ed. T. Lickona 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976), pp. 31-53. 
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and expectations. In relation to the self they remain ex-
ternal. He neither comprehends the grounds for their being 
nor does he have any sense of having participated in designing 
them. His is a concrete individual perspective. Paramount 
in his considerations are his own personal interests and some-
times those of isolated individuals other than himself. Re-
sponsiveness to rules at this level is based upon anticipated 
physical or hedonistic consequences of his behavior. There is 
a deference to the superior power of authorities. Children 
under nine years have rarely gone beyond this level and some 
                        may still be found to be at level 1. Kohlberg 
points out that it is also a prevalent level amongst adolescents 
and adults who have committed criminal offences. 
The conventional level (stages 3 and 4) encompasses the 
majority of people,                         and adults, in all societies. 
People at this level advocate support of the law precisely be-
cause it is the law. Rules and expectations .are identified with 
or internalized by the self. Hence, the rule of authority is 
no longer experienced as an external imposition and compliance 
has a more volitional character. This flows from a member-of-
-society perspective. The perspective no longer is a concrete 
individual one, but instead the individual's interests is 
secondary to the group's needs, welfare, and outlook. The 
individual at this level goes beyond mere compliance, seeking 
to actively maintain and justify the social order. A sense 
of loyalty is a strong feature at. this level. The individual 
enjoys a sense of shared membership in the group. 
The postconventional level (stages 5 and 6) is not 
arrived at before age twenty and even amongst an adult 
population relatively few people ever achieve it. The 
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acceptance of society's rules is founded upon the individual's 
own capacity to construct and comprehend the general principles 
from which the rules derive. In time of conflict, convention 
is subordinated to principle. Kohlberg views this level as 
predicated upon a prior-to-society perspective. Paradoxically 
there is a return to an individual outlook rather than an 
unquestioning identification with the social group. However, 
it has a distinctively different quality from the individualism 
of the preconventional level. In Kohlberg's own words: 
The individual point of view taken at the post-
conventional level ••• can be universal; it is that 
of any rational moral individual. Aware of the 
member-of-society perspective, the postconventional 
person                     and redefines it in terms of an 
individual moral perspective, so that social 
obligations are defined in ways that can be 
justified to any moral individual. An individual's 
commitment to basic morality or moral principles 
is seen as preceding, or being necessary for, his 
taking society's perspective or accepting society's 
laws and values. Society's laws and values, in 
turn, should be ones which any reasonable person 
could commit himself to-whatever his place in society 
and whatever society he belongs to. l . 
Seen in light of the above it would be expected that 
there would be a greater consistency of moral choices amongst 
people at the postconventional level because of the rational 
universality underpinning them than amongst people at lower 
IIbid., p. 36. 
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levels. This is what Kohlberg claims to happen and he refers 
to it as a "probabilistic ten·dency" for people at the higher 
stages of moral development to reach consensual agreement. 
Kohlberg makes an important point in cautioning against 
identifying a person as being at the postconventional level 
solely because he may make a judgment based on individual con-
science and what he insists ·is morally             in opposition to 
the established order. It is entirely possible that such a 
person may be identifying with the rules of a sub-group which 
he accepts with as little question·as any other conventional· 
level               who, however, has identified with the wider social 
order. It is always the source and nature of one's moral 
reasoning that we must know to determine the structural level 
or stage. 
It is perhaps useful to reflect upon the three 1e,'e1s 
from the standpoint of individuals' attitudes toward the law. 
Briefly, when the preconventional child advocates obedience to 
the law it is because harm may come to him if he doesn't obey 
it or good will come to him if he does obey it. When the con-
ventional youngster supports the law it is because he perceives 
it as necessary to the preservation of good relationships and 
social order. Lastly, when the postconventional adolescent or 
adult is found embracing the law it is because he believes it 
to be based upon principles which safeguard individual rights. 
Within any given level, the second stage is found to be 
more highly organized and mature in relation to its general 
perspective than the stage first entered into when arriving 
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at that level. In viewing the shifts from one level to 
another we see that the self of the preconventional individual 
decenters from his own personal interests as he moves onward 
to the conventional level. In turn, in order to accomplish 
the passage from the conventional level to the postc"Onvent-ional 
level, the individual must decenter from the perspective of 
society. His widening perspective, as the self disengages 
from the environmental and cultural embeddec1ness, requires an 
increasing capacity for abstract thinking and provides greater 
adequacy of moral reasoning. 
Six Stages of Moral Development 
As the stages weare about to examine were based upon 
subjects' responses to stories containing moral conflicts it 
would be instructive at this point to cite three illustrations 
I as appear below. 
1. In Europe, a woman was near death from a kind 
of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors 
thought might save her. It was a form of radium 
that a druggist in the same town had recently 
discovered. The drug was expensive to make, 
but the druggist was charging ten times what the 
drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the 
radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of 
the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, 
went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, 
but he could only get together about one thous-
and, which is half of what it cost. He told 
the druggist that his wife was dying and asked 
him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. 
But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the 
drug and I'm going to make money from it." 
lLawrence Kohlberg, Moral Judgment Interview and Pro-
cedures for Scoring. Unpublished manuscript. (Cambridge: 
__ .Center for Moral                                       University, 1976). 
So Heinz gets desperate and considers 
breaking into the man's store ·to steal 
the drug for his wife. 
2. Heinz did break into the store and get the 
drug. Watching from a distance was an 
off-duty police officer, Mr. Brown, who 
lived       the same town as Heinz and. knew the 
situation Heinz was in. Mr. Brown ran over 
to try to stop Heinz, but Heinz was gone by 
the time Mr. Brown reached the store. 
Mr. Brown wonders whether he should look for 
Heinz and arrest him. 
3. Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to 
go to camp very much. His father promised 
him he could go if he saved up the money for 
it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper 
route and saved up the $40 it cost to go to 
camp and a little more besides. But just 
before camp was going to start, his father 
changed his mind. Some of his friends de-
cided to go on a special fishing trip, and 
Joe's father was short of the money it would 
cost. So he told Joe to give him the money 
he had saved from the paper route. Joe 
didn't want to give up going to camp so he 
thinks of refusing to give his father the 
money. 
151 
Once a story is presented to a subject the investigator then 
poses a series of pertinent questions about it and probes the 
respondent's answers. For example, in the first story, the 
subject is asked whether Heinz should steal the drug and the 
reasons behind the respondent's deci'sion are then pursued. 
He is further asked whether Heinz's feelings toward his          
should influence his course of action and whether the pre-
scribed action should be any different if the woman is a 
stranger to Heinz. Questions are posed regarding the law in 
the story                     and in general with a focus upon. obedience. 
In the third story, the questions involve relationships, pro-
mises, and property rights. The subject's responses to stories 
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of this type and their accompanying questions becomes the 
raw data from which an individual's stage of moral development 
is assessed. 
Stage 1: Heteronomous Morality 
The defining feature of this stage is the individual's 
conception of right as being obedient to the power holders. 
Those in authority have a position enabling them to impose 
punishments upon those who disobey, hence obedience is sub-
scribed to by Stage I children because it will help to avoid 
punishment and other adverse consequences. There is no vision 
of a moral order which must be maintained through punishment 
as necessary to accomplish that end. Hence, a notion of right 
is arrived at by anticipating the physical consequences of the 
act, irrespective of any other consideration. It is not the 
case that the child has no realization that there is a right 
and wrong at this embryonic stage, but that his notion of it 
pivots around the desire to avoid punishment. There is an 
old familiar phrase,                 makes right" which carries some-
thing of the central meaning of this stage. The imprint of 
preoperational thought is upon this stage as there is a dis-
torting egocentrism in the child's centration upon only one 
aspect of the situation. The value of life during Stage 1 
is not differentiated from an individual's material possessions. 
Therefore, moral judgments regarding the value of anyone per-
son's life will be heavily influenced by his wealth. 
There is obviously a sharp departure in Kohlberg's inter-
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emphasizes the child's emotional bond producing unilaterial re-
spect toward the adult, Kohlberg does not. He suggests that in 
Piaget's view anticipated punishment is important because it 
signals to the child what the respected adult will or will not 
approve. Kohlberg found neither respect for adults nor an at-
tidue of rules as sacred in children of this stage. 
Stage 2: Individuali·sm and Instrumental Purpose and Exchange 
In originally reporting his findings, Kohlberg observed 
that his Stage 1 coincided with Piaget's stage of heteronomy and 
that Stage 2 coincided with the autonomous stage in Piaget's work. 
However, it it frequently suggested that some elements of heter-
onomy as described by Piaget extend from Stages 1 to 4 in Kohl-
berg's system, whereas elements of autonomy may be found ranging 
from Stages 2 to 6. 
The child's conception of right at·Stage 2 is essentially 
one of stark reciprocity. An exactly equal exchange of goods or 
favors seems to be the guiding light of. this stage. Until re-
cently the prevalent terminology for this stage was "instru-
mental hedonism." Doing something for another is right because 
he will repay you in some way now or later. Leaving someone 
alone is right, because then he will leave you alone. In a 
religious context, Kohlberg reports one child as saying a person 
should be good to God because then He will be good to the person. 
Reciprocity at this stage does not flow from a respect for the 
rights or dignity of the other, but merely from a pragmatic 
expectation of receiving similar treatment. There appears a 
naive egalitarian outlook with an accompanying dimunition of 
any sense that adults may be morally superior. 
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A·growing awareness of the· relativism of each person's 
own needs and perspective is now manifest. The hallmark of 
this stage is pursuing one's self interests and obtaining 
rewards, tempered only by a pragmatic concept of fairness as 
equal exchange. Of paramount concern is having one's own needs 
fulfilled. The relativism of perspectives and reciprocity of 
this stage are the aspects that link it with Piaget's autonomous 
stage. However, the full flowering of Kohlberg's stages of 
development will take the growing person very far from this as 
he constructs moral knowledge of a much higher order. 
Stage 3: Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, 
and Interpersonal Conformity 
The child now goes beyond strict equality to equity. 
Role-taking invokes taking into account the feelings and in-
tentions of others. A conception of right is geared to meeting 
the expectations of friends and family. Loyalty and affiliation 
become of the utmost importance. The Golden Rule is now ex-
ercised as the individual will place himself in the other per-
son's shoes to determine what is fair and· desirable. Kohlberg 
distinguishes this type of role-taking ability as imaginative 
reciprocity in constrast to exchange reciprocity which is 
characteristic of Stage 2. A concern for others is expressed. 
A desire to receive praise and avoid blame will influence the 
·judgment of what constitutes right and wrong action. Kohlberg 
refers to this sometimes as the "Good-boy/Nice-girl" stage. 
One is motivated to observe rules in order to maintain relation-
ships. The individual's conception of right at this stage is 
- _ .. -_._----- --- -       . --- --- ----.-
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limited to people within his own circle and does not extend 
to a broad societal level, encompassing both known and un-
known members of the larger social group. It is at this 
stage, however, that 'the child is aware in interpersonal" 
relationships that the other will make a judgment about him 
based on his behavior. This new role-taking ability will en-
able him to modify his intended behavior on the basis of how 
he anticipates the other might respond to it. This capacity 
both allows the child to construct a new view of what con-
stitutes the right and at the same time helps him to fulfill 
what is prescribed by it. 
Stage 4: Social System and Conscience 
The scope of this stage encompasses the complete network 
of the entire society. There is a sense of obligation to obey 
laws and perform duties. Laws are construed as necessary to 
maintain society. The allegiance to following laws now springs 
from a conception of a moral order which goes beyond one's own 
circle of friends and relatives. The level of abstraction re-
quired "at this stage is greater, for the notion of justice is 
based upon legislation issuing from govenment and is expected 
to apply to all people in the land without exception. To 
maintain the social order conformity to the laws is demanded. 
This, of course, precludes deviation and diversity. The con-
servation of laws is emphasized and change is deemphasized. 
Kohlberg provides an incisive comment on the main features 
of this stage, in stating the following: 
Stage 4 positive reciprocity is exchange 
of reward for effort or merit, not in-
terpersonal exchange of goods or service. 
Negative reciprocity is even more clearly 
centered on the social system: vengeance 
is the right of society and is conceived 
not as vengeance but, as "paying your debt 
to society." The equality element of 
justice appears primarily in terms of the 
uniform and 'regular administration of the 
law, and as equity in an order of merit. 
Social inequality is allowed where it is 
reciprocal to effort, moral conformity, 
and talent, but unequal favoring of the 
"idle" and "immoral," poor, students, 
etc., is strongly rejected. l 
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The majority of adults in most societies are at this 
stage. Kohlberg's description of it is not intended as a 
disparagement. He believes that it is a considerable advance 
over previous stages, that it is not merely an internalization 
of society's rules and taboos, and that in light of the re-
latively mature role-taking ability involved it is rooted 
cognitively in a fairly deep-structure. 
Stage 5: Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights 
Discussion of this stage will open with a caveat. 
Although it is customary to present the traditional six stages 
without qualification, the fact is that since first identifying 
these stages a considerable amount of attention has been de-
voted to the transition between Stages 4 and 5. It is an 
especiallY critical juncture since comparatively few people do 
1 ' Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit 
the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of 
Moral Development," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, 
ed. T. Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p_ 197. 
-------_ .. _- ----- -- - -- - -- --------- ---_._--- --------------
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progress to the postconventional level and yet it is at this 
            that heteronomy is surpassed and genuinely principled 
moral reasoning emerges. To avoid muddying the waters, 
however, until familiarity with the basic stages has been 
acquired, I shall defer discussion of Stage 4B. 
It has been observed that the Piagetian moral character-
istics of intentionality, reciprocity, and relativism appear 
in the develepmental sequence prior to. the postconventional 
level. Therefere, the defining features of principled thinking. 
to be found in stages 5 and 6 must go beyond these character-
istics, at least beyond them as they appear in conventional 
level forms. 
Stage 4 moral reasoning concentrates on maintaining the 
status quo. Stage 5 is defined by a qualitatively different 
conception of justice attuned to the necessity of changing 
unjust laws. This moral vision is possible because of the 
prier-to-society perspective which the person at this stage is 
able to. adopt. A perspective from .this angle informs the mind 
that laws do net exist to be obeyed but to protect the rights 
ef individuals and enhance the general welfare. A law that 
does no.t embody and assist in fulfilling a human right aria -
which, iri fact, runs counter to it must be changed. A 
democratic seciety is the natural outgrowth of Stage 5 moral 
thinking. There exists in it a theoretically fair procedure 
for effecting change and it is recourse to this procedural 
mechanism which the Stage 5 person will advQcate when confronted 
with an unjust law. Hence, there is a legalistic orientation 
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founded upon the social contract. It is not that there is 
any disrespect for law, but rather that the source of the re-
spect is a knowledge of the purpose law is intended to fulfill. 
Therefore,· when'it fails to meet the standard set for it by 
the stage 5 person, then the grounds· for changing it are 
clear and rational. Kohlberg formulates his view: 
There is clear awareness of the relativism 
of personal values and opinions and a cor-
responding emphasis upon procedural rules 
for reaching consensus. Aside from what is 
constitutionally and democratically agreed 
upon, the right is a matter of personal 
values and opinion. The result is an em-
phasis upon the legal point of view, but. 
with an emphasis upon the possibility of 
changing law in terms of rational con-
sideration of social utility •••• Outside 
the legal realm, free agreement is the 
binding element of obligation. l 
Kohlberg has pointed out the fact that not all moral 
conflicts are those between society's rules or interests and 
the egoistic impulses of the individual, which must be re-
strained. There may exist, and often does, conflict between 
two valid alternatives. Kohlberg's stories are designed to 
accentuate this type of dilemma and it is at Stage 5 that the 
person becomes most accutely aware of this. Previously there 
is either an ignorance of the true nature of the conflict or 
an evasion of it. The stage 5 moral thinker recognizes it, 
faces it squarely, and attempts a genuinely rational resolution. 
The Stage 4 thinker tends to view maintaining law and order 
as defending against the outsiders who do not comply or show 
lLawrence Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel, "Moral Development ---------- ilrid'-Education,"'ii1 Collected Papers' on-Mer-al Deve16pmemt- and -------
Moral Education, ed. L. Kohlberg (Cambridge: Center for Moral 
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proper respect for law. The Stage 5 thinker in contrast is 
concerned with just procedural mechanisms that will extend 
across the range of all citizens to encompass suspected and 
even convicted criminals, whose rights must also be protected. 
There does not exist the same                     between conforming 
insiders and non-conforming                     at Stage 5 as there is 
at stage 4. The rights of any two citizens or of a single 
citizen and the general welfare may legitimately clash and 
        task is to seek a rati,onal method for resolving the con-
flict which will be just. Kohlberg believes that a Con-
stitutional Democracy provides, the organization to achieve 
this. Implicit in the arrangement is contractual consent. 
Kohlberg's observations on this point are illuminating. He 
states: 
The social contract which is the basis of 
the Stage 5 socio-moral order is a justice 
conception which presupposes reciprocity 
of the partners to the agreement and 
equality between them prior to the agree-
ment, though the form of agreement takes 
priority over substantive justice, once 
agreement has been reached. Contract and 
due process are fundamental, and since 
contracts cannot be binding without the 
liberty of the contracted, liberty typically 
takes priority over the' other elementsof--
justice (reciprocity and equality) in the 
Stage 5 view •••• l 
Education, Harvard University, 1973), p. 416. 
1 Kohlberg, IIFrom Is to Ought," p. 202. 
Shortly afterward he states pointedly: 
Law is nonarbitrary when it accords with 
constitutional procedures which a rational 
man could accept without prior cultural 
. values or conditioning. Particular laws 
are arbitrary, but still binding to a 
rational man in this context. l . At Stage 5 there is a heightened awareness of the 
relativity of the positions held by those in a conflict 
160 
situation. In the case of the Heinz story cited above, assume 
that Heinz carried out the theft and is now before the judge. 
Kohlberg reveals that someone at Stage 5 can believe that the 
husband was morally right in carrying out what appears to be 
a rational act, stealing the drug to save the life of his wife, 
while at the same time hold that he was legally wrong and it 
would be right for the judge to sentence him to jail. The 
judge must properly discharge his assigned and agreed upon role 
even though he, himself, may not think that the husband was 
morally wrong. 
Despite the greater adequacy and universality that 
characterizes Stage 5 structural development in the moral 
domain, Kohlberg2 highlights the potential inherent in it for 
undermining individual rights in favor of the general welfare 
on. some occasions, because of its utilitarian foundation. 
He chooses as an example an issue of no less significance than 
that of capital punishment. Stage 5 upholds both a principle 
lKohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 204. 
2Lawrence Kohlberg and Donald Elfenbein, "The Development 
----.- --___ of_Mor_al_ Jud_gmem_ts _                                               _                                   American 
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of welfare maximization and of individual rights existing 
prior to society. In general, both of these principles would 
be against an essentially retributive punishment. The conflict 
Kohlberg is leading up to is masked as long as it is believed 
that             is no evidence to support the de terence theory o"f 
execution. In the absence of such evidence there is no gain 
to the welfare of society's members in capital punishment and, 
hence, in ruling it out the murderer's right to life is pre-
served. However, assume that compelling documentation to 
support the deterence theory is submitted. It is now possible 
to conceive of a situation in which hundreds, perhaps thousands, 
of lives can be saved yearly by executing apprehended murderers_ 
and, of course, running the unavoided risk of occasionally 
killing an innocent person in error.- Koh1berg argues that the 
utilitarian orientation of maximizing the general welfare would, 
in the light of evidence                       deterence, permit a de-
cison in favor of capital punishment to be made. There is 
nothing in the structural dimensions of Stage 5 which allows 
for a resolution to this potential conflict that could deprive 
--the convic-ted murderer--of his right to life. It is_ to Stage 6 
that we must turn to find the completely universalized principles 
that infuse the highest order of prescriptive moral vision. 
Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles 
The rare person whose sociocognitive moral development 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 45 (1975): 614-39. 
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has brought him to this stage of moral reasoning is fully 
autonomous. He is completely decentered from society's ex-
pectations and basis his resotutions to· ethical conflicts upon 
universal principles of justice which are prescriptively con-
sIstent without--e·xcep-ti-on. Urri"vers·a-lity ,-cons·± s·tency , and 
logical comprehensiveness are the central attributes that 
characterize the guiding principles of his conscience through 
which he chooses right over wrong. Conscience, in this sense, 
does not connote guilt, but the purely rational quality of his 
justice structure. Respect for the dignity of each individual, 
regardless of station in life, has reached a zenith. 
Although there is less hard research data on this stage 
than on any of the preceding             Kohlberg devotes more time 
to exploring it than with all of the others combined. It is 
here that he may be found at his most philosophical and eloquent. 
It is also at Stage 5 and especially at Stage 6 where critics 
find him the most vulnerable. Koh1berg is adamant that some 
ways of resolving moral issues are better than others and it 
is an absolute that Stage 6 moral reasoning offers a better 
way than any other. It is the highest known stage of moral 
development and as such offers the most adequate means for 
arriving at ethical solutions to competing claims between 
individuals or between individual and the general welfare. 
The justice principles embraced at this stage lead to ethical 
resolutions which would be··                   by any rational person who 
is engaged in moral reasoning uninfluenced by his own existential 
---------- role_and_personaL in.terests. __ The_ solution-.itself_will._be seen __ _ 
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as intrinsically and necessarily just, which makes it even 
more adequate than the justice of stage 5 which comes from 
consenting to submit to the binding nature of social contract 
or democratic procedure. 
Principled thinking at this stage provides the rationale 
for breaking the law. At Stage 5 there is an emphasis upon 
working though the democratic process to change an unjust 
law. Thus, Stage 4 appears conservative by comparison. 
Similarly, to the Stage 6 thinker the· long change process ad-
vocated by the person at Stage 5 might seem relatively con-
servative. At Stage 6, an unjust. law. constitutes sufficient 
ground for civil disobedience. One's own conscience dictates 
that compliance with an unjust law is not morally required and 
that active resistance to it is ethically defensible. An ex-
cellent example of Stage 6 moral reasoning appeared in the 
form of a letter to the editor of a large metropolitan news-
paper. It was written by Philip Berrigan, the well known 
radical priest, and a friend who were serving six months in 
prision at the time for protesting nuclear proliferation in the 
United States. They state that they are questioning the role 
of the courts and law in America. They then go on to assert, 
"And we will risk arrest and accept prison because the price 
of freedom in a society ruled by the Bomb is unconscionably 
great. The price of freedom is to remain good, law abiding 
citizens in the face of preparations for genoicide on a scale 
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that will dwarf the holocaust of World War II."l Is the 
Stage 6 thinker an anarchist who has no respect for law? 
An answer comes from a letter by a man in a Birmingham jail. 
Martin Luther King states, "One who breaks an unjust law must 
do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the 
penalty. An individual who breaks the law that conscience 
tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty of im-
prisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community 
over its injustice is, in reality expressing the highest respect 
for the law. 1I2 It is worth noting that an analysis of the 
public pronouncements of soldiers who followed the command of 
Lt. Calley in the Mai Lai Massacre of the Vietnam War reveals 
that their conception of justice was at Stage 4. They believed 
it was their duty to do as they were ordered to do in this 
situation. The one soldier who refused to fire has been inter-
viewed privately and Kohlberg has found his explanation for re-
fusing to obey the order to be at a stage 6 principled level of 
reasoning. This reflects the universality of principles of 
justice. 
Their occurs an enlargement across development of the 
range to which the inherent valuing of human life is extended. 
At Stage 1 we find that value of others' lives is determined 
by their importance, at Stage 3 friends and relatives are those 
lphilip Berrigan & John Schuchardt, Letters to the Editor, 
The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia, Penna., appx. 1978. 
2Rolf E. Muss, "Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental Approach 
to -Adolescent Morality," Adolescence 11 _<J.9l.fiLL_46. _____________ _ 
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whose lives are essentially valued, by Stage 6, however, the 
inherent value of each person's life and his right to that 
life is universally recognized. The importance of the person 
or the moral agent's relationship to him are totally irrelevant 
as far as an application of the principle is concerned. 
We have seen that at Stage 5 the morally right is conceived 
of as contractual. and legal. Laws are consensually agreed upon 
as .they are designed to maximize human welfare and promote in-
dividual rights. Once legislated, laws should be obeyed since 
the citizen has entered a contract although he may work through 
the democratic process to have unjust laws changed. At. Stage 
6 an act of· civil disobedience is considered an appr9priate 
response to unjust laws because the principles of justice              
lying a conception of morality transcend the limitations of the 
stage 5 utility orientation of maximizing the general welfare 
of society's members. These principles of justice and a method 
for arriving at truly just solutions must now be explored. 
Kohlbergl has offered several excellent philosophical 
expositions and they have served as major sources for this 
discussion. A prescriJ?tive right based on principle at Stage 
6 is one made by a moral agent who has decentered from both his 
lLawrence Koh1berg, "Stages of Moral Development As a Basis 
for Moral Education," in Moral Educa·tion, ed. C.M. Beck, B.S. 
Crittenden, & E.V. Sullivan (New York: Newman Press, 1971), 
pp. 24-92; Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit 
the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of 
Moral Development," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, 
ed. T. Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 151-235; 
Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Claim to· Moral Adequacy of a Highest 
Stage of Moral Judgment," The Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 
630-46. 
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own egoistic impulses and the pressures of others. It there-
fore becomes a right that is applicable to all individuals. 
A principle is viewed as a guide to choice which possesses a 
more abstract quality than a rule. A rule has a more concrete 
base and cannot beuniversalized to all people. A rule to be 
faithful to your spouse cannot be founded upon a univeral 
right that encompasses all people, as clearly not everyonehas 
a spouse. If one wezeto accept the rule it still could not 
apply to children, bachelors, and those who are divorced. 
A class of acts cannot be universalized according to Kohlberg, 
because he believes there is always the possibility that a 
particular situation might call for a violation of the pre-
scription or proscription involved. Hence, while it might be 
generally good not to steal, it is morally defensible to steal 
in the case of the Heinz story because the wife's right to 
life takes precedent over the druggist's right to property.l 
Unlike a rule, a principle does not specify the act to be carried 
out or refrained from. A principle may be construed as a 
metarule, which is to say that it serves as a higher order rule 
or instrumentality for constructing and assessing first order 
rules. Cognitively this is rooted in formal operations where 
lThe Heinz story is ideally constructed to serve Kohlber·g' s 
purpose. Should the reader think, however, that Heinz's dilemma 
is remote from real life, it is worth noting that at the time 
of this writing in 1978, the state of Pennsylvania due to a bur-
eaucratic impasse has temporarily discontinued reembursing 
druggists for services to welfare recipients. The result is that 
many druggists have stopped filling the prescriptions for these 
people and, therefore, thousands of poor people have at present 
__________ gone for_weeks __ wLthout_needed __ medic_in.e_. __ . _________ . _____ . 
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we find the abstract ability to think in terms of second order 
propositions as opposed to merely first order propositions. It 
is paradoxical that the less abstract conventional level thinker 
places the welfare of the more abstract collective above the 
concrete individual, whereas the more abstract Stage 6 moral 
agent places the rights of the concrete individual in a real 
situation above the collective's need for order. As Kohlberg 
states, IIFrom our point of view there is a logical fallacy 
par.allel to elevating the group above its members: the fallacy 
of treating. a principle as elevated above ·the individuals in 
the situation to which it applies •••• True principles guide us 
to the obligating elements in the situation, to the concrete' 
human claims there." l A principle permits the individual to 
identify and organize, in any specific situation, all moral 
elements germane to resolving the conflict of competing claims, 
according to Kohlberg's view. 
Kohlberg draws heavily in his formulation of Stage 6 
thinking upon Kant's two basic moral tenents. One is to always 
act toward another human being as to treat him as an end and not 
merely       a means. The other is to act upon a maxim only if you 
--would be willing to see it embodied as a universal law. By 
applying the second of these to the first, Kohlberg maintains 
the outcome is that, 1I ••• all individuals must be accorded 
lLawrence Kohlberg, IIStages of Moral Development As A Basis 
for Moral Education,1I in Moral Education, ed. C.M. Beck, B.S. 
Crittenden, and E.V. Sullivan (New York: Newman Press, 1971), 
p. 61. 
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fundamentally equal consideration." l In his analysis of 
Kant from which derives the justice principle enunciated in 
the preceding statement, Kohlberg concludes that treating 
another as an end and not as a means is to be interpreted 
with respect to rights and claims. 
At this juncture in following Kohlberg's agrument it is 
necessary to reintroduce the concept of reversibility, which 
is a cornerstone to Piaget's genetic epistemology. In fact, 
he links his particular use of the term to fogical thought. 
There is a mobility of thought in logic which permits shifting 
from premise to conclusion and back again while averting dis-
tortion. Reversibility in the moral domain is isomorphic to 
the logical domain in relation to rights and duties. Duties 
and rights have a reciprocal relationship. A right by. one per-
son implies a duty by another and reciprocally, a duty by one 
implies a right by another. Conversely, in the absence of a 
right there is no correlative duty. This is an instance of 
reciprocal implication which is one of the causal relationships 
comprising the sixteen binary operational model that governs 
formal operational thought. Kohlberg amplified his notion of 
reversibility to add that in the presence of a right others 
are duty bound to acknowledge           right. By assuming re-
versible positions of key individuals in a conflict situation 
and exercising what Kohlberg calls a second order conception 
lLawrence Kohlberg, liThe Development of Moral Judgments 
Concerning Capital Punishment," American Journal of Ortho-
psychiatry 45 (1975): 633. -_ ... _--- -------- - ----_. __ ._------------- --- --------------
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of Golden Rule role-taking it is possible for the Stage 6 moral 
agent to arrive at a just and equilibrated ethical solution to 
conflicts. There exists a state of disequilibrium when com-
peting claims remain unresolved and it is only at Stage 6 that 
a solution which would be-satisfactory to all rational in-
dividuals regardless of what role they may find themselves in 
may be arrived at. Central to his position is the following 
clarification by Kohlberg: 
Reversibility of moral judgment is what is 
ultimately meant by the criterion of the 
fairness of a moral decision. Procedurally, 
fairness as impartiality means reversibility 
in the sense of a decision on which all in-
terested parties could agree insofar as they 
can consider their own claims impartially, 
as the just decider would. If we have a re-
versible solution, we have one that could be 
reached as right starting from anyone's per-
spective in the situation, given each person's 
intent to put himself in the shoes of the other 
••.• If something is fair or right to do from the 
conflicting points of view of all those involved 
in the situation, it is something we can wish all 
men to do in all similar situations. l 
If Heinz is reasoning at Stage 6, he will place the druggist 
in the situation of the dying wife and anticipate whether the 
druggist would, from that perspective, still hold to the claim 
of property rights over                     would_ then                         imagin-
ative drama and have the wife placed in the druggists' situation 
and ask whether she would continue to press her claim to life 
after having experienced that perspective. Kohlberg suggests 
lLawrence Kohlberg, liThe Claim to Moral Adequacy of a 
, Highest Stage of Moral Judgment," The Journal of Philosophy 
70 (1973): 641. 
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that the druggist would yield his claim and the wife would 
not. Once Heinz has                     this "ideal role-taking" he 
will see clearly in which direction justice lies. The pro-
cess described here is what Koh1berg is referring to when he 
speaks of second order Golden Rule role-taking. Heinz does 
not simply put himself in the wife's position but he first 
imagines himself to be the druggist and then he places him-
self in the wife's shoes. Thus he takes the perspective of 
his wife as seen through the eyes of the druggist. This is 
more complex than the process through which the Stage 3 per-
son applies the Golden Rule. At Stage 3 if he merely takes 
the perspective of his wife, then her claim will be va1id1 if 
he takes the perspective of the druggist, then his claim will 
seem valid. Hence, while Stage 3 moral reasoning is most 
assuredly an advance over the preceding stages it does not 
offer a fully equilibrated solution to moral conflicts, which 
is not arrived at until Stage 6. It is Koh1berg's conviction 
that the philosophical analysis he offers is a demonstration 
of the manner in which justice principles which are universal, 
consistent, and logically comprehensive are derived. 
The work of John Raw1s 1 has made a profound impact since 
its publication in 1971 and is worthy of comment in connection 
with Koh1berg's moral system. Rawls' book has already spawned 
a spate of articles and other books about his theory of justice 
1John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 1971). 
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and it is being speculated that his                           to political 
and philosophical thought will be permanent in the tradition 
of Plato, Kant, Mills, and Locke. Rawls' analysis of justice 
focuses upon a level of justice in relation to social in-
stitutions and does not have the psychological and individual 
emphasis which Kohlberg' s does. Nevertheless., the central 
vision of justice as the core structure of morality inextricablY 
links the two thinkers together. Rawls has identified two 
major principles of justice. The first is that each person in 
society has equal entitlement to maximum liberty that .is con-
genial to a similar liberty for others. The second is related 
to inequalities within a society regarding social and economic 
areas. Rawls' contention is that existing inequalities should 
be only those which are of benefit to everyone. A corrolary 
is that positions of inequality should be affiliated with posts 
which are equally accessible to all. Injustice for Rawls are 
those inequalities which do not work to the advantage of every-
one. Justice is fairness. The principles are to be applied 
to the entire society and the second one in particular is con-
cerned with distributive justice, regulating wealth, income 
and welfare services, including health and education. The 
theoretical cornerstone is the idea that citizens are to enter 
a social                   founded upon principles of justice that all 
rational people would design and embrace. As a hypothetical 
device for arriving at justice principles he·offers his notion 
of imaginatively entering the "original position" under a "veil 
of ignorance.'1 What he is suggesting is that to design a 
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fair society one should rationally adopt the perspective of 
a person who will live in the society after it is conceived, 
but who at the time of conceiving it does not know anything 
about what his role will be in it. The nature of his work 
and socio-economic status he -remains comple-tely ignorant of 
while he is 4eveloping the blueprint. He is to exercise 
prudence and take into account what the possible effects 
would be upon him should he find himself in one role or an-
other at a later date. He is to assume that he will, in fact, 
enter one or more of the roles within the society once it has 
been designed. In the meantime, he must decide how goods and 
services are to be distributed and on what basis opportunities 
are to be made accessible. Rawls believes that all rational 
people agree upon the justice principles that would be derived 
through the heuristic device of the original postion. He 
further believe'S that his own two egalitarian principles, pre-
viously stated, may be generated in this manner and that, there-
fore, all rational people would find them acceptable. 
Kohlberg and Elfenbeinl have applied Rawls'device of the 
original position in a discussion to the question of whether 
capital punishment is just. They suggest that no rational per-
son would in advance consent to enter a society that practiced 
such retributive punishment if there was a chance that he might 
be a murderer. Yet it would be rational to design some type of 
deterrence in the penal system since the hypothetical person 
_____________ , ______ lKohlberg, __              tal_ P..unishrnent_,-"_pp_. ___ fi14 -::4 0 __ 0 ____________ - ______ _ 
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might fulfill a role of a non-criminal. It would be prudent 
to run the risk of facing some restraint as a criminal, should 
he find himself in that role, to avoid finding himself con-
fronted with criminals on the street, should he turn. out to 
be a non-criminal. Still bearing in mind that he might assume 
the criminal role, he would favor that detterrence mechanism 
which places the least constraint upon him while effectively 
achieving the detterent goal. Pursuing their analysis through 
the original position, Kohlberg and Elfenbein conclude that 
neither capital punishment nor even life imprisonment would be 
                    to deter the rational person, as. all that would be 
necessary would be a punishment, " ••• just· severe enough to 
offset the gains which might be realized from the commision 
of the offense." 1 Their analysis is brought to a close with 
the following summary statement: 
The judgment that capital punishment per se is 
unjust is ineluctable if we accept the Stage 6 
proposition that the murderer is to be treated 
as anyone else in his position who also took the 
roles of others would wish to be treated (as an 
end rather than a means). As we have stated, the 
Stage 6 mode of moral reasoning is unique in that 
it yields a determinate and fully reversible 
solution. It is therefore the mode we want all 
men to adopt; if a-II men did so, -they ·would 
reach unanimous agreement that the death penalty 
is morally wrong-on grounds that all who took a 
moral point of view could accept as fair.2 
IIbid., p. 637. 
2Ibid., p. 637 
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In the context of this discussion, the authors introduce an 
important theme, which appears to be one about which Kohlberg 
has a strong conviction. He believes that a social evolution 
has been occurring which is reflected in a trend toward 
                                                          progress at a higher level of 
development than it has been in the past. The authors express 
the opinion that this is being applied to retributive forms 
of justice, which increasingly will be deemphasized in future 
penal codes in favor of a greater form of justice. 
Stage 7: The Cosmic Perspective 
In recent work Koh1berg1 has begun introducing the 
possibility of a seventh stage which assumes a cosmic per-
spective that goes beyond the humanistic one of the sixth 
stage. This is a step that moves his theory toward a life-
span developmental psychology, as it would no longer confine 
itself to the periods of childhood, adolescence, and youth. 
His speculations on the possibility of this stage are appealing, 
although he readily acknowledges that there exists no research 
data to support them presently. Kohlberg suggests that Stage 
6 does not answer the questions, "Why be moral?" and, by im-
plication, "Why live?" To raise these questions is to shift 
from a moral plane to a religious or ontological plane. Kohl-
berg believes that answers to these questions cannot be derived 
1 Lawrence Koh1berg, "Stages and Aging in Moral Develop-
ment: Some Speculations," Geronto10gi'st 13 (1973): 497-502; 
Lawrence Koh1berg, "Education, l-1ora1 Development and Faith" 
Journal of Moral                     4 (1974): 5-16. 
---_._._------_._--- _._-----_. ---
175 
from rational grounds, as with the purely moral issues, but 
he does feel, nevertheless, that the an'swers need not be in-
compatible with reason. Nor need the answer be essentially 
theistic as opposed to a cosmic one. Koh1berg speaks of 
experiencing despair       the beginning of movement into Stage 
7. The aging person begins to construe his finite life from 
the infinite perspective of the cosmic, which generates de-
spair, as doubt is cast upon life's meaning, given its, 
temporality. The next phase, however, involves a transition 
from seeing the infinite perspective to identifying the self 
with the cosmic perspective of the infinite. A sense of unity 
with the cosmos imparts a new valuing of one's own life and 
eliminates the sense of meaninglessness that characterized 
the preceding phase of despair. In the absence of data, 
'Kohlberg refrains from concluding that what he is elaborating 
upon signifies a structural advance that would meet the formal 
criteria qualifying it as a true stage in the same sense that 
the preceding stages do. However, whether the cosmic per-
spective is'u1timate1y determined to qualify as a stage from 
the standpoint of a structural orientation or not, it is clear 
- -that Koh1berg believes spiritual growth Is possible amongst 
the aging. 
176 
Bridging Conventional and Postco"nven"t:ion"a1" Moral Development 
There are two key papers,l dealing with the issues of 
structural regression and· stage transition, which merit special 
attention within the context of this discussion. The papers 
are related, as the 1973 one is a revision of the original 
interpretation made in the 1969 paper of what then appeared to 
be structural regression. Normally, one would not predict re-
gression from a stage theory as defined by cognitive-structur-
a1ists, barring such serious developments as senility. 
The 1969 paper reports the results of research conducted 
earlier by Kramer. The subjects were a group of those who 
were in Kohlberg's own original longitudinal study. They ranged 
in age from sixteen to twenty five. Kramers study was both 
longitudinal and cross-sectional. The interviewing was con-
ducted at three year levels. A young man in the study would 
either be compared to his own earlier statements or to those 
of a boy in another age group. There were a total of 45 
subjects in the study. 
1Lawrence Koh1berg and Richard Kramer, "Continuities 
and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development," 
Human Development 12 (1969): 93-120; Lawrence Kohlberg, "Con-
tinuities in childhood and Adult Moral Development Revisited," 
in Collected Pa ers on Moral Development and Moral Education, 
ed. L. Koh1berg. Cambr1dge: nterfor Moral Educat1on, Harvard 
University, 1973). 
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One of the conclusions from this study, later to be 
revised upward, was that Stage 5 thinking, when it appeared, 
was completely stabilized by the time high school had ended. 
However, it is not until the early twenties that stage 6 
thinking, rare though its occurrence may be, is found to be 
fairly well along in development. On the basis of this data, 
one would not anticipate that any significant moral develop-
ment would occur after the early twenties. The stabilization 
of conventional moral modes of thought after graduation from 
hi"gh school, for those who did not progress to the next moral 
level, was a significant developmental observation. 
The finding that drew the most serious attention was 
that 20% of the middle class boys slipped from a higher stage 
to Stage 2. Those who did this had ranked amongst the most 
developed of the entire group under study. Their previous 
moral development had reflected a mix of Stages 4 and 5. Yet 
they seemed to retrogress to a stage of hedonistic relativism. 
Nevertheless, two important qualifications obtained. Even 
though they were found to be making predominantly Stage 2 
statements, the content contained a degree of philosophical 
and political coloration not ordinarilY found in Stage 2 
subjects. Furthermore, when it was explored with           through 
the clinical interview, the retrogressors displayed an aware-
ness that people generally preferred Stage 4 type of reasoning. 
Hence, although they seemed to prefer Stage 2 reasoning in 
this regressed condition, they retained a comprehension of 
Stage 4 type reasoning. This, of course, would not be true of 
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a person who had arrived developmentally at Stage 4 without 
having regressed. The regression of the subjects had occurred 
while they were in their senior high school year or early 
college career. The striking fact is that without exception, 
by the time they had reached age twenty-five each one had not 
only been restored to Stages 4 and 5 thinking, but there then 
appeared to be a trifle more of the principled level of moral 
reasoning than of the conventional, in comparison to when 
they had been in high school. Sifting through all the pert-
inent evidence, Kohlberg and Kramer concluded that their sub-
jects had undergone a functional advance although a structural 
regression. Kohlberg and Kramer, based on an analysis of the 
subjects' statements, suggest that the regression was a way 
of coping with guilt from internalized parental authority. 
Once on the college campus, they attempted to break free of the 
guilt-inducing constraints. Kohlberg and Kramer comment, as 
follows: 
In the case of our retrogressors, there is 
considerable use of relativism and anti-
moral protest to free themselves from 
familialy induced guilt. At least half of 
our regressors gave conscious and clear 
statements of strong sensitivity to and 
preoccupation with guilt feelings in pre-
adolescence and adolescence. In this pre-
regression period, the guilt was com-
pletely accepted as the voice of higher 
morality, as something self-accepted and 
internal. At the same time, the capacity 
of the boy's parents to inflict this sense 
of guilt was also noted by the boys. After 
-- -- - --- .. _- --- - ---- - --- --- -- ----------- -- - - - ---- ----- ---- -- -_._-._- -- -- - - -------- ----
they left home, they started to test out 
their capacity to be guilt free. l 
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In addition to this psychological phenomenon, the youngsters 
were being confronted with a challenge to their conventional 
morality as college life exposed them to the fact that often 
people did not follow moral precepts or were not rewarded for 
doing so when they did. Their regression was seen by Koh1berg 
and Kramer to be partly a rebellion against this realization. 
The authors go on to observe, "There are, then, two deve10p-
mental challenges to conventional morality to which our re-
gressors are unhappily responding. The first is the're-
lativity of moral expectations and opinion, the second is the 
gap between conventional moral expectations and actual moral 
behavior. ,,2 
In a liberal adaptation of Erikson's concept of psychological 
moratorium, Kohlberg and Kramer interpret the retrogressors' 
condition as a "rebellious moratorium" which frees them from 
their guilt so that when they are restored to higher level 
morality it has more of a ·volitional quality than a psychically 
determined one. Return to the higher morality from which they 
appear to have temporally dropped now·has a-quality of the 
"Right thing for the right reason," if I may paraphrase T. S. 
Elliot. The reaffirmation of the higher stages of morality 
lLawrence Kohlberg and Richard Kramer, "Continuities 
and Discontinuities in Childhood and Moral Development," 
Human Development 12 (1969): 114. 
2Ibid ., p. 115. 
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with its rules and contracts is embraced with greater realism 
and commitment than prior to regression. The structural re-
gression is also a functional advance in the service of ego 
development. 
I have chosen to treat this issue at considerable length 
because any true structural regression in normal developme.nt 
would deliver a fatal blow to Kohlberg's invariant sequence 
and greater ·adequacy hypotheses. It is also important to pay 
careful attention to Kohlberg's reworking of any apparent 
regression for there is always the danger that he may be un-
wittingly straining at reinterpreting the facts merely to 
preserve the hypotheses rather than modifying the latter to 
fit the former, as Brown and Bernsteinl incisively caution. 
Lastly, the subject we are focusing upon hovers around the 
transition from conventional to principled moral reasoning, 
which is a matter of decisive importance. 
A span of four years passed before the second paper, 
which provided more opportunity to explore in-depth. the de-
velopmental changes that the subjects in the longitudinal study 
were undergoing. Kohlberg and Kramer had claimed that no real 
structural development was occurring in adulthood and that 
most of what they observed could be explained in terms of 
functional stages of the psychosocial variety described by 
Erikson. However, given new data, a searching conceptual re-
analysis of regression in relation to stage theory, and a 
--_.-___ . _______                                                                       J                           Psychology 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1975)-.--- ---
reassessment of the scoring system, a revison was seen to 
be in order. _ The change in the scoring system involved a 
further deemphasis of content, accompanied by a greater 
attentiveness to structural elements. Essentially, 'l7hat 
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Kohlberg is now asserting is that the apparent regression of 
the subjects we have been following is proof that none of their 
thinking had been morally principled, for if it had been, then 
it would have been stabilized and-would not have yielded to 
regression in the face of conflict. Genuine Stage 5 and 
Stage 6 moral development is crystalyzed in the latter part 
of one's twenties and beyond. 
Koh1berg, drawing upon a conceptual distinction made 
earlier by Turie1, comments, " ••• the apparent regression 
involved in stage development is a disequilibrium of transi-
tion very different than the disorganization or dedifferent-
iation involved in regression •••• our relativistic regressions 
to Stage 2 are in a disequilibrated transitional stage in 
which the breakup of conventional morality is easy -to confuse 
'th h f ' I' . 111       t e resurgence 0                                           1ty. Koh1berg 
acknowledges having been in error when he and Kramer inter-
preted their subjects' as-having had a structural regression, 
1Lawrence Koh1berg, "Continuities in Childhood and Adult 
Moral Development Revisited," in Collected Papers on Moral De-
velopment and Moral Education, ed. L. Kohlberg (Cambridge: 
Center for Moral Education, Harvard University, 1973), p. 21. 
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even though a functional advance. The reinterpretation calls 
for the identification of a transitional stage to be referred 
to as Stage 4B. What is happening experientially to the sub-
jects is that having been at Stage 4 they start the progression 
              Stage 5. The movement is characterized by skepticism 
which leads to a questioning of the very Stage they are about 
to move away from. Their moral reasoning appears relativistic 
and egoistic, as in Stage 2, because they now seem to be holding 
that anyone person's choice based on his own interests and 
desires is as morally sound as another's, as there exists no 
objectively validated standard against which to assess them. 
The qualitative difference is that Stage 2 children evaluate 
right and wrong strictly in accord with their personal wish. 
They lack any concept of a societal perspective or duty. The 
Stage 4 thinker in transition possesses these concepts, but is 
facing a crisis in that he is challenging, hence skepticism, 
the very grounds upon which he had been embracing his con-
ventional morality. He is on the threshold of a breakthrough 
to principled moral reasoning which, although he does not yet 
realize it, will supply him with the new standard for which he 
is striving. In the meantime, he is at neither Stage 5 nor 
Stage 2, but has reached a more abstract level of Stage 4, which 
is 4B, than he had been at previously. Kohlberg emphasizes 
that the Stage 4B subject takes a dual relativistic perspective 
in which he now sees both society's and the personal "selfish" 
points of view people hold as morally valid. 
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Turiel l views those undergoing the passage from Stage 
4 to 5 as being temporarily in a state of limbo, having re-
jected the stability of Stage 4 while not yet having invented 
for themselves the more adequate structure of the Stage 5 
social contract orientation. What we find characterizing the 
responses of these Stage 4B transitional subjects is a          
stant vacillation between highly relativistic and rigidly 
absolutistic solutions to moral dilemmas. This vacillation 
greatly resembles the cognitive dynamics of a nonconserving 
child as he moves toward the conservation of substance, first 
centering upon length and then upon width, but failing to co-
ordinate the two variables in a simultaneous decentering. 
Similarly, the Stage 4B subject who is in- transition engages 
in sequential decentering, alternating between relativism and 
absolutism, thereby coming up with distorted and inadequate 
moral solutions. The subject is in transition and experiencing 
a necessary disequilibrium. Out of this interim phase he forges 
a new moral vision based upon a social contract structure. The 
penalty for avoiding the conflict is to remain permanently con-
signed to a Stage 4 version of morality. For those who do go 
on, Turiel suggests that at some point during the passage to 
Stage 5, "A                   view of Stage 4 absolutism is coupled with 
an awareness of the relativity of social conventions." 2 
Returning now to Kohlberg, on the basis of the .new 
lElliot Turiel, "Stage Transition in Moral Development," 
in Second Handbook of .Research in Teaching, ed. R. Travers 
(New York: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 732-58. 
2Ibid ., p. 750. 
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interpretation he revised his position. Candidly noting . 
the earlier scoring error, he formulates a summary              
ment, as follows: 
We now claim that apparent "retrogression" and 
"stabilization" was really a structural stage-
development, a -movement from a "high scho·ol con-
ventional Stage 4 position to a transitional 
        ethical relativism and egoism to a princi-
pled stage 5 position. Our earlier inter-
pretation error was due to· confusing·high 
school conventional thought with principled 
thought. We said the confusion was due to the 
fact that there is an overlap in content bet-
ween developed forms of conventional concepts 
of the moral as social consensus and social 
welfare and principled concepts of the moral. 
While both the conventional Stage 4-B and the 
Stage 5 orient to socio-moral concerns and 
welfare, the Stage 5 subject has questioned 
society's norms but then reaccepted them 
through the social. contract. l 
Kohlberg revises his comments about the appearance of struc-
tural development in adulthood, to acknowledge its actual 
occurrence. Stage 5 thinking is found to have emerged during 
the mid-twenties and there were no observed instances of Stage 
6 moral reasoning in any of the subjects by age thirty. By 
implication this signifies that Stage 6 is a comparatively 
late development.             one considers that Kohlberg cites such 
men as Socrates, Jesus, Lincoln, and King as examples of Stage 
6 morality, its rarity is not surprising, although it has been 
estimated that five percent of American adults reach this 
achievement. It only takes a moments reflection on the fate 
of the four men identified as examples to raise the. intriguing 
lKohlberg, "Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral . 
________ . _______                                                                             ___                  __ • __ . ______________ . ____ . __ . ____ . 
question about the possible inherent danger of being at 
Stage 6 in a predominantly conventional society. 
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Chapter Five 
ACTION, HIERARCHY, AND LOGIC 
In the preceding chapter the core of Koh1berg's theory 
of sociomoral knowledge has been presented. It is a theory 
embedded within a cognitive-developmental framework and built 
upon Piaget's early work on moral judgment. Although it offers 
a considerable extension and refinement of Piaget's position, 
it also departs from that perspective in some important re-
spects. Since its first publication in 1963, Kohlberg's own 
findings have been subjec.t to an ongoing process of elaboration 
and refinement. Principal amongst the participants in this 
process have been Kohlberg himself, as well as Turiel, Rest, 
Kuhn, Langer, and Haan, all of whose contributions will be ex-
amined below. I have organized this chapter around three major 
theme.s each of which deals with an essential question pertaining 
to Kohlberg's theory. The first is the relationship between 
moral development and human action. In Kohlberg's theory, the 
unit analyzed to determine moral stage is the verbal judgment 
of the individual, which reflects his conception of justice. 
However valuable that may be as knowledge for its own sake, 
many will want to know whether that judgment has any impact 
in the real world where people's lives are affected by the way 
fairness and justice are implemented in interpersonal re-
lationships, bureaucratic organizations, law-making, and some-
-"--------------t-£rR-es--in acts-· 6-£- c:Lvfr"disobed-ienc-e-.----------- -------
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The second question has to do with the hierarchial nature 
of .stages and the mechanism which facilitates passage through 
those stages. What is the relationship of a given stage to those 
both adjacent and remote from it in the hierarchy? How does 
the               account for passage from one stage to the next? To 
what practical advantage may the answers to these questions 
be put? 
The third and final question to be explored in this 
chapter is the relationship between logico-mathematical structures 
.as conceived by Piaget and moral development in the Kohlbergian 
stage theory. Is pure cognitive development sufficient to pro-
duce corresponding stages in the moral sphere? If not, is it 
necessary at all? If it is necessary, but not sufficient, then 
what might be some of the other variables which perhaps mediate 
between logico-mathematical mental structures and the justice 
mental structures? 
These questions have been introduced as a preliminary in 
order to sharpen the focus of the discussion which follows. 
Moral Judgment ·and Action 
Perhaps the single                                                 spurred by the 
cognitive-developmental approach to sociomoral knowledge is the 
relationship between type of             reasoning and behavior. The 
clear position adopted by proponents of this approach is that 
stage structure does definitely influence behavior choice. 
It is acknowledged that variables other than one's stage of 
moral development will come to bear in determining action. 
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These.would certainly include personality attributes, situ-
ational conditions, affective arousal, and degree of personal 
risk or loss involved. Although the cognitive-developmental 
stage of an individual is, by definition, based on his mode 
of moral reasoning, which reveals his structural attainment, 
one could argue that the acid test is the extent to which there 
is a correspondence between that reasoning and behavior. 
Certainly we know people are capable of combining lofty pro-
nouncements with base actions. In The Moral Judgment of the 
Child, Piaget pointed to the paradox that sometimes children 
espouse fidelity to the rule, while breaking it at every turn, 
whereas it may also be observed that their behavior is in ad-
vance of their moral judgments at times. 
Koh1bergl believes that confronted with a conflict choice, 
there is a tendency for a given stage to favor one specific 
alternative over another, even though it happens that those at 
different stages may sometimes make the same choice. He holds 
that individuals at Stages 4, 5, and 6 are more likely to be 
consistent in their behavioral patterns than those in the lower 
stages. The reason for this is that those at the higher stages 
are governed by stable considerations based on an objective 
standard or principle, while those at Stages 1, 2, and 3 are 
lLawrence Koh1berg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the 
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral 
Development,lI in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. 
T. Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 151-235. 
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                  by more personalized and situational factors, which 
are more readily subject to change. Principled moral reasoning 
in particular implies a set of values that have been"differ-
entiated and integrated into a hierarchy that is universally 
shared by people at that level. Therefore, Kohlberg's theory 
would predict greater consistency and reliability of action 
amongst those at the higher level. Behavior itself, however, 
is not a criterion of the actor's moral developmental level, 
as it" is necessary to know his conception from which the action 
follows to determine that. For example, one person may march 
on Washington in a protest against an unjust war. Another may 
join in the same march because he feels his friends expect it 
and he would be wrong to go against their wishes. The first 
is action out of Stage 6 principles involving the value of 
            the second is behaving out of a conception of right 
based on group loyalty. The overt behavior of these two              
during the day of the march is not demonstrably different even 
though their moral conceptions vary vastly and can only be dis-
covered by exploring         meaning                               has to them. 
. " The focus in this section, however, will be upon di"fferent be-
haviors which, from the evidence, seem to be largely influenced 
by structural development. Kohlberg has pointed out that two 
individuals at the same stage could very well generate opposite 
action choices even though the form of their reasoning is the 
same. For example, one person may compliantly go off to fight 
a war upon being drafted, on the basis of his Stage 4 moral 
reasoning that the social order can be maintained only if he 
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and all others obey the law of the land and do as they are 
told by legitimate authority. A second person may become a 
draft resister based upon the religious dogma of his faith 
which inveighs against any act of aggression. If his action 
is predicated upon obedience to religious authority and not 
a higher principle then it is as much a form of Stage 4 moral 
reasoning as is the case of one who chooses to go off and 
fight the warN Nevertheless, as indicated previously, the 
higher one moves up the developmental scale, the greater the 
likelihood that the behavioral choice will favor one side of 
a two-choice conflict and the lower one moves down. the scale, 
the greater the likelihood that behavioral choice will favor 
the other side. Kohlberg believes that stage structure imparts 
a "cognitive disposition ll which is the critical element ex-
ercised in determining moral action and not the affective 
element so often emphasized in traditional psychology. Affect 
itself is neutral with regard to the moral realm. It mayor 
may not be applied to a moral field. When it is, then it may 
be referred to as moral, but it takes on this character be-
cause it has been channeled in that direction by the cognitive 
disposition which interprets the situation. 
1 The classic study by Hartshorne and May (1928-30), which 
provided support for the position that honesty is situation 
lH. Hartshorne and M. A. May Studies in the Nature of 
Character: Vol. 1, Studies in Deceit, 1928; Vol. 2 Studies in 
Service and Self-Control, 1929; Vol. 3, Studies in the Organi-
zation of Character, 1930, (with F. K. Shuttleworth). (New 
--- --·-----York: -Macmillan,- 1928-1930) ;- - ------- - ----
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specific has served as a point of departure for many dis-. 
cussions on the subject .over the years. Anticipation of 
being caught at cheating or not is cited as being a greater 
determinant of behavior than any hypothetical internal trait 
of honesty or a unitary notion of conscience. Other factors 
such as group pressure         willingness to take a risk were . 
more significant than a consistent trait of honesty. Kohlberg, 
himself, has repeatedly critized the "bag of virtures" notion 
of morality as being incorrect. He rejects the idea that there 
are discrete attributes or virtues, such as honesty, which one 
either has or does not. ·A view of morality based on single 
                  virtues is incompatible with a cognitive-developmental 
position. To that extent, Kohlberg may be said to find the 
conclusion of Hartshorne and May congenial.                   their re-
search is based on a content analysis of their subjects rather 
than upon a structural analysis. 1 Burton presents a searching 
exposition of their early work within the context of a dis-
cussion on honesty and dishonesty. He highlights that the 
researchers defined the behaviors studied (i.e. cheating, 
lying, and stealing) as an active effort at deception. They 
defined traits as some type of internal disposition which would 
function independently of the situation. Since they found 
gross inconsistency in the studied behavior.s across situations 
they were led to reject the trait theory. Burton argues that 
lRoger V. Burton, "Honesty and Dishonesty," in Moral De-
velopment and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social                
e.d. T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976),-
pp. 173-97. 
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Hartshorne and May, however, had some glimmerings of an under-
lying generality of behavior and that in his own attempts at 
reanalyzing their original data he found grounds for concluding 
that, in fact, there was a pattern of resistance to temptations 
that cut across situations. 
I Kohlberg and Krebs have reported research substantiating 
the view that certain internal variables are predictive of moral 
behavior and, contrary to Hartshorne's and May's conclusion, 
that moral behavior is not essentially determin,ed by si tuationally 
related dynamics. This may be qualified by indicating that the 
degree to which situational determinants are paramount is a 
, function of moral level. Kohlberg and Krebs hold that the forces 
operating within a situation are most likely to effect the person 
at a preconventional level. At the conventional level there 
exists more of a dual pull or battle between the forces in the 
situation and a person's moral stage development. The struggle 
is mediated by the "moral will," which in this study is con-
strued as ego controls constituted by attentional stability. 
The person at the principled level is not influenced by situ-
ational forces and does not undergo a struggle of conscience, 
as his course is determined by rational considerations derived· 
from principles. Before presenting some of the pertinent data 
and discussion, it is necessary to make one further qualifying 
comment. Kohlberg and Krebs are applying their analysis to 
IRichard Krebs & Lawrence Koh1berg, "Moral Judgment and 
Ego Controls as Determinants of Resistance to Cheating" (Un-
-.-. __ . ----- -published-paper_, Cambridge: Cen_t.er f_or                                           Harvard Universi ty, 1973).--- -- ------- --- -
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what is referred to as minor moral decison making. It is 
the absence of intense sacrifice that defines that task as 
minor. In the event that intense sacrifice is a variable, 
then even for adults at the principled level, it may be 
necessary to reintroduce ego controls to steadfastly hold to 
the correct moral action as dictated by rational reflection 
at the principled level. Although this is a vital' distinction, 
it does not mitigate the value of the material presented be-
low, when its limitations are understood. 
The study reported by Kohlberg and Krebs had a population 
of 123 sixth-grade subjects ranging from lower-class to upper 
middle-class. Sex and social class variables were balanced. 
Mean l.Q. was always above 107 whether viewed by sex or social 
class. Children in the study were tested for resistance to 
temptation, cheating behavior, attentional stability, and moral 
stage. 
The results clearly indicated that moral judgment was 
predictive of the subjects' actual behavior in situations de-
signed to tempt them to engage in cheating. It was found that 
amongst Stage 5 subjects 80 percent resisted cheating and 
amongst Stage 4 subjects 45 percent resisted cheating. In 
sharp contrast, from a combined count of those in Stages 1, 2, 
and 3 only 25 percent resisted cheating. Taking Stage 1 se-
parately, only 19 percent resisted. A factor of further in-
terest to the researchers was whether attentional ability was 
related to resistance and how this variable interacted with 
moral stage. They equated attentional processes with the notion 
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of William James, the America1 philosopher, that the capacity 
to attend an object through an act of volitional effort con-
stitutes moral will. However, attentiona1 stability is not 
intrinsically a moral factor in the Koh1bergian sense as clearly 
it is applicable to both moral and non-moral tasks alike. The 
major discovery was that the variable of attentional stability, 
construed as ego control, had a differential effect related to 
moral stage. Attention was found to have a significant effect 
upon Stage 4 thinkers, increasing the likelihood that subjects 
at that stage would resist temptation to cheat. . The data re-
vealed that of high attending Stage 4 subjects 56 percent re-
frained from cheating, whereas of low attending Stage 4 subjects 
only 33 percent did so. In contrast, it was found that high 
attention was associated at the preconventional level with in-
creased cheating. This was especially true at Stage 2, where 
the data reflect that while 75 percent of the low attending 
refrained from cheating, the high attending subjects who re-
sisted came to 20 percent only. Hence, we find a reversal of 
effect of high attention when we go from Stage 4 to Stage 2. 
Kohlberg and Krebs point out that lower stage morality by its 
very nature is more situation specific. In explaining the 
ostensibly surprising effect of high ego control being associated 
with low resistance to cheating at lower moral stages, they 
state: 
The pre-conventional child is determined in his moral 
reasoning by the immediate situation. Ego factors, 
then, support the child's reasoning and choice, but 
this reasoning and choice is not consistently moral. 
--- -.. --.----.------For . the ___ lower_ .stage _c.l1il_cL                                                                    ___ . ____ . ___ . __ . 
force independent of, or opposed to, the situation. 
Accordingly ego factors do not oppose situational 
pressures or temptations for the lower stage child. 
For the lower stage child, ego factors of attention 
and brightness aid the child to "do well" in a task 
as "doing well" is defined by social situational 
forces. "Doing well" for a lower stage child, how-
ever, is more likely to mean cheating to gain a re-
ward or a "good score" than i.t is to mean displaying. 
"moral strength".l 
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It follows, Kohlberg and Krebs reason, that when the' low at-
tending preconventional subjects abandon their task from dis-
tractibility, the task they are abandoning is cheating, which 
their structural level of moral development permits them to 
engage in as right in certain situations. Consider the 
following observation by Kohlberg and Krebs, which contains 
a comparative                       as follows: 
The lower stage subject is just as likely as the 
higher stage subject to judge cheating as bad or 
wrong on attitude scales. The "wrongness" of 
cheating for lower stage subjects, however, is 
interpreteQ in terms of, or incontingency upon, 
situational forces of punishment, reward, authority, 
and group status which can, under certain conditions, 
predispose toward cheating as much as predisposing 
against it. At higher stages, the "wrongness" of 
cheating is defined in terms of considerations of 
trust and equity which predispose agajnst cheating. 
regardless of most situational forces. 2 
It is reported that five principled subjects (80%) resisted the 
temptation. These were all at Stage 5 and interestingly they 
measured as low attending. Because of the felicitous se-
paration between the variables of attentional ability and moral 
stage, it is clear that high moral stage in itself is sufficient 
IIbid, p. 33 
2Ibid , p. 32 
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to produce moral behavior based on principle. As for pre-
conventional children who do not cheat, Koh1berg and Krebs 
do not view them as having faced an internal struggle of con-
science, mediated by ego controls with a victory for moral be-
havior. They are simply not tempted to cheat because of their 
definition of the situation. For example, a Stage 1 child who 
anticipates a decisive penalty for violating a rule is simply 
less likely to be tempted to cheat. In the final analysis, it 
is the Stage 4 subject who faces the internal struggle in the 
face of genuine temptation. It is at this stage that ego con-
trols as a mediating variable play a most crucial role in 
assisting the youngster toward the choice to resist temptation. 
The Stage 4 person is committed to a conception of right that 
entails following the rules promulgated by society as a general 
abstraction. Hence, in a situation designed to tempt him to 
cheat he enters a state of conflict between situational pre-
ssures and moral stage dictates. The exceptional situation had 
been set. up in sucp a way that the immediate pressure was to-
ward cheating because of the opportunity afforded to do so. 
Lacking a set of universally consistent principles, the Stage 
4 person becomes conflicted. It is at this Stage that moral 
will power, construed in terms of high level attentional pro-
cesses, becomes decisive in assisting the subject to resist 
temptation. 
Elsewhere, Koh1berg1 cites similar·research conducted 
------------ -- --- _-lKoh1berg;- _II From- Is- to 0ught-,--!!-- pp .-. -151-235.--- --- ---
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by Brown et. al. l who carried out their work with under-
graduates. Half of the conventional level subjects cheated, 
while out of nine                                   students only one cheated. 
Kohlberg concludes: 
A Stage 5 or 6 person defines the issue as one 
of maintaining an implicit social contract 
with the tester and others taking the            
The more unsupervised, the more trusting the 
experimenter, the more contractually obligated 
this principled person is. Also, the principled 
person defines the issue of cheating as one of 
inequality, of taking advantage of others, of 
deceptively obtaining unequal opportunity, that 
is, in terms of justice. • •• This interpretation 
implies that moral                 determines action by 
way of concrete                           of rights and duties 
in a situation. 2 
It would seem that while Hartshorne and May were perhaps on 
. solid ground in rejecting a simplistic notion of an all-or-
none honesty trait that imparts consistency across all 
situations, they were incorrect to give little credence to an 
internal disposition that influences moral behavior independently 
of situational forces. Although possessed by few, principled 
cognitive-structural reasoning would                 qualify as"just 
such an internal variable. Furthermore, ego control, defined 
as volitional-attention, when exercised by the Stage 4 person 
also qualifies as an internal variable that influences the 
actor toward a moral choice of honesty. These developmental 
lMichael E. Brown et. al., "Some Correlates of Conflict 
in Two Situations of Moral Conduct," Journal Of Personality 37 
(1969): 803. 
2 Kohlberg, p. 229. 
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phenomena are obviously more complex than the single-trait 
theory, but there is evidence to support Koh1berg's inter-
pretation of their role in moral behavior. 
Whi1e- the -above re-s-e-arch o-f- Kre-bs- and- Koh1berg focuses 
upon young children in minor decision making, the classic 
findings of Haan, Smith, and B10ckl shift our attention to 
young adults in a critical situation. Whereas subjects in the 
former were acting under contrived laboratory conditions, those 
in the latter acted spontaneously in their natural environment. 
The subjects consi"sted of students from the University of 
California at Berkeley and San Francisco State College, and a 
group of Peace" Corps volunteers in training. There was a total 
of 957 respondents chosen at random from the registration files, 
who responded by completing five of the moral dilemma stories 
devised by Koh1berg. A total of 54 percent of that group were 
used in the study and their selection was based on the fact 
that upon scoring their responses while utilizing very stringent 
criteria they were the ones who could be scored as being in a 
pure stage without ambiguity. Assignment to"a pure type 
signified that they had at least twice the score at that stage 
than at any other stage, across all five stories as assessed by 
two judges. The subjects also filled out an extensive question-
INorrna Haan, M. Brewster Smith, & Jeanne Black, "Moral 
Reasoning of Young Adults: Political Social Behavior, Family 
Background, and Personality Correlates, Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 10 (1968): 183-201. 
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naire providing biographical .. information, and took some ad-
ditional tests regarding child rearing and self-concepts. The 
self concepts identified pertained to both perceived self and 
ideal self.. Students in the study were enrolled in their 
educational activities in 1964 at the time of the famous 
Berkeley Student Revolt which revolved around the           Speech 
Movement. Administrative officials restricted political 
activity by students on the Berkeley campus and many students, 
as w.ell as other activists, protested on campus by acting in 
violation of the prohibitions. A major sit-in occuring in 
December, 1964 led to many arrests by the police. A sub-
section of the present research analyzes by moral types those 
student activists who were arrested. We shall return to the 
smaller sample of those students arrested at Berkeley in 1964 
after noting some distinctive features of the larger sample of 
students from both universities including the Peace Corps 
Volunteers. 
Subjects at the principled level of morality were more 
radical politiqally and tended to str.ongly favor the Free 
Speech Movement. There was a greater incidence                 them 
- . of having interrupted their college career and of living apart 
from the campus in apartments or houses. They described them-
selves more frequently as being atheistic, agnostic, or 
areligious. Their parents were seen by them as liberal in 
politics. The principled subjects had been comparatively more 
active in sociopolitical affairs and had a background of in-
volvement in organizations and protest activities. It was 
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found that the ideal self of principled men was a perceptive, 
empathic, and altruistic one. They specifically disavowed the 
trait of stubborness and emphasized the value of self-expres-
siveness. The researchers observe that this configuration of 
attributes implicitly espouses role taking virtues, which are 
essential to high moral development in the Kohlbergian scale. 
The principled women described themselves as being altruistic, 
but with dissatisfaction over having feelings of guilt and 
doubt and being both restless and impulsive. In general, the 
principled young adults rejected conventional mores and seemed 
more autonomous than the others. They appeared to place a 
high value on interpersonal sensitivity and responsibility, 
as well as self-expressiveness and candor. Based upon their 
data, the researchers, two of whom are women, suggest that 
women might have a more difficult time achieving moral and ego 
autonomy by the time of young adulthood than do men. They in-
dicate further that this may be because there is a clash be-
            autonomous attributes and the sterotyped feminine roles 
that women had been locked into. In this connection, it is 
noteworthy that Gilliganl has recently advanced a revised and 
differentiated construction of moral development specifically 
based upon women's experiences. 
The conventional subjects were the most conservative of 
the three moral levels, as was true of their parents. They had 
few instances of interruption in their college careers, tended 
lCarol Gilligan, "In a Different Voice: Women's Con-------------- -----c-ei)'t"rori-s-- o-f-Sel-f-- ana-Moral Tty -; II--H-arvai"cr Educat:ional---Revi ew------------------
47 (1977): 481-517. 
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with greater frequency to live on campus, and had the most 
religious affiliations and background. The idealized se1f-
concept they cited embodied an emphasis upon social skills and 
self-control. The         in parttcu1ar valued order, competitive-
ness, and ambition, and appeared to shun the very attributes 
embraced i:o the idealized self-concept of their principled 
counterparts. Hence, they devalued self-expressiveness and 
interpersonal responsiveness. The women held to a similar 
conception of the ideal, although of especial interest is that 
their version of an ideal self-concept included the apparent 
contradictory traits of competitiveness and self-denial. 
Attributes of sensitivity and rebelliousness were not highly 
regarded by them, just as they were not by conventional men. 
In general, the conventional subjects were raised in families 
and communities in which they were exposed to greater harmony 
and clearer expectations of traditional rules to be followed. 
They were exposed to less skepticism and conflict than the 
principled subjects had been. They seemed to have followed 
the examples of their conservative parents, whereas the 
principled subjects                   to posses.S! greater f.reedom to 
diverge from the thinking and ideologies of their liberal 
parents. 
The preconventional group contained no Stage 1 subjects. 
The Stage 2 subjects comprising. it were referred to as In-
strumental Relativists. These young people had a comparatively 
high incidence of interrupted college careers, greater than the 
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.case with either principled or conventional youth. The men 
viewed themselves as radicals or liberals and the women had a 
perception of themselves as moderate liberals. The men, 
although not the women, had the highest incidence of off-
campus living. Political differences.between the male youth 
and their fathers were greatest in this class. In striking 
contrast the females within this group shared complete con-
gruence with their mothers on political issues. The women 
belonged to many organizations, but were relatively inactive 
compared to the men who joined fewer organizations, but en-
gaged more intensely in the activities involved. In general, 
the men were extremely active in political protest and                
a strongly radical posture. They evidenced greater paternal 
conflict and anger than any of the other subjects. Although 
they embraced a self-concept of being reserved and not 
particularly responsive interpersonally they saw themselves 
as highly individualistic and also creative. Amongst all other 
subjects they devalued altruism. Their ideal self-concept 
possessed attributes of stubbornness, detachment, and unyield-
ingness to compromise solutions and yet it also included 
spontaneity and artistic ability. Women in this group did 
not seem to value personal expressiveness to the extent that 
the men did, but instead emphasized pursuing and attaining 
personal goals. They idealized practicality and stubbornness. 
At the same time they placed a high value on becoming 
idealistic and sensitive. The general picture for both young 
- ---------- --men -and -·women--a t-.thi s- preconven tional_le:vel_r.e flec_ted __ an_. __ . __ .. ___________ ._ 
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absence of a sense of interpersonal responsibility and a s.trong 
commitment to achieving self-fulfillment. They seemed to have 
had an upbringing characterized by parental indulgence based 
upon the parents' own convenience. and interest. Haan et al. 
suggest that such rearing fosters unpredictability and mitigated 
mature moral development because it fails to introduce clear 
communications about reciprocal rights and duties. 
Haan et al. see a striking contrast between the Instru-
mental Relativists, Stage 2, and the Individual Principled 
subjects, Stage 6. The comparative evaluation made by the re-
searchers is worth citing, as follows: 
The two groups differ in their relationship 
to society and to authority. The IPs are 
independent and critical, but also involved, 
giving and responsive to others. The IRs 
are angry, also critical, but disjointed, 
uncommitted to others, and potentially 
narcissistic. It should not be surprising 
to find moral heterogeneity among protestees. 
Protest which opts for change and accommoda-
tion in the social order should draw support 
from individuals who question the justice 
of the status quo and are committed to improving 
it, as well as from those who wantlto win an 
issue simply because it is theirs. 
The moral stage development of subjects from the Uni-
versity of California has' been fruitfully examined in relation 
to whether they were arrested while participating in the Free 
Speech movement on the Berkeley campus in 1964. Through such 
an examination it is. possible to derive information on the 
relationship between behavior and conceptions of morality. 
1 Haan, Smith, and Block, p. 197. 
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It is important to take cognizance of the emphasis by Haan 
et al. upon the fact that the actual sit-in protest during 
which the students were arrested was preceded by months of 
public debate amongst the students and conflict with the 
administration. Therefore, participation in the protest is 
not likely to have been impulsive or the result of a band-
wagon effect, but more probably the outcome of a carefully 
considered decision. 
Inspection of the findings support Kohlberg's contention 
that moral stage of development bears a relationship to human 
action. Stages 3 and 4, the conventional level, account for 
the lowest number of arrests. Of the total population of 
University of California male students at Stage 4, only 6 
percent were arrested and of those at Stage 3 only 18 percent. 
Contrasted to this, it was found that 75 percent of the Stage 
6 and 41 percent of the Stage 5 male students were arrested. 
The difference is striking. What is of especial significance 
beyond this, however, is that 60 percent of the male students 
at Stage 2 were also arrested. The importance of being arrested 
in this study is, of course, that only those who were engaged 
in prominent activist roles were likely to have been picked up 
by the police. On the basis of the moral conceptions under-
girding each stage one would predict low involvement for con-
ventional thinkers and high involvement for principled ones. 
This is exactly what the survey reflects. However, it might 
be instructive to ask why any of the conventional level sub-
. __ .. _----------- ---------- --j ects--participated_a t __ all. __ Haan_ et _ ale _ nad_. qdcled _                  _______ . __ _ 
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situation revolving around the Free Speech Movement to the five 
Kohlberg stories and that additional story had been specifically 
administered to the Berkeley students. The responses of the 
Stage 4 arrested students revealed their belief that the 
authorities had not maintained proper legal procedures in in-
hibiting the right of free speech. The Stage 3 students who 
were arrested also believed that the authorities had defaulted 
in their role, but the emphasis for these students was upon 
the authorities failing to be "good" people. The Stage 2 stu-
dents                     concern about the repression of their own rights 
and construed the situation as a power conflict. Lastly, the 
principled subjects were primarily concerned with the breach of 
community and citizens" rights represented by the conflict. 
Thus, an analysis in each case reveals that although those 
arrested cut across the spectrum of stages, the meaning to the 
individual actor was determined by the stage of moral develop-
ment he had reached. The Stage 4 subjects         were protesting 
did not behave, for example, as would be predicted, but an 
understanding of their moral reasoning reveals a structural 
conception of justice consistent with Stage 4 thinking. This 
serves to highlight the strong phenomenological cast to Kohl-
berg's model of moral stages. It also emphasizes that behavior 
alone is not sufficient for a judgment on the morality of the 
actor. It is necessary to know the underlying conception of 
right and wrong that generates the behavior. As long as con-
ventional level moral reasoners believe that authorities are 
acting properly, they are not likely to challenge the prevailing 
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status quo, but will embrace it and exhibit compliance.- Re-
garding the stage 2 thinker, Haan et al. point out that since 
.he does not engage in mature role-taking skills, he is likely 
to protest merely on the basis of frustration of his own 
wishes. The principled thinker, in contrast has differentiated 
self from subjective wish and the social perspective, having 
become free to engage in moral reasoning that is universal, con-
sistent, and objective. He engages in a form of role-taking 
which entails placing himself at the other person's perspective 
to understand that viewpoint and reciprocally inquiring how 
he might want the other to act on his behalf when he is deprived 
of his own rights. The inference is that the subject should 
act on another's behalf as he would want the other to act for 
him. Approximately only 20 percent of the toal subjects at 
Stage 6 did not get arrested, whereas about 50 percent of the 
Stage 5 subjects did and 50 percent did not. Brown and Hern-
steinl offer a cogent explanation of this even split by under-
scoring the social contract nature of the moral reasoning in-
volved at this stage, which lends itself to a more probable even 
split than in the case of the more fully principled subjects at 
Stage 6 or the_egoistic ones at Stage 2. Clearly, sitting-in 
could be justified on the grounds that although it violates the 
law that had-been laid down, there were transcendent principles 
involved. These subjects were already adjacent to a more fully 
lRoger Brown & Richard J. Hernstein, Psychology (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Company, 1975). 
-- - -. _._--- ------- _._-------------_._--- ----- ------- -------------------- --- - -- ------------
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principled level of ethical thinking in their present stage and 
so it is not surprising that they would move in that direction. 
However, the structure' of their present             reasoning calls 
for full utilization of available legal change mechanisms. 
The University did provide such procedures for instituting 
change of existing policies and, therefore, it would be ex-
pected that many Stage 5 students would opt to use them rather 
than engage in civil disobedience. Of significance in our 
analysis is the fact that Stage 5 students who did not sit-
in and both Stage 5 and Stage 6 students who did sit in, shared 
a more common value base than did Stage 5 and 6 protestors ,in 
comparison to Stage 2 protestors. 
I Haan compared the stage reasoning of the Berkeley stu-
dents as scored from hypothetical Kohlbergian moral dilemmas 
and the stage of moral reasoning used by them in explaining 
their own actual behavior in relation to the Free Speech Move-
ment sit-in which resulted in so many arrests. Her formulation, 
as well as the empirical findings, encompassed three categories. 
Altogether two-thirds of the students explained their actions 
using a stage different from the moral stage             they had re-
ceived for, reasoning in hypothetical situations. It was found 
that 46 percent invoked a higher stage and 20 percent a lower 
stage. Hence, moral reasoning used to explain behavior in an 
            Haan, "Hypothetical and Actual Moral Reasoning in 
a Situation of Civil Disobedience," Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 32 (1975): 255-70. 
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              situation was either higher, lower, or the same in 
relation to that utilized in hypothetical situations. Haan's 
view was that the same reasoning could be accounted for by a 
subject having fully stabilized his moral development stage. 
Students who had already begun to show evidence of reasoning 
at the next stage, hence already moving in that direction, 
were likely to be those who would show a gain in stage reasoning. 
She points out that the leaders of the Free Speech Movement were 
presenting arguments publicly, over a period of time, which 
were at higher stages than the majority of the students. This 
could produce the conflict and disequilibrium necessary for 
stage transition. Finally, personal factors in the pressured 
situation which the Berkeley Student Revolt certainly induced 
could account for loss in stage reasoning in actual behavior 
for some students due to disorganization. This need not be 
viewed as moral regression because of the complex nature of the 
situation. It may be analogous to a child performing non-
egocentrically at a simple task, but egocentrically at a com-
plex task. The underlying structure or competence has not 
been altered in such a' situation, but performance is influenced 
by task or situational complexity. The Stage 4 students tended 
not to show any marked split between reasoning pertaining to the 
actual situation and that applied to the hypothetical stories. 
In other words, they essentially reasoned the same in both 
situations. Those at the principled level,demonstrated a fairly 
even division between students who maintained their stage of 
- reasoning -and those -who - fell be low- their-- stage· when .going from-. '-- -.--.---- -
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hypothetical to actual circumstances. The tendency on the 
part of those at Stages 2 and 3 was toward moving from a lower 
to higher stage. Haan haS addressed specifically those stu-
dents who favored the Free Speech Movement, but did not 
participate in the sit-in and who lost a stage in going from 
reasoning in the hypothetical situation to the actual one. 
She suggests that these students suffered a sense of incon-
sistency and diminished integrity because they did not sit-in. 
As a result, in reflecting upon their actual behavior there 
occurred some disorganization as they attempted to justify or 
rationalize the apparent incongruity between not participating 
in the protest while favoring the cause. The evidence from this 
study supported the contention that gains were most frequently 
found amongst the developmentally ready. One sign of this 
readiness was the fact that those who gained had already ex-
hibited a greater frequency of use of reasoning at one stage 
above their scored stage than those who d"id not gain. This 
would make them more susceptible to influence by leaders speaking 
at a higher level, as research to be examined later will testify. 
There was also biographical data indicating that the gain group 
was more challenging and skeptical in relation to authority by 
comparison to the loss group whose members were more inter-
personally bound to their parents. Haan chooses to place em-
phasis upon action itself as the critical factor, in experientially 
profound situations, accounting for stage growth. In contem-
plating the statement below, bear in mind that the Berkeley sub-
. 
jects, while reasoning about their own actions, had done so after 
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the actions had been engaged in; in order       provide data for 
the study. We do not know what their thoughts were prior to 
their actions. Haan comments: 
We see then that the theory's normative, genetic 
description of gain is approximately correct, 
that mere confrontation with moral conflict is 
sufficient to enable most university students of 
lower stages to use higher stage forms, and that 
action that is consistent with ideology apparently 
energizes moral thought. When the action is non 
trivial, it may well be the first, rather than 
the last manifestation of an evolving compre-
hension of more sufficient moral structuring than 
can yet be articulated in a cognitive-hypothetical 
way. Nevertheless, it can readily be observed 
in moral interviews that hypothetical decision 
is not a pallid experience, since people 
struggle with the elegance of their suppositional 
resolutions. Still, moral action is not re-
quired, and therein lies the rub: Action 
actualizes, while thoughts can always be taken 
back. Moral situations of less consequence 
and duration probably produce more equivalence 
and less change. l 
The above statement by Haan has been quoted at length 
because of the central role·.it endows action with, as being 
instrumental in inducing moral stage growth when the subject 
is in a state of readiness. This is a crucial and different 
emphasis than the customary one of action flowing from the 
                stage. 
Sameness or equality of reasoning between hypothetical 
and actual conditions was generally typified by those whose 
moral stage structure and ideological commitment were con-
sistent with one another and with the beh.avior they engaged in. 
lIbid., p. 268. 
---------------- ---"--- ----- ---------------------- ------------------- -----.-. --- ---------------
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For example, a Stage 6 thinker who interpreted the situation as 
one obliging him to act out of principle to protect in-
dividual rights, favored the Free Speech Movement, and parti-
cipated in the sit-in, had no impetus to shift in going from 
reasoning about the hypothetical to actual conditions. This 
is in contrast to the "Stage "6 person mentioned previously who 
favored the Free Speech Movement, but did not actively pro-
test: an inconsistency which could lead to rationalization. 
The loss groups were, in fact, comprised mainly of those 
who did not sit-in. They were largely Stage 5 and a few Stage 
6 students. Also included in this group were ideologically 
uncommitted Stage 4 students. Haan believes that the cause 
of their going from a higher to lower form of reasoning is less 
likely to be found in the moral realm than the socia-affective 
arena. This is largely based on the biographical data re-
flecting conflict with authority around obedience and disobedience. 
Haan's research and speculation perhaps make their greatest 
contribution by alerting the moral cognitive-developmental stu-
dent to the complexity and diversity of considerations to be 
taken into account when thinking about the relationship between 
moral stage and human action. 
Because of the potentially devastating implications, one 
of the most significant findings in the field of moral develop-
ment and behavior is a spin-off of research originally conducted 
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b °1 1 Y       gram. The experiment was ostensibly an attempt to 
observe the effect of punishment upon learning by a person who 
was given tasks to perform and who was to receive shocks from 
the volunteer subjects whenever he made a mistake. The in-
tensity of the shock was modulated and beyond 75 volts the 
learner, who in actuality was a collaborator of the experimenter, 
would convincingly pretend to be in great pain. The deceived 
volunteers did not know that real shocks were not, in fact, 
being administered. Subject to encouragement and pressure from 
the experimenter to continue increasing the intensity of the 
shocks, despite escalating cries of agony from the learner, 
the volunteers could be observed undergoing unmistakably great 
stress. However, when volunteers would hesitate, the experi-
menter would escalate the commanding quality of his pressure 
to continue, going so far as to say, "You have no choice, you 
must go on." The experiment. has been replicated in a variety 
of ways. The essential finding that has impressed Milgram is 
the extreme length that otherwise perfectly decent people will 
go upon the command 6f an accepted authority even at the ex-
pense of inflicting great pain upon another, as the volunteer 
subjects truly thought they were doing. It was clear that          
believed that they were acting wrongly and that they, too, were 
suffering as they increased the voltage along the scale from 
15 to 450. ·In the original experiment, which had been conducted 
lstanley Milgram, Obedience to Authori·ty, (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1975) • 
. ------- ------- - - --- - - -- - ------- ------ - -- - -- -_. - - ---- -----------------.- - - .-------. --------_. 
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at Yale University, the full voltage was administered by 
1 65 percent of the volunteer subjects. Kohlberg scored the 
moral stage of one group of undergraduates who participated 
in this experiment. The results have not been published in 
detail, but Koh1berg reports .in passing that 75 percent of 
Stage 6 subjects terminated the experiment rather than per-
sist, despite the commands, in causing pain to another. 
All volunteers below Stage 6 continued with the shocks to an 
extensive degree except for 13 percent which terminated early 
in the experiment. This group included the Stage 5 moral 
reasoners which might appear surprising to some. Kohlberg 
suggests that Stage 5 social contract thinking does not pro-
vide adequate principles for resolving the dilemma. The in-
dividual has entered into an agreement with the experimenter 
and the learner has also consented to participate. There 
exists an obligation to meet one's commitments. It is only 
the                       Stage 6 thinker whose principled. reasoning 
transcends the bonds of the social contract to reject the 
experimenter's authority to command him. As Milgram ·agrees, 
the implications are frightening. One has only to recall the 
1 Lawrence Kohlberg, "Indoctrination Versus Relativity 
in Value Education" Paper presented at Harvard.University at 
. the eighteenth summer conference of the Institute on Religion 
in an Age of Science, Star Island, New Hampshire, July 31-
August 6, 1971. 
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Nazi era or the Mai Lai incident to be reminded of the cruelty 
and destruction that can come through obedience to authority. 
A point to be reemphasized is that the total group of people 
who participated in the set of Milgram experiments were decent 
individuals from all walks of life. Many were dismayed after-
ward at their own conduct and had to be debriefed to alleviate 
some of the distressed feelings they were experiencing. 
Observing that the research has tended to highlight the 
behavior of moral reasoners at the principled level as com-
pared to the conventional, Krebs and Rosenwaldl deliberately 
executed research that focused exclusively upon examining the 
relationship between behavior and moral structural development 
of the average person at Stages 3 and 4. The subjects were 
volunteers who answered a newspaper ad offering them three 
dollars to participate in a psychological testing experiment • . There were 31 of them from diversified backgrounds. Ages 
ranged from 17-54, with 23 being the mean. It is especially 
important to explicate the procedure in this experiment for 
full appreciation of what took place and the results. The 
subjects assembled in a lecture hall. They were told that the 
time desired for the testing was an hour and a half, but that 
as it turned out they would only have one hour for the hall, 
unexpectedly. Theperson leading the group identified herself 
lDennis Krebs and Ali Rosenwald, "Moral Reasoning and 
Moral Behavior in Conventional Adults," Merrill Palmer Quarterly 
--------:- -23 {-1977}--: 77-87. - - ----------
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as an undergraduate student         was conducting the present 
project for data needed to complete requirements for a course. 
It would be necessary for her to have the test and personality 
questionnaire in her hands within seven days or her grade for 
the course would be endangered. In view of the shortened time 
allotted them, she explaine9 that they would be asked to do 
only part of the required tasks in the lecture hall and that 
they would be issued the necessary materials involved in the 
balance of the tasks. Armed with a self-addressed stamped 
envelope and the questionnaire to take home they were strongly 
urged to return the completed form and mail it back within a 
week. Before leaving they were paid the three dollars, the 
leader emphasizing that she would trust that they would not let 
her down. During the one hour in the lecture hall they took 
·the Kohlberg moral development test and supplied biographical 
data. 
An analysis of the scores on the Kohlberg test indicated 
that 83 percent of the subjects were at the conventional level. 
Altogether, despite the great emphasis on the importance of 
having the questionnaire back on time to avoid jeopardizing the 
leader's grade, 39 percent of the participants did not return 
them within the week. Of that group, 23 percent never returned 
        questionnaires and 16 percent managed to get them in, but 
after the deadline. The completed forms of all Stage 4 and 5 
participants were promptly                   and in the hands of. the 
leader within the time frame requested, with one exception. 
Amongst Stage 3' subjects 40 percent were on time, 33 percent 
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were late, and·27 percent did not return thei.r questionnaires 
at all. There were only 3 Stage 2 subjects in the population. 
One of them returned the questionnaire on time and the other 
two did not return them at all. All of those questionnaires 
that were returned late came from Stage 3 subjects. In brief, 
the higher the stage, the more likely the questionnaires would 
be returned; the lower the stage, the less likely they would 
be returned. 
Utilizing the biographical data that had been obtained 
on the day the subjects were all present in the lecture hall. 
Krebs and Rosenwald were able to rule out such variables as 
education, sex, and social class as having any significant 
bearing. Engaging in what they refer to as a clinical analysis, 
Krebs and Rosenwald concluded that, in fact, it is the moral 
reasoning, as tested by Kohlberg's dilemmas, which governed 
the behavior of the subjects. Their clinical analysis is 
essentially that of noting the logic of correspondence between 
a subject's moral stage and his behavior in the experiment. 
          having received the three dollars and terminating the 
relationship, there was nothing to be gained by bothering to 
return the completed questionnaires, just as there was nothing 
to be lost by not returning them. Since there was no reward 
for sending the forms back and no punishment for failing to do 
so, two of the three instrumental hedonists of Stage 2 did 
not fulfill the contract. There exists the possibility that the 
one who did return the questionnaires might have been at Stage 
----- ------- -4B -actually·; - in- the- -l-ight-of- -Kohlberg' s- r.evised --scoring---system ... ________ _ 
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However, this is not known. 
Krebs and Rosenwald compare·the moral reasoning of their 
Stage 3 subjects to those in Stage 4 in order to account for 
the observed differences in behavior. The central distinguishing 
factor seemed to be that Stage 3 subjects conceived of inter-
personal commitments as depending upon knowing someone· as a 
friend, whereas they did not acknowledge moral obligations to 
strangers. In contrast, the responses in the Koh1berg test 
revealed that the Stage 4 subjects recognized a binding 
commitment in terms of social rules. Adhering to social norms 
is necessary amongst all people if order is to be maintained. 
Although there is reason to believe that Stage 3 subjects are 
susceptible to group pressure, once having left the experi-
mental setting they were no longer exposed to any external 
influences toward conformity. Hence, it is consistent with 
this analysis to discover that out of 15 Stage 3 subjects, a 
total of 9 did not return their questionnaires on time. Of 
those 9, there were 5 who eventually turned them in late, while 
the remaining four never turned them in at all. Krebs and 
Rosenwald interpret the fact that 5 of the 9 did turn the 
questionnaires in late and that no other stage group was 
in the late category, as suggestive of the indecision character-
izing this population when the structural stage of its members 
is tranSlated into behavior. The researchers assume these 
subjects knew it was right to meet the obligations.inherent in 
the informal agreement           they had made, yet they had not 
reached a plane of consistently integrating structure and action. 
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Their emphasis upon personal familiarity and the lack of 
external group pressure mitigate fulfilling obligations that 
they had contracted into. In the absence of ,such mitigating 
factors and in the presence of structural reasoning that honors 
rules and the maintaining of social order, it is not at all 
surprising to find that out of 11 Stage 4 subjects, 10 re-
turned their questionnaires on time. There was 1 subject out 
of the 11 who never returned his questionnaire. None of the 
11 returned the questionnaire late. Of course, the fact that 
the 2 Stage 5 subjects returned their questionnaires and 
did so on time hardly needs commenting upon at this point, 
given the greater adequacy of the principled reasoning which 
characterizes the quality of their moral structure. 
Krebs and Rosenwald believe that it is precisely the 
type of low-pressured situation, with opportunity for re-
flection, which 'they simulated, that affords the soundest 
predictive grounds from Kohlberg's stages. They caution that 
crisis situations entailing impulsive, non-reflective be-
havior would not lend themselves as readily to predictions 
of high reliability. The relationship between moral stage 
and action depends upon time for cognitive-structural mediation. 
The type of situation for which they believe Kohlberg's test 
has the most predictive power is of a more commonplace every-
day variety than those involving emergencies and heroics. 
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Hierarchy and Transition "in Mor:a"l Growth 
Piaget, with a smile passing over his lips, has fre-
quently called the question of whether cognitive development 
can be hastened, "The American Question. 1I He does so because 
whenever he lectures in the United States the inquiry is 
invariably made. The position he has adopted is that given 
a normal amount of environmental opportunity, the child will 
properly interact with his milieu and construct the necessary 
structures for adaptation. Piaget points out that cats reach 
the significant stage 4 in object permanence more quickly than 
the human infant, but unlike the latter it does not continue 
past that stage in the cognitive hierarchy to representational 
thought and the acquisition of language. Therefore, the pace 
of growth may not be nearly as important as the process and 
outcome. The fact remains that only about 50 percent of the 
population appears to acquire fully developed formal operations. 
Even more conservatively, it has been estimated that only from 
10 percent to 20 percent of the population reach the principled 
level of moral reasoning. Although Stage 4 of the conventional 
level is where most people seem to be, it is still a limited 
form of morality from the standpoint of                   Once 
accepting justice as the core of morality, as Kohlberg does, 
then the issue of facilitating movement in the individual" 
through the hierarchy of moral stages can hardly be seen as 
a trivial matter. "Indeed, Kohlberg has engaged in extensive 
programs designed to acclerate moral growth amongst those in 
such diverse institutional settings as public schools and 
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prisons. 
Anyone who has followed this dissertation from the be-
ginning will surely realize that Kohlberg's approach to stim-
ulating advance toward moral maturity will not consist of 
attempting to inclucate character traits such- as· honesty, 
courage, or cooperation. .This would be tantamount to the 
Aristotelian "bag of virtures" method which Kohlberg dismisses 
as antithetical to cognitive-structural theory. Nor would it 
be anticipated that the trainer would simply attempt to teach 
a higher stage to the subject in any mechanistic or content 
oriented fashion. First of all, we know that the individual 
cannot leap over a stage, so clearly the focus is relative in 
that it must be upon the stage one step beyond his present 
predominant stage. Equally significant, is that the in-
dividual, interacting with the environment, must construct for 
himself the qualitative advance inherent in what is for him 
the next stage. He cannot be taught the stage by someone 
simply transmitting information about it to him. The equi-
librati·on model proffered by Piaget to explain cognitive 
development generally, also has great utility when applied 
to explaining moral stage advance. The dynamic of the model 
may be harnessed and consciously channeled into a social or 
experimental setting to facilitate moral growth. Turiel, in 
an excellent resource on stage transition, has stated suc-
cinctly: 
There are two interrelated aspects to the principle 
of equilibration. The first refers to equilibrium -_ ... _-----------_. __ ... - -_. - -- ------------- ---_._- -.------.-- ---- - -------
within structures that form coherent wholes: 
stages are defined as organized ways of 
thinking and relating to events. The second 
refers to equilibrium in the interaction of 
the indiv·idual with the environment. Stages 
in a developmental sequence are, then, suc-
cessive levels of equilibrium in two respects. 
First, each stage is a more equilibrated form 
than the previous ones (e. g. there is more 
internal consistency). Second, each stage 
represents a more equilibrated means of inter-
acting with the environment. That is, each new 
stage is a more adequate way of understanding 
moral problems and resolving conflicts en-
countered. l 
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Central to moving from one stage to the next is the 
experiencing of conflict induced by encountering events that 
one's present stage of development cannot adequately encompass 
or resolve. The very organization of the milieu one is in may 
be more or less conducive to inducing the disequilibrium 
necessary for growth. For example, a youth who moves away 
from horne to attend college, may be leaving behind an orderly 
and stable intellectual existence which he had been experiencing 
in a community of rarely challenged homogenous values. Upon 
stepping onto the college campus he finds himself surrounded 
by a diversity of viewpoints and backgrounds. Chalienge and 
skepticism become the order of the day. Only the most rigid 
and insulated of students could escape the inevitable conflict 
and accompanying development. It is perhaps too often overlooked 
that the primary contribution of college is not the imparting 
lElliot Turiel, II Stage Transition in Moral Development," 
in Second Handbook of Research in                     ed. R. Travers 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), p. 737. 
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of information, but the promotion of an equilibrating process 
that cuts across all disciplines bringing the student forward 
to a new perspective for understanding and functioning within 
his sociomoral world. It is in this sense, of undergoing 
genuine d"ev"eloprnent, that on-e tru"ly--c"anno"t go "home" -again, to 
borrow a phrase from Thomas Wolfe. In one of his frequent and 
more philosophical moods, Kohlberg has commented upon the 
role of conflict thusly: 
The first stage in teaching virtue, then, 
is the Socratic step of creating dissatis-
faction in the student about his present 
knowledge of the good. This we do ex-
perimentally by exposing the student to 
moral conflict situations for which his 
principles have" no ready solution. 
Second, we expose him to disagreement 
and argument about these situations with 
his peers. Our Platonic view holds that 
if we inspire cognitive conflict in the 
student and point the way to the next 
step up the divided line, he will tend 
to sie things previously invisible to 
him. 
Turiel2 has taken the lead in explicating and researching 
the area of stage transition through cognitive conflict in the 
field of sociomoral knowledge. Based upon cognitive-develop-
mental theory, Turiel tested two hypotheses. The first was that 
subjects would manifest greater change in stage status upon 
having been exposed to reasoning that is one stage above their 
dominant stage than would other subjects who had been exposed 
lLawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern 
Statement of the Platonic View," in Moral Education, ed. T. 
Sizer (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1970), p. 82. 
2Elliot Turiel, "An Experiment Test of the Sequentiality -------"- of D-evelopmen-t:al" St"ages- ill the                                                         -------"-"--
223 
to reasoning that was two st.ages above their dominant stage. 
The rationale was that, given the invariant sequence hypo-
thesis of Kohlberg, the assimilation of new moral concepts 
would be limited by the subjects' present stage. The second 
hypothesis tested by Turiel was that subjects "exposed to one 
stage above their present one would exhibit more stage gain 
than those exposed to stage reasoning that was one below their 
present stage. Turiel assumed that since a stage displaces 
the preceding ones by reorganizing them into a more complex 
structure, it would be likely that the individual exposed to 
reasoning at one stage below his present stage would reject the 
lower mode of reasoning. The design of the experiment con-
ducted to test these hypotheses involved a population of 44 
seventh grade boys, ages 12 and 13, chosen randomly from school 
files. They were divided into four groups. One was exposed 
to stage reasoning one above (+1) their current dominant stage, 
a second to reasoning two above (+2) their dominant stage, and 
a third to reasoning one stage below (-1) their dominant 
stage. A fourth group served as the control. Kohlberg's moral 
judgment interview was the instrument used to determine dominant 
stage in a pretest and in a posttest to assess what gains, if 
any, had been made. 
The method entailed a role playing procedure which re-
quired the subject to assume the role of the main character 
in the story. He was asked to approach two friends in search 
Journal o"f Personality and Social Psychology 3 (1966): 611-18. 
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of advice on how to resolve the moral dilemma he was faced with. 
The experimenter simulated the role of both friends. He pre-
sented the subject with two opposing solutions each at the 
same level of reasoning and at the relative stage appropriate 
to the particular subject in the experiment. For example, 
a Stage 2 subject playing the role of Heinz would seek advice 
whether to steal the drug to save his wife's life or not. 
If he had been assigned to the +1 group, then the experimenter 
would present two arguments, one in favor of stealing the drug 
at Stage 3 and one against stealing at Stage 3. The subjects 
who were chosen to participate in the experiment were at Stages 
2, 3, and 4. The experimental design permitted deriving two 
sets of results, one was direct and the other indirect. The 
former used the same test material in the posttest as had been 
used in the experiment itself. The latter used the same 
material in the posttest as had been used in the pretest, but 
had not been used in the experiment. Turie1's hypotheses were 
confirmed. Results pertaining to the direct influence were 
most compelling. Those subjects exposed to +2 showed no in-
fluence. Subjects exposed to +1 demonstrated a significant 
increase. in their use of the stage one above what had been 
their dominant stage. Subjects exposed to -1 did exhibit 
some influence from this exposure, but their posttest use of 
one stage below what had been identified as their dominant 
stage was not nearly as significant as exposure to +1 had been 
for those in that group. Analysis of indirect influence re-
_yea.1eg trends j.l1 _.the_         __ d;i.!,e9t.i9n, . bout                                   _o!          _______    _____ _ 
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evidence was not as significant as in the analysis of direct 
influence. Turiel concludes that the results call for a 
rejection of the notion that the gains could be accounted 
for merely by the subjects having memorized the advice offered 
them at a different stage, as this explanation would not 
account .for the differential aspect of the findings. The in-
direct influence, although weaker than the direct, does sug-
gest some generalization. The fact that                   to +2 had 
no effect, whereas exposure to +1 had a significant effect, is 
taken as evidence in support of Kohlberg's theory of the in-
variant sequence followed in progressing through moral stages. 
The ease of assimilating concepts one stage above one's do-
minant stage and the inability to comprehend reasoning two 
stages above is exactly what one would predict. The insigni-
ficant, but apparent, use of some -1 reasoning by the group 
exposed to one stage below the dominant stage indicates that 
lower stages are comprehended, but not especially influential. 
Turiel goes 'on to suggest that cognitive conflict may be 
the dynamic which produces transition to a significant use of 
reasoning.·at one stage above the dominant stage. The structural 
shift occurs as a result 'of the conflict inducing disequilibrium, 
which sets in motion an equilibrating process that eventuates 
in a new and'more adequate equilibrium. The subjects in the 
experiment, he comments, were not supplied univocal answers 
to resolve the moral dilemmas. Instead they were offered two 
contradictory alternatives, both at the same level of moral 
reasoning, however. The task of resolution remained with the 
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subjects. Turiel suggests that when confronted with the con-
tradictory options the subjects may have entered a state of 
cognitive conflict upon contemplating them. The ensuing 
disequilibrium then resulted in structural development that 
integrated preceding stages and achieved a higher level of 
equilibrium. Because +2 arguments could not be comprehended 
they did not stimulate conflict. Arguments at -1 did not pre-
cipitate conflict because their comparative simplicity was 
recognized as less adequate than the stage the subject was 
at currently.· It was for those subjects presented with argu-
ments one stage above their dominant stage that the procedure 
held the most meaning, hence producing conflict as they grappled 
with the concepts involved. This observation highlights, once 
again, the significant phenomenological aspect of Kohlberg's 
work. 
Turiel l raises the question of how it is that a child 
can grasp the contradiction inherent in opposing arguments 
that are even only one stage above his own. If, by definition, 
he is not yet at the next stage then why is reasoning at that 
stage not also incomprehensible, just as is the case for stages 
two or more above the present stage. Cognitive-developmental 
psychology is rescued from this problem by the reality of 
stage mixture. Turiel rejects the notion of discrete homogeneous 
lElliot Turiel, "Developmental Processes in the Child's 
Moral Thinking," in Trends and Issues in Developmental Psy-
chology, ed. P. H. Mussen, J. Langer, and M. Covington (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 92-133. 
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stages sharply demarcated from adjacent               with develop-
ment consisting of a sudden leap out of one stage and into the 
next. Functioning exclusively at one stage would preclude the 
possibility of apprehending the contradictions inherent in 
incompatible argeements one stage above. It follows that where 
there is ·a                       low mixture of the dominant stage and 
some amount of the next stage, development will be. slow. The 
presence of a higher mixture facilitates development as those 
elements that are already present from the next stage will 
facilitate the child's capacity to perceive the contradiction 
in opposing solutions one stage above his dominant stage. The 
recognition of the conflict then energizes the equilibrating 
process toward structural reorganization. Bearing in mind the 
crucial role of stage mixture, it is worth noting Turiel's in-
cisive conunent that, IIChange occurs when perceived conceptual 
contradictions energize attempts to restructure by exploring 
the organizational properties of the higher mode of thought. 1I1 
Following this we find the key to perceiving the contradiction 
in Turiel's statement: 
A child who functioned at only one stage would 
experience relatively little conflict, as it 
would be difficult for him to perceive contra-
dictions in the external environment. The 
child whose functioning is mainly on one stage, 
but who uses other stages as well,'will more 
readily perceive contradictions and thus ex-
perience conflict more frequently •••• Stage mix-
ture serves to facilitate the perception of 
lIbid., P. 127 
contradictions, making the individual more 
susceptible to disequilibrium and conseq-
uently more likely to progress develop-
mentally.l 
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A deepening appreciation of moral stages and their transi-
tions may be acquired through familiarity with the work of 
2 Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg and the subsequent contribution of 
Rest,3 which builds upon the former. The first of these two 
studies was an attempt to duplicate, through a different 
design, the findings of Turiel cited above and to further seek 
explanatory factors. 
The essential difference in the design and the experiment 
conducted by Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg was that after being 
presented with a moral dilemma the subjects were provided with 
six statements giving advice for resolution. The advice was 
one stage below, one above, and two above the subjects' own 
dominant stage. At each of the three stages there           two 
opposing pieces of advice. The subjects were initially scored 
at a given stage ranging one through four. Subjects at Stage 
one were given advice at their own stage in lieu of advice one 
IIbid., pp. 129-30. 
2James Rest, Elliot Turiel, & Lawrence Kohlberg, "Level of 
Moral Development As a Determinant of Preference and Comprehension 
of Moral Judgments Made by Others," Journal of Persona'lity 37 (1969); 
225-252. 
3James Rest, "The Hierarchical Nature of Moral Judgment: A 
Study of Patterns of Comprehension and Preference of Moral Stages," 
(Unpublished paper, Cambridge: Center for Moral Education, Har-
vard University). ' 
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stage below, which would not have been possible. The subjects 
ranged in age from 10 to 14 with an average I.Q. score of 119, 
the lowest being 95 and the highest 150. Rather than being 
exposed to opposing arguments at only one stage, these subjects 
were exposed to the full gamut of advice covering three stages. 
The advice was contained in a booklet and was hypothetically 
being offered by a variety of ·friends. The subjects were then 
asked a series of questions such as who gave the best advice 
and who gave the worst. Other inquiries sought to determine 
which of the friends was thought .to be the "smartest" and which 
the "most good" on the basis of the advice. Each response was 
probed to elicit the reasons behind it', which generally' brought 
forth a restatement of the advice that could be scored by        
gree of comprehension. The subjects were also asked to formulate 
a version of their own advice. 
The findings reflected a consistently significant trend 
toward selecting statements at higher stages as containing pre-
ferred modes of thought and a correspondingly significant ten-
dency to prefer least the advice at the lower stage. Compre-
hension of the stages decreased, however, in going from lower 
to higher. Subjects were asked, in effect; 'to recapitulate 
the stage of their preference. Those who selected one stage 
below their own comprehended it most frequently. Subjects 
voicing a preference for one stage above exhibited a moderate 
frequency of comprehension by comparison'. Lastly, those who 
preferred advice at two stages above their own were the least 
frequently correct in their comprehension of the advice. There 
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was a marked tendency, when incorrectly recapitulating the 
advice, to assimilate it at the subjects' own stage or one, 
stage below. In instances where 'the advice was disliked, the 
tendency was to distort it by assimilation specifically to one 
stage below the subjects' own stage. Further analysis com-
pared the subjects' own construction of advice to their pre-
test scores, after exposure to the friends' advice. The re-
sult confirmed Turiel's finding that there is a significant 
increase in correct usage qf responses at one stage above the 
subjects' dominant stage, whereas two stages above had no in-
fluence and one stage below only slight influence. The ex-
planation offered suggests that +1 over -1 is based on pre-
ference, since -1 is well comprehended, but not preferred. 
Regarding +1 over +2, it is speculated that comprehension is 
the critical factor, since +2 is not well comprehended, but 
both +1 and +2 are preferred. Rest et al. emphasize that lower 
level stage reasoning is rejected on structural grounds in that 
the rejecting subjects' comprehend its qualitative character, 
but still do not prefer it. Contrary to this whenever higher-
level advise is rejected the grounds are not structural. In 
other words, there was never evidence that a subject genuinely 
comprehended higher stage advice and then rejected it. When 
higher advice was rejected, an examination always revealed an 
other than structural basis. For example, the subjects re-
jecting +2 advice very frequently had distorted it to the point 
that they had understood it as being -1, which interpretation 
-served--a-s-the--basis-for--the-rej-ect-ion-. - - I,t- was-- also-found -tha t-----------
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liking +2 was often based upon misinterpreting it at the sub-
jects' own· stage level or one above, especially when the content 
agreed with what the child's own belief dictated. In such a 
case, for example, a Stage 2 child who believed the ·drug should 
not be stolen (content), might have a tendency to prefer Stage 
4 advice not to steal the drug. However, it is revealed upon 
examination that this child does not comprehend the Stage 4 
reasoning, but i.nstead interprets (distorts) . it as being at 
Stage 2 or 3 reasoning. There are aspects of the rhetoric 
of Stage 4 that promote preference for it, but the actual 
limi tations of the S.tage 2 child's development simply does not 
permit true structural comprehension. 
Restl in                         further upon findings on the 
hierarchical nature of stage development, maintains that a 
subject providing evidence of comprehending a stage generally 
manifests a comprehension of previous stages. Significantly, 
about half of all subjects studied exhibit comprehension of a 
stage that is one stage above their own predominant stage as 
revealed in a pretest. The best predictor of understanding a 
stage beyond one's predominant stage is the amount of spontaneous 
usage of a stage beyond the predominant one that the subject is 
observed                         In other words, when scoring a subject for 
moral stage, it was recognized that in addition to the spontaneous 
products of the predominant stage to which they were assigned, 
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approximately half of the subjects displayed 20 percent 
spontaneous usage of higher stages. Of that group, as many 
as 84 percent understood those stages above their predominant 
one, which they had used spontaneously. There was a marked 
difference of only 30 percent, who did not show any spontaneous 
stage use above the predominant one, providing evidence of 
comprehending any stages higher than the predominant stage. 
Reflecting upon the distinction between spontaneous usage of 
a stage and comprehension of a stage based on advice presented 
to a subject, Rest points out that the former involves a more 
mature skill. In spontaneous usage the subject does not merely 
respond to a formulation that already embodies moral reasoning, 
but instead he must construct and organize the reasoning on 
his own. Therefore, subjects showing substantial usage of a 
higher stage than their predominant one may well be expected 
to comprehend all stages that they are capable of utilizing 
spontaneously. Rest's empirical observations lend credence to 
Turiel's advocacy of stage mixture as critical to undergoing 
transition in the stage hierarchy. The spontaneous usage of 
a stage other than the assigned one is generally that of one 
higher than that which predominates. Hence, when a subject 
comprehends a stage higher than his predominant one, it will 
usually be the stage one above. Furthermore, it is those 
subjects who demonstrate comprehension of one stage above 
their predominant one who are the most likely to show a de-
cisive shift in the posttest toward increased thinking at one 
stage higher. Thus, spontaneous usage is predictive of com-
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prehension, which is predictive of assimilation. Rest uses 
the term assimilation in this context to refer to accurate 
increase in thinking at the next higher stage above the pre-
dominant one upon being exposed to the experimental condition. 
Lastly, the highest stage comprehended is most likely to be 
the one preferred from amongst all those stages that are com-
prehended. Genuine understanding of the structural components 
of a stage is likely to compel the subject to embrace it as 
preferable. There was not a tendency to prefer one's own pre-
dominant stage. However, Rest maintains that his findings in-
dicate that irrespective of comprehension and spontaneous 
production of a stage, subjects tended to prefer the higher 
stages. Stage 6 is preferred the most, Stage 5 next and so on 
in that order. While it is clear that subjects would prefer 
the highest stage comprehended over all lower stages, which are 
also comprehended, it is not clear why subjects would prefer 
higher stages not comprehended and ·to do so with a diminishing 
degree of preference in order, starting with Stage 6 as most 
preferred. Rest speculates upon this phenomenon, offering 
several possible explanations, but seems to favor a Platonic 
doctrine of intuitive---recognition of the truly just, -despite 
an absence of ability to either spontaneously articulate or 
comprehend it. As Kohlberg has stated elsewhere in reflecting 
Plato's ideas: 
The kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue 
is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal 
form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance 
of conventional beliefs. 
(A paragraph omitted here) 
The reason the good can be taught is 
because we know it all along dimly or 
at a low level and its teaching is more 
a calling out than an instruction. 
The reason we think the good cannot be 
taught is because the same good is known 
differently at different levels and direct 
instruction cannot take place across levels. 
Then the teaching of virtue is the asking of 
questions and the pointing of the way, not the 
giving of answers. Moral education is the 
leading of men upward, not the putting into 
the mind of knowledge that was not there 
before. 1 
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The preceding statements provide a smooth transition into 
a discussion of Kohlberg's considerable efforts at utilizing 
the findings on hierarchical stage development in the field of 
moral education. Kohlberg has frequently acknowledged a great 
debt to John Dewey, the American philosopher of pragmatism or 
instrumentalism, for influencing his thoughts on moral develop-
ment and education. Before proceeding further, a brief sketch 
of Dewey's influence would be appropriate. Dewey (1859-1952) 
was profoundly interested in the connection between science and 
values. He rejected the bifurcation proposed by those who 
held that values had no place in the matrix of scientific be-
liefs. He has stated, in thoughts that may reveal some of his 
strong appeal for Kohlberg, the following: 
The problem of restoring integration and coop-
eration between man's beliefs about the world 
in which he lives and his beliefs about values 
lLawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern 
Statement of the Platonic View," in Moral Education, ed. 
T. Sizer (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1970), p. 58. 
and purposes that should direct his condqct 
is the deepest problem of modern life. It 
is the problem of any                       that is 
not isolated from life. 
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In another incisive comment, alluding to the concern between 
thought and action, Dewey formulates the following: 
A moral situation is one in which judgment 
and choice are required antecedently to overt 
action. The practical meaning of the situation--
that is to say the action needed to satisfy it--
is not self-evident. It has to be searched for. 
There are conflicting desires and alternative 
apparent goods. What is needed is to find the 
right course of action, the right good. Hence 2 
inquiry is exacted ••. This inquiry is intelligence ••• 
Dewey placed great faith in the educational system as the 
avenue through which moral education should take place. He 
advocated a democratic milieu with emphasis upon persuasion, 
reason, interaction, and in brief, the process as the essential 
ingredient for growth, a desirable end in itself. For Dewey, 
moral principles were not etherial and inert abstractions that 
existed in a realm remote from everyday life. Although real, 
they had meaning for him only insofar as they infused the lives 
of individuals embracing them in a community context. Applied 
to the school curriculum, geography, for example, was not to 
be taught simply           __ body of facts about the earth, but in a 
way that organized and related those facts to human, va1ue-
laden concerns. Dewey's view, echoed in Koh1berg's position 
1 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Minton, 
Balch & Co.; 1930), p. 255. 
2John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: 
Menton Books, 1950), p. 163-64. 
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today, is that if the school is to prepare one for properly 
living in a democratic, social, and moral manner upon gra-
duation, then it must recreate the conditions necessary for 
such a life. It cannot reasonably expect to subject children 
and adolescents to twelve years of authoritarian rule in a 
morally sterile context and then set them free to lead their 
lives as committed adults participating in the democratic pro-
cess. Dewey sees                     as development and Kohlberg seizes 
upon this to assert with some congency that, therefore, once 
one knows what development actually is, he then has a load-
stone to help construct a definition of what it ought to be. 
For Dewey and Kohlberg experience is intrinsic to development. 
It is the responsibility of the schools to provide those ex-
periences which will stimulate development upward through the 
stages in the hierarchy toward more adequate functioning. 
Kohlberg is adamant in rejecting any suggestion that the schools 
should teach children conformity to conventional rules and 
authoritative pronouncements, as their primary goal of moral 
education. He is equally assertive in challenging the prevalent 
philosophical posture of engendering an acceptance of ethical 
relativity amongst children. He has taken pains to expose the 
"hidden curriculum" in schools, making it clear that if not 
I 
explicit, then values will be implicit in the child's school 
experience. Lastly, as has been alluded to previously, the 
"bag of virtues" approach, still popular today and promulgated 
by no less an ancient sage than Aristotle, is roundly rejected 
by Kohlberg. The proper role of the school is to               that 
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milieu which will stimulate cognitive and moral development 
as far along the universal stage hierarchy as possible for each 
student. It is not simply because later stages come after 
earlier stages that Kohlberg pronounces them better. They 
constitute a proper aim for moral education because: 
What is most properly called development is 
a movement toward greater adaptation,            
erentiation, and integration. Each stage 
is a more differentiated, comprehensive, 
and integrated or equilibrated structure than 
its predecessor, and the fundamental cause 
of movement from one stage to the next is 
that a later stage is better, more adequate in some universal sense, than an earlier 
s..tage ••.• My psychological theory for ex-
plaining why children move from one moral 
stage to the next is built upon a 
philosophic or ethical theory in which each 
higher stage is morally and logically more 
adequate than the one below. l 
The above statement by Kohlberg is the most direct and suc-
cinct formulation that one will find in his voluminous writings 
to support, on theoretical grounds, his position on why 
higher stages are better and why, there·fore, their attainment 
should be the aim of education. He is unrelenting in his 
conviction that moral education as he conceives it is not, even 
remotely, to be equated with indoctrination. The emphasis is 
lLawrence Kohlberg, "The Concepts of Developmental ' 
Psychology As the Central Guide to Education: Examples from' 
Cognitive, Moral, and Psychological Education" in Proceedings 
of the Conference on psychology and the Process of Schooling 
in the Next Decade: Alternative Conceptions, ed. M. C. Reynolds 
(Leadership Training Institute, sponsored by Bureau for Edu-
cational Personnel Development, U. S. Office of Education.), 
p.        
238 
upon the form of moral reasoning and not upon content or 
telling the child what to believe. The mode of education he 
is advocating does not single out any particular religious 
or sociopolitical ideology. 
Koh1berg has been engaged in direct intervention within 
school systems on an experimental basis. On a micro level he 
has been instrumental in activities involving classroom dis-
cussions designed to facilitate development of the discussants. 
The method is to present hypothetical moral dilemmas with the 
leader introducing.arguments one stage above the stage of the 
students whose stage is lowest in the class. The premise is 
that for those students the discussion induces dissatisfaction 
with their own resolutions. An ensuing cognitive dissonance 
promotes the disequilibrium that engenders a reorganization and 
restructuring at the next highest stage. As the discussions 
proceed and lower stage students move upward, the leader in-
creases the stage level of his arguments. On a macro level, 
Koh1berg has designed alternative schools which have heightened 
the engagement of students in participatory democracy, increasing 
role-taking opportunities in the process. Emphasis is upon dis-
cussions and decision-making around issues vital to the students, 
such as drugs, from the standpoint of morality and fairness. 
Kohlberg has been critical of the schools' moral climate, which 
he contests too often is based upon Stage 1, obedience and 
punishment orientation, and Stage 4, law and order orientation. 
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Logic and Moral Jud"gme"nt " 
Kohlberg has made it clear that he does not view moral 
judgment as merely the application of logic to the moral domain. 
The justice structure that is constructed and reconstructed 
\ 
throughout development has an essential nature of its own that 
makes it separable from the purely logical. However, moral 
judgment at any given stage has a structural quality parallel 
to and dependent upon the structure of cognition at corresponding 
periods of development. Cognitive development, therefore, places 
constraints upon the range of one's moral judgment and is con-
sidered to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for it. 
There appear to be two major critical points in the influence 
brought to bear by cognitive transformations upon moral develop-
mente The first is the presence of concrete operations which 
promotes moral judgment at Stage 2. Prior to the emergence of 
the concrete operational period, the child's moral judgment is 
not likely to exceed the punishment and obedience orientation 
of Stage 1. The second critical development is the emergence 
of formal operations necessary for the social contract orientation 
of Stage 5. Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, Haanl maintain that subjects 
who display some -principled inoral reasoning-,-but "are---at an in-
cipient phase of emerging formal operations, are still found to 
be predominantly at Stage 4. The early emergence of formal 
lDeanna Kuhn et al., "The Development of Formal Operations 
in Logical and Moral Judgment," Genetic Psychology Monographs 95 
(1977): 97-188. (The research reported by Kuhn et al. in this 
article was completed in 1971.) 
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operational thought, they have found, is necessary for the 
consolidation of a pure Stage 4 development. However, some 
conventional moral reasoning exists without the presence of 
formal operations. Concrete operational subjects never de-
monstrate moral judgment responses that exceeded Stage 4. Most 
subjects at the concrete operational period or lower exhibit 
moral reasoning that is predominantly Stage 3 or below. Com-
pletely or predominantly moral thinking at the principled level 
does not become consolidated until the later stages of formal 
operations have appeared. Kuhn et ale believe that paramount 
to their findings was the observed decal age between purely 
cognitive and moral spheres. In one sample only 21 percent 
evidenced some principled thought out of 85 percent who showed 
some formal operational thought. In a second group there was 
evidence of 9 percent demonstrating some principled thought 
out of a total of 80 percent who demonstrated some formal opera-
tions. In general, substantial moral growth occurred during 
the earlier stages of development. Once subjects reach the 
conventional level, advance in moral judgment is found with 
diminished frequency. Thus, it seems that logical structural 
development progresses further than does moral maturity in 
t K 1 , 'f t d' th b' t d mos cases. easey 1n a reV1ew 0 s u 1es on e su Jec un er 
discussion, reached the conclusion that the evidence supports 
lCharles B. Keasey, IIImplications of Cognitive Development 
for Moral Reasoning,1I in Moral Development: Current Theory and 
Research, ed. D. J. DePalma & J. M. Foley (New York: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1975), pp. 39-56. 
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adopting the position on cognitive development as a necessary 
condition for moral development and that the former facilitates 
the emergence of the latter, although is not sufficient to 
fully account for it. 
Kuhn et al. 1 attempted to fill in the gap between formal 
operations and principled moral judgment. To accomplish this 
they focused upon those of their adult and adolescent subjects 
who were predominantly formal operational, with the aim of 
comparing those who had achieved principled moral judgment to 
those who had not. Their strategy was to identify the presence 
or absence of two additional variables. These were social order 
concepts and moral comprehension. In a commentary upon the 
former, they state: 
We are interested ••• in when an S makes the 
transition from a conception of the social 
order in which societal regulation is main-
tained for its own sake, to a conception 
of the social order in which societal 
regulation has as its purpose the protection 
of individual welfare and rights. Our pur-
pose ••• was to investigate this transition 
in conception of the social order itself, 
as distinguished from the transition in moral 
judgment we think it generates. 2 
The critical transition being referred to, of course, is from 
Stage 4 to Stage 5. Social order concepts are viewed as being 
more immediately linked to logical operations"." Moral compre-
hension is seen as more directly connected to moral judgment. 
I Kuhn, pp. 97-1"88. 
2Ibid ., p. 170. 
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Since moral judgments presented to subjects can be comprehended 
before the subjects can spontaneously express them, it is as-
sumed that competence at comprehension would be a necessary 
element in a continuum of elements, which would precede sponta-
neous moral judgment. The proposed order of elements in the 
continuum is as follows: logical operations, social order con-
cepts, moral comprehension, spontaneous moral judgment. The 
expectation in this formulation is that whenever the presence of 
a later element is identified, the preceding elements would also 
always be present. However, identification of a given element, 
would not automatically assure that those which follow are pre-
sent. Kuhn et al. conclude from this portion of their study that 
the evidence is suggestive of such a continuum, but urge that 
further research is necessary for elaboration and confirmation. 
At the risk of confusion, but in the hope of avoiding over-
simplification, it must not be thought that the influence of 
one mental structure upon another is always unidirectional. 
Kuhn et al. point out that each mental structnre functions within 
two domains. It interacts with the structure of the environment, 
but also it interacts internally with other mental structures. 
As has been commented upon in previous sections, when interaction 
produces feedback that is discrepant with the initiating mental 
structure, then a disequilibrium is induced and is resolved by 
structures reorganizing at a higher level. Reflecting the re-
verberating complexities that can occur in the course of develop-
ment, Kuhn et ale explicate the following: 
An interaction between a given mental structure 
and the environment ••• may stimulate a reorgani-
zation in the internal relationship 
or coordination of this structure and 
other related structures. This reorgani-
zation in turn may generate internal dis-
equilibrium which leads to further inter-
actions with the environment, involving 
both the original and related structures • 
••• Mental operations, in the purely logical 
domain should influence operations in more 
peripheral domains more so than the reverse. 
This influence, however, is not strictly uni-
lateral; cognitive operations are only 
adequately described as a network of inter-
"active and coregu1ative structures. 1 
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Thus, Kuhn et al. suggest that despite the ordered sequence they 
tentatively put forth to explain the development of moral judg-
ment, there probably occurs a bidirectional interplay amongst 
the various domains of the mental structures. 
The study by Kuhn et al. is a most ambitious one. They 
utilized two samples, one comprised of 265 adults and adoles-
cents, the other of 75 youngsters from 10 to 12 ye'"ars of age. 
The pre-adolescents were involved in a short term longitudinal 
study spanning a nine month period. Cognitive development was 
assessed through testing with three Piagetian tasks. These 
were the pendulum problem, a correlation situation involving a 
set of cards, and the chemicals problem requiring combinatorial 
analysis. Moral--juagment "was"" determi-ned "by-u-se - o-f- the--Kohlberg 
interview. It is worth noting that amongst adults in the 
sample 15 percent failed to demonstrate any formal operational 
thought. There were 30 percent who had crystalized their 
lIbid., p. 178. 
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cognitive competence at the formal operational period. The 
majority, 55 percent, were in a transitional state between 
concrete and formal operations. 
Emphasis in the Kahn et al. study was upon the qualitative 
correspondence between logical and moral domains and not upon 
mere correlational discoveries. They explored the increasing 
differentiation between what "is" and what "ought" to be, the 
full blooming of which becomes possible upon the consolidation 
of the formal operational thought structures. The Stage 4 
moral reasoner in emphasizing the maintenance of laws is 
fusing the factual character of laws with what ought to be. 
He has not yet achieved the formal operational thinkers re-
cognition that what is, is merely one subset of a range covering 
the gamut of what is possible. He is more' advanced, however, 
than those at earlier stages for at least in the face of law 
violations, the law does stand as that which ought to have 
been followed rather than the fact of the transgressors be-
havior. Once formal operations become firmly established there 
is an essential reversal in that the thinker grasps that reality 
is one possibility amongst many. The law need not be maintained 
as it is and new laws may be formed guided by one's vision of 
what ought to be. The capacity for second order operations of 
the final period of cognitive development facilitates the in-
dividual's progression in his judgment making capacity. As 
Kuhn et al. state: 
Initially the S only makes judgments of fact, 
what is. He then becomes capable of making 
judgments about the fact: i.e. norms or rules 
applying to fact. Only at the most 
advanced level does he become capable 
of second-order operations: operations 
on operations, or judgments about judg-
ments. l 
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In other words, there is a structural isomorphism between the 
secondary-order logical operations which constitute a central 
                of the forma,l operational period and the                      
level individual's new found competence at making second-order 
moral judgments. A final differentiation must occur at the 
principled level. Even though the Stage 5 moral reasoner has 
shifted from a law maintaining to a law creating creature, 
Kuhn et ale stress that the moral oughts are still not fully 
universalized as they are locked into the procedural mechanism 
which is the hallmark of the social contract orientation. 
When this final differentiation is made, then the individual 
is completely autonomous in choosing a priori universal oughts 
based upon natural rights. These are rights which, Kuhn et al. 
assert: 
••. can be phrased in terms of liberty, 
euality, and reciprocity or simply in 
terms of the concept of the equal worth 
of all human beings as ends in themselves, 
rather than means. 2 
. - - -- -- - - . - . The Kohlbergian autonomous individual is rare, but he does 
exist. To achieve that autonomy, however, he must first undergo 
a cognitive transformation. Grounded in the power of formal 
operational thought, he soars to the highest moral principles. 
lIbid., p. l4la 






METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL CRITIQUE 
The work of Kohlberg has been criticized by both enemies 
who seek to deliver mortal blows and by friends who aim to 
effect improvement. In the case of the former, attack is 
usually leveled against the heart of the theory. Propositions 
bearing upon the invariance of stage sequence, the hierarchical 
nature of the stages, and their universality are challenged. 
In more friendly quarters, methodological shortcomings are cited 
and accompanied by recommendations. The limitations of the 
theory with its deemphasis upon affect and habit, traditional 
components of moral psychology, are highlighted as the congenial 
critic generally urges movement in the direction of integrating 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral elements. Inquiries are 
made about the extent to which Kohlberg has abandoned the 
scientific foundation of his work in favor of philosophical 
speculations which have led him to advocate an impossible ideal 
that may be more                               of his                         _ j;lJan the                      
truth he claims it to be. Although published articles by Kohl-
berg and his collaborators are voluminous, a published volume 
by him devoted exclusively to his theory and research findings 
has not yet been made available. Nevertheless, over the last 
several years he has been listing two forthcoming books l in his 
1 Lawrence Kohlberg, ed. Recent Research in Moral Develop-
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bibliographies. In personal communication with the Harvard 
Center for Moral Education, I have been informed over the 
summer of 1978 that a three volume work edited by Kohlberg is 
expected to be published within                             one year. In 
view of the impact and scope of Kohlberg's achievement, the 
lack of such a publication has represented a serious deficiency. 
Hopefully the remediation of it will put an end to the prolonged 
practice by Kohlberg of constantly suggesting that the publi-
cation of books, which never materializes, is imminent. 
An extensive theoretical exposition encompassing the 
sophistication and complexity of Kohlberg's work, as well as 
abundant citation of its empirical moorings, appears in the 
preceding chapters. Therefore, I shall not attempt here to 
marshal a defense of his unquestionably significant and far-
reaching efforts. Instead, an endeavor will be made to main-
tain fidelity to the critical sources which have attempted to 
cast a spotlight upon possible weaknesses in Kohlberg's system. 
Peters l has taken issue with Kohlberg for staunchly main-
taining a monolithic position to the exclusion of other schools 
of thought which have traditionally contributed to moral 
ment (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, in preparation); 
Lawrence Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel, Moralization: A Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart & Winston, in preparation). 
I R. S. Peters, "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism," 
in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. T. Misihel (New 
York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 237-67. 
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psychology. The form of justice, so narrowly constricting 
Kohlberg's conception of morality, implies other values which 
are never considered within the system. To determine what is 
just on a substantive issue necessitates introducing other 
criteria which in themselves could assume greater priority in 
an alternate moral system. Peters speaks specifically of 
attempting to determine what might be a just wage, which entails 
considering factors such as need, contribution to community, and 
risk involved. These veer in the direction of content over 
form, Peters                   and to that extent, Kohlberg's system must 
move toward being prescriptive. Remaining with an emphasis 
upon form over content and avoiding this horn of the dilemma 
places Kohlberg on the other horn of being too formal to guide 
moral educators or ethical agents in everyday life. In ex-
tending further his comments on the distinction between form and 
content, Peters agrees that Kohlberg is correct in maintaining 
that a form of cognitive stimulation or Socratic dialectic is 
'necessary for generating principles in the learner. However, 
he goes on to emphasize that there is a place for teaching in 
the area of content, as well, and this would rely upon the direct 
showing and telling, o,f the teacher, which-Koh:lberg -seems to be-
little. 
Peters insists that certain essential trait-like charac-
teristics must be accounted for in a fashion that is different 
than         the development of justice principle,s are accounted 
for. Concern for others is vital to moral character and yet 
this precedes conceptions of justice in very young children, 
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even though this concern may later be ordered along the lines 
of justice. He distinguishes a category of traits which, 
unlike honesty, is content free and necessary if the will to 
abide by one's principles is to be present. This category 
encompasses such traits as courage, integrity, determination, 
consistency, and persistence. Devoid of these elements of 
will, the most principled moral thinker would be sterile as 
an ethical agent in his encounter within the real world. 
Peters outlines a hierarchy of traits ranging from those that 
are rooted to specific acts, such as punctuality, to the higher 
order traits identified above, which are not linked to specific 
acts. Implied in all of them, however, are principies. 
Punctuality may be a mechanically learned trait, but implied by 
it as an objectively desirable act, it could be argued, is a 
consideration for the rights and feelings of other people. 
Peters is of the opinion that in maintaining a sharp dichotomy 
between principles and traits, Kohlberg has exaggerated the 
difference and created an artifical distinction. In any event, 
Kohlberg's criticism of character traits, in Peters view, is 
limited to those that are most concretely involved with specific 
acts, such as honesty, and overlooks others along the scale, 
such as compassion. 
The central thrust of Peters' criticism concentrates upon 
Kohlberg's relegation of habit formation to a role of minor im-
portance in moral development. The virtuous traits, which 
Kohlberg slights, are cultivated by habit formation. Aristotle 
long ago underscored the need to practice virtue in order to 
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develop and bring it to maturity. Virtuous actions, to be 
sure, will not be appreciated for what they are by the very 
young. External rewards and punishments certainly will play 
an instrumental role in training the very young. However, this 
is necessary if the correct behaviors are to be carried out. 
In time, the inner understanding and motives to do the right 
thing for the right reason will hopefully appear. In Peters' 
view habit formation constitutes the early pole of a continuum 
leading to a mature virtuous morality that is informed by rea-
son. Acquired initially through external incentives provided 
by the caretakers, the child will eventually appreciate the 
reason in ethical terms for maintaining that which is virtuous. 
In this formulation, reason supports what has had its origin 
in habit, but does not substitute for it. Intelligence can be 
applied to habit in the sense of thinking about one's actions 
that derive from habits. In brief, one can acquire the habit 
of honest behavior to avoid punishment and later, even in the 
absence of possible punitive consequences, maintain honest be-
havior with a full appreciation of its desirability in,inter-
personal terms, as one reflects upon it. Reason then reenforces 
the early acquired honest behaviors and, hence', . habit and rea-
son work in tandem. Children when very young cannot comprehend 
a principle so abstract as justice, nor even recognize that 
certain rules derive their raison"d'etre from principles. This 
is where habituation enters. Through exposure and repetition 
one may acquire certain action patterns. aabituation may occur 
as the result of associative learning or through intentional 
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design. In habituating the very young to certain virtuous 
acts, such as honesty, there must be some attempt to explain 
to the child what the relevant acts and contexts are. Habitu-
ation in the moral sphere must be accompanied by understanding 
at the appropriate level for moral education to occur. The 
point Peters seeks to make is that habit in children need not 
be acquired by a process of drill, but through one in which the 
connections between rules, as well as their consequences, are 
consistently brought to their attention. In a brief summary of 
this aspect of his position, Peters states, "My argument is that 
learning habits in an intelligent way can be regarded as pro-
viding an appropriate basis, in the moral case, for the later 
stage when rules are followed or rejected because of the justi-
fication that they are seen to have or lack."l 
Peters further develops his argument by suggesting that 
Kohlberg has been so preoccupied with the abstract virtue of 
justice that he has ignored an important but somewhat less 
abstract virtue. Much more meaningful for young children at 
their stage of development than the concept of justice is con-
cern for others. Peters suggests, "The plight of others is 
much easier to grasp, and concern for it develops much earlier 
in children. If such concern is encouraged early in children, 
it can come to function later as one of the fundamental princi-
pIes of morality, when the child reaches the stage 
1 Ibid., p. 258. 
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of being able to grasp the connection between many rules and 
their effect on other peoPle.,,1 Principled morality is barren 
without the proper sensitivity to people's sUffering which might 
move one to action. Young children can be trained to decenter 
from their own concerns and to also take into account the needs 
of others. An habituation to doing so may generate a com-
passionate disposition, which in turn may produce appropriately 
relevant moral actions in response to human suffering. 
Virtues of self-control, which Kohlberg fails to consider, 
are for Peters those of the highest order. They have already 
been identified as courage, determination, persistance, in-
tegrity, and consistency. If one is to possess the moral courage 
to act upon principle, then there must be experienced some 
training in acquiring such courage to face rebuke and ostracism 
from the social milieu, in the course of growing up. It is pre-
cisely this type of character training that will sustain the 
autonomous principled thinker when confronted with the inevit-
ability of social resistance and confrontation. There can be 
very little autonomy for the principled thinker who does not 
possess moral courage. In fact, to reason at a principled 
level without the "cou"rage to sustainone"'s -convict:ions may in-
duce great stress and guilt. 
In conclusion, there is something of a paradox contained 
in the observations made by Peters. He has insisted that the 
lIbid., p. 259. 
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basic concepts of habit and trait be accorded their proper 
place in moral psychology, despite Kohlberg's almost contempt-
uous dismissal of what he calls a "bag of virtues." In doing 
so, Peters has restored to moral psychology some of the grand 
traditional notions, such as moral courage and integrity, which 
Kohlberg's exclusive emphasis on justice has eliminated. There 
is one final component omitted from Kohlberg's work, which 
Peters comments upon with almost chilling simplicity. It is 
one thing to know the difference between right and wrong. 
It is quite another, to care. 
Alstonl has also commented upon Kohlberg's neglect of the 
concept of habit, as well as his deemphasis of affect in the 
moral system. That both habit and affect have been consigned 
to roles of secondary importance is viewed as an artifact of 
the moral dilemmas, used in the interview, which are designed 
in a fashion that assures channeling the subject's responses 
in a cognitive direction. Alston takes Kohlberg to task for 
having asserted that conflict between physical desires and 
conscience pose no real moral crisis in contrast to the view 
that moral crisis derives from uncertainty in social situations 
when one experiences a distintegration of moral expectations. 
Alston's point is simply that only a biased ideological com-
mitment could lead to this sort of one-sided position, when 
                P. Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is to 
Ought'" in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. T. Mischel 
(New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 269-84. 
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clearly a moral crisis could be precipitated in the individual 
faced with either condition. 
Alston construes being at a moral stage as evidencing an 
"habitual style of moral" reasoning. He concedes that the 
child who moralizes at a certain stage must have acquired the 
concept commensurate with that stage. However, he challenges 
that this provides adequate grounds for inferring anything 
about concept development. The frequent use of concepts at a 
certain level is not proof that concepts at higher levels not 
being used are necessarily absent. A concept may be present in 
a behavioral repetoire, but dormant. Citing Kohlberg's own 
acknowledgment that about 50 percent of one's concepts in moral 
reasoning derives from stages adjacent to the predominant stage, 
Alston chips away at how meaningful it really is to say that 
someone is at a certain stage. An individual may very well 
have the higher concepts, but find it more natural to reason 
at lower stages. Hence, the reason for that individual being 
assigned to the lower stage is different from what is ordinarily 
assumed by Kohlbergians. Alston is not adverse to accepting the 
invariant stage theory of moral development, but is urging that 
a more rigorous test to determine what concepts one t£city does 
and does not possess be designed, with less emphasis upon con-
cept tendencies expressed in overt verbal reasoning. Current 
adversaries of the cognitive-developmental field consistently 
make the argument that performance at a certain level in a 
cognitive task does not rule out the possibility of competence 
existing, but unutilized, at a higher level. Conversely, the 
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lack of performance at a given level is not sufficient proof 
that the competence is not possessed, only that it has not 
been displayed in a particular task. 
Kohlberg has claimed that there is a logical necessity 
to the order of stage sequences, as increasing differentiation 
and integration occurs with each stage transition and attain-
mente Alston is clear, however, that even though this may be 
so, it offers no support to the position that later stages are 
morally superior to earlier stages. A concept may be logically 
contingent for its emergence upon a preceding concept, but it 
would be a gratuitous leap to assume its moral superiority on 
that account. Believing it to be a serious challenge to Kohl-
berg's theory, Alston argues that many philosophers enjoy as 
much sophistication on a conceptual plane as the Stage 6 
thinker, yet adopt philosophical and theological positions that 
correspond to Stages 4 and 5. The prescriptive "ought" of Kohl-
berg's Stage is not self-evident, but reflects the built in 
bias that has led him in the direction he has pursued. It is 
incumbent upon him, as with any philosopher, to marshal proof 
of the superiority of his construal of what is truly moral in 
the highest sense. Somewhat trenchantly, Alston drives his 
point home, as follows: 
It is notorious that moral philosophers agree 
no more about what is distinctive of the moral 
than about anything else; and a large number 
of distinct accounts of what makes a judgment, 
a reason, an attitude, a rule, or a principle, 
moral have been put forth. Kohlberg chooses 
one of these ••• but fails to do anything by 
way of showing that this is more t.han a choice 
of what seemS most congenial or interesting 
to him.... If these pronouncements are to 
carry any weight, he will have to show that 
this sense of "moral" which is functioning 
as his standard has itself some recommend-
ation other' than congeniality to his pre-
dilections. 
What Kohlberg really wants most to recommend 
to our acceptance is the principle of justice 
(in h.is interpretation) as a supreme moral 
principle. But stages of prescriptivity will 
not advance that cause. A judgment based on 
a principle of racial destiny, or no principle 
at all, can be just as prescriptive as a judg-
ment based on an application of Kohlberg's 
principle of justice. l 
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Despite Alston's almost unrelenting commentary on Kohlberg's 
claims, he does temper his remarks by conveying a belief that 
Kohlberg has contributed to enhancing the field of moral 
psychology generally and has personally provided Alston with 
new ways of viewing the field. 
In a systematic and searching critique, Simpson2 has pur-
sued further some of Alston's earlier references to Koblberg's 
subjectivity. She views him as both culture-bound and personally 
influenced by certain thinkers of his time. A well aimed arrow 
strikes directly at the heart of his claim to having established 
the universality of principled moral reasoning on a scientific 
basis. Simpson contends that throughout the prodigious body of 
work produced by Kohlberg, he is fuzzy on the distinction 
lIbid., pp. 276-77. 
2Elizabeth             Simpson, "Moral· Development Research: 
A Case Study of Scientific Cultura.L Bias," Human Development 
17 (1974): 81-105. 
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between valid empirical evidence and his own purely normative 
pronouncements on what he thinks ought to prevail in the moral 
realm. In other words, it begins to look as if Kohlberg is the 
least scientific when he is the most prescriptive. Despite 
his insistence on the commonality of peoples across all 
cultures, Simpson is equally insistent that Kohlberg has re-
ceived his intellectual nourishment from the following heroes 
of Western Philosophy: Kant, Mill, Hare, Ross, Dewey, and 
Rawls. However, the intellectual heritage of Eastern philo-
sophies is essentially different from these sources and Kohl-
berg fails to take it into consideration in his description of 
normative ethics. Assuming that it is a logical possibility, 
a universal normative morality would have to be derived from 
a synthesis of both Eastern and Wester philosophies. 
In a pointed commentary on the individualistic and far 
from universal outlook of Kohlberg, Simpson states the follow-
ing: 
Like each of us, Kohlberg himself, his interest 
in cognitive development and moral reasoning, 
his choice of a Kantian or Deweyian in-
frastructure for this theory and his predilection 
for abstractions of such principles as justice, 
equality, and reciprocity are all, in a sense, 
accidents of time and place and the interaction 
of his personality with a specifiable social 
environment and the norms of the sub-groups 
within that environment. His rebuttal of 
Brandt and others who emphasize cultural dif-
ferences ••• is more a statement of faith than 
an evidence-based conclusion. l 
Simpson has argued that despite having research data on 
IIbid., p. 85-86. 
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at least twelve different cultures, at tne time of her remarks, 
Kohlberg's treatment of his material lacks a sufficient sense 
of differentiation in comparing these cultures. Furthermore, 
some of his' most dogmatic statements about the universality 
of post conventional morality are laden with sermonizing 
,type phrases rather than scientific ones. In suggesting that 
under the proper conditions all people, not only the few who 
have been discovered, would develop to the highest sociomoral 
level, Kohlberg employs such phrases as "I prefer to think" 
and "I believe all should." Simpson notes that in so doing 
Kohlberg clearly reveals the source of his version of normative 
ethics as personal. He has gone, in Simpson's opinion, from 
the scientist, to the philosopher, to the preacher. The in-
dictment is a serious and harsh one, considering the articulated 
premises from which Kohlberg claims to be building upon. 
In his emphasis upon universality and invariant sequence 
of stages, Simpson contends that Kohlberg has minimized the 
very real and profound impact of sociocultural forces. She 
illustrates this persuasively by an example citing the shift 
from 4-5 year olds who do not appear to verbalize that copying 
other peoples work 'ls-'bild-to- 6- year olds"who state -that it is 
wrong to do so. Her point is that it is unwarranted to inter-
pret this shift as a natural progression, when the children 
are going from a preschool orientation of cooperation into a 
school milieu of competitiveness that honors individual effort 
over team work. Introducing the variable of competitiveness 
confounds the findings and demands further research to achieve 
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more certain conclusions. She suggests, further, that the 
experiential reality of living in a ghetto .. will rivet the 
Stage 2 child to an orientation of instrumental relativism. 
An orientation of this type has functional survival value 
which will preempt the influence of any natural developmental 
process. To assume that there exists an autonomous person who 
is guided by self-chosen universal principles which entirely 
transcend his sociocultural anchoring is unwarranted. Simpson 
reasons that the social base of the conventional thinker is 
apparent because he shares the dominant value system of the 
society in which he lives. However, the so-called autonomous 
person may be no freer than those planted in the conventional 
soil from which he is said to have grown. Observe Simpson's 
comments on the subject, as follows: 
At the post-conventional level the principles 
displayed may simply be the learned values of 
a different and smaller reference group so 
well internalized that its members believe 
themselves to be functioning autonomously ••• 
In some groups, internality--in the sense of 
autonomy in respect to the dominant culture--
is learned as a norm, and admission and con-
tinued membership are contingent upon that 
knowledge. I 
A few passages beyond this, she crisply concludes: 
Kohlberg's stage 6s are not functioning in-
dependently of their socialization; they have 
been very thoroughly socialized into the com-
pany of intellectual elites who value and prac-
tice analytic, abstract, and logical reasoning. 2 
IIbid., p. 94. 
2Ibid., p. 95. 
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Simpson is qoubtful that there exists a level of moral 
achievement beyond the conventional mode of thought. At least, 
she contends that the case for Kohlberg's morally autonomous 
man remains unproven. 
In addition to all of the above, Simpson has also ,found 
cause to rebuke Kohlberg for what she judges to be his rather 
discursive method of reporting his own findings. He has 
failed to follow adequately the canons of explicit and par-
simonious reporting of the research he has conducted. Allusions 
to cross-cultural research, although frequent, do not include 
appropriate details on samples and methodology. Especially 
painful is the omission of comments on how the moral dilemma 
stories are adapted to the various cultures studied. It is 
essential that the manner in which responses are scored to take 
into account cultural variations be conveyed. Simpson laments 
the fact that information in this area has not been made avail-
able. l It is her opinion that Kohlberg has drawn generalizations 
from his work that are premature. Replications and methodical 
research ranging across a greater diversity of the world's 
cultures must be awaited. 
Kurtines and Grief2 have also questioned that Kohlberg 
has established the empirical validity of his basic premises. 
lAlthough it does not stress cross cultural scoring, a 
scoring manual is available through'the Harvard Center for Moral 
Education. It is revised periodically, the most recent revision 
having occurred the summer of 1978. 
2William Kurtines and Esther Blank Grief, liThe Develop-
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Their critique is a highly technical one which is essentially 
an assault upon various aspects of the measuring instrument, 
the Moral Judgment Scale. They allow that refinement of the 
means for measurement and greater consistency in its app1i-
cation may ultimately confirm Kohlberg's theory, but hold that 
this is an achievement not yet attained. A restriction placed 
upon wide use of the instrument is the complexity of adminis-
tration and scoring it entails. Since the scoring requires 
an analysis of the subject's responses and is not immediately 
evident from the responses themselves, special training is 
necessary and this is provided by Kohlberg himself. Training 
is offered at summer workshops mounted at the Harvard Center 
for Moral Edu·cation. 
The nine moral dilemmas constituting the Moral Judgment 
Scale are usually not all employed in a given research project 
and often published reports do not communicate which of the 
several have been utilized. In addition, since there occurs 
a clinical probing to subjects' responses during the inter-
viewing, the questions asked will frequently vary from subject 
to subject. Kurtines and Grief see this lack of standardization 
in administering the tests as a serious impediment to sound com-
pari sons of research reports. It also raises questions about 
the validity of generalizations from even a single project. 
ment of Moral Thought: Review and Evaluation of Kohlberg's 
work," Psychological Bulletin 81 (1974): 453-70. 
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Clearly this does not impose an unsurmountable problem, for 
at least there can be standardization with regard to which 
stories would be administered across studies. Kurtines and 
Grief believe that the chances for rater bias are high because 
of the judgmental component necessary for scoring and they 
further suggest that independent research is inhibited due to 
the scoring difficulties involved. There are also content 
oriented problems cited in the Moral Judgment Scale. For 
example, the fact that most of the characters in the dilemma 
are male may yield specific moral judgments that are based on 
a cultural understanding of a differential in sex roles. The 
reliability of the instrument has not been satisfactorily de-
monstrated, in the opinion 6f Kurtines and Grief. Kohlberg' 
has reported interrater reliability for the Moral Judgment 
Scale. However, a good many of subsequent research projects 
rely on his former account of this and do not attempt independent 
efforts to demonstrate such reliability. It is suggested by 
Kurtines and Grief that it would further understanding and 
appreciation of each new study, if independent interrater re-
liability measurements bearing on the current research were to 
-- ------_. _. ---- - "-" --- -- - --------.-. be reported. JA significant flaw found in all published studies 
based upon the Moral Judgment Scale, according to Kurtines and 
Grief, has been the omission of reports on the temporal stability 
of subjects' responses. It is crucial to Kohlberg's theory that 
there be accuracy in assigning a subject to a particular stage. 
Yet there is no evidence that stability of moral judgments by 
subjects is maintained over brief periods from time x to time y. 
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Further, there have been no attempts reported to establish 
internal consistency across dilemmas, which might provide some 
assurance that there is a fundamental similarity in what is 
being measured (i.e. moral reasoning) by them. Kurtines and 
Grief assert that if they measure basically different domains, 
then a combined score of virtually unique areas does not add 
up to meaningful information. Lastly, despite its utility for 
the Moral Judgment Scale, omitted from the literature are 
estimates of the standard error of measurement. The authors 
have pointed out that this would be a particular asset in the 
field of moral development since a moral s"tage may reflect only 
45 percent judgments at that stage, with the balance being at 
adjacent stages, the lower stage generally comprising more 
responses than the higher one. 
Another aspect that comes under fire in the Kohlbergian 
system is what Kurtines and Grief view as its relatively low 
predictive validity. They recognize that theoretically two 
people at the same stage may choose alternate courses of 
action, as well as that six individuals, each at a different 
stage may all choose the same course of action. Nevertheless, 
it is true that Kohlberg maintains that there exists a probable 
relationship between moral stage and action. A survey of the 
literature led Kurtines and Grief to conclude that the pre-
dictive validity of the theory in this regard is moderate at 
best, when comparing grossly between high-level mature moral 
reasoning and relatively low-level reasoning. A clear cor-
respondence, however, between a specific stage and a predictable 
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action has not been established •. They found it particularly 
difficult to discriminate amongst the last three stages when 
it comes to predictive ability, as reflected in the extant 
literature. Lastly, upon surveying the various types of 
evidence bearing upon the invariant sequence hypothesis and 
the hypothesis of qualitatively different structural modes· or 
reasoning, Kurtines and Grief conclude that there does not 
exist unequivocal suport for these hypotheses. Kuhn1 has re-
sponded to this allegation with some counter-evidence and the 
following observation: 
••• it is probably fair to say that Kurtines 
and Grief ••• have recognized neither the 
complexity of the task nor the uniqueness 
of Koh1berg's theoretical sequence •••• To 
obtain the appropriate longitudinal data 
is a formidable task, especially in the 
case of the more advanced portion of the 
sequence, where progress, Koh1berg claims, 
is slow and not all individuals complete 
the progression. But the theoretical 
model should not be rejected until these 
data have been obtained. 2 
The dialectical process in search of truth will most likely 
continue for some time to corne. In fact, Broughton3 has already 
offered a thorough negation of the negation by Kurtines and Grief. 
lueanna Kuhn, "Short-Term Longitudinal Evidence for the 
Sequentiality of Koh1berg's Early Stages of Moral Judgment," 
Developmental Psychology 12 (1976): 162-66. 
2Ibid., p. 166. 
3John Broughton, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to 
Morality," Journal of Moral Education 7 (January, 1978): 81-96. 
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An arresting reformulation of Kohlberg's stage theory 
has been recently advanced by Gibbs. I . He first cites two 
criteria, previously identified by Piaget, for qualification 
as a naturalistic stage theory. One of them is simply that 
stages should be found commonly amongst all peoples. The 
other is that behavior emanating from the stages derive from 
processes which the individual is not conscious of. It is 
Gibbs contention that these criteria applied to the first four 
stages of Kohlberg's theory qualify them as candidates for con-
stituting a naturalistic stage theory. He sets apart the last 
two stages, however, as distinctly different. They are referred 
to as existential themes, lacking in universality, and charac-
terized by "meta-ethical reflection." Upon reviewing the 
literature which mostly focuses upon the first four stages, 
Gibbs firmly concludes that these stages do, indeed, meet all 
of the Piagetian stage criteria. Gibbs further suggests that 
Kohlberg's theory embraces holism, constructivism, and inter-
actionism. Each of these is a major characterization of 
Piaget's cognitive-structural developmental theory. Naturalism, 
also a Piagetian characteristic, is not entirely applied by 
Kohlberg to his theory. Naturalism stresses continuity between 
species and the biological roots of human functioning. According 
to Gibbs this also implies a cognitive unconscious which, in-
1 John C. Gibbs, "Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Judgment: 
A Constructive Critique," Harvard Educational Review 47 (1977): 43-59. 
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deed, Piaget has cited. l 
The principled level of morality is one in which the 
member takes a stand or perspective outside of society and 
reflectively questions conventional morality. The rarity of 
principled thinking raises doubts about whether it is comprised 
of what may be said to meet the Piagetian stage criteria, as 
do the first four stages of Kohlberg's theory. In addition 
to being found with reasonable frequency, naturalistic stages 
should have a tendency to move upward through sequences and 
they should respond to enrichment in the social milieu with 
increased progress. Doubt is also raised because the reflective 
nature of principled morality imparts a dimension of se1f-
consciousness not present in naturalistic stages, as inter-
preted by Gibbs. He states, "Post-conventionality is the ex-
istential experience of disembedding oneself from an implicit 
wor1dviewand adopting a detached and questioning posture.,,2 
At the principled level there is an attempt to consciously 
formalize philosophies which are implicit in earlier stages. 
Gibbs does not construe Stages 5 and 6 as integrating and re-
placing previous stages in the same way that, for example, Stage 
- -. - .. - --3 reorganizes and subsumes Stage 2. At the same time he fully 
affirms that, confronted with an unjust situation, principled 
thinking may govern behavior and in so doing preempt the earlier 
1 Jean Piaget, "Affective Unconscious and Cognitive Uncon-
scious," in" The Child and Reality (New York: Grossman, 1973), 
pp. 31-48. 
2Gibbs, pp. 55-56. 
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naturalistic stages. Moral thinkers at the principled level 
confronted with injustice, " ••• have experienced a dissonance 
between ethical presuppositions and the demands of their social 
situations. This conflict may provoke considerable meta-ethical 
reflection in the effort to formulate a defensible ethic."l 
Gibbs speculation that a sharp break be recognized between the 
first four Kohlbergian stages, comprising a naturalistic develop-
mental stage theory, and the last two stages, comprising 
existential themes, is both abstruse and intriguing. It holds 
some promise for resolving the issue of accounting for the un-
common appearance of Stages 5 and 6 in a theory that purports 
to validate the universality of stages. 
Hall and Davis,2 like Gibbs, are constructive and con-
genial critics, who find Kohlberg's theory largely impressive, 
compelling, and therefore, acceptable. In general, however, 
they find more clarity and persuasiveness in the three basic 
levels of egocentricity, heteronomy, and autonomy equivalent 
to the preconventional, conventional, and postconventional 
levels respectively, than in the descriptions of the six dis-
crete stages. Despite their adoption of his moral developmental 
theory for their purposes of moral education, they distinguish 
sharply between his philosophy and psychology, rejecting the 
lGibbs, p.57. 
2Robert T. Hall and John V. Davis, Moral Education in 
Theory and Practice (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus, 1975). 
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former and embracing the latter. Considering the extent to 
which Kohlberg interweaves, sometimes almost imperceptibly, 
between philosophy and. psychology this is an important point of 
difference. Acknowledging the pragmatic value of Kohlberg's 
theory and believing that it is the best that cognitive-develop-
mental psychology has to offer thus far, Hall and Davis caution 
against prematurely accepting it with finality. As with many 
other critics, they are impressed with research validating the 
invariance of developmental sequences up to Stage 4. 
Hall and Davis appear to find an inconsistency between 
Kohlberg's description of a stage as     world view which inter-
prets all experiences through its characteristics mode of 
thought and the notion of its being inadequate to incorporate 
some experiences, thereby precipitating the conflict that leads 
to stage transition. For some reason, which I do not think is 
made clear, Hall and Davis believe that if it is true that a 
stage cannot incorporate a particular experience and this pre-
cipitates a stage transition, then a social learning model can 
be invoked to explain the change. The equilibration model is 
dismissed summarily. 
Regarding the issue of generality and specificity, Hall 
and Davis suggest the interesting notion that one stage may be 
brought to bear upon specific kinds of issues, whereas another 
stage within the same individual, might be brought to bear upon 
other kinds of issues. The research problem would be to deter-
mine what variables influence such a differential functioning 
of stages. The phenomenon of stage mixture lends some credence 
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to the plausibility of this idea. 
Hall and Davis believe that Kohlberg has been less than 
precise in conveying exactly what he .means by Stage 6 as the 
embodiment of a general concept of justice. They note that 
he has used at least three definitions, which they cite as 
follows: "1.) the preservation of the rights of individualS, 
2.) a universal mode of choosing, and 3.) respect for persons."l 
Regardless of bow justice is to be defined, Hall and Davis think 
that Kohlberg is wrong to view it as the exclusive core of 
morality. They are not the only ones, of course, who have taken 
this position. There are other principles which could be 
identified as possessing universal scope, such as liberty, 
which could serve as the loadstone for autonomous Stage 6 moral 
reasoning. Even if one were to confine the Stage 6 moral vision 
to justice, there is a remarkably small amount of cross-cultural 
agreement on its meaning, which Simpson2 has pointed out. 
Diverse cultures conceive of justice differently, which places 
its universal status in jeopardy. Hall and Davis do not agree 
with Kohlberg that "respect for persons" is a pure principle 
constituting only the form of a mode of thought. It has a 
distinctively substantive character which can be compared, for 
lIbid., p. 104. 
2Elizabeth L. Simpson, "Moral Development Research: A 
Case of Scientific Cultural Bias," Human Development 17 (1974): 
81-105. 
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example, to respect for law. While they reject justice as the 
core and exclusive principle of morality, they do adopt a ver-
sion of an autonomous Stage 6 individual who is principled in 
his moral reasoning. 
The value of life has been given·a position· of supremacy 
over all other values in the Kohlbergian scheme. This is re-
peatedly brought out in most of Kohlberg's writings. The ve-
hicle for highlighting this supreme value is the classic Heinz 
story in which a husband is tempted to steal a drug from the 
local pharamacist to save his wife from dying of cancer. The 
pharmacist, who has discovered the drug, is asking an exorbitant 
amount, which the husband, Heinz, cannot possibly afford. In 
each context that Kohlberg discusses this dilemma he makes it 
abundantly clear that the moral thing to do is for Heinz to 
steal the drug in order to save the life of his wife. The 
rationale is the sovereignty of life over all other values, 
certainly including property. Simpson has leveled a serious 
challenge to Kohlberg's claim to the universality and priority 
of this principle. She explores diverse cultural attitudes 
about this matter and concludes that the issue is not one of 
valuing life over all other values, but rather " ••• that it is 
valued si tuat:ionaTly in highly culturally-specific ways. II I 
In one culture a traitor will be                 in another a person 
IIbid., p. 97. 
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may be killed to protect him or her from what others might do; 
and in another the elderly are left to die. The Congress of 
the United States has sent millions off to war, knowing that 
hordes of them would die; the wars were not always just. 
Patrick Henry has said, "Give me liberty, or give me death. II 
Simpson reminds us that after losing property in the Great 
depression men jumped off of buildings and put bullets through 
their head. She states: 
History is full of examples of men and women 
who have freely given of their lives for the 
preservation of their own property or the pro-
perty of others. The point is that the re-
lative value of property and life is decided 
situationally and culturally and is not a 1 
matter of natural and universal knowledge. 
Returning to the Heinz dilemma itself, one may wonder about 
its particular construction and the implication of Kohlberg's 
position. Kohlberg has designed the story in such a way that 
the pharmacist is a villian. A greedy capitalist, we might 
say. But why has he done this? The fact that the druggist is 
charging a grossly excessive amount is actually a contaminate 
in the situation which is entirely unnecessary if the principle 
is a valid guide to action. Kohlberg could have had the 
druggist asking only what it might reasonably cost under the 
circumstances. He did invent the drug, "after all, and it might 
well be a scarce commodity. It is entirely conceivable that 
IIbid, p. 98. 
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Heinz may still not be able to afford the drug. However, 
we all know that it is much easier to steal from a bad guy 
than a good guy. Hence, the story calls for the druggist in-
sisting upon the exorbitant cost. If there is any conflict 
for our moral reasoner between advocating that Heinz break the 
law and save his wife versus maintaining the law and allowing 
his wife to die, Kohlberg's story construction will help to 
tip the scale for him. Furthermore, an elaboration of the story 
can certainly bring to light situational variables that might 
modify the response. If the drug is scarce, does stealing it 
mean that another person in need will die because of the theft? 
At what cost to himself has the druggist invented the drug? 
He may hypothetically have isolated himself for many years and 
worked arduously to discover this drug, at great personal 
sacrifice. If so, how is a just price to be placed upon it? 
Under these conditions, the mere theft of the drug is actually 
depriving the druggist of more than a piece of property. Has 
the druggist worked hard to discover the drug in order to sell 
it for a large sum so that he would then have the money that 
he needs to order an operation for his own debilitated wife? 
If so, is it right for Heinz to steal the drug? True, these 
are all hypothetical possibilities, but they are conceivable 
and they do have a bearing on the morality of the judgment. 
Furthermore, how does Heinz know whether any of these possibi-
lities obtain? Most likely he does not: but he can know, if 
he pauses to think about it, that they might possibly obtain. 
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How is this meta-reflection to modify the judgment one is to 
make about the dilemma? 
Kohlberg further suggests two significant ideas regarding 
morality in the Heinz situation. One is that Heinz should steal 
the drug even if the woman is a stranger to him and the other 
is that it is not only right for Heinz if he does steal, but 
it is wrong if he does not. The first of these is consistent 
with the universality of the principle upon which the action is 
to be predicated. The second has to do with reciprocal rights 
and obligations. If Heinz has the right to expect that someone 
should steal to save his life, should the tables be turned, 
then he has the obligation to steal for another in the same 
situation. The paradox, however, is that if our moral reasoner 
is at Stage 6, he will surely find his intellect taking him 
far beyond the concrete situation to the many possibilities 
of human suffering and life-endangering situations throughout 
the world. He knows that dying people can use his physical and 
financial aide. There is no justification for being rooted in 
the present situation. There are literally millions of strangers 
in the world whom Heinz can be sacrificing for. He may even 
actually save the lives of one or two. Interpreting the valuing 
of life as Kohlberg does, it is difficult to see how any fully 
principled Stage 6 moral reasoner can justify his own existence 
as long as his possessions are in excess of a subsistence 
level allowing mere survival. Any excess beyond what is 
needed for survival may be defined as property which can be 
used to save the lives of others. If the value of life is to 
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be interpreted as a pure universal principle, superordinate 
over all other values regardless of circumstances, then the 
moral obligation is to yield what one owns in excess of what 
he must have to survive. 
Looking at the problem from a different perspective, 
suppose a family has three children. One is in the second 
year of college and another is about to start. A third, 
tradgically, is dying. The family physician and two outside 
consultants, both experts in the field of the child's disease, 
insist that at best the child can be kept alive in the .hospital 
for six more months through the use of extraordinary means. 
By hypothesis, maintaining him there would completely wipe out 
the family savings, accumulated ··over many hardworking years. 
The savings were intended to be used for the children's college. 
At Stage 6 would it be moral to choose not to prolong the life 
of the child after weighing the six months gain against the 
probable total loss of the money and what it would purchase in 
terms of humanistic values for the two remaining children? 
Consistency with Rohlberg's principle as a superordinate 
absolute would dictate keeping the child alive. Yet I believe 
that while doing so is· a- ·perfectly viahle·-fftage -6 -cho-f.ce, so 
is the alternative, even though the choice would not be to 
maintain life at any cost. Death is inevitable. To seek to 
maintain it at all costs, despite circumstances, can be com-
pulsively destructive. Imagine that death never occurs and 
there is no technology allowing escape to other planets. Over-
population would eventually reach the point of so diminishing 
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the quality of life that existence would become insufferable. 
I believe that a rational person would design a world in which 
life would be time-limited, hence, permitting all to enjoy 
a higher quality of it during the finite period of living. Thus 
it follows, that given the imaginative possibility to enshrine 
life as a sovereign principle that will endure everlastingly, 
the rational person will reject the opportunity and opt for a 
society in which each member will eventually experience death; 
himself included, as that would only be fair. It would appear 
that this choice must imply values other than and higher than 
the mere sustainment of life. I would argue that those values 
are based on a "respect for persons" every bit as much as the 
Kohlbergian interpretation of the "value of life."             death 
is occurring naturally and the ordinary resources for preventing 
it, which at best in all cases can only mean forestalling it, 
are not available, then it is not unethical to allow it to occur. 
Further, one is not obliged at great personal loss to attempt 
to prevent it. Undoubtedly, if the third child in the dilemma 
above could be not simply saved for six months, but could recover 
at the expense of the family savings, then there would be no 
dilemma, for the course of action would be obvious. Supposing, 
however, the dying child lives next door and belongs to another 
family. Would                     family be morally obliged to give up all 
of its savings for the sake of helping the child next door to 
recover? The universal principle would dictate that it would be 
so obliged, just as it would be if the child were a stranger 
from across the world whose parents suddenly knocked at the 
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door. Theoretically implicit in Kohlberg's position is the 
premise that an individual must virtually be enslaved to 
another, as long as that other is in need of the first person's 
income to keep alive. To concede otherwise is to acknowledge 
that the sanctity of one person's life does not always take pre-
cedent over the property of another person. However, this is 
exactly what Kohlberg does not seem to acknowledge in his many 
philosophical tracts. I cannot help wondering if Kohlberg has 
thought through all of the ramifications of the microcosmic 
Heinz story and if he has, whether he is willing to claim 
them. In my opinion, however, the truly autonomous Stage 6 per-
son would not give a narrowly confined response, whatever his 
ultimate recommendation, to the Heinz dilemma. Precisely 
because of his sociocognitive moral maturity he would be com-
pelled to entertain alternate possibilities that might obtain 
in the situation and to anticipate the reverberating implications 
of his decision from many perspectives. To the extent that 
Kohlberg maintains a purity and singularity of definition, 
viewing justice as a mode of choosing, there is no disagreement. 
It is clear, however, that Kohlberg sees a converging of form 
- - -. --- --and content at Stage 6 and that he seeks to impose his own 
ideological content at that point. The distinction between form 
and content in moral reasoning is compromised by its own maker. 
Now let us move a step beyond Kohlberg. I have tried to 
show that it is not necessarily just to view an individual as 
obliged to offer up all of his property and continuing income, 
in excess of his survival needs, to save other people from a 
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natural death, which is inevitable at some time, in any event. 
But what if an individual volitionally chooses to do so? Sup-
posing the family members living next door to the dying child 
confer and all agree to sacrifice their savings and forgo 
college, at least in the present, for the children. Have they 
not made a moral choice that goes beyond justice into the realm 
of love. Certainly they value the life of the dying child, but 
their choice" is not made out of a cognitive sense of correlative 
rights and duties, instead it is generated by a mature form of 
brotherhood and love. It moves away from egocentricity and to-
ward universality since the child is not in their own family. 
If they were to make the same sacrifice for a child who is a 
stranger to them, then their choice would be based on love that 
has become completely universalized. It is an irony of the 
world's religions that many of them have impeded the universal-
ization of love. Contrary to their own doctrines, many churches 
throughout history have created amongst their membership a 
divisive feeling between themselves as insiders and others as 
outsiders. Love is reserved for the insiders and withheld from 
the outsiders. Of course, love as morality is not what Kohlberg 
is talking about. The question, however, is whether justice as 
morality is not an arbitrary and unnecessarily delimiting con-
ception. 
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Pukal repudiates justice as the core of morality entirely, 
reconstruing it as a political concept. Morality itself en-
compasses a broader framework, within which justice orients us 
to what we cannot eliminate doing and must refrain from doing, 
in order that we not fall into the class of immoral. Because 
of this emphasis, it is seen as the negative side of morality. 
The positive side of morality places the concept of "better" 
at its center. It functions not to resolve conflicts, but to 
promote the growth of individuals. Puka sees the goal as 
becoming better people so that we evolve to a moral conscious-
ness that brings us to " ••• the transcendence of                                
obligation, duty, rights, blame, guilt, censure, and even 
2 justifiable resentment." In a deontological theory, one does 
the right thing because duty commands it. The Stage 6 person 
anticipates that if he doesn't act upon what he knows to be 
right then he will have violated his self-ideal and will experience 
self inflicted negative sanctions. In a positive morality, 
people have developed socially so that they genuinely want to 
do what they perceive as what they ought to do. Ideals and 
self-interests coincide. 
lBill Puka, "Moral Education and Its Cure," in Reflections 
on Values Education, ed. J. R. Meyer (Ontario, Canada: Wilfried 
Laurier university Press, 1976), pp. 47-86. 
·2 Ibid., p. 57. 
279 
Although a just decision-making procedure may satisfy 
the demands of Kohlberg's concept of morality, it is entirely 
conceivable that a fair compromise solution to a conflict may 
not satisfy the actual participants themselves. Puka questions 
whether, in fact, it is justice and satisfaction they should 
be in pursuit of. He introduces the intriguing notion that 
a positive morality utilizing a love ethic may neutralize a 
conflict and offer a resolution that transcends justice. As 
an example he cites the famous lifeboat dilemma in which 
several survivors of a shipwreck stand a chance to survive 
only if two people leave the raft to face certain death. The 
rational Stage 6 just solution calls for drawing straws to 
determine who shall go overboard. However, he conveys that 
at a conference on moral development which he attended, the 
discussants simulating being in this dilemma agreed not to 
draw straws, but to take their chances with one another in-
stead. The likelihood of survival with all aboard would be 
slim. Puka urges that the choice made reflects a love ethic 
which is higher and nobler than a morality of justice. There 
was, however, one dissenting participant who argued that the 
decision of the others was unfair and might· be responsible 
for his possible death. Puka agrees that when considered in 
the abstract the dissenter was justified, even though all of 
the others made an opposite choice when role-playing the 
situation with great feeling. The name of the dissenter, in-
cidentally, was Lawrence Kohlberg. 
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The lifeboat dilemma could be complicated .by first 
as.suming that there are four survivors all of whom agree to 
draw straws. Once the straws have been drawn, the two who 
lose refuse to jump overboard. We may further assume hypo-
thetically that had the other two lost, they would have kept 
the contract. That would, of course, have been unfair to 
them because, although they would not have known it, they 
stood to lose to some extent either way. However, they now 
do know where they stand and are faced with the two who have 
reneged on the bargain. Is it just for them to overpower the 
losers and throw them overboard? Does it involve a higher 
morality to see the losers' behavior as based upon fear of 
certain death, rather than visciousness, and to embrace them 
as brothers without resentment? 
A final perspective in this chapter exploring criticisms 
of Koh1berg is drawn from the work of Gilliganl who refutes the 
tendency in developmental moral psychology to view women as in 
some way deficient. No longer willing to accept the males 
independence and commitment to the work world with its emphasis 
upon responsible decision-making as superior to the contextual, 
caring, interpersonal focus of women, Gilligan speaks for the 
distinctively female voice. The alleged deficiency in women's 
1Carol Gilligan, "In a Different Voice: Women's Con-
ceptions of Self and Morality," Harvard Educational Review 
47 (1977): 481-517. 
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moral development is reinterpreted as actually representative 
of an equal type of social and moral concern. Both Freud and 
Kohlberg are noted as viewing women's morality as lower on the 
developmental scale than that of men. In particular, Kohlberg 
found that women, given their strong interpersonal orientation, 
favored Stage 3 in development, a stage he claims to be both 
functional and adequate for them. Gilligan comments incisively 
in a way that commands one to reflect seriously upon the matter, 
as she states: 
And yet, herein lies the paradox, for the 
very traits that have traditionally de-
fined the "goodness" of women, their care 
for and sensitivity to the needs of others, 
are those that mark them as deficient in 
moral development. The infusion of feeling 
into their judgments keep them from develop-
ing a more independent and abstract ethical 
conception in which concern for others de-
rives from principles of 1ustice rather than 
from compassion and care. 
G 'll' , , 2 d 1 ' 3, t' 1 19an, )01nS Haan an Ho ste1n, 1n sugges 1ng that 
Kohlberg's scoring system may be based on a standard that is 
biased against women. It is not the varying qualitative structures 
that is brought into question, but the subordination of the 
lIbid., p. 484. 
2Norma Haan, "Activism As Moral Protest: Moral Judgments 
of Hypothetical Dilemmas and an Actual Situation of Civil Dis-
obedience," (Unpublished paper, Harvard University, 1973). 
3c . Holstein, "Development of Moral Judgment: A Longitu-
dinal Study of Males and Females," Child Development 47 (1976): 
51,:,,61. 
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interpersonal orienta-tion to that of the conventional de-
finition of good that is ma-intained by the society. She 
stresses the disproportionate number of males and adolescents 
to be found in research samples and the fact that the under-
lying developmental theories tend to be formulated by males. 
This results in a departure from the male standard being viewed 
as inferior. The research of Haan and Holstein points up 
divergences between men and women. The women appear to express 
greater concern for dilemmas reflecting real situations that 
one is more likely to encounter. Empathy and compassion are 
more typical of them than the men, who lean in the direction 
of being more concerned with that which deals with the hypo-
thetical. The central dilemma for women developmentally, as 
seen by Gilligan derives from the traditional feminine notion 
of the good as self-sacrifice. The females problem in attain-
ing adulthood without losing what is valued in her femininity 
is to resolve the struggle between self and other. As Gilligan 
puts it, lilt is precisely this dilemma-the conflict between 
compassion and autonomy, between virtue and power--which the 
feminine voice struggles to resolve in its effect to reclaim 
the self and to solve the moral problem in such a way that no 
one is hurt."l To sharpen the true and genuinely female de-
velopmental moral process, Gilligan selected to do research with 
women engaged in choosing a course of action revolving around 
the possibility of abortion. It is a problem exquisitely 
lGilligan, p. 491. 
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suited for her purposes. The women are in a condition which 
is specifically feminine and there is no alternative to their 
making an active choice, one which they must assume responsi-
bility for, regardless of what it is. The tendency of so 
many women in society to be passive and not actively choose 
would not be possible in this situation. Although her own self 
interests must be taken into account, the choice will impact 
upon others. Therefore, the typical female motive to avoid 
hurting others may come into conflict with pursuing the in-
terests of her own self. 
In listening to the women exploring their feelings and 
concerns, Gilligan identified a distinctively "femine voice," 
a language focusing upon the need to evidence care for others 
and to avoid hurting them. The latter is based on a commit-
ment not to be selfish and the former is conceived of as ex-
pressing responsibility. To hurt another is to be immoral: 
to demonstrate caring is to be moral. The mature adult, male 
or female, must integrate into his moral vision both care and 
compassion for others. Certainly these "feminine" characteristics 
are as worthy of universalization in a fully developed moral 
system as the independent, decision-making, autonomous self of 
Kohlberg's male-oriented scheme. Gilligan suggests that the 
emphasis upon separation and independent judgment so prevalent 
in some of Kohlberg's more mature subjects is actually a re-
flection of their adolescent struggles. To become fully mature, 
those qualities must be integrated with the feminine voice. 
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It is only upon the advent of a successful synthesis that true 
adulthood is reached for either male or female. The self must 
become capable of both sep'aration and connection with others. 
The women Gilligan found to be at the highest level 
identified a principle of responsibility for self and others 
as distinguished from Kohlberg's emphasis upon rights and 
duties. She is critical of his moral dilemma stories because 
they are designed in a fashion that removes them from the 
real-live social context. When reconstructed and embedded 
in that context, the causes and consequences of the moral de-
cision-making are manifest. The Kohlberg stories work to the 
disadvantage of the female, whose special moral strengths 
are accentuated by the type of reconstructed story design 
Gilligan refers to. She notes that the women in her research, 
who were given three of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas, had a 
tendency to embellish and restructure the stories so that they 
did not respond in the abstract in terms of rights and duties. 
Instead they sought more information about the circumstances 
and explored the stories from the standpoint of who would be 
hurt and what would the consequences be to the participants of 
alternate choices. Gilligan finds' that many of the responses 
given by her subjects do not fit the Kohlbergian stages and, 
therefore, are not readily scoreable. She believes that the 
male-biased research sample from which the stages have emerged 
account specifically for a frame of reference which is different 
from that which women bring to the moral dilemmas. Viewing the 
Heinz dilemma from the perspective of not wanting to hurt, one 
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woman began to recast the dilemma in terms of societal in-
stitutions that permit exploitation. Another stressed how 
regardless of the choice Heinz might make he would suffer 
guilt and his life would be sundered from his wife's. She 
would either die or he would most likely wind up going to 
jail. Gilligan pinpoints women's characteristic ways of 
responding to the dilemma in the following remark: "When 
women begin to make direct moral statements, the issues they 
repeatedly address are those of exploitation and hurt."l 
At the principled level, they adopt a moral world view that is 
based upon a structural comprehension of non-violence, which 
facilitates their attempt at establishing justice when en-
countering moral conflicts. This is markedly different from 
the male proclivity to respond by searching for abstract 
principles pivoting around rights and obligations. Gilligan 
points out the potential danger in a formalized ethical system 
which unyieldingly seeks to impose sovereign principles upon 
the real world at the cost of suffering to people. 
Summing up her critical stance on Kohlberg, she comments, 
as follows, "Kohlberg's research on moral development has con-
founded the variables of age, sex, type of decision, and type 
of dilemma by presenting a single configuration (the responses 
of adolescent males to hypothetical dilemmas of conflicting 
rights) as the basis for a universal stage sequence • .,2 
lIbid., p. 514. 
2Ibid ., p. 515. 
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Gilligan has opened up new vistas in understanding. 
feminine moral development. Beyond that, however, she has 
discovered the missing piece which Kohlberg's autonomous man 
must integrate if he is to progress to adult moral maturity. 
As with any significant                             thought or 
scientific endeavor, Kohlberg's cognitive-structural theory 
of moral development has been the target of a considerable 
body of critical commentary. It has been sternly criticized 
on both methodological and theoretical grounds. There are 
those who argue that despite Kohlberg's claims to the contrary, 
the invariant sequence and cross-cultural universality of the 
theory have not been proven. Others have criticized the 
selection of justice as the central concept of morality for 
being arbitrary and unduly restrictive. still others would 
seek to reinstate affect, habit, trait, and a concern for others 
to their proper place in a comprehensive system of moral psycho-
logy. The charge of sex-bias in the methodology has been leveled 
from some quarters, while the soundness of the research tech-
nology utilized by Kohlberg and his collaborators has been 
questioned elsewhere. 
I have been purposefully unsparing in presenting the 
criticism that Kohlberg's work has drawn. To avoid diluting 
its impact, I have not attempted a point by point rebuttal. 
In a very real sense, except for this chapter and the one that 
follows, the dissertation is itself a response to much of the 
criticism. As time goes on, some of the criticism becomes 
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outdated. Some of it is entirely valid and must be answered 
by Kohlberg1 if he is to continue to develop his theory toward 
the highest stage of theoretical adequacy that is possible in 
the field of sociomoral knowledge. 
lLawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach: 
New Developments and a Response to· Criticisms." Paper        
sented in the Symposium on Moral Development and Behavior, 
biannual convention of the Society for Research in Child Develop-
ment, Denver, April, 1975. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF ALTERNATE MODELS 
Two major theories of moral psychology which differ pro-
foundly from Kohlberg's formulations are to be found in the 
psychoanalytic and social learning models. Each will be pre-
sented in this chapter with emphasis upon essentials as they 
relate to this dissertation. An exhaustive attempt to provide 
an expositiqn of each school of thought in its entirety would 
be beyond the scope of the present undertaking. Both psycho-
analysis and social learning theory have been treated compre-
hensively in a variety of ways in the literature throughout the 
years. Their relevance to moral development will be concentrated 
upon in this context. This parsimonious, but salient approach 
to these two models should enrich one's appreciation of the 
cognitive-structural developmental school of sociomoral know-
ledge. 
Both of the schools under discussion are similar in re-
spect to one essential theme and dissimilar in relation to 
another. Psychoanalytic and social le"arniiui theories are a"like 
in their considerable emphasis upon parents as the socializing 
agents which induct their childx'en into the cultural and moral 
mores of the society. In the view of Freud, the founder of 
psychoanalysis, this is accomplished in the course of psycho-
sexual development, particularly during the phallic stage when 
2BB 
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the formation of a superego occurs. For Bandura, a leading 
social learning theorist, the achievement takes place largely 
through the process of modeling or observational learning. 
Parents, of course, serve as the models and children the ob-
servers. 
The theme of generality versus specificity is one in which 
the two schools of thought diverge. Introjection of moral com-
mands and prohibitions, as posited by psychoanalytic theory, 
results in a relatively stable psychic structure, the superego, 
which would predict consistency of behavior across diverse 
situations involving moral temptations and demands. On the 
other hand, the influence of reinforcement contingencies and 
powerful models in the environment, cited by social learning 
theory, predicts less generality and greater variation of be-
havior across situations. The variation is influenced by the 
large number of variables that converge in any given situation. 
As the child's capacity for invoking cognitive mediational skills 
increases, he makes finer discriminations amongst the many 
factors involved, which in turn will influence his judgment and 
behavior. 
Psychoanalytic Theory 
Psychoanalysis has undergone diverse permutations since 
its inception in the mind of its founder, Sigmund Freud. Modi-
fications have led to the emergence of both left and right wing 
schools of thought, with other viewpoints situated somewhere 
along the continuum bounded by the two extremes. It is Freud's 
own views which shall receive attention here. An understanding 
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of moral development in Freudian psychology must be based upon 
the conceptual cornerstone of identification, a process in 
which the parent serves as the primary socializing agent. 
First, however, for a deeper understanding of Freud's meaning 
it is necessary to comprehend the core tendency of his person-
ality theory. Maddi classifies Freud's theory as a psycho-
social conflict model with a core tendency described thusly: 
"It is the tendency to maximize instinctual gratification, 
while minimizing punishment and guilt."l The child at birth 
is dominated by instinctual impulses which seek satisfaction 
without knowledge or consideration of constraints in the real 
world. The psychological wish which embodies the instincts 
reign supreme in the infant's psychic                       In elaborating 
further, Maddi points out: "The wishes and emotions of the id 
are deeply self-centered, indeed selfish, in nature.,,2 Seeking 
fulfillment on the basis of wish alone is designated primary 
process. The resistance of the real world and the inevitable 
frustration that must come from failure to completely gratify 
the wish leads to the emergence of a psychic structure called 
the ego, which functions as the instrument responsible for 
thinking, perceiving, and executing realistic action designed 
to successfully gratify instinctual impulses. The strategies 
of the ego are governed by what is termed secondary process. 
1 Salvatore Maddi, "Personal"i ty Theor"ie"s: A Comparative 
Analysis, 3 ed. (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1976), 
p. 22. 
2Maddi, p. 30. 
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The ego's functions are by no means entirely conscious, as 
they include defensive maneuvers operating unconsciously to 
shield the individual from facing directly the crudity of 
his instincts. Sex and agression are the two instinctual 
elements that have the most meaning for the human condition in 
Freud's view. Although the individual seeks his own unbridled 
pleasure, society seeks the common good. Maddi points out that 
this inherent antagonism is the basis for viewing Freud's per-
sonality theory as representative of a psychosocial conflict 
model. There is an inescapable opposition between two great 
forces; one has its locus within the individual and the other 
in society. Maximization of instinctual gratification can only 
be achieved within the context of compromise. Seeking tension 
reduction from one's own instincts without taking into account 
the needs and impulses of others would inevitably produce 
punishment from society. The source of punishment for young 
children is usually parents. The pursuance of one's own pleasure 
must be tempered to avoid punishment. A series of punishments 
provides the child some basis for abstracting general rules to 
guide his conduct. This, coupled with verbal social trans-
mission of prohibitions and commands, supplies information 
about parental and societal expectations which become internal-
ized. Once internalization has begun, the child can feel 
guilt and is no longer dependent upon the external sanctions 
of authority. The anticipation of a transgression may even be 
sufficient for him to experience guilt. As Maddi points out, 
guilt, like the fear of punishment, serves as a brake upon the· 
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·unbridled expression of instinctual impulses. The instincts 
must be transmuted into socially acceptable modes of be-
havioral expression. Although it will not receive further 
comment here, the ego functions unconsciously to institute 
defense mechanisms to aid in the transmutation process, while 
functioning consciously to design and monitor plans of action. 
Implicit in the description of Freud's personality theory 
appearing above is the basis for the formation of the superego, 
which gradually evolves from the ego. It crystalizes out of 
the famed oedipal conflict and is generally believed to be 
formed by the               the phallic phase of development at 
approximately five to six years of age. The superego has two 
components. One is the conscience which places prohibitions 
upon the individual's behavior and it is the source of guilt 
feelings produced by anticipated or actual transgression of 
rules. The other is the ego-ideal and it points the way toward 
desirable behavior, which produces good feelings. Punishment 
and praise from the parents, who embody social standards, lead 
to the formation of the superego through a processs known in 
psychoanalysis as introjection. 
Proceeding with this description, it is now appropriate 
to reintroduce "the concept of identification. Hall and Lindzey 
provide an especially lucid exposition of Freud's theory. In 
a particular reference to identification, they inform as 
follows: 
The child learns to identify, that is, to match 
his behavior with the                     and prohibitions 
laid down by the parents. He introjects the moral 
imperatives of his parents by virtue of the orig-
inal cathexes he has for them as need satisfying. 
agents. He cathects their ideals and these become 
his ego-ideal; he cathects their prohibitions and 
these become his conscience. l 
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Hall and Lindzey indicate that although the parents are the 
major figures upon which identification is founded, our per-
sonalities are formed over a period of time through identifi-
cation with a number of people. Identification need not be 
total, as selected aspects of another may be incorporated on 
the basis of their appeal, which usually rests upon the extent 
to which they effect tension reduction. Identification, 
although central to moral development in psychoanalytic theory, 
also leads to personality development in non-moral areas, such 
, , I 'd ' 2 It' t' t as 1n assum1ng sex ro e 1 ent1ty. n any even , 1 1S no a 
superficial and conscious emulation of behaviors, but a complex, 
profound, and subtle unconscious process. 
Bronfenbrenner,3 upon reviewing Freud's use of the term, 
observed that it has been employed variously. Regardless of 
ICa1vin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Person-
ality, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), p. 42. 
2Martin L. Hoffman, "Moral Development" in Carmichael's 
Manual of Child Psychology, ed. P. Mussen, Vol. 1 (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1970), pp. 261-359. 
3urie Bronfenbrenner, "Freudian Theories of Identification 
and Their Derivatives," Child Development 31 (1960): 15-40. 
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this diversity of meaning, however, identification in all 
cases appears to be predicated upon an affective link to a 
human being in the real world. In contemporary psychoanalytic 
terminology it is based upon object relations. Freud sometimes 
uses the term in reference to the result· or product that 
eventuates from a process. At other times he used it to refer 
to the psychodynamic process itself. The product usage is in-
clusive of three elements. These are the overt behavior of 
the parent, an internalization of the parent's motive, and 
the parent's aspirations. The last of these is characteristic 
of Freud's later writings. It comprises the child's ego-ideal 
and is based not upon the parent's actual self, but what the 
child discerns at some level as the parent's own superego, 
" ••• his idealized standards for feeling and action."l 
As a process, Bronfenbrenner finds two distinct usages, 
less clearly separable in Freud's early writings, but emerging 
as vividly distinguishable in the later writings. The two pro-
cesses are anaclitic identification and aggressive identification. 
Freud suggests that the process of identification for the male 
has its roots in the latter, whereas in the female the roots of 
identification are in the former. The key to understanding his 
position resides in the oedipal complex. Between the ages of 
three to six the boy experiences a sexual cathexis toward the 
mother and recognizes the father as an obstacle to be eliminated, 
if he is to achieve his goal of possessing the mother. The 
1 . Ib1d, p. 22. 
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child fears retaliation from the father because of his own 
sexual wishes for the mother and murderous impulses toward 
Ehe father. He anticipates that he will be castrated. To 
avoid this fate he relinquishes the wish and identifies with 
his father, the "aggressor." This leads to tension reduction 
and ushers in the latency period with its repressed sexuality. 
However, the forbidden impulses are likely to continue at the 
repressed unconscious level.. Al though there are precursors to 
superego formation, its                         origin is the prohibition 
against incest and murder that leads, through identification, 
to the resolution of the oedipal complex. The same dynamics 
cannot apply to the little girl for she has no fear of 
castration and, hence, no motive for identifying with the 
father. She has already been castrated, in effect, given her 
lack of a penis. Freud resorted to anaclitic identification 
to explain the females identification with the mother. The 
notion of anaclitic, appearing fairly early in his writings, 
pertains to a dependency which the very young develop upon the 
nurturing person in their environment, usually the· mother. 
Freud emphasizes that the young girl experiences a fear that 
the mother's love will be lost and personal needs will not be 
met. To avoid that loss, the female identifies with the mother, 
thereby incorporating some of the mother's qualities into her-
self. By becoming more like the mother, the chances of rejection 
by her are diminished. Further, in the absence or event of 
actual loss of the love object, qualities of the mother will be 
retained since they have been incorporated into the self. 
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Bronfenbrenner notes that although Freud stressed aggressive 
identification for males, he acknowledged the possibility that 
identification with the father by the boy could have a found-
ation of affection also. As alluded to in the previous chapter, 
Freud believed that the female's process of superego formation 
leads to an incomplete and inferior moral stance. Her sense 
of morality remains forever bound to emotionality, with its 
emphasis upon affection and hostility, never achieving the 
objective and impersonal sense of justice which men become cap-
able of. In light of both Freud's and Kohlberg's position on 
female morality,                       exposition assumes crucial signi-
ficance. 
In the actual disciplining of children, they may be sub-
ject to either overtly punitive behaviors or the passive with-
holding of love. The predominance of one type of discipline 
over another could influence the type of identification process 
the child is more likely·to initiate. Hoffmanl has stated that 
contemporary thought places less emphasis on aggressive 
identification as a process leading to the internalization 
of moral standards than Freud had. In fact, he.indicates that 
it is a process more likely to lead to a hostile orientation 
toward the world than a behavioral repertoire based upon a con-
science that guides toward accepted behavior. This is likely 
to occur when the child, more often the male, is subjected to 
harsh, punitive discipline. The boy identifies with the 
aggressor, who is usually the father, and manifests the same 
1 .Hoffman, pp. 261-359. 
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overtly aggressive behaviors toward others. Behavior of this 
type has been reported in individuals held in concentration 
camps, who were completely dependent upon their                 for 
survival. It is important to distinguish, however,between 
the actually punitive behavior that children in some circurn-
stances might receive and the universal fantasy amongs·t males, 
postulated by Freud, pertaining to fear of retaliation and 
castration anxiety derived from incestuous and murderous im-
pulses. Be that as it may, Hoffman observes: 
The other type referred to as developmental 
or anaclitic identification, is based on the 
child's anxiety over the loss of the parents' 
love. To get rid of this anxiety and assure 
himself of the parents continued love, the 
child strives to become like the parent---
to incorporate everything about him including 
his moral standards and values. This type 
of identification, originally seen by Freud 
as especially characteristic of females, is 
assumed by most current writers to underlie 
the development of inner conscience in both 
sexes. 1 
In this discussion the formation of the superego is seen to be 
an outgrowth of the oedipal conflict and its resolution. Pre-
cursors to the superego antedate the phallic phase of deve1op-
mente Similarly, modifications of it will occur in subsequent 
developmental phases, although in Freud's view it will not 
undergo any essential changes once the child enters the latency 
period. Identification is the central process which produces 
the internalization of parental and social moral standards. 
As the child grows older identification with those other than 
1 Hoffman, p. 306. 
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the parent may occur. Freud's theory of personality is 
essentially different from the social learning theory about to 
be examined. It is the psychodynamic interplay of forces 
serving a causal role in the identification process that dis-
tinguishes psychoanalysis. Social learning theory postulates 
neither instincts nor an unconscious. It is not psychodynamic. 
Yet in some sense Freud's description of moral development 
involves social learning, with the parents as the socializing 
agents. 
Despite the presence of the ego-ideal as a constituent 
part of. the superego, the total internalized moral structure 
in Freud's psychology emphasizes the negative aspects of 
morality.· The superego, more often than not, is described 
as a prohibiting agency that is severe and unrealistic. One· 
goal ·of psychoanalysis, in fact, is to lessen the superego I s 
harshness and bring the necessary restraining force under the 
more realistic control of the ego. An important aim is to 
eliminate or diminish the role of irrational guilt, which has 
its historical and developmental roots in the formative period 
of the superego at the time of .the oedipal conflict. It is 
generally recognized that following latency there occurs a 
resurgence         intensification of biological drives confronting 
the adolescent with renewed sexual struggles and a heightened 
role for the superego. In most cases, maturation into adult-
hood does bring with it a lessening of the self-critical super-
ego. The positive side of an internalized moral agent is 
neglected in Freud's writings, although ·subsequent psycho-
299 
analytic theorists have attempted to correct for this without, 
however, coming up with any radical departures or innovations. 
Hoffmanl has reviewed some of their efforts. He suggests that 
the emphasis upon the negative aspects of the superego prob-
ably can be accounted for by the fact that the theories of 
classical psychoanalysis were formulated through contact with 
neurotic patients. It is his. recommendation that psychoanalytic 
theory make a concentrated effort to develop a theoretical 
foundation for positive morality which springs from motives 
other than the repression of impulses. 
Social Learning Theory 
There are two major distinguishing characteristics of 
social learning theory which stand in sharp contrast to the 
theories of Freud and Kohlberg. Social learning theory is not 
based upon a premise of developmental stages through which the 
child passes in an invariant sequence. This rejection of stage 
theory is particularly pertinent to cognitive-developmental 
·psychology since Kohlberg's entire position on the acquisition 
of moral structures is built upon the premise of invariant 
stages. A further distinction is the fact that moral motives, 
values, and behavior are derived from principles that are 
identical to learning in all other areas for the social learning 
theorist. The same mechanisms that may enable one to learn how 
to become an automobile repairman may lead to the moral attitude 
and behavior which one adopts. Only a moments reflection will 
1 Hoffman, pp. 261-359. 
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reveal how essentially qifferent this is from the way which 
Kohlberg conceives of moral development as involving a series 
of transformations of justice structures. The very concept 
of structure, itself, implies greater stability and direction-
ality than the notion of learning theory, which implies greater 
change and malleability. 
Social learning theory dismisses psychodynamic 
motivational systems as accounting for development and be-
havior. It focuses largely on situational determinants rather 
than fixed characteristics or personal dispositions. It has 
its             in behavioral learning theories, which it subsumes, 
but its enlarged scope includes a mode of learning that appears 
to be distinctively human and social. This is in contra-
distinction to radical behaviorism which maintains a theoretical 
policy of utilizing the same principles to explain all learning 
of behaving organisms with no allowance for differentiating 
between the human species and other animals. Furthermore, 
social learning theory focuses predominantly upon mediating 
cognitive variables, a practice which radical behaviorism with 
its stong environmentalist position                       eschews. In this 
sense, social learning theory is a cognitive psychology utilizing 
an information processing model to explain behavior. As pre-
viously observed, however, this. model                   neither stage 
nor structure concepts. Social learning theory accords a role 
to rewards and punishment of maintaining behavior, but does 
not view them as essential to new learning. The well known 
learning paradigms of classical conditioning and operant 
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conditioning, while integrated into social learning theory, 
do not play a paramount role. 
As a -backdrop to the discussion that will follow, I 
would like to introduce here Kohlberg's identification of five 
major assumptions made by social learning theorists about moral 
development. 
1. Moral developmen_t is growth of behavioral and 
affective conformity to moral rules rather 
than cognitive-structural change. 
2. The basic motivation for morality at every 
point of moral development is rooted in 
biological needs or the pursuit of social 
reward and avoidance of social punishment. 
3. Moral development or morality is culturally 
relative. 
4. Basic moral norms are the internalization of 
external cultural rules. 
5. Environmental influences on normal moral 
development are defined by quantitative 
variations in strength of reward, punish-
ment, and modeling of conforming behavior 
by parents and other socializing agents. l 
The major proponents of contemporary social learning 
theory are Bandura2 and Mischel3 • Bandura advances the view 
lLawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Moralization: The 
Cognitive Developmental Approach," in Moral Development and 
Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues, ed. T. Lickona 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976), p. 48. 
2Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977). 
3Walter Mischel, "Toward a Cognitive Social Learning Re-
conceptualization of personality," Psychological Review 80 
(1973): 252-83. 
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that most human learning is acquired through an observational 
process in which the observing child will later imitate the 
behavior of a model. It is both possible and cornmon for novel 
behaviors to be acquired in this vicarious fashion without 
personally receiving positive reenforcement while performing 
the behaviors. Performance by the observer, however, is not 
automatic. There occurs cognitive mediation between the time' 
the behavior is observed and the time it may be reenacted. 
There is also the significant variable of incentive. Research 
. 1 by Bandura has demonstrated that observation or modeling can 
lead to the acquisition of novel behavior·which the observer may 
refrain from performing in the absence of a promised reward, but 
readily perform when a reward is promised. This experiment makes 
a clear distinction between learning the behavior in the absence 
of reward, but requiring the expectation of reward as an incentive 
to actually performing what had been learned. Three groups were 
exposed to a film of a model engaging in a highly aggressive be-
havior. In one trial the model was rewarded, in another punished, 
and in a: third there was neither reward nor punishment. Each 
group witnessed only one of the three trials. Subsequently it 
was recorded that when given the opportunity, the group that ex-
hibited the most spontaneous imitative behavior had viewed        
model being rewardeQ. The group that demonstrated the least 
spontaneous imitative behavior had viewed the model being 
punished. Finally, the group that had observed a model who had 
lAlbert Bandura, Principles of Behavior Modification, 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969). 
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been neither punished nor rewarded proved to display an inter-
mediary frequency of imitative behavior. Following this, all 
members of the three               were                   attractive rewards 
if they would perform the behaviors they had observed. This 
time there were no group differentials among-st the members as 
each group displayed the same frequency of imitative behavior. 
It appears that reenforcement is not necessary for learning be-
havior, but the anticipation of it is instrumental in promoting 
performance of behavior that has been learned. Bandura con-
cludes: 
Findings of the foregoing experiment, and 
others reviewed later suggest that the be-
havior analysis advocated by proponents of 
the Skinnerian approach might further advance 
understanding of modeling processes if it 
were separated into a learning analysis and 
a performance analysis. The learning analysis 
is concerned with the manner in which vari-
ables operating at the time of exposure to 
modeling stimuli determine the degree to 
which the modeled behavior is learned. The 
performance analysis, on the other hand, is 
concerned with factors governing persons' 
willingness to perform what they have 
learned. 1 
In the experiment that has been described it is apparent that 
pure observation of the aggressive behavior did not influence 
the children's frequency of spontaneous behavior. Cognitive 
mediation occurred in which information concerning the rei·ward 
and punishment system was processed. For example, observing 
a model being punished was processed in such a way as to in-
hibit imitation of the aggressive behavior, even though it was 
1 Bandura, Principles of Behavior Modification, p. 129. 
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subsequently discovered that the behavior had been acquired. 
Later, when the expectancy of reward or                     was intro-
duced, this verbal information was processed internally with 
a resulting increase in performance of the previously observed 
behavior. Hence, in social learning theory, reenforcement is 
seen largely as playing an antecedent role, in terms of 
expectancy of reward, as opposed to emphasis upon its con-
sequent function. Upon the observance of modeling, symbolic 
representation is generated which then guides performance. 
Learning by modeling is analyzed into four elements by Bandura. 
They are as follows: attentional processes, retention pro-
cesses, motor reproduction processes, and motivational pro-
cesses. Attentional processes bear on what spec.ifically is 
attended to and selected out for information processing from 
the total scene being observed. As a prior consideration, one 
can only attend what is available so that the behaviors of 
the people in the environment will both supply and delimit what 
will be observed. Retentional processes call into play facets 
of memory which entail symbolic representation. Imagery and 
verbal s¥.IDhols are,                       't::-Q. promoting,                       which 
will later facilitate performance. Also included' in this 
dimension is mental rehearsal which serves as a prelude to 
efficient behavior. The preceding skills are                     first 
cognitively and then translated motorically into a spatio-
temporal matrix as performance is executed. An incongruity 
between symbolic representation and behavioral features is 
the basis for feedback which sets in motion a self-corrective 
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process aiming to eliminate the discrepancy. A motivational 
component is necessary to account for the fact that not all 
acquired learning is carried out behaviorally. Bandura notes 
that when observed models enact behavior leading to results 
valued by the observer, then the ohserve·r i-s 1tlore likely to 
imitate the behavior than if it clearly leads to undesirable 
results. Effective outcomes by modeled behavior is predictive 
of the observers likelihood of imitating it. Information pro-
cessing is a rational procedure and, although, it utilizes a 
motivational component, this version should not be confused 
with the unconscious determinants of behavior postulated by 
psychoanalytic theory. In summary, Bandura comments: liThe 
failure of an                   to match the behavior of a model may 
result from any of the follow: not observing the relevant 
activities, inadequately coding modeled events for memory 
representation, failing to retain what was learned, physical 
inability to perform, or experiencing insufficient incentives. IiI 
A significant variable bearing on whether imitation will follow 
observation. bears upon the attributes of the model. Those 
models perceived as nurturant, powerful, and in control of the 
reward system are more likely to be imitated than those models 
lacking such attributes. The potential impact of parents as 
prevalent models in the natural environment is evident from 
these observations. 
lBandura, Social Learning Theory, p. 29. 
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A crucial question deals with what actually is learned 
through vicarious observational experience. According to 
Mischel and Mischel l , modeling does not simply lead to 
atomistic responses, but to the construction of rules and 
skills which enable the observer to behave in related situations 
in a novel and competent manner. The learning derived from 
observation- includes symbolic mentation such as concepts and 
abstract principles. In addition, the observer learns through 
modeling what to anticipate from performing certain kinds of 
behavior. A knowledge of the probable outcome of particular 
behaviors will significantly influence whether the_observer is 
likely to carry out such behaviors as he has seen the model 
perform. Armed with newly acquired rule-governing behavior 
and informed expectancies about outcomes, the observer's learning 
through observation does not result in mere slavish imitation of 
the model. The link to the environment is never lost by social 
learning theorists, despite the emphasis upon cognitive media-
tional variables. Rosen-thaI and Zimmerman comment upon this, 
as follows: n ••• cognitive coding is treated as a learned skill 
or rule that can be cued by environmental stimuli. Thus, 
although there is hypothesis-formation during learning, the 
rules                       hypotheses to be generated and tested can be 
IWalter Mischel and Harriet Mischel, Essentials of 
Psychology, (New York: Random House, 1977). 
traced to previous environmental experiences and usage 
norms. "I 
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Learning through observation is a highly                     and 
economical way to acquire new behaviors. It is quite adaptive 
in contrast to         successive approximation model of Skinner-
ian psychology. In that model it is necessary to await the 
organism's spontaneous emanation of a behavior that moves it 
toward the ultimate behavioral goal. Each time a behavior of 
the desired type is made it is then reenforced, increasing the 
likelihood that it will be repeated rather than behavior that 
is further from the goal. There is a continuous process of 
shaping the organism's behavior in this fashion with the re-
suIt that the behavior increasingly approaches the goal and 
eventually reaches it. In Bandura's modeling paradigm, novel 
behavior is acquired without any such prolonged and arduous 
process as successive approximation being necessary. It is 
not even required that the new behavior be moderately novel, 
as postulated in the Piagetian paradigm, since there is no 
stage or structure to which it must be assimilated. The 
,cognitive mediating variable, which is analyzed by Bandura in 
meticulous detail, is what accounts for these leaps in learning. 
In general, his model is a powerful one. Applying it specifi-
cally to the moral area, it can be readily appreciated that 
ITed L. Rosenthal and Barry J. Zimmerman, Social Learning 
and Cognition (New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 30 
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learning both prosocial and anti-social behaviors will be 
largely contingent upon modeling. 
Bandura escapes the strict environmental determinism of 
traditional behaviorism by introducing the notion of reciprocal 
determinism. In this context, reciprocal refers to the mutuality 
of action that takes place between event·s in the milieu and 
does not have the connotation it carries in Piaget's epistemology. 
Bandura points out the paradox, perhaps inconsistency, in 
Skinnerian psychology which adopts a position of environmental 
determinism, but proceeds to advocate that individuals rearrange 
their own reenforcing contingencies so as to create the type of 
society they prefer. Bandura, with greater consistency, asserts 
that individuals both are shaped by their environment and through 
self-generating behaviors also shape their environment. The 
newly modified environment will in turn partly determine their 
behavior further, to which individuals will again respond by 
modifying the environment further. In a succinct formulation, 
Bandura stresses: "Contrary to the unidirectional view, human 
accomplishments result from reciprocal interaction of external 
                            with a.host of personal determinal)t/?, including 
endowed potentialities, acquired competencies, reflective thought, 
and a high level of self-init·iative ... l Thus an individual is both 
shaped by his environment and contributes to shaping that very 
IBandura, Social Learning Theory, p. 207. 
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environment which shapes him. By avoiding a rigid unidirec-
tional version of environmental determinism, Bandura imparts 
a mea-sure of freedom as a creator to the individual in his 
paradigm without sacrificing scientific respectability. Both 
Bandura and Mischel, as prototypical cognitive social learning 
theorists, stress the self-regulating capacity of the in-
dividual. They focus upon self-control in long range planned 
behavior as opposed only to a grasp of principled -judgment. 
Mischell correctly states that ultimately morality will have 
no impact in the real world if the individual lacks the ability 
to regulate his behavior in order to achieve principled goals. 
Each person generates, based on early and recent experiences, 
his own internal standards. He can be self-critical and set 
goals that he expects his own behavior to achieve. Further-
more, contributing to self-regulation is the individual's 
anticipation of the consequences and rewards of contemplated 
behavior. Hence, even in the absence of current external rein-
forcement, the individual may exercise self-reinforcement. 
sometimes the internal reinforcing mechanism may oppose and 
take priority over a present external reinforcement. Children 
do not always yield to impulse and are capable of placing 
restraint upon immediately gratifying behavior. This is 
especially likely to occur after observing models who use high 
              Mischel and Harriet N. Mischel, "A Cognitive Social-
Learning Approach to Morality and Self-Regulation," in Moral De-
velo ment and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues, ed. 
T. Lickona (New York: Holt, R1nehart & Winston, 1976 , pp. 84-107. 
310 
standards of self-evaluation and place similarly high 
standards upon the children. Once having set a goal, covert 
symbolic mentation is instrumental in reaching it through 
periodically supplying praise to one's own self and offering 
internal instructions. Upon achieving the goal one may further 
reinforce the efforts expended through self-acknowledgement of 
a job well done. Clearly the cognitive social learning theorists 
expound a humanized paradigm which, although encompassing 
environmental-stimuli, avoids the mechanistic model of those 
who rely exclusively upon classical and                 conditioning. 
Mische11 has been especially critical of trait and psycho-
dynamic theories which assume that there are broad internalized 
dispositions accounting for behavior across a wide diversity of 
situations. In the case of trait theory the approach is more 
direct. For example, honesty is construed as a personality 
trait which will be manifest in all situations even though the 
circumstances may be very different.- In psychodynamic theory, 
the approach is indirect. Recognizing an apparent variation of 
behaviors across different situations, many clinicians will infer 
an underlying motivational disposition which has produced de-
fensive_ maneuvers accounting for the superficial diversity. 
The real-meaning of the sympotomatic behavior-has been disguised. 
Neither trait nor psychodynamic interpretations of personality 
are acceptable to social learning theorists, who maintain 
1Walter Mischel, If Toward a Cognitive Learning Reconcept-
ualization of Personality," Psychological Review 80 (1973): 
252-83. 
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that both correlation and experimental research fail to 
confirm them. At the same time, Mischel agrues strongly that 
social learning theory has been                               as maintaining 
that the situation is the main determinant of behavior and that 
there is no consistency within the individual. For Mischel, 
the question of whether the individual or the situation is more 
important is not a fruitful one. He suggests, instead that: 
••• what a person does tends to be relatively 
specific 'to a host of variables, and that 
behavior .is multiply determined by all of 
them rather than being the product of widely 
generalized dispositions ••• To say that what 
a person thinks, and does, and feels--and 
hence what he is at any moment--depends on 
many subject and condition variables is also 
to underline the complexity and uniqueness 
of his behavior. l 
Applying the above generic commentary on internalized disposi-
tions to the familiar moral issue of honesty versus cheating, 
Mischel elaborates specifically: 
When the probable reinforcing consequences to 
the person for cheating, waiting, or working 
differ widely across situations depending on 
the particular task of circumstances, the be-
havior of others, the likelihood of detection, 
the probable consequences of being caught, 
the frustration induced, the value of success 
etc., impressive generality will not be found. 2 
Mischel's plea in behavioral assessment is for a much more highly 
individualized approach to understanding the interface between 
lIbid., p. 256. 
2Ibid., p. 259. 
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person and situation. A more finely grained analysIs of 
specific classes of situations must be made and the idiosyncratic 
meanings of stimuli to individuals under the circumstances ex-
perienced should be sought. The explanatory and predictive 
value of generalized internal dispositions is low in comparison 
·to the type of assessment recommended by Mischel. It is evident 
that social learning theory as delineated here does not favor a 
concept of an internalized conscience that provides moral com-
mands and prohibitions leading to consistency across a diversified 
range of                       •. Similarly, it does not accept a              
structure theory to account for consistenty of moral judgment 
and predictability qf behavior. 
Although psychoanalytic theory and cognitive-developmental 
psychology do not share a common motivational foundation, the 
tendency is toward effecting a rapprochment based upon an in-
tegration of their affective and cognitive foci respectively. 
To the contrary, social learning theorists have mounted a frontal 
assault upon the work of both Piaget and Kohlberg. Rosenthal 
and Zimmermanl are in the forefront· of this attack, devoting 
considerable attention intp_eir recent volume       criticizing 
structuralism. They begin by disregarding the structuralists' 
insistence that their view of development is                                
constructivist, and auto-regulative. Rosenthal and Zimmerman 
summarily dismiss this characterization, contending instead that 
1 Ted L. Rosenthal and Barry J. Zimmerman, Social Learning 
              and Cognition (New York: Academic Press, 1978). 
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Piaget's and Koh1berg's theories are nativistic, following 
fixed internal patterns that rely only minimally on experience. 
They even go so far as to quote Furth, unquestionably a superb 
Piagetian scholar, as asserting that structures are at no time 
external and later internalized. What they ignore, however, 
is the 'crucia1 role of overt action upon things in the environ-
ment by the epistemic subject, first during the sensorimotor 
period and later during the following periods. These overt 
actions are, in fact, interiorized and lead to increasingly 
more complex developmental levels of knowledge about reality. 
The structures that promote a knowledge of reality and are 
constructed by the child's own activity, both internal and upon 
the environment, do not appear de novo. They are not innate 
as suggested by a nativistic label. Neither do they appear on 
a maturational basis, a common misconception, following a 
preset time-table. The pace of growth may be either retarded 
or accelerated depending upon environmental opportunities. There 
may be significant differences in the rates of growth amongst 
children exposed to the same general environment. Social trans-
mission and physical experience play important roles in cognitive-
developmental psychology, as does the auto-regulation of these 
activities. Maturation is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition. The very mechanism through which stage transition 
is said to occur relies heavily upon feedback from the environ-
ment to produce cognitive conflict leading to the reorganization 
of structures. Of course, Rosenthal and Zimmerman are aware of 
this, but prefer to minimize its significance, maintaining that 
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Piaget and Kohlberg have inaccurately characterized their own 
positions. It is interesting that they fuse Chomsky, the 
famed psycholinguist, together with Piaget in their critique 
of structuralism, which they call nativistic. While it is 
true that both are structuralists, the innate baseline of 
linguistic structures marks Chomsky's approach as significantly 
different from the constructivist philosophy that is central 
to Piaget's genetic epistemology. This unwillingness to make 
appropriate discriminations between two elements which are 
alike, admittedly, in some major respect, but essentially 
di,fferent in another major respect, is unbecoming theorists, 
whose own adopted paradigm calls for such precision like dis-
tinctions. Rosenthal and Zimmerman seem to suggest further 
that Piaget's theory must be nativistic because of its biological 
origins. However, Freudian psychology also has biological 
origins and the plasticity of instincts, 'perhaps more appro-
priately referred to as drives, is well known. None of this is 
to deny the truth that the influence of experience in Piaget's 
theory is delimited by the structural level of development to 
which it is assimilated. In their discussion on structuralism, 
Rosenthal and Zimmerman introduce the Piagetian task of con-
servation. They point out that the Geneva School exercises 
stringent criteria to determine a genuine conservation judgment. 
For example, one criteria is that the competence at conservation 
must be durable and not sQbject to abandonment upon counter-
suggestion. Therefore, if a child is trained experimentally to 
make conservation judgments which, however, are easily relin-
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quished upon countersuggestion so that the child goes back to 
making nonconservation judgments, Piaget would deny that he 
had truly acquired the structures undergirding conservation. 
It can be demonstrated that natural conservers are, in fact, 
·resistant to any such countersuggestion and will persist in 
making conservation judgments even when an experimenter 
attempts to trick them. In their effort to discredit Piaget's 
theory, Rosenthal and Zimmerman dismiss this distinction, along 
with other essential criteria, as inconsequential. In general, 
social learning theory maintains that the acquisition of new 
learning is much more influenced by experience than cognitive-
developmental psychology would allow. There is no necessity 
to gradually proceed through a locked step sequence of stages 
and it is posited, therefore, that radically new learning can 
take place in a very brief span of time. The Geneva School 
does make a distinction between narrow learning and structural 
development, however, and it is one which those favoring other 
schools often fail to appreciate. Rosenthal and Zimmerman 
assert: 
From a social learning standpoint, neither 
moral nor conservation judgments enjoy a 
privileged status. Both involve decision 
making in some                 and are expected 
to respond to social influence, as are 
language and other classes of rule-
governed behavior. In many cases, 
governing rules can often be abstracted 
from information conveyed by social ex-
emplars. The cognitive gains will hinge 
on the observer's prior level of skill 
related task's, on the clarity of the 
teaching procedures, and on the learner's 
inferences about the value and relevance 
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of the new guidelines modeled. l 
Rosenthal and Zimmerman emphasize the muitiplicity of 
variables that converge in any given situation to influence 
the e"thical conduct of an individual. It is their position 
that the homogeneity of behavior that an internalized stable 
conscience or moral structure would predict simply overlooks 
the highly intricate and discriminating balance that enters 
into ethical decision-making in any given situation. They 
advocate a view which emphasizes greater heterogeneity and 
discrimination in "the exercise of moral rules with the passage 
of age for children rather than a fixed typology. They believe 
that the acquisition of morality and the capacity to generalize 
across situations, to the extent that this occurs, is based 
more upon learning cognitive skills which form a foundation for 
" -subsequent skills. In a sense, their interpretation is a 
highly pragmatic one, in that the efficiency of a moral rule 
will determine whether the child will revert back to use of a 
former one or continue with the present one. It is asserted 
that social learning theory is exceptional amongst theories in 
its explanatorypowe:t; linking. moral judgment and behavior. 
The social matrix within which the moral agent acts will exercise 
a great influence upon the ethical character of his·conduct. 
For example, a student who forthrightly states he failed a 
final examination because he had not studied, is likely to elicit 
little sympathy and would probably fail the course. In contrast, 
lIbid., p. 151. 
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the circumstances readily allow him to communicate that he had 
tried to study, but became ill and was in pain throughout the 
eveQing before the final. He might readily predict that from 
doing this he will not be found out and may well be offered a 
reexamination. On the other hand, if he is observed breaking 
into another person's locker and walking off with the other 
student's books, knowing that there are several witnesses, he 
may be more likely to tell the truth and place himself in con-
trite fashion at the mercy of the authorities. 
Tbere exists a series of three articles in which dialogue 
takes place around an experiment conducted by Bandura and 
1 HcDonald who sought to modify the Piagetian moral judgment 
sequence through social reinforcement and modeling. It is 
revealing to explore at some length because it presents an 
opportunity to witness minds from the two schools of thought 
in relation to one another. It should be noted that Bandura 
and McDonald" are critical not only of stage theories, but also 
of traditional learning theories for failing to adequately 
explain complex social behavior and instead relying upon the 
reductionistic concepts of simple learning principles. The 
experiment to be discussed involved two Piagetian moral stages 
in which children under seven base culpability of a person upon 
lAlbert Bandura and Frederick J. McDonald, "Influence of 
Social Reinforcement and the Behavior of Models in Shaping 
Children's Moral Judgments," Journal of Abnormal "Psychology 67 
(l963): 274-81. 
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the objective damage of his actions and children around seven 
or higher base culpability upon a consideration of subjectivity 
or intentions. Children from ages 5 to 11 were read pairs of 
stories, each one entailing a child who deliberately does 
something wrong, but with only .small consequent damage, and 
a child who innocently, either while trying to be helpful or 
by accident, 'produces considerable damage. The children were 
asked who was the naughtier of the two in each pair and they 
were required to give reasons for their selection. This phase 
constituted the                 and resulted in the children being 
classified as having given either predominantly objective 
judgments, bas.ing culpability upon degree of damage, or sub-
jective judgments, basing culpability upon intentions. There 
were 165 children of both sexes. The stories read to them 
were adopted from Piaget's protocols in some instances, while 
others were designed for the occasion. The treatment phase of 
the experiment utilized 84 children, as only 48 children could 
be singled out as being predominantly subjective and 3.6 as 
being predominantly objective. Upon being redistributed into 
three treatment groups there was a balance regarding age and 
sex arrived at by the experimenters. In one group an experimenter 
read twelve pairs of stories to a model and a child. The first 
story would be read to the model and second story to the child. 
All the stories were read in this alternating fashion. The 
model would deliberately make a judgment contrary to the known 
classification of the child. Thus, if it was known that a 
particular child had given predominantly subjective responses 
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in the pretest, then the model would make an objective judg-
ment in the presence of that child. The experimenter would 
consistently give verbal reinforcement to the adult model. 
He would also provide such reinforcement to the child, when-
ever the subject would reverse his baseline judgment and 
adopt the model's. A second group of children was exposed to 
the same experimental condition with the exception that none 
of the children received verbal reinforcement. In the third 
group the children were not exposed to a model at all. However, 
each child received verbal reinforcement whenever making a judg-
ment that was opposite to the predominant response he had made 
during the pretest. Approximately two weeks expired between 
the pretest and the treatment phase. A posttest was conducted 
immediately after the treatment phase, but it took place in a 
different room, without the presence of a model. An experi-
menter unknown to each child presented new pairs of stories to 
see if there had occurred any shift in the type of judgment 
and rationale the children would make. The treatment conditions 
provided an opportunity to identify the effects of modeling and 
social reinforcement combined, modeling without reinforcement 
for the child, and reinforcement in the absence of a model. 
In an" analysis of the results, Bandura and McDonald point 
out that even amongst the youngest children there appeared 
about a 30 percent rate of subjective judgments at the pretest. 
Furthermore, amongst the older children there was found a 
diversity of amounts of" objective judgments at the pretest. 
The two treatment groups in which children observed models made 
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significant posttest gains in moving from subjective to 
objective responses. However,               in the group of children 
which did not receive                               but only observed the 
model, who was reinforced, was. as significant as in the group 
in which children were reinforqed in addition to watching the 
model, who was reinforced. In other words, the modeling per 
se appeared to be the critical variable and not direct reinforce-
ment of the child. This is further supported by the fact that 
in the treatment group which did not observe a model, although 
the children did receive social reinforcement, there was only 
a               increase in objective responses. The increase was not 
statistically significant. 
What conclusions do Bandura and McDonald arrive at from 
these findings that are relevant to this discussion on social 
learning theory and cognitive-developmental moral stage theory? 
First, they contend that a clear cut demarcation of the stages 
is not supported, as discrimination of moral judgment repre-
senting both subjective and objective responses were.found to 
coexist across all ages. They argue that the apparent malle-
ability of the Piagetian stages delimits its potency as a 
conceptual tool and that the results of the treatment procedure 
emphasize how powerful the modeling .phenomenon is for effecting 
change in social behavior which acquires stability. The 
stability or generalization factor is based upon the posttest 
which,                   taking place immediately after the treatment 
procedure, did occur in a different physical ·environment and 
social milieu, i.e. took place in another room in the presence 
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of people not previously involved. The reversal of Piagetian 
stage sequence, that is moving in the direction of going from 
subjective to objective responses, is something that Bandura 
and McDonald set out to demonstrate could occur under the 
condition of introducing appropriate modeling cues. Similiarly 
they· had hoped to prove that                     type moral judgments 
were less age-specific than Piaget, as interpreted by them, had 
thought. 
There is a general propensity in human affairs to judge 
others more by their overt behavior, while taking into account 
psychological causation more readily when judging one's own be-
havior. This is understandable since our own inner world, at 
least the conscious portion, is primary data to us, whereas 
information abo.ut other people's inner world must rely on our 
inference or their communication. In the world of scholarship 
there seems to be a comparable phenomenon in operation. 
Theorists from school x always appear to capture the richness, 
depth, and subtlety of their own approach. Yet when it comes 
to representing an alternate approach, particularly if it is 
in opposition, those enhancing qualities are omitted and an 
oversimplified, sometimes even distorted or caricatured, version 
appears. Piaget, in his references to learning theory has not 
escaped this pitfall, and it is not likely that many have. 
Certainly Bandura and McDonald in their characterization of 
Piaget's position on moral judgments have not. To begin with, 
their rather atomistic treatment, not surprisingly as it comes 
from the behavioristic camp, of an essentially holistic theory 
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does not exactly do justice to it. They fail to make the dis-
tinction that Piaget himself does, between the more rigorously 
stage-like progression of basic cognitive-structural develop-
ment and the development of moral judgment discussed in his 
early work. It is Kohlberg, greatly refining Piaget's work on 
moral development, who has stressed stage sequence in this area. 
Coincidentally, Kohlberg's findings were first published in 
the same year ,that Bandura and McDonald published their experi-
ment.                   this explains why they chose to conduct their 
experiment on Piaget's observations about moral judgment              
than Kohlberg's theory       the'time, it does not account for 
their misinterpretation of Piaget's studies on moral judgment. 
Piaget did not claim age specificity for the two stages he 
discovered, nor did he indicate that one was clearly demarcated 
from the other in the course of the child's growth. He did 
speak of a comingling of the two stages with an increase of 
intentional judgments over time and a diminution of objective 
judgments occurring simultaneously. In his own words, Piaget 
states the following: 
Thus these answers present us with two distinct 
moral attitudes--one that judges actions ac-
cording to their material consequences, and 
one that only takes intentions into account. 
These two attitudes may co-exist at the same 
age and even iri the same child, but broadly 
speaking, they do not synchronize. Objective 
responsibility diminishes on the average as 
the child grows older, and subjective' re-
sponsibility gains correlatively in importance. 
We have therefore two processes partially over-
lapping, but of which the second gradually 
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succeeds in dominating the first. l 
The above characterization by Piaget hardly bears a close 
resemblance to the age-specific and clearly demarcated stages 
which Bandura and McDonald ascribe to his moral theory. The 
demarcation is said, by Bandura and McDonald, to be applied 
at approximately 7 years of age by Piaget. Yet the Genevan 
scholar comments: "Nearly all the children under 9-10, while 
paying full tribute to the thief's intentions, consider the 
theft of the roll and the cage a more culpable act both from 
a police and from a moral point of view than that of the 
ribbon or the sweet.,,2 The fact that children may recognize 
intentions, yet not utilize them in making moral judgments is 
a variable which Bandura and McDonald do not ever touch upon 
although it hardly appears to be a trivial distinction. They 
simply maintain that for Piaget, young children were, for the 
most part, incapable of adopting a subjective outlook. 
While alluding to the reciprocity and cooperation which 
Piaget cites as instrumental in leading to subjective moral 
judgments, which take into account intentions, Bandura and 
McDonald deemphasize the role Piaget ascribes to the social 
environment and stress the ontogenetic factor. There can be no 
question that Piaget's theory deals with the ontogenesis of 
1Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, trans. M. 
Gabain (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 133. Originally 
published, 1932. 
2piaget, p. 134. 
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cognitive and moral structuration. However, it is essential 
to bring into prominence once again that his theory is inter-
actionist and the organism's exchanges with the social com-
ponent of its milieu is deemed vital. Can this be unclear 
after contemplating the passage by Piaget which follows: 
HOw, then, does subjective responsibility 
appear and develop within the limited do-
main we are analyzing at present? There is 
no doubt·that by adopting a certain technique 
with their children, parents can succeed in 
making them attach more importance to in-
tentions than to rules conceived as a system 
of ritual interdictions •••• It is when the 
child is accustomed to act from the point 
of view of those around him, when he tries 
to please rather than to obey, that he will 
judge in terms of intentions. So that 
taking intentions into account presupposes 
cooperation and mutual respect. l 
One can only wonder if justice has been done to Piaget's theory 
by Bandura's and McDonald's delineation of it. 
The Bandura and McDonald experiment has become the center 
of a controversy revolving around the issue of whether its 
apparent modeling effects disprove Piaget's stage theory. Pro-
ponents of social learning theory believe that it does, whereas 
those of the cognitive-organismic school believe that it does 
not offer a true test of ·Piaget's theory even though its find-
ings. may be significant in their own right. Cowan, Langer, Heav-
enrich, and Nathanson2 point out that success in reversing a se-
quence under laboratory conditions does not disprove that a par-
ticular sequence develops in the natural environment. In the 
lpiaget, p. 137. 
2philip Cowan et al., "Social Learning and Piaget's 
Cognitive Theory of Moral Development," Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 11 (1969): 261-74. 
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experiment under dispute, individual subj'ects went' from 
evidencing approximately 20 percent, at the pretest, of the 
responses that did not predominate to 50 percent at the post-
test. Cowan et. al.'do not accept that an even split of 
judgments signifies a structural change, such as from sUbjective 
to objective orientations, as much as it might signify a state 
of confusion. It is quite conceivable that changes in either 
direction might reflect a tendency toward conformity, possibly 
to seek approval. Lickonal attempted to promote developmental 
progression in children predominantly utilizing objective 
responsibility judgments by designing an experiment with four 
different training procedures. He was interested in identifying 
variables that could account for structural stage shifts. 
One technique was aimed at facilitating the children's ability 
to distinguish between motives and consequences, while                
both in mind simultaneously. A second involved placing children 
in the presence of adults whose judgments contradicted each 
others, as well as their own. It was expected that this would 
eliminate a single and unvarying message from the adult, which 
could be slavishly imitated. Another method was to instruct 
the children directly that intentional judgments were the cor-
rect ones. Instructions were accompanied by explanations. In 
this condition the adult's view was clear and unequivocal. 
lThomas Lickona, "Research on Piaget's Theory of Moral 
Development" in Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research, 
and Social Issues, ed. T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston, 1976), pp. 219-40. 
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The fourth procedure paired one subjective with one objective 
child. Debate was.stimulated between them. The goal in setting 
up this peer interaction, which Piaget has placed such credence 
in, was to diminish the egocentrism of the children who made 
objective responses and to enable them to more readily take 
the other's perspective. The children, six and seven year olds, 
made substantial gains in making intentional judgments as a 
result of the training procedures. The gains were found to be 
stable at the end of one month, except for the group that had 
been exposed to the adults making contradictory judgments. In 
particular, there was an increase to subjective responses of 
60                 in children who engaged in peer interaction. Those 
children who had been making predominantly subjective judgments 
before placed in the peer interaction group did not show any 
shift at all toward an increase in objective judgments. Lickona 
concluded on the basis of this, that change apparently took 
place in the direction that growth normally follows. Further, 
he infers from his results that where change occurs in the re-
verse direction, such as in the experiment by Bandura and 
McDonald, it can be accounted for by the child's conformity to 
adult influence, rather than a structural regression. The peer 
interaction eliminates the variable of an adult and it is under 
this condition that movement is found in only one direction. 
There are many examples in the               School tradition of 
training studies in which verbai responses         modified to 
ostensibly reflect the next highest stage in cognitive develop-
ment. However, upon analysis the techniques prove not to have 
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promoted genuine comprehension or durable gains. One of 
smedslund'sl several classic conservation experiments provides 
a superb illustration of this. Hence, when Bandura and 
McDonald suggest that they induced precocious moral develop-
ment going from objective to subjective judgments, one must 
be wary of how substantial the· gains are through the modeling 
procedures utilized until they are put to the same stringent 
tests that the Genevans demand of themselves. Cowan et al. are 
inclined to conclude, following a searching analysis that: 
"Bandura and McDonald have not always stated Piaget's position 
accurately and have not provided definitive                       to assess 
stages or changes in stages of moral                               They also 
suggest that Piaget and the social learning theorists have 
perhaps not been attending the same phenomena and have been 
measuring whaot they are attending in different ways. 
Cowan et a1. 3 attempted a replicated study of the Bandura 
and McDonald experiment. They introduced some variation to 
enlarge upon the findings, but they remained true to the social 
learning formulation of the research, deliberately not rede-
signing the experiment the way one might to truly test Piagetian 
lJans Smedslund, liThe Acquisition of Conservation Sub-
stance and Weight in Children. III Extinction of Conservation 
of Weight Acquired 'Normally' and by Means of Empirical Controls 
on a Balance Scale, II Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 2 (1961): 
85-87. 
2Cowan et al., p. 264. 
3cowan et al. 
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stage development. Their findings were in support of the 
changes that had been reported by Bandura and McDonald and 
attributed to the modeling procedures. Their interpretation 
of course, was not in accord with the researchers of the 
original experiment, as is undoubtedly obvious in view of much 
of the preceeding discussion. Although they found that adult 
modeling, indeed, does have the power to induce moral judgment 
shifts in either direction, .they raised question about the 
meaning of these changes. r The Bandura and McDonald study per-
formed a posttest immediately after the treatment procedures. 
Cowan et al.                     a second posttest two weeks after the 
experimental techniques were implemented. The findings were 
exceedingly important and were not revealed by the design of 
the original experiment which this replicated. Those children 
whose shift had been from objective judgments to subjective 
judgments were discovered to have continued increasing in that 
direction. Contrary to this,             subjects whose responses 
had been modified from·subjective toward objective judgments 
had begun to revert back to their pretraining position of 
making predominantly subj·ecti ve responses. In other words, there 
was a prevailing tendency for change in the natural direction to 
continue, whereas change in a backward direction, once the· 
artificial modeling ques were removed, declined. Cowan et ale 
highlight the                       of social learning theory in ex-
plaining this differential effect. Similar findings to that 
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just cited were uncovered by LeFurgy and Woloshin1 in an 
experiment with adolescents utilizing Kohlberg's moral dilemma 
stories. 
One of the most striking refutations made by Cowan et a1. 
of the vicarious or observational learning position is that 
objective judgments do predominate at the lower ages despite 
the presumed tendency on the part of adults to neither model 
nor reinforce objective moral responses. They point out that 
if one contends that adults do model and reinforce such be-
havior, it would be difficult to explain the readily verifiable 
age trend from objective to sUbjective judgments. 2 Bandura, 
in a response to Cowan et al., rejects the suggestion that 
adults relate toward their children in an invariant manner; 
instead he finds them quite variable depending upon the many 
facets of the circumstances obtaining in any given situation. 
He also emphasizes that peer models have a considerable impact 
upon growing children with the result that they are often ex-
posed to conflicting standards. Bandura's rebuttal to Cowan 
et ale was formulated by invitation and provides a succinct 
1 w. S. LeFurgy and G. W. Woloshin, "Immediate and Long-
Term Effects of Experimentally Induced Social Influence in the 
Modidication of Adolescents' Moral Judgments," Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology 12 (1969): 104-10. 
2 Albert Bandura, "Social Learning of Moral Judgments," 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 11 (1969): 275-83. 
330 
refinement of some key social learning principles. The on-
going debate between structuralists and social learning 
theorists-will surely not be resolved here, nor       it likely 
to achieve resolution in the near future. There certainly 
exist fundamental differences which are perhaps ultimately 
irreconcilable. The clash between them, nevertheless, is to 
be regarded as a desirable dialectic, for as a result both 
are forced to continuously strengthen and sharpen their positions. 
Indeed, paradoxical as it may seem, each-school pursues re-
search vigorously and makes major contributions to the growth 
of scientific knowledge. It may well be true, as Alfred White-
head has said, that a clash of opinions is not a catastrophe, 
but an opportunity. 
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Chapter Eight 
CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES FOR INTERVENTION 
Neither Piaget nor Kohlberg had set out to deliver theory 
or techniques for practice to the helping professions. Yet it 
was inevitable that the cognitive-structural approach to develop-
ment would generate new ways of conceiving practice and action 
models for carrying them out. There does not exist a single 
monolithic technique for guiding all practice, but instead a 
diversity of ideas for application has gradually been emerging 
from several related sources, all deriving from a sociocognitive 
or moral developmental paradigm. The present chapter is designed 
to introduce some of the most suggestive and promising attempts 
at applying those ideas that have appeared thus far. In pre-
senting this material I have classified each of the approaches 
under one of three perspectives: the psychodynamic, the inter-
personal, and the organizational. There is no doubt that in 
each case an argument could be made for classifying a particular 
approach under another category. The distinctions are a matter 
of emphasis and sometimes subtle. Nevertheless, I have 
adopted this formulation in the hope that it will impart at 
least a shade more of understanding as the reader encounters 
the material. 
Kegan has been classified under the psychodynamic, per-
spective both because that seems to be his own preference and 
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because of the special phenomenological focus his work re-
flects,in discussing the developing person. Abroms is viewed 
within an interpersonal matrix because of the emphasis he gives 
to the dialectic between the therapist's developmental stage 
and that of the client. Selman and Chandler are also both 
classified under the interpersonal perspective and this is so 
because of the attention they pay to promoting the ability to 
see the other person's viewpoint and the effect this has on 
one's relationships and interpersonal behavior. Lastly, be-
cause the intervention by Kohlberg and his collaborators is 
explicitly intended to'effect the 'climate and structure of 
organizations such as schools and prisons, their work is pre-
sen ted within the organizational pers,pe'ctive. 
The Psychodynamic Perspec'tive 
Keganl has attempted to elaborate upon the Piagetian 
system, integrating affective components, to emerge with an 
impressive and striking theory of personality. The central 
concept which proves to be the key to unlocking a comprehensive 
personality theory from the system is equilibration. The equi-
librating process that undergird-s an ongoing activity in which 
the self is taken through a                         of self-other disengaging 
and rebalancing stages is the major theme winding through 
lRobert Kegan, "Ego and Truth: Personality and The Piaget 
Paradigm" (Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1977). 
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Kegan's extensions of Piaget and Kohlberg. Equilibration 
as seen from the outside is descriptive 'of the cognitive aspect, 
but the "self-constituting meaning making" constituent of 
equilibration is the phenomenological feeling aspect. Kegan, 
in his formulation, feels that his approach is an interactionist 
one, escaping a mere intra-psychic focus. Consider his rather 
bold statement, as' follows: 
Each re-equilibration of a'person's self-
other balance brings the equilibrative 
whole into greater balance, and -- out-
rageous as it must sound -- changes the 
world. The importance of saying so is 
to stress that such transformation does 
not gO'on only in someone's head, but 
means something to the balance of the 
universe, and most immediately to those 
persons and social organizations which 
people that individual's other. l 
The helper who concentrates upon facilitating the equilibrating 
process in the individual will of necessity be involved in the 
social matrix. The traditional focus of social work practice, 
the interface between person and environment, will not shift 
to an intra-psychic one by adopting a developmental psycho-
dynamic perspective. Further, the helper must assume a 
responsibility for considering the manner in which the "others" 
of his client might be affected by further development in the 
client. 
The work of Kegan is profound and comprehensive. I plan 
to introduce only two facets of it here, beyond the preceding 
introductory remarks. The first is an alternate way of con-
ceptualizing depression; which differs from the standardized 
lIbid., p. 344-45. 
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approach of diagnostic and descriptive                         It is 
based upon a study by Kegan of thirty-nine cases and is 
linked to Kohlberg's stage theory. I will then follow with 
some of Kegan's general comments on the significance of a 
cognitive-structurai approach for the helper. 
Kegan.investigated the data that had been accumulated 
on each of the thirty-nine patients in his study. He had 
access to staff reports, in-take information, material de-
scribing interpersonal relationships and soc.ial milieu, and the 
patients' descriptive formulations of their own condition. 
He discerned an underlying pattern which he organized into 
three discrete categories                       the world view of the 
individuals involved. Kegan chose the affect of depression 
around which the three classifications were galvinized. Some 
of the patients were clinicallY depressed, but others were not. 
His use of depression, however, was independent of the patients' 
official psychiatric diagnosis. Instead he viewed it as an 
emotional state of varying intensities which was found to one 
degree or another in all of the patients. A patient so viewed 
was not necessarily found to be depressed all of the time or 
with great intensity. Because the Kohlberg instrument is fairly 
tuned to measuring the state of balance between self and other, 
Kegan's central developmental interest, he adopted it as a 
theoretical framework. He found that each of the three 
categories reflecting patients' views of their world reality 
bore a strong relationship to one of three Kohlbergian stages, 
as interpreted by Kegan, himself. Furthermore, their stages 
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did not correlate with their diagnoses as determined with the 
use of standard psychiatric nomenclature'. In other words, no 
particular stage was more                       associated with either 
neurosis or psychosis. Similarly, for example, no one 
Kohlbergian stage was more readily associated with a specific 
psychotic state or with a character disordered personality. 
Thus, persons found to be within a particular Kohlbergian 
group could be from' anyone of the                   psychiatric 
categories, but they held in common a phenomenological out-
look about their world reality. Briefly, despite having been 
labeled variously from a psychiatric standpoint, they had 
constructed a certain way of knowing the world which they 
shared. In this study, that shared feature which earned them 
membership in a Kohlbergian group was typified by a character-
istic form of a depressive affect. Kegan, in effect, is main-
taining that this reconceptualization of emotionally disturbed 
people provides a new way of understanding them through their 
own phenomenology based upon qualitatively different ways of 
knowing-in-the-world. 
The first kind of depression identified by Kegan is re-
ferred to as "self-sacrificing."l It revolves around the sub-, 
ject's own needs. Each of the three types has a fundamental 
concern. The concern for the self-sacrificing type is the dis-
continuance of need gratification. An alternative concern of 
this type, should needs be met, is the mounting cost to the 
lThe reader is cautioned against attaching a connotation 
of altruism to this term. 
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individual of having his needs met. There is an uneasy 
                          that should need satisfaction not be achieved, 
the I of the subject will cease to be. 
The second kind of depression has as its main concern , 
the interpersonal context with the 'accompanying potential for 
loss of relationships. Subjects experiencing this variation 
of the affect feel helpless, hopeless, weak, and lonely. They 
are especially sensitive to the threat of being abandoned. 
Subjects in this phenomenological category, called ,"dependent 
depression" are preoccupied with the apprehension they have 
over angering or hurting others. There exists an overriding 
fear that should a significant relationship terminate, the 
I of the subject will disappear along with it. 
The third kind of depression expresses concern over an 
incapacity to execute one's proper role, conceived indepen-
dently of others' judgments,         to live up to one's own 
standards. The world is experienced as a                         void. 
Guilt and depair are prevalent feelings. Regan calls this 
"guilty depression." It is feared that faced with a lack of 
role fulfillment and failure to appropriately discharge 
responsibilities, the I will evaporate. 
In each case, apart from the threat of annihilation of 
self, there is also the overriding apprehension that the basic 
orientation implied in the outlook is without meaning. For 
example" in dependent depression there is an underlying fear 
that an interpersonal outlook in life as a source of meaning 
and security may itself be without any foundation. Kegan 
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observed a stability within each patient, such that an in-
dividual subject consistently reflected the same orientation 
and did not shift from one to another. 
Upon invoking the Kohlberg measure, it was found that 
a strong association existed between self-sacrificing, de-
pendent, and guilty forms of depression with stages 2 or 2-3 
transitional, 3 or 3-4 transitional, and 4 or 4-5 transitional, 
respectively. Approximately half of the patients were scored 
in the transitional state. By transitional, Kegan is not 
alluding merely to stage mixture. It is a state in which the 
subject possesses a unitary outlook which has passed beyond 
one stage, but has not yet achieved a new balance or centration 
typical of the following stage. Hence, a transitional state 
is said to be characterized by a single world-view of its own, " 
existing midway between the perspectives of two balanced 
stages. The subject in transition may hold a critical attitude 
toward the balanced stage from which he is moving away, while 
not yet exhibiting the rebalanced perspective to be acquired 
at the stage he is moving toward. An alternate criterion for 
assigning a subject to a transitional phase, is finding him to 
be undergoing the "dissonance of simultaneously experiencing 
the perspectives of two consecutive stages. Kegan points out 
that while transition entails previous disequilibria, not all 
states of disequilibrium necessarily signify further transition. 
Kegan makes many subtle, complex, and sometimes even abstruse 
distinctions. His work is bold and innovative. He is 
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attempting to be not simply a Piagetian "cognitivist" but 
IIpsychodynamicist." I Will not be quite "as bold, and so 
will refrain from pursuing his           through every compartment 
of the labyrnth he has constructed. However, I would like to 
trace his efforts just a few more steps. 
Kegan conceptualizes depression as being more a matter 
of disequilibrium, in his terms, than transition. The Kohl-
berg measure picks up the features of transition, but not 
disequilibrium in the psychodynamic sense. Kegan is in full 
accord with the cognitive emphasis that depression will be 
known variously, contingent upon stage of development. He 
states: 
The correlation I have just reported is not 
by itself evidence that depression is related· 
to disequilibrium. It is evidence that when 
people are depressed they will describe, 
construe, and probably experience, their de-
pression in different ways depending on ego 
level. It is evidence that a "feeling" is 
known differently at different "levels of 
knowing. "1 
Kegan, however, is struggling to establish more than the above, 
which reflects a purely cognitive interpretation. In striving 
to go beyond the cognitive, he conceptualizes what he views 
as the psychodynamic interpretation that would flow from a 
Piagetian and Kohlbergian orientation. He goes on to observe: 
But what I am suggesting is that depression ••• 
is not·onlY shaped but is about that shaping 
activity. Our hypothesis is not that, once 
depressed, meaning-constitutive activity 
will cast a meaning for this experience as 
lIbid., p. 190. 
it will for any others; but that depression 
is meaning-constitution itself under assault. 
Meaning-constitution, in equilibrium, is a' 
matter, not of an individual's having an 
"answer" for the world, but of an.in-
dividual's being an "answer." ·Yet those 
"depression concerns" ••. are n9t ••. mere 
grist for the "answer" that is equilibrium; 
rather they expre-s·s the particular forms 
by' which meaning-consititution in dis-
equilibrium leaves the individual, not so 
much having a Ilquestion,1l as being one. l 
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Kegan's own meaning in this somewhat opaque quote is diffi-
cult to grasp. He is, first of all, .going beyond a cognitive-
structural position which would assert that the stage of 
cognitive development in an individual structures the way he 
interprets the depression he may experience. In that view-
point, cognitive stage is the independent vari.able and de-
pression is the dependent variable. I have indicated above 
that Kegan does not reject such a position. However, his 
psychodynamic reformulation introduces an existential quality 
not evident in the original formulation. For Kegan, the core 
of depression is itself one form or another of radical doubt 
about the very foundation of what ordinarily constitutes meaning 
at a given developmental stage. It might be said that at such 
a point one's existence is in essence meaning that has become 
undermined and challenged. Hence, the individual is not 
simply asking a question, but is experiencing his very existence 
as questionable. 
Kegan reasons that a constructive-developmentalist views 
growth as going from stages of diminishing subjectivity to in-
lIbid., pp. 191-92. 
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creasing objectivity. Development· moves away from self-
contradictory and less adequate subjectivity toward that which 
is more equilibrated in that it more adequately covers a wider 
range of situations and demands. Progressively, develop-
ment is the construction of a wor:i.d-view that is "true-for-
all." The rebalance between self and other at a given stage 
is more adequate than the preceding balance. At stage .2, the 
subject is emmeshed in his own               hence loss of satis-
faction of those needs constitutes loss of self. The shift 
from stage 2 to. 3 entails a decentering from one's own needs. 
The self must no longer be equated with its needs. Instead 
the subject will go on to experience the self as that which 
possesses needs, but is not the same as them. The self, no 
longer exclusively embedded in the own needs, may reflect upon 
them in stage 3. The needs of other people are clearly rec-
ognized and at stage 3 are coordinated with one's own needs. 
Because of this shift there has occurred a rebalancing of self 
and other which has a defining characteristic of an inter-
personal matrix. Prior to transition, while still at stage 2, 
there is an assimilation of events and potential precipitants 
of change to that· stage     ·There occurs little in the way of 
accommodation, with the result that the scope of experience 
that is realistically adapted to is severely limited. Kegan 
refers to the .person in such a fixed state, regardless of stage, 
as a "balance defender." Each new rebalancing of self and other 
allows for an enlarged range of adaptive experience, although 
it is characterized by limitations in relation to the following 
stages. Before achieving a rebalanced state there is a phase 
341 . 
of disequilibrium during which there is a sense of having lost 
one self without having acquired a new self. The epistemic 
subject in going from Stage 2 to 3 is unaware that his needs 
per se are not being lost, but rather that he is giving up a 
way--o-f· -conc·e-iving--them-for--a more ·adequate or-ientat·ion. The 
person who suffers depression as a result of this kind of con-
cern is experiencing "radical doubt" about the continued 
existence pf self. 
In discussing clinical case material of a 15 year old 
female on a hospital ward, Regan asserted that an insight-
oriented treatment would be contraindicated for a patient not 
yet at stage 3. The patient saw others merely as thwarting 
the fulfillment of her needs. On the ward she was seen by 
staff as resistant and manipulative in that she appeared more 
interested in finding out what she was supposed to say, rather 
than genuinely sharing something of her self. She did not 
experience guilt, but was concerned over whether her mother 
would learn that she had lied pertaining to a certain matter. 
Her problems were viewed by her as having their locus in the 
external environment. The staff react to her with distaste. 
Regan suggests a reconceptualization which takes some of the 
onus off the patient and may even perhaps lead to more accept-
ing attitudes by staff, as well as to a more effective treat-
ment strategy. Taking a constructive-developmentalist position, 
Regan points out the patient's mode of being is consistent with 
a stage 2 orientation. By locating the source of difficulty 
for herself as external, she is reflecting a developmental stage. 
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It is as "true" for her that         difficulties she is ex-
periencing have an external locus, as it would be that the 
person at a later stage who talks of guilt experiences his 
difficulties as internal. The patient is not being resistant 
in the sense of concealing a deeper self, which she guardedly 
.refuses to unveil. By her statements and actions she is re-
vealing, in fact, the self that there         Labeling her as a 
"sociopath," which the hospital did, is not a particularly 
helpful step, with the pejorative implications that such a 
label carries, as do many other labels. Rather than viewing 
the patient as having a psychiatric illness, Kegan's approach 
would suggest an equilibrative analysis with a view toward 
promoting development to a more adequate stage. The particular 
patient in this case was bound to frustrate the staff, which 
could hardly be helpful to the patient, because she was ex-
pected to meet the demands of hospital milieu treatment. Yet 
that treatment approach requires that a participating patient 
have at least a Stage 3 interpersonal orientation. The Stage 
.2 patient is not "acting out" or being willfully resistant, 
for such a patient truly does not as yet have ·a way of "knowing" 
the requirements of the treatment contract. 
Kegan makes the intriguing suggestion that the precipitat-
ing events leading to hospitalization may vary according to 
stages. That is, a specific type or range of events may account 
. for hospitalization of those patients at one stage and these 
precipitants may differ for patients at another stage. It is 
those events which an individual at a particular stage can 
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neither assimilate nor accommodate, which ·cannot be meaning-
fully ordered and adapted to by his world-view, that would 
result in                               sufficiently severe as to warrant 
hospitalization. One thing that is clear from Kegan's ground-
breaking work is that the concept of equilibration is utilized 
to explain much more than Piaget's cognitive periods and that 
the stage theory of Kohlberg opens a door to understanding 
much wider aspects of personality than moral development only. 
The equilibrative analysis brought to bear upon the young patient 
at Stage 2 is merely an example of what may be done with any 
person regardless of developmental position. It is the 
equilibration process which is at the heart of Kegan's con-
ception of personality drawn from the work of Piaget and Kohl-
berg. Each stage is a way station of dynamic stability along 
the path of the self-other reequilibrating process toward 
greater objectivity. The role of the helping person then, in 
a constructive-developmental viewpoint, is to facilitate the 
equilibrating activity. More adaptive ways of knowing-in-the-
world is the pivotal point of growth. Knowledge is not dormant 
waiting within the individual to be uncovered or activated. 
Knowledge is constructed developmentally as the epistemic sub-
ject experiences dissonance upon encountering events he cannot 
adequately construe. The knowing subject must resolve the dis-
.crepency between his present meaning system and the unas-
similatible event by constituting meaning anew. Despite the 
phenomenological emphasis in Kegan's work he avoids the pure 
existentialist position which honors the uniqueness of each 
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person's meaning system accompanied by a refusal to acknow-
ledge objective meaning in the world. He believes strongly, 
as I do, that one may respect the uniqueness of the individual, 
without according parity to all of his specific convictions. 
The helping person shares with the helpee the very pro-
cess that the former seeks to stimulate in the latter. The 
helper is engaged in his own developmental process just as is 
the helpee. Kegan reformulates conventional ways of looking 
at the helping process when he states that the way he looks 
at the helpee: 
••• derives not from convictions about 
"patients" or "sick persons" or even 
"persons with problems," or "persons 
in pain," but simply (and complexly) 
about persons growing. Hence, the 
clinician's most fundamental orientation 
toward the persons with whom he works 
derives from convictions about an 
activity he shares at that very moment 
with the persons with whom he works •••• 
We neither escape from our own fate 
as life-long meaning-makers nor escape 
from our life-long fraternity or people-
hood with those who may be finding that 
fate a greater burden. l 
I believe that this formulation of the helping process diminishes 
"its hierarchical character and links both helper and helpee in 
a mutual growth process. Furthermore, I think Kegan's words 
reflect the spirit of social work philosophy more adequately 
than most other conceptualizations. 
lIbid., p." 323. 
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Psychother"apy "as Valu"e" Change 
Abroms,l in a similar vein to Kegan, but concentrating 
upon a narrower scope, has argued that while the therapist 
cannot impose his own personal and narcissistic goals upon 
the client or patient, he should derive power and direction 
from the transpersonal values he embraces. It is those higher-
order values which the therapist must move the patient toward. 
The therapist, just as he does not impose his purely sub-
jective interests, also does not mindlessly help the patient 
to achieve any goal regardless of how narcissistically and 
selfishly determined it may be. Abroms sees psychotherapy 
as a process of value change primarily and symptomatic relief 
as only a secondary component. To achieve the goal of assisting 
the patient toward adopting higher-order values, the therapist 
must, himself, be at a higher level than the patient. Abroms 
envisions the therapist as the embodiment of inspirational 
ideals held forth before the patient. He has adopted Kohl-
berg's stage theory of moral development because it is his 
conviction that it can become a loadstone which provides 
guidance in selecting appropriate treatment goals and methods. 
At Stage 1, the aim of therapy is to assure physical and 
lGene Abroms, "The Place of Values in Psychotherapy," 
Journal· of Marri"age and Family Counseling 4 (October 1978): 
pp. 3-17. 
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material well-being. The keynote at this stage is sheer 
survival. Treatment methods correspond to biomedical"methods 
and conditioned learning theory. Stage 2 rises above an em-
beddedness in sheer survival needs to encompass pleasure 
seeking. Activities such as eating and sex which have a 
survival function may be engaged in for pure pleasure. Treat-
ment seeks to facilitate appropriately uninhibited expressive-
ness and to reward pleasure. Although Abroms is not specific 
in differentiating amongst the many varieties of behavior 
therapy, it would seem that positive reinforcement would be 
" . appropriate at both stages 1 and 2, but with different aims 
in mind. Punishment, in technical learning theory terms, 
might best be reserved         Stage 1, as in the use of aversive 
therapy to prevent an autistic child from continuing to batter 
his head against the wall. It should be noted that Abroms, 
himself, does not explicitly recommend this. The use of 
aversive therapy to treat any problem" has been ruled out by 
some ethicists. Others, however, would argue that it is the 
only alternative to certain death or brain damage in some cases. 
Treatment methods at Stage 3 have a socializing goal, 
regardless of whether individual, group, or familY modalities 
are brought to bear. The necessity for survival and desir-
ability of pleasure are not eliminated, but are subordinated 
to the value of belonging and socialization. At Stage 4, 
the orderliness of the total social unit going beyond one's 
personal social matrix is recognized. Hence therapy seeks to 
institute ego controls and a sanctification of proper authority. 
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There is a valuing of rule-regulating behavior to which the 
self is subordinated. The maintenance of order goes beyond 
the mere seeking of approval within the sphere of one's per-
sonal society of significant others. 
At Stage 5 one is no longer rigidly bound by the pre-
existing laws of the land. One is capable of creatively 
innovating new laws and institutional arrangements to seek a 
higher justice than the prevailing one. Adaptive flexi-
bility is said to be the chief mental health value. Abroms 
holds that at this stage the formation of utilitarian con-
tracts becomes a matter that should receive paramount attention 
in the therapy, with a special emphasis upon the commitment to 
adhere to those contracts consented to. At Stage 6 universal 
values assume a role of supremacy over the relativity inherent 
in adaptive flexibility. Therapy now seeks, "The synthesis of 
a cohesive self with an idealized super-ego, devoted to the 
realization of social justice •.• "l 
Abroms elaborates at some length upon the relative fit 
between developmental level and therapist. It is out of the 
dialectical process between the two that development to the 
next stage in the hierarchy can occur. The essential point, 
however, is that the therapist must be at least one stage 
above the patient in his own personal development, if he is 
to facilitate the patient's growth. If he is merely at or below 
the patient's dominant stage, then failure in the therapeutic 
lIbid., p. 12. 
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endeavor is                         The problem of mismatch can occur 
at the other end of the scale, as when a therapist at a stage 
much higher than the patient, will offer interpretations at 
a level beyond what the patient can possibly comprehend. In 
such a case, the patient will either reject the lofty wisdom 
or assimilate it to a mode of comprehension that depletes its 
potentially meaningful contribution. Hence, Abroms advances 
a view of therapeutic competence in which: 
One aspect of technical skill involves the 
ability to exemplify health and personal 
values at a level appropriate to the client's 
sophistication in cognitive and moral aware-
ness. The therapist cannot, for example, 
interpret troublesome behavior as lacking in 
fairness or loyalty if the client is a 
devoted hedonist, out for his own pleasure 
and uncomprehending of the rejection that 
he thereby provokes. According to the 
schema, the technically appropriate" inter-
vention would involve interpretations and 
corrective experiences aimed at the issues 
of social concordance (Stage 3) or the 
organizational and personal boundaries 
(Sta"ge 4) that he has vio1ated. 1 
Technical competence, in Abroms view, would direct the therapist" 
to formulate an interpretation or promote discussion at" Stage 
3 for the Stage 2 hedonist. The focus of communication would 
be upon the social unit confined to the patient's personalized 
experiences and significant others. This could encompass the 
immediate family, circle of friends, or organizational milieu. 
The impact of the patient's behavior upon these people or the 
1Ibid ., p. 14. 
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institution and the reciprocal effect upon him may be con-
centrated upon. Conceptualizing the discussion at this stage 
may offer the client or patient a sufficiently discerning 
glimpse of the next higher truth ""to stimulate his movement in 
that direction. Abroms also makes the point that the therapist 
might recognize that an individual at a fairly high stage level 
may be living a life that neglects some of the requirements for 
fulfillment at a lower level. Thus, a principled client may 
not be enjoying his proper due at the level of sensuality 
characteristic of Stage 2. Upon making such a diagnosis", the 
therapist should assist the client in experiencing that aspect 
of Stage 2 which he has an ethical right to. 
                contribution consists of adapting Kohlberg's 
stage theory to the psychotherapeutic enterprise in a manner 
that lends much greater precision to assessment and differential 
intervention than has prevailed in many quarters. Although the 
overall goal is value change achieved by stimulating develop-
mental progression, he has also achieved greater precision in 
goal setting by specifying sub-goals corresponding to each 
stage in the hierarchy. Abroms has redefined the therapist's 
technical competence and has set an unconventional goal for the 
therapeutic process. His formulation is a reconceptualization 
that is both creative and innovative. He maintains that the 
position he espouses joins both humanism and science, further 
asserting that as the helper leads the helpee towards the con-
struction of highe"r spiritual values he is by definition help-
ing him to achieve a more adaptive knowledge of reality. 
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Promoting Role Taking Competence 
Chand1er1 has reported good results in combining drama 
and filming techniques, subjects rotating at playing character 
roles, and subsequent group discussions in work with delinquent 
boys. Role-taking competence increased in the participants 
and their rate of recidivism significantly reduced in comparison 
1 d 1 b 2 d h ... to contro an pace 0 groups. Staub foun t at tra1n1ng 1n 
role-taking skills led to a differential effect in the pro-
social behavior of boys and girlS. Boys subsequently ex-
hibited increased sharing behavior and girls increased 
helping behavior. . 3 Chandler, Greenspan, and Barenboim con-
ducted an experiment with emotionally disturbed institution-
alized children who were divided into three groups. There 
were two experimental groups, one of which received role-taking 
training, a second of which received referential communication 
training. Referential communication refers to the speaker's 
ability to select the most appropriate word in his vocabulary 
to convey his meaning while taking into account both the 
context within which he is speaking and the informational needs 
lMichae1 Chandler, "Egocentrism and Antiosocial Behavior: 
The Assessment and Training of Social Perspective-Taking SkillS," 
Developmental Psychology 9 (1973): 326-32. 
2Erwin Staub, "The Use of Role Playing and Induction in 
Children's Learning of Helping and Sharing Behaviors," Cllild 
Development 42 (1971): 805-16 •. 
3Michae1 Chandler, Stephen Greenspan, and Carl Barenboim, 
"Assessment and Training of Role-Taking and Referential Com-
munication Skills in Institutionalized Emotionally Disturbed 
Children," Developmental Psychology 10 (1974): 546-53. 
     
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of the listener. A third group received no training. The 
two training groups demonstrated significant post-intervention 
improvement compared to the control group. The role-taking 
group utilized video filming techniques in which the children 
rotated opportunities       portray disparate characters, there-
by giving them practice at taking the perspectives of others. 
In the referential communication group, children were given 
feedback when they delivered inadequate messages. It was 
predicted that the feedback would create cognitive conflict 
and out of the dissonance they would reconstruct the messages 
more accurately. It is of interest that those children who 
received referential training only, improved both in that area 
and in role-taking. The children who trained in role-taking 
improved in that area, but showed no improvement in referential 
communication. It is likely that referential communication 
demands role-taking competence as a precondition, hence while 
training at the former, the latter is also developed. Role-
taking competence, however, does not automatically imply ref-
erential communication skills. 
The most extensive and highly conceptualized efforts 
directed at applying sociomoral knowledge in a cognitive-
developmental framework to clinical practice have been 
emanating from the Judge Baker Guidance Center in Boston, 
frequently in""collaboration with Harvard University. The 
leader in this pioneering undertaking, which has been gaining 
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recognition over the last several years has been Robert Sel-
man, the Director of the Guidance Center. Selman's conceptual 
orientation to role-taking and its relationship to moral 
development have been presented in Chapter Three. Paralleling 
these structural developments are qualitatively increasingly 
more complex stages of interpersonal conceptions which children 
acquire with age. The various components of development as 
seen in Piaget's, Kohlberg's, and Selman's work are all inter-
related as structural wholes. Selman's work is geared to 
making a diagnosis of how this all comes to bear upon a child's 
competence at social reasoning. Developmental lags which may 
be instrumental in causing or maintaining emotional disturbance 
are diagnosed and attempts are then made to stimulate develop-
ment with a view toward improving social functioning. Strategies 
of intervention are designed with the specific aim of further-
ing development in role-taking and interpersonal conceptions. 
Selman is clear in conveying that he does not see a cognitive-
structural approach as replacing more traditional psycho-
dynamic models, but as an alternate orientation that" may offer 
a greater clinical yield in some cases, _depending upon the 
problem. 
In one clinical vignette, Selmanl d"escribes diagnosis 
and intervention with a ten year old boy who was at an ego-
lRobert Selman, "Social Cognitive Understanding: A Guide 
to Educational and Clinical Practice" in Moral Development and 
Behavior: Theory"," Res"earch and Social Issues, ed. T. Lickona 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), pp. 299-316. 
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centric level generally found in children at ages four and 
five. Upon observation it was discovered that when he inter-
acted with others he appeared not to be making any differenti-
ation between what he was feeling and what others might be 
feeling. He failed to evidence any role-taking capacities 
and, hence, his interpersonal relationships were shorn of 
reciprocity. He expected that his needs would be gratified 
immediately and, of course, failed to take into account what 
other people's perspective of that expectation might be. In 
fact, since he could not role-take, he had no way of knowing 
that from another person's point of view his needs may often 
remain unknown unless expl.ici tly communicated by him. Social 
work practice has certainly discovered this type of problem 
even amongst adults in dysfunctional relationships. Selman's 
young client, like many an adult, would feel that he was 
hated when his uncommunicated needs were not being met. 
In fact, the young boy was disliked, but this was the result 
of the deficiency in his social reasoning, rather than any 
inherent inclination on the part of others to turn. against him. 
The intervention strategy was to give him a concentrated ex-
perience over a period of time in a therapeutic camp at dif-
ferentiating between his own and other people's feelings and 
thoughts. He was helped to seek out internal causes of be-
havior in other people and to take their point of view. He 
was constantly informed about the usual expectations that 
other people would have of him in different situations. At 
..    
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the end of eight weeks his conception of friendship had 
matured, he had shifted from being completely                       to 
evidencing some role-taking ability, and his popularity had 
increased to the point where he had acquired many friends. 
The strategy.adopted in this case can be adapted to a variety 
of settings. When the child is not as accessible around the 
clock, the way this child was in a summer camp or another 
may be in a residential treatment center, the parents may be 
trained by the social worker to continue the intervention at 
home. A secondary benefit of doing this is· in enlisting the 
parents in a constructive activity which may promote in them 
a sense of being directly helpful to their child. The increase 
in positive interaction· between parent and child may itself be 
beneficial. Furthermore, conceptualization of the problem in 
this manner avoids the dilemma of pointing an accusatory 
finger at the parents, who so often feel either guilty or 
defensive about their child's problem. Lastly, this orientation 
does not label the child as sick, but views him as in need of 
developmental stimulation to further development in social 
reasoning along its. normal course. The enhancement of.psycho-
social functioning, a primary goal of social work practice, 
meshes well with Selman's conceptualization of helping. Not 
only is this true, but social workers are often in key· settings 
where they have the opportunity to provide precisely this kind 
of help either directly or by training caretakers to implement 
it under proper supervision. 
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Selman, in citing another example, demonstrated how a 
refined diagnosis from a sociocognitive perspective can pro-
vide valuable supplementary material to other data obtaining 
methods. A fourteen year old adolescent was brought to the 
clinic by his mother because he was socially isolated and had 
not been promoted to the next grade the previous year due to 
a school phobia. He seemed to have low self-esteem and was 
fearful of entering into social relations. The clinic team 
decided to administer the Heinz dilemma from Kohlberg's rep-
ertoire of moral dilemmas. Asked whether Heinz should steal 
the drug to save his wife's life, he replied that he should 
do so only if he loves her. If he does not love her, then 
there is no point in risking jail. He elaborates further 
that he should steal for her only if he needs her. Asked if 
Heinz should steal the drug to save himself, the adolescent 
replies that Heinz should not, explaining that he, the boy, 
would not steal the drug to save himself because he is not 
worth it. Asked to explain further, he points out that he 
does not have a lot of money and, therefore, is not important. 
In discussing capital punishment he comes out in favor of it 
because he would not want to spend a lifetime in prison. 
Encouraged to see it from the point of view of other hypotheti-
cal prisoners he could not entertain the possibility that any 
of them would have a different perspective. He sensed that 
they would have a perspective, but he failed to differentiate it 
from his own. In Selman's analysis the youngster is seen as 
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being at Stages 1 and 2 in both role-taking and m9ral 
development, even               by his age most young 'people would 
be at Stage 3 in both areas, some as high as Stage 4 in 
role-taking. His view of saving the wife's life reflected 
an instrumental orientation, Stage 2, in moral development 
since it was based on his own need gratification and had 
nothing to do with respe?t for her as a person. His orientation 
regarding the preservation of his own life was at Stage 1, 
being based upon a purely materialistic conception of his own 
worth. ,This cognitive structural aspect of his development 
clearly coincides with his feelings of low self-esteem. 
Selman 'conveys, "-••• not that cognition is cause and feelings . . ... 
are effect, but that cognition and feelings about the-self 
and about others are inseperable. lI l:. Despite the lag in the 
moral area he was functioning at a low formal operational 
level in his performance on Piaget's and Inhelder's cognitive 
tasks in the physics area, reflecting good scientific rea-
soning for his age. However he scored at the concrete 
operational level in his social reasoning. Selman suggests 
that his lack of social interaction offered him lit-tIe 
opportunity to test out his interpersonal and social hypotheses, 
in the fashion that adolescents would normally do, often with 
great vigor. The point of such an analysis is to individualize 
the client, understand him from his own phenomenological 
lIbid., p. 315. 
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perspective, and to assess from this information the strategic 
entry level for developmental intervention. In a general 
statement encompassing his basic. orientation, Selman expresses 
the following: 
Determining the stage of cognitive or social 
development of a particular child leads the 
professional to understand how the child 
looks at the world, and to avoid expectations 
of conceptual and emotional abilities that 
the child has not yet developed. Far from 
disdaining the value of understanding the 
child's interpersonal dynamics, this 
approach enhances that understanding by 
exploring the stage and by identifying 
the next stage toward which his develop-
ment can be directed. 1 
The Organizational Perspective 
To illustrate an imaginative and novel application of 
Kohlberg's orientation in an often neglected milieu with under-
serve'd populations, let us turn to intervention within the 
correctional field. Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey2 conducted 
a series of pilot studies which ended in 1972. Since that 
time they have elaborated at some length upon the theory and 
rationale utilized in those pioneering efforts. 3 
lIbid., p. 300. 
2Lawrence Kohlberg, Peter Scharf, and Joseph Hickey, 
"The Justice Structure of the Prison: A Theory and an Inter-
vention," The Prison Journal, A:utumn-winter (1972): 3-14. 
3Lawrence Kohlberg et al., "The Just Community Approach 
to Corrections: A Theory, "Journal of Moral Education 4 (1975): 
243-60. 
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The goal of the studies was to implement moral development 
programs amongst inmates and staff of correctional institutions 
as a form of rehabilitation. The approach ·was one of "justice 
as treatment" in contrast to previous inefficacious attempts 
at rehabilitation. Work with offenders in early society had 
emphasized retribution and moral                 Imprisonment and 
punishment were ways of extracting the price one had to pay 
for the offense. There existed a climate of moralism in which 
prisoners were subject to persuasion and sermonizing with the 
expectation that they would add such traits as honesty, re-
straint, and respect for authority to their "bag of virtues," 
as Kohlberg is fond of saying. These methods proved un-
successful. The traditional approach of attempting to produce 
reform by altering moral character gave way to a modern view-
point, adopted by many professionals, that offenders are sick 
and should receive psychotherapy. Programs directed at psycho-
therapy have not. demonstrated any greater success than the 
historical emphasis upon reform by modifying moral character. 
An alternate modern approach has been the use of behavior therapy 
technology. Although some immediate gains in modify-ing be-
havior have been observed through the use of token systems which 
dispense rewards for desired behaviors, long-range benefits have 
been minimal. This was predictable as the emotions, cognitions, 
and values of the prisoners were.ignored. Since it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to maintain the reward system in the 
natural environment upon release, newly acquired behaviors 
were eventuallY· extinguished. It is true that psychotherapy 
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does deal with feelings and attitudes,- but there is little 
focus upon the existential reality the prisoner encounters 
daily in relationships with security officers and fellow 
prisoners. A vacuum existed in terms of effective rehabilitation 
programs, which Kohlberg and his collaborators have been trying 
to fill. It is my contention that the theory and practice they 
follow is compatible with social work practice in every respect 
and that implementing such programs on a broad scale falls well 
within the parameters of the social work profession. 
In what has come to be known as The Cheshire Experiment, 
Kohlberg and his collaborators investigated the justice 
structure of a reformatory located in Cheshire, Connecticut. 
In addition, they collected data on the moral stages of 
prisoners. The prisoners judgments on moral dilemmas de-
signed to test their perceptions of justice both outside and 
inside of the prison were sought. In examining the justice 
structure of the institution it was clear that prisoners 
were completely subjected to the authority of the administration. 
They held no decision-making power whatsoever. Rewards and 
punishments were not uncommonly dispensed arbitrarily by              
There existed no avenue for appealing abuses. Punishments were 
sometimes disproportionately harsh for minor infractions of _ 
rules and sometimes administered as a means for a guard to 
exercise a personal dislike toward a prisoner. The discipline 
board that prevailed did not feel obligated to offer rational 
explanations for punishment meted out. Certain privileges 
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were accorded to influential prisoners by staff to elicit 
cooperation in exchange. From this analysis it was concluded 
that the justice structure operated at Stage 4 insofar as 
there did exist definite bureaucratic rules which inmates 
were expected to conform to with no opportunity to have the 
rules reconsidered, much less modified. It was also found 
to be operating at Stage 2 "insofar as staff indulged their 
own needs and bestowed rewards in anticipation of a re-
ciprocal exchange that would benefit them. It is against 
this description of the prisoners' reality that their moral 
perceptions can most fruitfully be considered. The inmates 
tended to perceive the prison as functioning at a premoral 
level, encompassing both Stages land 2. Their relationships 
with other prisoners they mostly viewed as being at Stage 2, 
henc.e predicated upon instrumental exchanges. The justice of 
the prison administration was identified by inmates as coer-
cively demanding obedience and, therefore, assigned to Stage 
1 by most of them. Perceptions by inmates of how the prison 
was actually run proved to be independent of their scores on 
normative moral judgments. A comparison was made-between 
inmates'                   resolutions to hypothetical moral dilemmas 
involving the prison environment and the non-prison dilemmas 
of the standard variety •. There appeared to be a significant 
difference in moral judgments depending upon whether the inside 
or outside environment was being evaluated. In general, the 
moral reasoning was at a lower level when considering dilemmas 
within the" prison context as compared to judgments about moral 
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dilemmas based upon stories that were non-prison related. Not 
a single inmate demonstrated a higher level on a prfson related 
dilemma in comparison to a non-prison dilemma. Inmates who 
exhibited as high as Stage 3 and even Stage 4 on standard moral 
dilemmas, were scored at Stage 1 or 2 when responding to prison 
related dilemmas. Thus it is seen that the impact of the 
environment has a decided inf1u'ence upon the moral judgment of 
the individual. This finding was typical not only at Cheshire, 
but at other prisons as well. It is important, however, not to 
overestimate the level of moral development attained by most 
offenders independently of the prison environment. Koh1berg, 
Kaufman, Scharf, and Hickey report: 
A variety of studies in the United States and 
other countries indicate that criminal offenders 
are remarkably lower in moral judgment develop-
ment than are non-offenders of 'the same social 
background. In fact, the majority (75 per cent) 
of non-criminal adolescents and young adults are 
at Stage 3 or 4, while the majority of adolescent 
offenders are at Stage 1 or 2.1 
This information is vital in appreciating the rationale of the 
moral development programs designed by Kohlberg. 
The Cheshire intervention was comprised primarily of moral 
discussion groups which resulted in small gains for some in 
moral maturity. A two year follow up did show that those who 
had advanced were less subject to recidivism than released 
prisoners who had not participated. However, the overall moral 
atmosphere of the prison justice structure placed severe re-
straints on what could be achieved. 
lIbid., P. 256. 
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Furthermore, life within the prison provided no role-taking 
opportunities such as might be stimulated by the availability 
of leadership .roles, flexible dialogue with open-ended out-
comes, and decision-making powers. The Cheshire experience 
led to the design of a more comprehensive treatment model 
which was mounted in 1971 at the Niantic State Farm for 
Women. By the time the experiment had been functioning for 
two years, only 16 .per cent of those women who had been dis-
charged either returned or once again had encountered some 
kind of trouble with the aut.hori ties. Many of the women had 
even gone on to create quite stabilized and decent lives. 
This was not the case for all, however. (In 1973 the experi-
ment was enlarged to continue           "justice as treatment" 
in a community based facility, where some of the inmates were 
permitted to finish their sentences.) The difference intro-
duced at Niantic was that the experiment became a .total 
experience. The institution had agreed to reshape its policies 
so that the participants were permitted to assume self-
governing responsibilities. Nine staff were trained by the 
Kohlberg team which served as trainers and consultants. Staff 
assumed the role of discussion leaders and facilitators. They 
had to be trained, for example, to avoid falling into the 
trap of. becoming preoccupied with the content and                      
management issues, as opposed to their proper role of facilitat-
ing discussion amongst inmates, with a focus on moral issues. 
It would be up to the inmates as a cohesive .self-governing 
group to determine policies of right and wrong behavior and 
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to recommend just disciplinary action for violations. 
In'the early training sessions with line staff, they 
voiced many of their own complaints, but following sufficient 
time for ventilation they shifted to a problem-solving 
orientation. Put simply by Kohlberg et al., "The involved 
staff members committed themselves to an intervention which, 
working from a moral development framework, would address 
the problems of the institution ... l It became apparent that 
their function was not viewed as being exclusively custodial; 
but although they had wanted to be helpful to the inmates, 
they lacked leadership and a theoretically grounded practice 
model to work with. The inmates' early sessions focused on 
very specific recommendations which were personal and 
idiosyncratic and, hence, did not offer a basis for forging 
out a policy document to govern their behavior. As the level 
of discussions became transformed there emerged a working 
constitution that was accepted as law by all members of the 
experimental community. As might have been anticipated, a 
preliminary problem that demanded attention was the mutual 
distrust that occurred between staff and inmates. The Kohl-
berg team served as mediators and eventually this obstacle, 
undoubtedly an inevitable one, was surmounted. One of the 
major objectives of the training model was to create, a moral 
climate for the inmates which was at least at their own level 
or higher. Community meetings, almost always called by 
IKohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey, "The                 Structure of 
the Prison," p. 9. 
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inmates, could be invoked by             or inmates to resolve 
issues of discipline as they would arise. Each person had 
only one vote, including staff. The Kohlberg team has made 
the point that for many of the women in this project the con-
stitution, which they had participated in establishing, was 
the first objectified set of rules and regulations they had 
had a genuine stake in. This is essentially different from 
traditional small group treatment.                           are more i?-
volved in the total matrix of operations. Emphasis is upon 
promoting their moral development to Stage 3, where they will 
experience some group loyalty and concern about others feelings 
towards them, which clearly goes beyond the hedonistic-instru--
mentalist orientation of Stage 2. There is an even more 
ambitious goal, albeit a realistic one, of stimulating moral 
development to Stage 4, where the inmate at that stage would 
become a citizen of the community with a commitment to uphold 
the laws, which she has had a part in creating. In addition 
to special community                   to deal with emergent problems, 
regular small group meetings are held. Fears and dilemmas 
that are very real to the women, some prison based and others 
related -to the outside, provide the grist for the discussion 
mill. The discussions are led in such a way as to facilitate 
and heighten role-taking capabilities. Alternate perspectives 
to what others are saying are deliberately elicited. Logical 
analysis of problems is invited. Conflicts inherent in com-
peting claims are brought into prominence and higher stage 
exposure emerges in discussion, as not all of the discussants 
365 
are at the same level. It is the role of the leader to 
sharpen the nature of the conflict and to take some responsi-
bility for introducing higher stage reasoning. Indoctrination 
and didactic teaching are avoided at all times. Structural 
mode of reasoning and developmental progress are stressed over 
content and sermonizing. As has been seen throughout this 
dissertation, structural advance is not an isolated psychic 
phenomenon. Moral stages reflect distinctly the organization 
of social and interpersonal knowledge in an individual. They 
generate rules and ultimately principles that playa strong 
governing role in behavior. 
The actual creat-ion of a just community is the essence 
of the treatment provided by the moral development "program 
model. Kohlberg et al. capture this well in formulating the 
following: 
We can see that democracy is central to            
development if we see that the heart of morality 
is a sense of fairness and justice. Morality 
means a decision of what is right where there 
is a conflict between the interests and claims 
of two or more people. Justice means fairness 
in deciding the conflict, giving each person 
his due and being impartial to all .•.• 
While most inmates do not care about society's 
morality, they do care about justice or fair-
ness. Because they feel they are treated un-
justly and live in an unjust world they do not 
try to be fair to others. To be motivated to 
act fairly, inmates must feel they are part of 
a just community.l 
As a follow up to the preceding comments, Kohlberg et al. 
IKohlberg et al. "The Just                                       to Cor-
rections," pp. 247-48. 
continue: 
In interviews with inmates two years after 
release, many who were functioning well 
outside expressed why they thought the pro-
gramme had led to significant changes in 
their lives. They said that for the first 
time they had lived in a setting where 
people treated each other fairlY and with 
mutual concern. On leaving the programme . 
they had decided that they wanted to have 
lives in which they could continue to have 
such relationships and choose life patterns 
which could enable them to do that.l 
Conc1usion 
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The interventive methods that have been under discussion 
in this chapter are firmly anchored in the cognitive-develop-
mental sociomoral tradition pf Piaget and Kohlberg. They are 
certainly not mutually exclusive of other approaches and, in-
deed, have not as yet attained a high level of technical re-
finement. Each method, either explicitly or implicitly, 
employs tactics designed to promote greater objective relativism 
by facilitating the subject's decentering process in the socio-
cognitive moral realm. In each approach a dimunition of em-
beddedness in. the egocentrism of one's present perspective is 
sought in favor of development toward a greater capacity for 
identifying,                             and synthesizing multiple perspectives. 
Success in such an endeavor is virtually seen as the construction 
of a higher and·more adaptive level of sociomoral knowledge. 
In all cases the·interventionist has a clear idea of the 
direction he believes it is necessary for the subject to move 
toward if more adaptive behavior is to be achieved. 
IIbid., p. 248. 
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The interventionist adopts a directive-catalytic role rather 
than a passive-neutral stance in the               procedure. The 
method in each approach is not interpretive, but instead en-
tails the disclosure of the subject's phenomenological state 
followed by a strategy for facilitating the transformation 
of that state into the perspective characteristic of the next 
stage in the universal developmental sequence. Adopting a 
developmental framework deemphasizes pathology and the over-
worked medical model in favor of an outlook emphasizing positive 
change and growth. It also reduces the dichotomous structure 
of the therapeutic situation as consisting of one sick person 
and one well person, replacing it with a view of two or more 
participants all of whom share in a potentially ongoing pro-
cess as developing persons. 
Despite the shared commitment to a cognitive develop-
mental framework and the commonalities described above, there 
are differences amongst the interventionists examined here 
that are worth identifying. Selman and Chandler have been very 
specific in citing concrete techniques that lend themselves to 
direct application. These techniques are designed primarily 
to foster role-taking competence in subjects whose interpersonal 
relationships appear dysfunctional due to a limited capacity 
to see the other's point of view. In the strategies of Abroms, 
Kegan, and " Kohlberg we find their interventive methods 'form-
ulated in broader terms. l 
........ . . .. 
ISelman's theoretical contribution, of course, includes 
broadly conceptualized developmental stages of social per-
spective taking. 
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Abroms is distinct from all of the               in that he is 
a psychiatrist whose professional education was not based upon 
a cognitive-developmental perspective, which he has embraced 
only recently. Therefore, it is not surprising that he has 
attempted to link more conventional treatment approaches to 
corresponding stages in the cognitive developmental sequences. 
In other words, for example, biological, behavioral, and family 
treatment approaches form a hierarchy of their own which may 
conceivably be most appropriately implemented in relation to 
the stage development of the subject or patient in question. 
It is also my impression that Abroms is perhaps the most openly 
avid advocate of psychotherapy as a value change procedure. 
The work of Kegan is the most theoretically ambitious, as 
he struggles vigorously to develop' a psychodynamic model that 
goes beyond the basic Piaget-Kohlberg paradigm. His work is 
demanding and requires that one grapples with his ideas through 
repeated encounters with them. Even by the most liberal 
literary standards, some of Kegan's                   fail to yield a 
clear and unequivocal meaning. Nevertheless, the total impact 
of his formulations suggests to me a                                             to 
a new reconceptualization of personality theory and develop-
ment. Although all cognitive-developmental theory has a stronq 
phenomenological component, it is in the work of Regan that 
each individual's way of                                           is brought to 
its sharpest focus. This is accomplished largely by integrat-
ing existential and developmental themes into a single model. 
Although Kegan has formulated an enlightened view of the 
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helping process, and this is especially true of his comments 
regarding the relationship between the· helper and helpee, he 
has not as yet presented specific techniques to guide the . 
helper in his efforts to promote'development. 
It is in their attempts to create ·"just communities" 
within prison and school environments that Kohlberg and his 
colleagues have exhibited the broadest spatio-temporal ap-
proach to intervention. Integral to any attempt at altering 
the sociocognitive moral structure of' the individual is an 
equally concentrated effort at modifying the environmental 
structure. The way to promote individual moral development 
is to create a total community that fosters conditions con-
ducive to it. A repressive and excessively authoritative 
climate is inimical to moral growth. An organizational con-
text, on the other hand, which provides direct participation 
in democratic decision-making and role-taking opportunities 
related to the everyday lives of the individuals involved will 
maximize the potential for moral growth. In adopting this 
position, Kohlberg's Piagetian roots are highlighted, as we 
recall Piaget's emphasis upon the growing child's evolution 
toward genuine cooperation and reciprocity. 
As further progress is made in developing change method-
'ologies for this field we might look forward to an increased 
range of interventive applications and an accompanying advance 
in the identification of more specific strategies and tactics. 
We might also reasonably anticipate attempts at integration 
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with other models of helping and practice techniques, as well 




IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL WORK 
Since the 1920's, beginning with the seminal work of 
Jean Piaget, the field of cognitive. developmental psychology 
has been growing and expanding. A major area of study within 
this field which has gained great momentum over the last twenty 
years due largely to the efforts of Lawrence Kohlberg and his 
colleagues, is the development of sociomoral knowledge. 
Although'social work has been commendably receptive to theories 
and research findings from the behavioral sciences, there has 
been a paucity of                       in the profession's literature to 
either Piaget or Kohlberg. Three leading social work theorists l 
have produced current books of excellent quality on clinical 
practice,' each of which omits any treatment of Piaget' s or Kohl-
berg's relevant and prodigious work. A review of each issue of 
Social Work, Social Casework, and Clinical Social Work for the 
year 1976 revealed not a single article or explicit reference 
to Piaget or Kohlberg, or the significantly related theorists, 
Flavell, Feffer, Selman, Rest, and Turiel. Yet despite these 
omissions there was a great diversity of subjects covered from 
IFlorence Hollis,                     A Psychosocial Thera y (New 
York: Random House, 1972, 2nd ed. ;                 J. Turner, Psycho-
social Thera y: A Social Work Perspective (New··York: The Free 
Press, 1978 ; Herbert S. Strean,                 Social Work: Theory 
and Prac·tice (New York: The Free Press, 1978). 
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the behavioral and applied behavioral sciences inclusive of, 
although not exhausted by, the following: communication 
theory, crisis theory, ego psychology, psychoanalytic theory, 
behavior modification, organizational theory, modeling, 
existentialism, g.estal tism, rational-emotive therapy, trans-
actional analysis, telepathy, and mysticism. A few articles 
even dealt manifestly with developmental psychology or values, 
but still with no allusion to cognitive-developmental theories. 
The drought in professional journals was broken by Ed1eson,1 
in the Spring of 1978. Further, Maier2 and Rosen,3 both social 
workers, have written clinically oriented books on the subject. 
In a recent volume a rare comment by a social worker on Piaget 
is made by Wasserman in his article on ego psychology. He 
states, ."The teachings and findings of Piaget have enriched 
. our understanding of the role of the intellect in ego deve10p-
ment ••• This complementarity instead of diminishing ego 
psychology or other theories -- has added to each.,,4 
lJeffrey L. Edleson, "A Piagetian Approach to Social Work 
Practice with Children and Adolescents," Clinical Social Work 
Journal 6 (Spring 1978): 3-12.-
2Henry W. Maier, Three Theories of Child Development 3rd 
ed. (New York:· Harper & ROw, 1978). 
3Hugh Rosen, Pathway ·to Piaget: A Guide for Clinicians, 
Educators, and Developmentalists (Cherry Hill: New Jersey: Post-
graduate International, 1977). 
4sidney Wasserman, IIEgo Psychology," in Social Work 
Treatment: Interl·ockinq Theoretical Perspec·ti ves, ed. F. J. 
Turner (New York: The Free Press, 1974) p. 50. 
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Wasserman's                   reflect the spirit of Piaget's own re-
marks, when upon addressing the American Society of Psycho-
analysis in full sess.ion during the early 1970' s he urged that 
a general psychology be formed from a snythesis of psycho-
analysis and genetic epistemology. 
The Piaget-Rohlberg Model 
A cognitive-structural approach to the development of 
sociomoral knowledge is highly congenial to social work prac-
tice, while at the same time imparting an innovative per-
spective to be coordinated with more traditional viewpoints. 
It. is generally viewed as compatible with ego psychology as 
advanced by Hartman, Erikson, and White. l It also lends itself 
well to integration within the ecosystems framework that has 
been forged out by contemporary theorists of social work 
practice such as Germaine and Meyer2. Recent texts on practice, 
in addition to Meyer's, which utilize a systems or ecosystems 
orientation are those by Goldstein, Pincus and Minahan, and 
1Heinz Hartman, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adapta-
tion (New York: International Universities Press, 1958): Erik 
H. Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle: Selected Papers, 
Psychological I"ssues 1, 1 (New York: International Universities 
Press, 1959): Robert W. White, Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic 
Theory, Psychologi·cal Issues 3, 3 (New York: International Uni-
versities               1963). 
2Carel B. ·Germain, "An Ecological Perspective ;in Casework 
Practice," Soci·al                     6 (June .1973): 323-30: Carol H. Meyer, 
Social Work Pract·ice: The Chan· in Landscape (New York: The Free 
Press, 1976, 2nd ed •• 
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1 Comptom and Galaway. Especially relevant is a volume edited 
by McGurk2 in which the contribution of ecological psychology 
to human development is explored, with a special section de-
voted to cognition focusing largely upon Piaget. 
The approach under discussion is grounded in a conception 
of interaction from birth onward between the human organism 
and its environment. The interaction is seen as productive 
of change and growth through the simultaneous activities of 
assimilation and accommodation in striving toward a more 
differentiated and complex system of structures that enhances 
adaptation. By adopting a biological view of intelligence as 
adaptation, Piaget has avoided the Cartesian duality of mind 
and body. He has further eliminated a bifurcation between 
organism and environment for it is only out of the necessary 
transactions between the present structure of the organism and 
the given structure of the environment that development occurs. 
Intelligence for Piaget is action. It may be the practical 
intelligence of the infant's behavior during the sensorimotor 
lHoward Goldstein, Social Work Practice: A Unitary 
Approach (Columbia, South Carolina: university of South Caro-
lina Press, 1973); Allen Pincus and Anne Minahan, Social Work 
Practice: Model and Method (Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock, 
1973); Beulah.R. Comptom and Burt Galaway, Social Work Processes 
(Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 197"5). 
2Harry McGurk, ed. Ecological Factors in .Human Develop-
ment (New York: North-Holland, 1977). 
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period or the interiorized action of an operation that appears 
several years later. In either case, cognitive structuration 
takes place through the individual inter·acting within the en-
vironment, which both transforms him and in turn is transformed 
by him. The assimilative and accommodative processes of 
adaptation assure both stability and                       on the one hand, 
as well as change and growth on the other. Each new scheme 
or structure has an intrinsic motivation to function and, hence, 
seeks out "nourishment" from the environment to further its 
growth and competence. This is as true of the adolescent 
who constantly devises hypothetical ideas. with his newly 
developed formal operations that are tested out experimentally 
on physical objects and verbally with his peer· group, as it is 
with the infant's sucking and grasping schemes which stimulate 
him to seek out things to be sucked and grasped. Novelty in 
the environment leads to the invention of new structures in the 
advance toward greater competence and adaptation. Negative 
feedback from the environment, when the cognitive-structural 
stage produces incongruity between expectation and experience, 
serves as energy input facilitating a reorganization of 
cognitive structures. The disequilibrium that results from 
the new and unexpected experience is thus resolved by an 
equilibrating process that furthers the growth of the organism. 
The image that emerges from the Piagetian developmental model 
is one of the person as an agent actively constructing know-
ledge and achieving competence as he interacts with the structure 
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of the environment. Overton and Reese, in a discussion on 
human ecology,                 on Piaget's holistic structuralism 
thusly, " ••• We find that it is ••• Piaget's theory which re-
flects the clearest articulation of the interdependent systems 
conception of· the man and environment system •••• "l 
The sociomoral developmental perspective of Kohlberg 
offers a model for change in a clear direction involving a 
. progressive sequence of stages and strategies for facilitating 
passage through those stages •. It provides the conceptual tools 
to implement with a reasonable degree of specificity the social 
work maxim, "Start where the client is." Perhaps a slightly 
modified version might be, "Discover where the client is and 
then proceed from a point that is only moderately beyond his 
basic stage orientation." The· concept of equilibration and 
the six moral stage structures offer the helper a dynamic 
change principle and a theoretical outlook for understanding 
any client's way of organizing his interpersonal and social 
knowledge. Regardless of whether a social work practioner is 
administering a service with a multi-problem family through a 
social welfare organizatic;m, conductingmari tal counseling in 
a family agency, engaged in psychotherapy in a community mental 
health center, or working with prisoners in a correctional in-
stitution, the constructive-developmental paradigm offers him 
lwillis F. Overton and Hayne W. Reese, "General Models 
for Man-Environment Relations" in Ecological Factors in Human 
Develo·pment, ed. H. McGurk (New York: North Holland, 1977), 
p. 17. 
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a powerful conceptual foundation. 
The model is concerned with thought and action predicated 
upon a view of rights, responsibilities, and values, yet re-
specting at all times the autonomy of the individual. The 
socio-environmental context is never ignored even though the 
organism's auto-regulative activities are considered of central 
importance. Full recognition of "the need for appropriate re-" 
sources in the environment to stimulate growth is present and 
the debilitating force of environmental deprivation is acknow-
ledged. The construction of knowledge in the physical, social, 
and moral realms remains an activity, however, which springs 
from within the individual. In an illuminating and integrative 
commentary, Furth has asserted: 
Philosophers, social workers, psychiatrists, 
educators, social scientists, all have an 
incredibly limited conception of what know-
ledge is and how it functions ••. When I con-
sider these dehydrated conceptions I see in 
Piaget a theory of knowledge and intelligence 
that gives life and blood to it and restores 
it to its biological source which is no doubt 
the source also of everything else such as 
the id, affect, motivation, the preconscious 
or any other deep structures. This source 
is the living person who coordinates all the 
various experiences by doing or thinking. 
Intelligence is as deep and as much in the I 
bones of a person as any affect or motivation. 
In accord with the social work ethos, the Piaget-Kohlberg 
model in the ethical dimension calls         mutual cooperation, 
I " Hans Furth, IIIntellectual Health in school: What can 
Piaget's theory contribute?1I in Piage"tian" Theory "and Its Im-
plications for" "the Helping Professions, ed. F. J. Magary et. al., 
Proceedings Sixth Interdisciplinary Conference, University of 
Southern California, 1977, p. 11. 
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participatory democracy, and a respect for persons. Autonomy 
is valued, reciprocity essential, and manipulation anathema •. 
As the individual undergoes stage progression, retributive 
justice yields to distributive justice.· 
Essentially moral dilemmas are situations involving 
either competing claims between individuals or between in-
dividual rights and the general welfare. As Kohlberg, Scharf, 
and Hickey state: 
At each successive stage there· is an increased 
capacity. to reason through moral conflicts in. 
a rational, equitable, and consistent manner. 
The conception of moral stages defines the 
underlying logical structure of the individual.' s 
moral philosophy: definition of right, responsi-
bility, and law are derived from the logic im-
plied by the moral stage. 1 . 
Members of the social work profession are concerned with issues 
of rights, ethics, values, justice, and human welfare. Social 
workers, perhaps more than any other helping professionals, 
work           populations of people who have           deprived of 
justice in their environment and of the role-taking opportunities 
which stimulate moral stage development-. Our concern spans 
social-systems levels from the interpersonal and familial to 
the scale of government where economic justice and humane social 
legislation are sought. At the practice level we are constantly 
1 Lawrence Koh1berg, J. Peter Scharf, and Joseph Hickey, 
"The Justice Structure of the Prison: A Theory and Intervention," 
The Prison· Journal,· . (Autumn-Winter 1972): 3-14. 
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invoking our clients' capacity for choice in sociomoral domains. 
It may be with an individual facing a sexual dilemma, a spouse 
contemplating divorce, or a juvenile delinquent on probation. 
Whether the focus is upon an interpersonal relationship, as in 
marital counseling, or helping an individual in trouble with 
a social organization, such as a prisoner facing the court 
system, there are always issues of conflicting rights and re-
sponsibilities to be taken into account. A small social system, 
as in a family, experiences many problems because of the im-
plicit rules and principles which underpin its sociomoral con-
ceptions of rights and responsibilities.. Of course, since 
members of the family are likely to be at differing levels of 
moral development this in itself could become a source of con-
flict, as well as growth. Social workers deliver services to 
people in a highly diversified range of settings where conflicts 
of rights between individuals or                 an individual and an 
organization are often prominent. These include such settings 
as prisons, general hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, schools, 
residential treatment centers, child welfare agencies, camps, 
transitional homes, boarding homes, mental health clinics and 
others. The interventive methods discussed in the preceding 
chapter may be adapted to clients and organizational structures 
ranging across these many settings. In particular, the 
"justice as treatment" concept of Kohlberg and his colleagues 
need not be confined to prisons or reformatories. 
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. 1 It has already been applied with some success to schools. 
Special target populations that might profit from an application· 
of this approach include juvenile delinquents and police officers. 
A group frequently overlooked until recently are the. retardates 
in the community, whose full developmental potential we have 
hardly begun to invest in. One of the most prevalent potent-
ialities for it in a modified version is in work with families, 
which has the added value of introducing a preventive, as well 
as rehabilitative component. One might even experiment with 
groups of families which would enrich the interaction and 
multiplicity of stage levels. Cojoining families in this 
fashion may be contraindicated in traditional family                  
but in a "justice as treatment" program this would not neces-
·sarily be so. The lives of all members and, indeed, the neighbor-
hood at large, might well be enhanced as individuals increase in 
their moral maturity in areas of fairness and reciprocity. 
Applying Role-Taking To Prac·tice 
'Considerable attention has been devoted to egocentrism 
and role-taking in a preceding chapter of this dissertation • 
. -- - -- - .- - --- .. It has been shown that                         is a necessary, but not 
sufficient ontogenetic development for mature sociomoral 
knowledge. The complexity of this development has been em-
'phasized and the                 relationship between egocentrism and 
lElsa R. Wasserman, "Implementing Kohlberg's 'Just Com-
munity Concept' in an Alternate High School" in Readings in 
Moral Education,' ed. P. Scharf                             Winston Press, 
1978): 164-72. 
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role-taking cited. Task complexity has been identified as 
a significant variable which may lead to reverting to an 
earlier phase of egocentrism, whereas task simplicity may tap 
higher levels of                           Be that as it may, egocentrism 
will most assuredly impede the development of communication 
and social skills. A lack of competence in these areas will 
become especially dysfunctional if the growing child falls 
markedly behind his peers as they progress to increasingly 
high levels of perspectivism. An approach that takes into 
account a diagnosis of "role-taking deficiency" could lead to 
effective forms of intervention which might otherwise be over-
looked. From the preventive side, the cognitive-developmental 
viewpoint would alert the practioner to certain at-risk 
populations, such as children from lower socioeconomic levels, 
where it is frequently found that role-taking opportunities 
are minimal. 
Adults do not share uniformly high levels of perspectivism 
and many of them will be found to be significantly behind their 
peers in this capacity. Even adults who have advanced con-
siderably in the acquisition of mature levels of perspectivism 
may revert to egocentrism on a situational basis, such as under 
duress or in particularly affect laden relationships. Know-
ledge of this phenomenon should in itself be useful to the 
social work practioner, whose focus so frequently is the inter-
personal relationships of clients. Even when this aspect of 
a client is not receiving immediate attention, the very fact 
382 
of being alone during an interview with a                 constitutes 
an interpersonal experience which 'will bring into play varying 
degrees of egocen,trism and perspectivism. The social worker 
aware of role-taking as a cognitive skill will use the know-
ledge to assess the client's level of competence and arrive at 
some formulation about how a possible deficiency may be creating, 
                            and social problems. Upon identifying a deficit 
in this area the worker will not only be influenced accordingly 
in her own verbalizations to the client, but will Seek out 
strategies designed to assist the client in becoming more 
sensitized to other people's perspectives. Social workers con-
ducting marital counseling and family therapy will, of course, 
have an opportunity to observe the problems of low role-taking 
skifls at the moment they are occurring. In addition to helping 
a client develop increasing'role-taking skills, the worker may 
also reeducate other members of the family so that they under-
stand the phenomenon, make allowances for it when appropriate, 
and exercise the patience necessary for the developmental pro-
cess to occur. For example, a mother who thinks her boisterous 
child is-selfish for -persisting, in his noise -making-i' when she 
complains of a headache, may be helped to soften her attitude 
              him by realizing his limitiations in comprehending 'What 
the pain and distress must be like for her., Working with a 
married couple, of course, provides exceedingly fertile grounds 
for an assessment of mutual perspective-taking levels and 
subsequent steps to enhance this ability. One obvious technique 
383 
would be to encourage each to express how" he or she may be 
feeling and perceiving a range of events, with efforts being 
made to assure that the opposite spouse "is attending the com-
munication, with a view toward differentiating it"from his or 
her own inner experience. A series "of probing questions or 
explorations about whether the other had ever realized the 
spouse felt that way may be initiated. The spouse may be 
asked to imagine himself in the other's shoes and to then talk 
about how a situation might feel to the other. Following this 
he would then be asked to decenter, returning to his own 
perspective, and to comment upon the perspective he had just 
constructed in the imaginary position. Group therapy may prove 
to be the treatment of choice for some clients whose problems 
may in large measure derive from egocentrism. The multiple 
perspectives and confrontations that abound provide a crucible 
of social interaction that will induce the client to attend 
other people's viewpoints, as well as to render his own com-
munications comprehensible and supported by logical argumenta-
tion. A less conventional approach might involve assigning 
a part in a play that has been written with the clients in mind. 
The script would call for each client to assume a role that 
would impart a perspective he seems insensitive to and might 
benefit from glimpsing. After playing the part he would then 
be asked to discuss it. 
A variation of this might be to have clients rotate, 
assuming different characters in a script, such as parent role, 
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and                   even social worker role. Discussions would then 
be held about how the various perspectives were experienced. 
In general, we tend to be more aware and, therefore, sensitive 
to the subtle psychological motivations influencing our own 
behavior, which we can readily justify with such knowledge. 
On the other hand, the tendency is to judge other people by 
their overt behavior with relatively little attempt to see 
things from their perspective. At the most primitive stage 
of egocentrism, of course., there is a total lack of awareness 
that the other has a point of view of his own, hence, there is 
no basis for even                       to make an inference about what 
it might be. In the case of many adults the role-taking com-
petence may be present, but frequently inactive, which would 
indicate the need for training in its use rather than the 
stimulation of genuine development. It is more likely, when 
dealing with children who lack perspectivism to a dysfunctional 
degree that developmental stimulation will be required. The 
social work practioner who is making a first acquaintance 
with this sociocognitive developmental phenomenon should not 
be deluded into thipking that                                                 skill, 
which one either has or does not have. Like the interrelated 
components of cognition and justice, it is based upon deep 
structures which undergo gradual transformations into in-
creasingly more complex hierarchies. 
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" Conunu:n:icat"ing Across D:i"ve"r:se "s:t"a:ges 
Much of social work practice," of course, takes place 
through verbal conununication. Yet the "meaning to the listener 
of what is spoken depends greatly upon his level of cognitive-
structural development. Specifically, in the realm of socio-
moral knowledge, if a social worker discusses a dilemma with 
a               (child, adolescent, or adult) at several stages be-
yond where the client is, then the listener will either not 
comprehend at all, or will assimilate what he hears to his own 
stage, hence reducing and distorting the meaning. Clearly, 
this can lead to a failure in the practioner's efforts. A 
helper who is not familiar with the stages of cognitive and 
moral development will neither possess the conceptual frame-
work to understand what is taking place, nor will he grasp 
what must be done to achieve effective conununication. As we 
have seen previously, one cannot assume from age alone where 
a child or adult is in his stage development. Indeed, research 
indicates that approximately only 50 percent of adults reach 
the formal operational level of cognitive development and only 
5 percent ever reach the highest or sixth stage in moral develop-
ment. Therefore, 95 percent of children and adults will be 
found somewhere along the continuum of sociomoral stages from 
one to five. Yet" the implications for the individual's total 
existence of being at one stage or another are enormous and 
far-reaching. In broadening the significance of Kohlberg's 
work further than he, himself, intended, Kegan has asserted: 
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"Beyond an attention to issues of fairness, competing claims, 
moral conflict and choice, these stages ••• look to the broader 
range of socio-personal experience which 'it is the human fate 
to' construe and thereby create."l 
A Philosophical Mar'r'i"age . 
I would like to advance for serious consideration the 
position that Kohlberg's sociomoral system based on Piaget's 
constructivist psychology is thoroughly compatible with con-
temporary. social work practice and philosophy. Its contri-
bution, which I am urging that the profession integrate with 
preexisting knowledge and practice, is its scientifically 
validated' theoretical orientation about human-being in the 
realm of social perspectivism, morality as justice, and per-
sonal autonomy. 
As social workers we frequently talk about helping 
clients achieve autonomy in               their own choices. However, 
autonomy does not operate in a vacuum and some choices are 
better ,than others. It is not for the social work practioner 
to tell the client what choices to make, but clients can be 
helped to acquire the governing principles higher along the 
sociomoral cognitive-developmental scale which will enable them 
to make more adequate choices. Kohlberg has stressed through-
out his work that the level of moral development is reflected 
1 . h' Robert Kegan, "Ego and Truth: Persona11ty and t, e P1aget 
Paradigm" (Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1977), 
p. 80. 
387 
primarily in the mode of reasoning utilized in resolving 
dilemmas and not in the specific content of that choice. 
In this spirit, he and his colleagues have discovered and 
validated means for advancing modes of moral reasoning which 
do not rely upon indoctrination into any particular ideology 
or rigid moral position based on content of choice. Although 
there always exists a measure of choice for each individual, 
the range and type of choice is limited by development. In 
the realm of self-propelled transportation, humans can choose 
to crawl, walk, leap, jog, or run; but they are not free to 
fly. Yet it is conceivable that in the future humans may 
choose to fly should structures that enable flight evolve 
for the species. On a less spectacular scale, the infant has 
not yet developed the capability for running and, hence, may 
not choose to do so without first passing through a stage in 
which he has learned to walk. In this same fashion, the 
higher one's sociomoral stage of development, the more adequate 
is his range of choice within the social and interpersonal 
environment. 
Below is a set of central characteristics which identify 
aspects of the theory and interventive methods discussed in 
Chapter Eight. Some or all of them apply to each of the inter-
vention programs. All of them are congenial to a philosophy 
of social work practice. Furthermore, they all apply to Kohl-
berg's "treatment as justice" program, which is predicated 
upon a paradigm that: 
.' 
1. Acknowledges the individual's potential for 
growth. 
2. Aims toward the                         of psychosocial 
functioning. 
3. Is based upon a belief in the "philosophical 
superiority and practical desirability of 
democracy. 
4. Takes into account a systems perspective. 
5. Views the structure of the environment as 
instrumental in affecting human welfare. 
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6. Utilizes principles of community organization. 
7. Addresses the reality of the client in the here 
and now. 
8. Is not based upon the medical model and, thereby, 
minimizes an orientation based upon pathology. 
9. Adopts a belief in the efficacy of rational 
problem solving activity, without diminishing 
the profundity of deep structures in the 
psyche. 
10. Is concerned with the individual's relationships 
and wider social context. 
11. Refrains from indoctrination and imposition of 
ideology, while at the same time recognizing 
the impossibility of being value-neutral. 
12. Respects and promotes the individual's self-
                      autonomy. 
13. Is humanistic "in its method-sandgoa1s. 
14. Is scientific in its theory building. 
15. Seeks social justice. 
These characteristics thread their way throughout the entire 
tapestry of the present dissertation. They are juxtaposed in 
this section to convey a sense of the integrated design which 
they create when placed together, as well as to suggest their 
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striking resemblance to the profession's values and practice 
approaches. 
In 1973 Germain introduced the concept of ecology to 
casework practice. A linkage of ecology to systems theory, 
termed ecosystems, has swiftly been gaining ground in many 
quarters as a preferred and viable framework for viewing social 
work practice. Germain states:" 
Ecology is the science concerned with the adaptive 
fit of organisms and their environment and with 
the means by which they achieve a dynamic equili-
brium and mutuality. It seems to furnish an 
appropriate metaphor for a helping profession 
concerned with the relationship between human 
beings and their interpersonal and organizational 
environments, with helping to" modify or to en-
hance the quality of transactions between people 
and their environments that support human well-
being. l 
The fundamental similarity between an ecosystems perspective 
and the Piaget-Kohlberg model is strikingly highlighted when 
considering the above formulation by Germain in relation to 
the material under discussion in the present work. Additional 
characteristics of the ecosystems orientation, as found in 
Meyer's2 exposition, are as                   1.) active engagement of 
the client in pursuing the helping process, 2.) a deemphasis 
of digging for historical case material and of conceiving a 
case in terms of pathology, 3.) an emphasis upon strengths 
presently possessed by the client and rational thought, 
IGermain, "An Ecological Perspective in Casework Practice," 
p. 326. 
2Meyer, Social" Work" Practice. 
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4.) conceptualizing service largely in preventive terms 
rather than in a narrowly clinical fashion,S.) designing. 
and delivering social services by taking into account people's 
natural life-space and developmental tasks. Dealing with 
pathology or residual needs is not eliminated from the scheme 
of ecosystems, but it becomes only one subset of a broad 
diversity of approaches to services organized. to reach large 
populations in their natural environment. None of the afore-
mentioned is incompatible with the Piaget-Kohlberg model and 
in many respects each is distinctly congruent with it. 
Although the model which has been the theme of this disserta-
tion, in its broadest conception, coincides with· an ecosystems 
orientation, it becomes differentiated within that classificatiqn 
by its concentration upon moral development and the derivative 
sociopersonal implication·s. 
Limi tations of the Piaget-Kohlbe·rg Model 
The era of exclusive adulation of Piaget's cognitive 
developmental psychology has passed, despite the vitality of 
its impact upon several major                             While the Geneva 
School and its followers around the world continue to pursue 
their research vigorously, neo-piaget!an and                        
epistemological models are emerging. Presentation of these may 
be found in the current work of Siegal and Brainerd and that of 
lFrank B. Murray·, ed. The· Impa:c·t of Piagetian Theory on 
. Educat·ion, Phi-l"osophy, Psychiatry,· ·and Ps-ycholo y (Baltimore: 
Un1vers1ty Park Press, 1979 • 
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1 Keats, Collis, and Halford. A technical review of the 
criticisms contained in these books, however, would take us 
far afield from the major                 of the present work. A 
critique of Kohlberg's moral developmental psychology may be 
found in Chapter Six of this dissertation. Comments in the 
present section, however, will focus on some reservations 
about the sociomora1 developmental model from the standpoint 
of the social work practioner. 
There are some potential abuses in Kohlberg's theory 
which are neither integral nor necessary, but which one should 
be cautioned against, nevertheless. First, there is the danger 
of resorting to the utilization of stages as a means of 
ascribing pejorative labels. Kohlberg,2 himself, strongly urges 
that this be avoided. One's conception. of justice, as governed 
by stage development is not to be construed as psychodynamic 
motivation. The sociomora1 model is not, in itself, a per-
sona1ity theory. The stage concept does not make a comment 
about the type of individual the person is. A Stage 2 per-
son, for example, should not automatically be viewed as having 
1Linda S. Siegal and Charles J. Brainerd, eds. Alterna-
tives to Piaget (New York: Academic Press, 1978); J. A. Keats, 
K. F. Collis, and G. S. Halford, eds. Cognitive Development: 
Research Based on ·a· Neo-Piagetian Approach (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1978). 
2Lawrence Koh1berg et al. "Assessing Moral Stages: A 
Manual" Cambridge: Center for Moral Education, Harvard 
University, 1978. (mimeographed). 
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a narcissistic and selfish personality. What .his stage tells 
us is the mode of reasoning through which"he comprehends the 
nature of justice at his particular developmental level. It 
is necessary to stress this point precisely because so many 
abuses have been known to occur. 
A second and related danger is that an excessive pre-
occupation with the internal development of the individu'al, 
overlooking the interactive and environmental components of 
the model, CQuld lead to falling back into the old trap of 
"blaming the victim." It is important to be vigilant against 
statically identifying the person in trouble as being mal-
adaptive and to keep in mind that in an adaptive model we 
are concerned with the relative fit between organism and 
environment. For example, we may find that a precocious 
youngster who is at the formal operational period cognitively 
and at Stage 5 morally is interacting dysfunctionally with a 
group of his concrete operational peers who are at Stage 3 
and 4. We would not, of course, diagnose such a youth as 
being pathological or even as possessing a deficiency, but we 
might seek to restructure his cultural and social milieu in 
such a way as to provide him with the stimulation and "nourish-
ment" he needs. In do doing we will have enhanced the optimal 
match between him and his environment, without identifying 
the cause of the problem as inhering in him. The same 
principle operates when working with disadvantaged populations, 
but becuase of certain biases through which such groups are 
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often approached, it is more difficult to realize. 
A third danger derives from the possibility, ,of an 
uncritical zeal for fostering moral development in an ,in-
dividual regardless of the sociomora1 context within which 
he lives. It may be that at any given point in a person's 
life, the optimal stage development does not coincide with 
the maximum potential that it is possible for him to achieve. 
A youth whose dominant social milieu is the neighborhood gang 
operating at a preconventional level, with at best some Stage 
3 functioning reserved for members only, could be physically 
endangered if he were to progress to a full use of Stages 3 
and 4. He would then be at a conventional level with a 
societal perspective that would be entirely discordant with 
his peers, most of whom would 'be singularly unimpressed with 
his new found achievement. Viewing the situation through an 
ecosystems lens, it becomes vividly apparent that the moral 
stage which is most adaptive cannot be determined on purely 
philosophical and psychological grounds, as Kohlberg has 
attempted to do. The process of ascertaining the most 
adaptive moral stage for an individual at any given time must 
take into consideration his existential life-space. This 
analysis need not lead to the assumption of a position of 
futility in such cases as the above, but instead it points to 
the necessity of directing change ef'forts toward an ever-
widening ,circumference encompassing the gang, the neighborhood, 
and ultimately social legislation. The social work profession 
should not only implement the moral tone of the community and 
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nation, but should also play a leadership role in shaping it. 
                attention should be drawn to the distinction 
between competence and performance. A blurring of the dis-
tinction can lead to an inaccurate assessment of the individual's 
developmental stage and consequently down barren interventive 
paths. The achievement of competence in a constructivist 
psychology signifies that the appropriate structures and under-
girding cognitive system have been arrived at through onto-
genetic development.. This, of course, presupposes that genuine 
competence has been exhibited and not merely surface behaviors 
which fail to meet the requirements of             criteria. One 
must be alert to the possibility, however, that the absence 
of performance does not necessarily mean that the individual 
lacks competence and the underlying structural network. The 
organism may possess the necessary structural development for 
competence in a particular area, but yet not perform at the 
corresponding stage for reasons other than its absence. Cross-
cultural research is rife with this particular problem due to 
language differences, as well as lack of familiarity with task 
materials and the                         of the researcher. These and 
other factors can readily restrain the performance of an 
individual even though he may possess the competence which 
the task demands. 
The fact that Kohlberg's work does not constitute a 
theory of personality is not a weakness from his viewpoint, 
since he never set out to formulate one. However, this does 
leave the helping person unsatisfied, as the helper is forever 
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seeking a comprehensive personality theory. There are two 
directions that can be taken to resolve the dilemma. One is 
to reformulate the Piaget-Koh1berg model in such a way as to 
encompass issues and aspects that are central to personality 
theorizing. We have already seen an· effort in that direction 
made by Kegan. I anticipate that the future holds promise 
for further attempts of this sort. The other is to attempt 
an integration of the sociomora1 model with preexisting theories 
that would complement it. To a limited. extent Haanl has 
attempted this with Freud and Maier2 with Erikson. As in-
dicated previously, Piaget, himself, has suggested that his 
genetic epistemology, upon which Koh1berg's work is founded, 
may be fruitfully articulated with psychoanalytic theory. 
Psychoanalysis has resisted strenuously many attempts to wrest 
it from its position as the queen of personality theories. 
Regardless of one's personal assessment of it, the fact re-
mains that it embodies the most comprehensive theory of normal 
personality development and psychopathology available. Its 
durability over the years suggests'a certain adaptiveness of 
its own. It was borne out of much clinical wisdom which 
finally has been subject to increased scientific testing, the 
results of which have been summarized at length by Fisher and 
1Norma Haan, Coping and Defending (New York: Academic 
Press, 1977). 
2Henry W. Maier,             Theories of Child Deve1o'pment 
(New York: Harper & 'Row, 1978, 3rd ed.). 
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1 Greenberg. As the myths of psychoanalysis are stripped 
. away and the viable portions retained, the stage for integration 
of the Piaget-:Kohlbe:rg model with 'it becomes set. 
The stages in Kohlberg's work are unvarying in their 
universal sequence. Knowing the dominant stage of a person 
does· tell us something important about him, but it does not 
individualize him for us within that stage. For example, 
Jung has devised a typology which is divided into two attitudes, 
introversion and extroversion, and four functional modes, which 
are thinking, feeling, intuiting, and sensing. These are com-
bined. in 'various ways to provide a set of psychological types. 
,'. Relating this to Kohlberg's stages, it is conceivable that an 
.:"" . .... "individual at any given             may still be further understood 
as being         or another type of personality from a Jungian 
standpoint. With a frame of reference of this kind, it is 
not difficult to see how           information is                 for the 
professional seeking a comprehensive theory of personality. 
The missing information may, indeed, supply a powerful' lever 
for understanding human behavior, as illustrated by the follow-
ing speculation. The reader may recall from Chapter Five that 
a study of'students at Berkeley during the time of the protest 
movement revealed that while an impressive majority of Stage 6 
lseymour Fisher and Roger P.                       The Scientific 
Credi·bili·ty of Fre'ud IS Theories and Therapy (New York: Basic 
Books, 1977). 
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students did participate, an unaccounted for minority of 
them did not. Is it not possible that one's psychological 
, 
type would influence behavioral choice once the moral judg-
ment has been made? For example, perhaps Stage 6 students 
who were extroverted were much more likely to engage in the 
protest because the activity involved was more congruent with 
their personality make-up. Introverts, on the other hand, 
may have been less likely to actively protest on the front 
steps of the school's administrative building because this 
type of behavior may have run counter to their introverted 
personalities. To carry this line of speculation one step 
further, an introverted Stage 6 student with a dominant 
thinking mode of functioning (introverted-rational psychological 
type) may have refrained from overtly protesting publicly in 
a'group, but he may also have written an article for the school 
newspaper or even authored a book in which full expression 
was given to his Stage 6 moral vision. In other words, the 
avoidance of engaging in the more obvious Stage 6 behavior, 
such as civil disobedience, yet still pursuing activity con-
sistent with moral judgment at that stage may be explained by 
invoking a personality theory, which is not supplied by the 
sociomoral model itself. As a caveat, one should not minimize 
the potential influence of a book written with morally princi-
pled eloquence, as witness the work of Harringtonl which ·drove 
IMichael Harrington,' The Other America (Baltimore: 
Penguin Books, 1962). 
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horne the reality of the poor amongst us and helped                 the 
War on Poverty. 
The question of the role of affect in cognitive-structural 
psychology ,is a recurrent one that disturbs many who are more 
, , accustomed to viewing human development                 a predominantly 
affective prism. Although Piaget held that affect is indis-
sociable from cognition, he apparently was not particularly 
interested in elaborating his views upon it. Cowanl reports 
that the only extensive treatment given by Piaget to affect 
was in a lecture course at the Sorbonne in 1954. In logical 
terms it may be said that there exists a relationship of re-
ciprocal implication, in which the presence of cognition implies 
emotion and the presence of emotion implies cognition. The 
affect involved in performing a highly intellectual feat may 
be no more than that of the minimal interest it takes to per-
sist in the task. Emotion is never experienced in,a totally 
unstructured manner, but is interpreted through a cognitive 
structure which imparts meaning to it. The role of affect 
can be seen as                                                             the environment 
produces an outcome other than what had been expected. The 
misexpectation produces perplexity and arouses curiosity which 
energizes the organism to search for more adaptive behaviors. 
1phi1ip A. Cowan, Piaget with Fe'eling: Cognitive, Social, 
and Emotional DimensiOns (New York: Holt, Rinehart & winston, 
1978) • 
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Kohlberg             to be in fundamental agreement with Piaget 
on the role of af"fect, "which is not at all surprising. We 
have observed how Kegan has tried to go one step beyond this 
in his attempt to reformulate the Piaget Paradigm into a 
psychodynamic theory. Kegan has taken nourishment from Perry, 
whose view on the emotion of courage and its role in achieving 
developmental progress is too valuable "to bypass. Perry 
suggests: 
Since our developmental scheme concerns precisely 
a person's IImoral" development, in the sense of 
his assumptions about values and responsibility, 
these implications require direct confrontation. 
For example, since each step in the development 
presents a challenge to a person's previous 
assumptions and requires that he redefine and 
extend his responsibilities in the midst of in-
creased complexity and uncertainty, his growth 
does indeed involve his courage. In short, the 
development resembles what used to be called 
an adventure of the spirit.l 
Working within a cognitive-structural tradition, Perry is 
commenting upon his own developmental study of Harvard under-
graduates and their evolving relationship to the acquisition 
of knowledge itself. In a closing passage, he remarks, IIAt 
each step the student senses his option of taking up new 
responsibilities or of pulling out in retreat or alientation. 1I2 
In his description of the developmental process, Perry seems 
to have captured the excitement inherent in the dialectic" 
between fear and courage, which many find missing in the work 
lWilliam "G. Perry Jr.," Forms of "Intellectual and Ethical 
Development "ion: the College Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston, 19G8), p. 44. 
2Ibid .", p. 215. 
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of Piaget and Kohlberg. It becomes the responsibility of the 
helping person to maintain respect and sensitivity toward what 
the client is experiencing as he 'struggles at the crossroads 
of stage transition. 
Professiona:l', Developmen't and' Soc:i'aT Work Educ'ation 
To be effective it is necessary that the social work 
practioner achieve a high level of perspectivism. Certainly 
of equal importance is his or her sociomoral development in 
the cognitive-structuralist sense that has been the subject 
of this dissertation. The social worker at Stage 3* who fears 
disapproval of his superyisor, will be less likely to take 
appropriate'risks in his practice unless he knows in advance 
that they will be met with approval. At Stage 4, the worker 
in a bureaucracy will be disinclined to effect change in 
those administrative policies that 'are detrimental to the 
welfare of his clients. At Stage 5, the worker will be un-
'likely to take to the streets in protest to effect social 
change, even when the issue is so emergent that waiting for 
the democratic process to go at its usual pace will violate 
justice. I will avoid suggesting what the hazards might be 
'of a' practioner at Stages 1 or 2. In face-to-face contact 
with clients the social worker who is not more advanced in his 
own developmental level of sociomoral knowledge will not only 
fail to understand the client, but will also be incapable of 
discerning the direction toward which the client must develop. 
I believe that content from the field of sociocognitive moral 
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development should be incorporated into the social work 
curriculum because it constitutes a legitimate and relevant 
area of study from contemporary behavioral science. Beyond 
this, however, I would also recommend that the curricula of 
the various schools should be designed to stimulate develop-
ment in the students' own form of sociomoral reasoning. 
Levy, in his unique work on social work ethics seems to think 
that students would welcome something along these lines. 
Observe his remarks on the subject: 
Learning that takes place in response to the 
quest for professional development--the quest 
for ethical performance and for the mastery 
of the principles that can be called on to 
achieve it--is more durable. It does not 
depend on the particular setting and the 
persons who are overseeing it. 
The student's view of success is not a 
high grade or an authoritative pat on 
his back but objective evidence of 
value-based and ethical practice, with 
full awareness of what made it so and 
with full confidence that he can rep-
licate the process and has the will 
to do it. l 
Levy, of course, is not specifical1y.referring here to the 
cognitive-structuralist orientation to sociomoral knowledge. 
However, that orientation does provide a theoretical and 
empirical foundation for achieving the goal of which he 
speaks. Siporin2 has characterized social work as a normative 
lCharles S. Levy, Social Work Ethics (New York: Human 
Sciences Press, 1976), p. 236. 
2M ax Siporin, Introduction ·to 'Socia1 Work Practice 
(New York: Macmillan Press Co., 1975). 
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profession. We are concerned not only with what "is" but 
with what "ought" to be. In ·order to sight the highest 
vision of that ought, we must, ourselves·, move closer ·and 
closer toward its attainment. 
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